A Breakdown of US Presidential Candidates' Foreign Policies

This will be our second breakdown of presidential foreign policies in as many presidential elections, making the event at this point a bit of a tradition. Our aim is to keep it simple, objective, and to the point.

So what of the candidates' foreign policies? Ultimately, despite attempts to simulate wide gaps, there are few. The president has, over the past four years, moved to a more traditionally conservative foreign policy stance, and Romney has more or less given up trying to find new ways to be even more aggressive on the international stage.

There are a few key differences, but we can mostly summarize their vision for the United States as such:

Obama, channeling Teddy Roosevelt, advocates that we "speak softly and carry a big stick."

Romney, on the other hand, differs mostly on the desire to "speak loudly and carry a bigger stick."

(Bonus points to readers who caught the Looney Tunes reference, though the comparison to Sam is not meant to be derisive of the Romney approach.)

Because they're more interesting, let's highlight the differences first.

Actual Differences:

Rhetoric: This is important to highlight because you may notice some other glaring gaps in the list of differences below. Romney and Obama obviously believe in having very different rhetoric (Romney's of a "strong America" and Obama's of a more "understanding America") behind very similar policy behavior. Romney is likely genuinely concerned that soft rhetoric is going to weaken the United States' credibility of deterrence (critical in the Pax Americana state in which the US tries to keep a lid on major warfare), where Obama believes that the United States will lose its ability to lead if it is not loved.

Both approaches have flaws. Obviously opinion of the United States crashed during the Bush administration of tough-talk, but it has also gone down since Obama took office in 2009, particularly in Muslim countries where the attempts of compassionate rhetoric have been strongest.

Russia: Romney sees Russia as a long-term threat that must be contained, where Obama sees it as a nation that can be bargained with and potentially partnered with. No doubt Russia's influence and military might are growing, and the United States must address Russia (where in the '90s it was largely able to ignore Russia completely). The two questions on the table here are whether Russia is a credible future threat and whether the US should be moving to oppose it and contain it, or whether it should be working with Russia to make it part of the wider "good guy" community. 

Israel: Short version: Romney sees Israel as an ally that can take action in the Middle East that the US simply is unable to, and can serve as the bastion of force against Iran. Obama sees it as a dangerous ally that can get the US reined into unwanted conflicts. Paraphrasing Bill Clinton on Netanhayu, "he doesn't know who the superpower is." 

Priorities in US Military Spending (and Strategic Approach): Obama's priorities in US military spending have focused on the ability to execute tactical strikes to deal with terrorist threats--more funding for drone strikes and a focus on special forces has been his focus (where Navy and Air Force spending--the big ticket items--has dropped). Romney, though unlikely to decrease this, wants to beef up the size of the US Navy with two extra Aircraft Carrier Groups in order to better position the US strategically against potential threats with more credible "hard" assets like Iran, Russia, and China. These Carrier groups would be used to protect the Strait of Hormuz, Taiwan/Japan/Korea, and the Baltics, as well as generally make sure that the US controls trade sea trade routes throughout the world.

Iraq?: There's a question mark here because it's not clear whether there will be any real change in action or just rhetoric. Romney is frustrated at the lack of the Status of Forces Agreement over the past 4 years and wants to use US troops to keep influence in Iraq and serve as a second force bastion against Iran.

Key Similarities:

While the candidates share a great deal in common, we will highlight the key--and sometimes surprising--similarities between their approaches. 

American Primacy / Exceptionalism: Despite Obama's 2008 rhetoric about the United States being a bit of a bully, his rhetoric has changed to embrace US Exceptionalism and, generally, its role in the world. Romney and Obama differ on how the US should posture itself with rhetoric and "outreach," but generally they both see the US as the force that should be running around keeping a cap on bad stuff. Both believe in "Pax Americana."

Iran: Ultimately both sides see the critical need to stop Iran from developing a nuke and want to oppose Iranian influence at all turns, which is why Obama (for example) is supporting the rebels in Syria. Romney is tougher-worded but not foolish enough to want war with Iran--both will have similar policies there.

War on Terror: Both will continue the new "precision" style War on Terror that was pivoted into around 2007 as the War in Iraq started to wind down. It will be a war of precision strike from drones and special forces as the US continues to support operations by Afghanistan, Kenya, Somalia, Egypt, Iraq, etc to eliminate terrorists locally.

