The Changing US Strategy in the AfPak Region

There is writing that is moving from the walls directly to the Oval-Office-sealed paperwork: the United States will be removing the vast majority of its presence from Afghanistan, and soon.

A few pretty obvious signs are pointing to this:
-Defense Secretary Gates is stepping down
-The extremely popular General Petraeus has been moved to the position of CIA Director
-The President is making it clear he plans to accelerate troop withdrawal from Afghanistan
-The US and Pakistan are finally working together to hunt down a list of Al-Qaeda / Taliban leadership using CIA/ISI resources

These signs are indicative of 2 major changes:
1) The US strategy in Afghanistan is becoming one that focuses on anti-leadership attacks
2) The US has discussed this strategy with Pakistan--and finally gotten real cooperation

As we discuss this strategy, we must keep in mind the US' overall goal: to prevent jihadist groups from being able to either unite the Middle East against the West, and from being able to organize and launch coordinated trans-national attacks.

The US has largely succeeded in its first goal. The Arab Spring is (mostly) a relatively liberal-democratic movement, rather than a jihadist one. The US has won the "hearts-and-minds" campaign; al-Qaeda and its affiliates lack support from large populations, except perhaps in Yemen and Somalia.

In the second, the US has largely succeeded in all places but Yemen and the AfPak region. Yemen poses a different problem, but the AfPak region can be managed without the total collapse of the Taliban.

In fact, much of the Taliban these days consist of a Vietnam-style nationalist movement. Yes, they're still unsavory folks that want to bring a twisted form of Sharia to Afghanistan, but that is largely not the US' problem, as much as we may cringe to say it. There's little indication that much of the Pashtun Taliban know much about al-Qaeda or, if they do, care for the trans-nationalist doctrine.

On the other hand, much of the hardened leadership of the Taliban and other associated groups pose the bigger threat to the US' interests. These leaders can and sometimes will coordinate strikes, as we've seen in Pakistan and India. The new strategy calls for their systematic elimination by drones or CIA/ISI strike teams coordinating both tactics and intelligence. So far, it looks like it stands a chance at being relatively effective.

In the general push for Afghan security, a few benefits arise:
1) Focusing on the leadership hampers the Taliban's ability to coordinate, resupply, etc, when facing offensives
2) Withdrawing troops hurts the Taliban's nationalist message
3) The Taliban actually do want a negotiated settlement, and seem to be willing to do so once the US withdraws. Yes, they will have much more bargaining power then, but a negotiated settlement (at this point) is a much more palatable option than continued warfare for either side. They have reached a "painful stalemate," and are ready to talk.

Ultimately, we must remember that most of the Taliban are folks with very well-defined and limited aims, that don't include attacking the US (as angry as they may be). To a large extent, we can use the NVDA/Viet Cong as an analogy for most of these fighters, even if international interests are involved in funding them.

The most important part, though, is finally getting Pakistan's full help. Pakistan is shifting for 2 reasons:
1) US promises of quick withdrawal have now made helping the US politically palatable. The Taliban are not popular in most of Pakistan, and carry out attacks against the Pakistani people all the time. If Pakistan can help the US in a way that is politically palatable, it will--the US has just given it that opening.
2) With the US withdrawing, Pakistan is now legitimately worried about the Taliban threat growing, and is going to take higher responsibility to deal with it, and take control of the Waziristan region. The US withdrawal has been a bit of a "wake-up" moment for both the Pakistani leadership and its people.

Ultimately, total defeat of the Taliban is unlikely. Unlike Iraq, where the there was a small group of "irreconciliables" that were systematically destroyed, the Taliban represent a large group that is afraid of marginalization (much like the Sunnis in Iraq felt), and it must be negotiated with and brought into the government in some way.

Focusing on strikes against the leadership is likely the way that the US can bring this negotiation to the forefront, while keeping the Taliban as weak as possible, and ultimately preventing any transnational attacks from occuring.

Retaking Mingora--and Pakistan

Mingora has been called "Taliban City" over the past few years. While the Taliban have a large presence in many districts of NWFP and FATA, this was their power base. But the Pakistani military offensive has proven either brilliant or lucky over the past month, leading to an increasing likelihood that the military will score a shattering victory over the Taliban in this particular offensive. I'll discuss below a few points of interest.