Afghanistan: The War in Afghanistan is unpopular and will come to an end no matter who is president. It is unpopular as well to pull out immediately (fears of a Vietnam-style collapse remain) so the 2014 departure will be stuck to by both presidents.

China: Both will be aggressive with China about trade policy and keep the implicit threat of the Mutual Defense Treaty with Japan on the table in case there is any tricky business in the Senkakus, but neither is going to either back down on Beijing nor try to incite war. 

Author's Notes: Both candidates are going to have statements on their websites different from those above. We encourage you to take a look, and we're also writing with some interpretation and analysis (rather than simple aggregation of what's already written). Our intent is to write what we believe will be actual policy enacted (or attempted) by each candidate, rather than simply what they're declaring.

We can talk at length about why they have strong incentives to say-one-thing-and-do-another--we obviously saw a great deal of this from Obama in the 2008 campaign and how much the presidency has changed its tone since coming to office--ultimately, a state's security interest generally takes over unless something very strange happens, and there's no reason for that to happen here, which is why we'll see so many similarities going forward. 

Baltic Solidarity to an Emerging Russia

1) The Visegrad 4: Eastern Europe as a Major Player
2) The Re-Emergent Russian Bloc
3) Baltic Solidarity to an Emerging Russia
4) The EU Periphery: "Core" EU's Albatross
5) The Atlantics: A Return to Arms-Length Continental Management

Dear readers,

Sorry about the wait. Today we conclude our 5-part series on the Blocanization of Europe with our final installment: Baltic Solidarity to an Emerging Russia.



The Baltics have worried about Russia for a long time, likely surprising nobody. When Russia looks west, it sees both vulnerability and opportunity. Its vulnerability comes from open plains stretching from Moscow all the way to the Alps, giving potential invaders an easy route in (which we've seen taken advantage of many times), as well as St. Petersburg being potentially bottled up by European maritime powers in the Baltic sea. Russia thus seeks to create buffer space and exert influence over its western neighbors in order to protect its land and sea periphery.

The opportunities are in natural resources (Finnish timber, Norwegian oil, etc). Russia has made moves to squeeze control of these resources or the processing of them out of the Nordic holders.

So Russia has thus spent most of the 20th and 21st centuries attempting to exert control over these areas to in order to protect itself and realize financial opportunities.

So the Baltics have been traditionally fearful. Much like the V4, their faith in NATO has started to erode. Estonia has been the constant victim of political manipulation and cyber-attacks for a decade; Finland has been pressed by tariffs.

So the rest of the story is short. The Baltic countries are looking to each other for solidarity, especially military. Sweden and Norway sport surprisingly powerful military forces that will make any incursions by Russia a much more painful contest than the invasion of Georgia.

In particular, Sweden and Poland are discussing potential alliance-making; nothing as strong as the V4 itself or the Baltic's grouping, but something that could potentially functionally replace NATO altogether.

The Blocanization of Europe: An Introduction

I'll keep this one quick.

I've been doing some thinking about how Europe has been changing in the past decade, especially with the military rise of the Visegrad 4. It has been a dramatic change indeed.

A large portion of my next few posts will be focused on this series: The Blocanization of Europe. In short: the vision of a single unified Europe is beginning to show the signs of fray -- a "blocanization" of the continent is beginning, based on natural lines of national interest and security.

In particular, as we see NATO's commitment to European Security weaken, and the financial integrity of the European Union shaken, the ability to depend on the hope of a strong, unified Europe is diminishing.

We'll be focusing on the reasons for this, and the new blocs emerging--and what each means. As a teaser, I've attached a map of these blocs, built on my current understanding of the geopolitical makeup of the new Europe.

What Bin Laden's Death Means

Bin Laden's death at the hands of American special forces sheds insight in two ways: learnings for the present, and implications for the future.

The Present (Answering the question "What does this demonstrate about the current state of the world?"):

1) Arab Muslim Sentiment: There has been little Arab outrage over the death of Bin Laden, or any other signs of upswollen support for the Al Qaeda movement. It's a sign that Al Qaeda has low popularity among the Arab Muslim world, which will cause it to be increasingly marginalized: "grassroots" movements like Al Qaeda rely on some popular support for both resources and sanctuary. It's a sign that Al Qaeda's message of global Jihad is falling on relatively deaf ears... and a sign that its ability to commit high-casualty transnational attacks is severely limited (as much as from pressure in Afghanistan as from losing the "propaganda war" for the hearts/minds of the Arab Muslim population).

2) Pakistan: one must be asking, "How did Bin Laden make it for nearly 10 years in Pakistan without being caught?" He wasn't even deep in a remote mountain area; he was in a relatively safe and populated town near Islamabad (people less than 1km away were tweeting about the noise from the American helicopters). Is Pakistan's intelligence service lacking in competence, or loyalty? Did Bin Laden have inside help? The US will need to figure this out.

Implications (Answering the "So What?"s hanging out there):

1) Al Qaeda Leadership: Damaged some, though not necessarily in any serious operational capacity. Al Qaeda became a relatively independent "cell" network that did sometimes interact with central leadership, but not terribly often. Tactics are generally left to the cells, and strategic (even if not "visionary") leadership is currently delegated to regional authorities (like Al Qaeda of the Arabian Penninsula, Al Qaeda of the Islamic Maghreb, etc).

Visionary leadership may well end up being lacking for Al Qaeda, but it may have been lacking for some time now. Bin Laden's grainy audio messages to go bomb this country or that country have largely failed to inspire any results, even if a few extremists were inspired to try.

2) The ground situation in Afghanistan: Little to no effect. Al Qaeda has been driven into Pakistan, and NATO is currently fighting a nationalist Islamist movement (the Taliban) rather than a transnationalist movement. The Taliban are certainly "bad guys" in the Western moral sense (in a much more clearly morally outrageous way than, say, the Viet Cong), but don't answer to Bin Laden and largely don't support his views of transnationalist Jihad. The Afghanistan "ground" situation won't change--the US hasn't beheaded the Taliban's leadership.

3) US Strategy: Ultimately, the signs are generally pointing to the fact that we may be slow to accept: that Al Qaeda, while still technically "in existence," is largely eliminated as a threat to the US. Other Islamist networks exist (in Algeria, in Yemen, in Saudi Arabia), but they have little traction to go transnational.

Not because of Bin Laden's death, but based on leading indicators from the response worldwide to Bin Laden's death, it may be increasingly clear: the War on Terror is won. Transnational terror movements are fractured and unpopular; the Arab world is more concerned with nationalism and democratic reform than it is with beating back the spread of Western culture through jihad.

Not to say there aren't many, many problems remaining in the Middle East. The US cannot ignore the region, but it can largely move towards a state where it is no longer burning its resources--and losing its sons--to the region.

My Skepticism and Optimism Over Reports of Progress in Afghanistan

One of the tough parts about an anti-insurgency campaign is that it's a pretty tough operation to measure with hard data. That drives people like myself quite crazy, at times. We depend largely on reports from mid- and high-level commanders, who have a bias to over-report success and under-report failure. But we do what we can.

There are a few reasons to be optimistic from some recent news. The first is that an (apparently) relatively large and relatively influential Pashtun tribe in Helmand, the Alikozai, have agreed to deny support to the Taliban in exchange for international aid and development.

It might be a key advance in an attempt to break a vicious cycle in the area, in which the local population doesn't support the Afghan government due to lack of services & security, and the lack of support from the local population bars the Afghan government from taking a foothold. The long-term strategy is to wash the Taliban out of stronghold areas (like Sangin), build government services and security, and thus not allow the Taliban to effectively move back in.

I'm mostly cautiously optimistic, though it'll depend entirely on whether the US is able to capitalize on this (and get more local allies), about which I'm rather skeptical. The US' only serious hope is in the brutality and unpalatability of the Taliban alternative.

I'm more skeptical about fact-lacking reports from senior US military leaders about the success of the North Waziristan campaign. A recent press release about "many, many" fighters/leaders killed or sent into hiding due to drone attacks brings only raised eyebrows. How many dead; what have the effects been? Where do we see relief of attacks? How are we entrenching the gains? None of it's there, and the risk is that, if out leadership is using these reports as signs of success, then we'll fall into the same traps as we did in Vietnam: mis-use our resources, mis-count victories, and ultimately lose.

Conventional War Dominance and the Railgun

Loyal Readers,

We're taking a break from the bleak world of WikiLeaks, Afghanistan, the Korean Peninsula crisis to focus on the longer-term picture of the world's superpowers. Here's why:

1) WikiLeaks will actually blow over. Sorry, Assange: one man can't bring down the Westphalian model of international relations.

2) Afghanistan will end. Whether it goes like Iraq (with a quiet, humble, half-victory) or like Vietnam (with a humiliating defeat), it won't have a long-term impact on the behavior (or, frankly, the security--terrorist attacks just aren't a serious threat to the stability of the United States, even if people die) of the major world powers.