Taliban Hubris and Error: The Taliban grew incredibly confident in their ability to walk all over the Pakistani government over the past few years, and they reverted from their insurgent campaign to a largely-conventional stance in many areas, Mingora included (the advantage of a conventional stance is that it is easier to suppress and control the population, set up a government, costs less to operate: one does not need to hide in caves, etc). But such a stance makes the Taliban incredibly vulnerable to a better-trained conventional force. With the incoming Pakistani offensive, the clever thing to do might have been to slip out to fight another day, leaving traps to greet the incoming soldiers--Army personnel would have died (in some number) and spent a great deal of time pouring house-to-house to find nothing. It would have been tough on morale, and allowed the Taliban to regroup and re-assess. But the Taliban--many of them--chose to tough it out and fight house-to-house, and all reports indicate that they're being crushed. Those that chose to escape have a surprise in waiting...

The Commando Raid: 300 or so Commandos from the Pakistani Army raided a Taliban base located 14 miles to the north of Mingora over the past two weeks. The fighting was difficult--massive trench and tunnel networks in the mountains prevented large ammunition from having any effect, so the Commandos had to eliminate Taliban the hard way. But the Army claims that the raid was successful. In all likelihood, paramilitary and Commandos await the arrival of fleeing, disorganized Taliban that hope to seek refuge in the mountain base. If this is the case, it would be an incredibly efficient and effective use of force. The Commando raid is going to be a particularly effective bolster to domestic support: the camp was used as a training ground for forcibly recruited children to make them suicide bombers--dozens of children were rescued. PR doesn't get much better than that.

House-to-house in Mingora: There are about 10-20,000 civilians trapped in Mignora, which is making the fighting incredibly slow and deliberate. But from what little reporting I've dug up, the Army seems to be in possession of most of Mingora, having killed about 1000 militants (and having lost about 50 of its own). These numbers may be wrong, but time will tell. Nonetheless, civilian casualties seem to be extremely low, and Mingora appears to be all but captured. If civilian casualties are kept to a minimum, then the Army will have proven itself to its people as capable of dealing with the Taliban threat--and the days of ineffectual "peace" deals will be over. The Army would have the opportunity to turn on its toes and continue pursuit all the way to the Afghan border.

Pushing North:The Pakistani military has taken two significant towns to the northwest of Mingora, as well. The choice seems to be an attempt to not only isolate the Taliban in Mignora from reinforcements and resupply, but also to capture or kill any escaping militants--such a move would be a sign that Pakistan is putting as much effort as possible into making this victory as decisive as possible.

Steadfast Commitment:Maj. General Abbas, who leads the Pakistani army's PR department, has made it clear through a number of press statements that the Pakistani military is committed to continuing the campaign. The recapture of Swat will be the beginning: he has claimed that it will be a "blueprint" for other areas, specifically Khyber, North and South Waziristan. These three provinces all border Afghanistan, signaling that the Pakistani government understands the need to eliminate Taliban influence throughout the AfPak region--rather than just the buds growing near Islamabad. And if this operation ends as well as it has begun, the army will have all the political support it needs to get the job done.

Fighting for Freedom: Their confidence bolstered by the coming success of the Army's campaign, villagers in Pakistan are taking up arms against the Taliban in hopes of driving them out (knowing that reinforcements will not be coming for their regional overlords). Such a move is a bit dangerous--if it fails, it will spell disaster. But there exists a tipping point, at which if enough villagers do indeed take up arms against the Taliban, the Taliban's ability to deal with such uprisings will be overwhelmed, and their control over any area with such a critical mass will collapse. If they're thinking on their toes, Pakistan should be pushing their paramilitary forces to these areas to support and encourage disruption in the Taliban's power base, which would further degrade the Taliban's organization (and reduce support to the Afghan Taliban).

The Future: A Full Pincer Offensive? If the Pakistani military is going to push into Waziristan and Khyber, then the Afghani Taliban is certainly going to lose critical support from its rear, making it more vulnerable than it has been in years. The Afghani Taliban is much smarter and more hardened than its Pakistani brethren--it has been fighting NATO since late 2001. It remains in an "insurgent" stance, but the strength of such a stance often depends on some base from which insurgents can receive weapons and ammunition, supply, etc. With NATO in control of areas north of Taliban territory, a Pakistani Army conquering of NWFP and FATA could potentially leave the Afghani Taliban without a route through which to bring arms and ammunition, making the fight (at worst) a war of supply attrition, which NATO could easily (if slowly) win. It is unclear whether the people of Pakistan see the Taliban as a sufficiently deadly enemy that they are willing to put aside their long-standing sourness towards the United States, but if they are, the cooperation between Afghanistan, Pakistan, and NATO would likely together be enough to scatter the Taliban and finally begin to provide real security.