3) The Korean Peninsula crisis won't become a war. No country in the mix (Russia, China, North Korea, South Korea, the US, or Japan) can actually gain from the measure, and North Korea knows it won't have Chinese support, and would thus get rolled over quickly. As unpredictable as North Korea is, it's not suicidal.

Anyway, now that you're not worried about any of that anymore, I want to think about the future--the control of the world as we know it, who will hold the reins, and how.

So we'll start out small: let's talk Railguns. My first caveat is that railguns will be horrifyingly expensive for a while, at least until one finds a way to fire a railgun projectile without destroying the rail itself (keep up the good work, engineers!). Some pretty awesome technological/business developments have been afoot (I won't repeat these narratives here).

A quick technical recap (longer, more exciting technical recap by Anton here): Railguns use magnets to launch projectiles at hypervelocity (Mach 7.5 or so). The projectiles have no explosives; the kinetic impact does the damage. Direct fire will lead to a near-instant kill; indirect fire allows travel of a few hundred miles in a few short minutes (the delay being due to the projectile lifting to about 500,000 ft to avoid air drag).

Expensive as they are, they're going to change the future of warfare, in a few ways that we should think about:

1) Even when we start killing each other in space, control of the oceans will remain the ultimate factor in geopolitical strength. When one controls the oceans, one controls international trade and transport. The US currently effectively controls international waters approximately everywhere (rare exceptions include areas near China), and will continue to do so. Russia and China are its biggest competitors for regional waters in the Pacific, but they are not positioned to control the Atlantic, and will end up competing against each other for control over the Pacific (where the US will continue to keep key alliances in South Korea, Japan, and the Philippines that allow it to project significant power in the area).

2) The United States will be "in the lead" in this technology, by a significant margin. Russia and China are not yet (at least to my knowledge) doing any serious work here. Russia has the pesky "Moskito," a powerful anti-ship weapon, but it fires at slower speeds and has a shorter range than a railgun (making it easier to potentially knock out of the sky).

3) Railguns are ultimately offensive weapons. Many weapons on modern US vessels are "defensive," in that they can be launched second and still be effective (modern jet fighter, AEGIS systems, etc). The railgun would win a naval battle with a coordinated first-strike; firing first means the engagement is over early, and firing second would probably just mean mutual destruction. The incentive with a railgun is to fire it first, rather than wait--thus the "offensive" descriptor.

The result of all this is that the world will likely remain relatively US-centric for some time, as it continues to control the seas. But it also means that there will be a new, natural instability in great power confrontations. For indeed, if the first shooter should win (or, at least, if the second shooter should suffer massive losses), then trigger fingers tend to get itchier.

The best example of this is World War I. Europe thought it has offensive technology (it didn't, but that's another story), and thus rushed to mobilize and press forward during a crisis that could have otherwise been spun down. In contrast, in World War II, Europe thought it had defensive technology (except the Germans, who realized otherwise), and thus cautiously appeased Germany while building the Maginot line.

When everybody believes they have offensive technology (they will), they're more prone to attack if they think they can win.

To be fair, China and Russia are unlikely to believe they can win against the US any time soon--the US has naval power projected everywhere and still has the military-industrial capability to start pumping out war machines at a moment's notice. The lesson of Pearl Harbor has been forgotten by no-one.

So what does it mean? If Russia and China see the world accurately, they will actually be less likely to want to confront the US on the seas, as any military confrontations with them will be likely to be even shorter and more decisive than before.

Russia will continue to focus internally and in its regional periphery for some time, trying to rebuild the military-industrial infrastructure necessary to challenge the European continent (where the US has much less military advantage). China, for its sake, will likely focus on regional power and influence, ensuring strong trade relations and security at its borders. Frankly, as much as there's a great deal of Sino-phobia out there, China has so many demographic problems building up that it will be focusing on its interior for decades as it attempts to avoid a socio-economic collapse. World Domination is not in Beijing's plans (though it may be in Moscow's).

So in the long-term, the US will remain the one power that exerts influence anywhere and everywhere, as long as it wants to. It will be able to bring powerful, high-speed offensive technology to bear in a short period, and be unchallenged in open waters. It will continue to struggle on land. It will worry about a Russian "takeover" of Europe (and eventually a German one) or a Turkish "takeover" of the Middle East, rather than Russian or Chinese challenges at sea.

There's more to this prediction than the railgun, but the railgun is the piece of technology that will push the Russians and Chinese to delay any plans to expand beyond their land influence for some time.

The American Response to the Korean Provocation

There are a few potential reasons for the North Korean artillery attack on a disputed South Korean island, and a few potential responses. Both are likely more complicated than meets the eye.

Potential Reasons for Attack
1) Kim is trying to re-set the "red line." In order to make sure it can secure a working nuclear weapons and deployment system, Kim Jong-Il might be trying to re-set what behavior actually leads to war (such that the nuclear program won't).

2) Kim Jong-Un is trying to display his power. Kim's successor may be trying to show domestic and international players that he is strong-armed and sufficiently aggressive that nobody thinks the shift in power will lead to a period of "softness" which could be taken advantage of.

3) An anti-Kim faction within the North Korean military may be trying to weaken the regime. After Kim Jong-Il came to power, a purge of military leadership struck fear into Kim's enemies, but also bolstered their sense of cohesion. Worries of another purge--or simply a sense of opportunism with the change of leadership--may be leading such a faction to provoke South Korea and the West into taking moves to weaken the Kim regime, up to war. Such a weakness or chaos might present an opportunity to stage a coup and replace the leadership.


Potential Responses by South Korean and Allies
1) The current response: the US joins South Korea's military exercises. The artillery shelling came during annual South Korean inter-service exercises in the Yellow Sea (which may tell us something about its motivations in North Korea). South Korea's response is measured, but the US has sent a carrier battle group to join the exercises. This serves both as a reaffirming of its commitment to South Korea's security, and also leaves open the option of precision air strikes against North Korea in the near future. Ths risk is that this response may look weak.

2) A tit-for-tat response. South Korea might attempt to show that it won't tolerate unprovoked attacks by reacting similarly: hitting a North Korean base. The risk is that North Korea may choose to escalate to show that it's willing to keep pushing to make sure it has the upper hand.

3) Tough sanctions. The US could rally a coalition for more sanctions against North Korea, but it's running out of options. Already, most countries avoid trading to North Korea in luxury goods (particularly those of which Kim Jong-Il is quite fond, like Mercedes cars). Broad sanctions would hurt an already-starving population, and would likely bolster North Korea's support for the regime, thus presenting a positive feedback to the North Korean military.

4) Significant escalation. South Korea could launch heavy surprise strikes against North Korea, both damaging its ability to wage war, and delivering an unambiguous message that further provocations would lead to destruction of the North Korean military (as South Korea would not make this move without US and Japanese support). The risk here is that North Korea would respond with artillery strikes against Seoul, where 25% of the South's population lives. Currently, North Korean artillery is so numerous and well-bunkered that it would be nigh-impossible to eliminate it before serious civilian tolls were suffered in Seoul.


The Chinese Response
The Chinese response has been intentionally cautious. North Korea as a tenuous ally has proven a liability, but China is largely unable to stop supporting the regime. If the regime collapses partially or entirely, China would be left with a humanitarian disaster and a refugee flood at its border (and under the Geneva conventions, it would be required to give them "reasonable" accommodation). China's current approach to North Korea is to make sure that the regime in power--whatever it may be--is stable. Unfortunately for China, this means supporting a temperamental and unpredictable Kim. At the same time, China will try to keep Kim in line as much as possible.

But Kim knows China is unable to stop its support, so China cannot use it as a serious threat (much like Israel knows the US is unwilling to drop its support entirely, and therefore the US cannot use it as a bargaining chip). China will need to find a way to temper North Korea's behaviour if it is going to be able to keep South Korea as a friend and trading partner (lest it lose South Korea to US/Japanese influence entirely).

Wisdom in the US Response
The US response shows strength and initiative to not only North Korea and China, but to the entire world. This is particularly important in a time when countries like Iran and Russia might see the US as exhausted or resource-drained from its commitments in Iraq and Afghanistan. The movement of its carrier battle group reminds potential rivals that its sea and air forces--the primary implements it would bring to bear in any engagement that wasn't a full-scale invasion--are still free, well-funded, and willing to move.

It also shores up South Korea's confidence in the US, which has balked at supporting countries like Georgia, Poland, and the Czech Republic against growing Russian influence and assertiveness. The move has marginally damaged relations with China, but the United States is showing South Korea that such damage is worth it in order to stick to its obligations.

A Petraeus-Style Plan Emerges in Afghanistan

It's being called "Inteqal," which is both Pashtu and Dari for "Transition." It's the NATO / Kabul plan (masterminded by General Petraeus) for a phased transition of military control, by province, to the Afghan military and police force.

The fact that there's a plan doesn't necessarily mean that it will work. Even if it's a good plan, it needs excellent execution to achieve "victory" (where "victory" is a very difficult and vague definition, anyway). But, holy smokes, it's a plan, which is something the Afghan War has seriously lacked for the last 8 years.

The concept very closely maps the Iraqi transition plan (my blog posts in 2008 focused largely on tracking the progress of this transition plan). Similar to Iraq, Afghanistan's map will now be colored red, orange, yellow, light green, dark green (indicating, respectfully: Not Ready for Transition, Partially Ready for Transition, Ready for Transition, Transitioning Within Six Months, and Transition Complete). The idea is that NATO develops capability internally in the "easier" provinces, transitions them, and consolidates its forces to progressively more "difficult" provinces.

This kind of plan has two advantages: first, it gives the Afghan Army and Police (as well as civil administrative) forces "practice" in these early-transition provinces, such that the kinks can be worked out in a lower-risk environment. Second, it gives NATO forces an opportunity to progressively consolidate, which allows them to maintain security forces in more hotly contested provinces, even as the troop draw-down begins. the plan has some merit.

Unfortunately for the sake of my curiosity, Petraeus is not keen on publishing the transition plan right now, lest it arm the Taliban with a document around which to develop a detailed strategy. But we can know a few of the provinces coming soon (like Herat), as well as some of those definitely not being transitioned for a while (like Helmand and Khandahar).

Small outposts and bases have already been transitioned--in part as a trial for the strategy, and in part due to the need to show progress.

The plan is good--though progress may need to be measured with some skepticism. The fact that a province is "transitioned" does not necessarily mean it's secure. With a pullout schedule looming over US forces, Petraeus will be under the gun to move quickly with the transition. The risk, of course, is that the "early" provinces are transitioned quickly in order to maximize security presence in Khandahar, Helmand, and Zabol.

Furthermore, NATO has to define the end-game. The Taliban are not going to disappear before NATO leaves. There is much talk of negotiations, but it's not clear whether those are actually happening.

In the end, this plan needs to be able to pose the following threat: "The Taliban cannot reach a sweeping victory after NATO leaves. A continued civil war will be a bloody stalemate." If such a threat is credible, negotiations can begin in earnest. Therefore, while Petraeus cannot divulge the details of the transition plan, results and progress will need to be publicized impressively, to put the Taliban in a position where it makes sense to seriously consider collaboration.

The Pessimistic View of the War in Afghanistan

General Petraeus is painting a relatively rosy picture of the path forward in Afghanistan. US intelligence agencies are saying somewhat else. It can be summed up thus (By Strafor):

"As U.S. Col. Harry Summers so clearly articulated, negotiation is achieved militarily when military power is applied in such a way as to impose upon the enemy a choice: negotiate on American terms and on American timetables, or be destroyed. Negotiation with the Taliban must be understood first and foremost as lacking that latter possibility."

If the Taliban do not actually see their position weakening over time, effective negotiations will not occur--they may be willing to humor negotiations at the last minute as NATO leaves, in order to avoid a civil war, but the NATO bargaining position at that point will be nearly zero.

The question that's not yet clear to me is this: how strategically effective is the US "Surge" in Afghanistan? How effective are the attacks on senior leadership and the counter-insurgency movements on the ground? I just don't know.

What the Afghan Endgame Looks Like

The Taliban don't want a protracted civil war in Afghanistan. This seems difficult to comprehend, given the last 30 years or so of fighting.

But it should be made clear right away--fighting an invading power is much different from fighting a full-on internal civil war. Defeating an occupying power requires great patience, but the Taliban can largely avoid losing major resources and manpower by avoiding a NATO army that is not large enough to cover the entire country.

Fighting a civil war is much different. No waiting will do--fighting against the central government and its own Warlord allies will be a knock-down drag-out war of attrition, and one the Taliban may well not win, if US intelligence and drone attacks remain on Kabul's side. Such a civil war would be devastating, even if the Taliban won.

This scenario is very unlike the complete power vacuum left when the Soviet Union withdrew--the Soviets had not conducted in massive, extensive state-building that NATO has. The central government may not have driven the Taliban out of much of the country, but it does not mean the Taliban is close to secure.

The other point worth keeping in mind right now is that a player in a war or other disagreement wants most to negotiate when its relative advantage is peaking--that is, the point that it's going to be able to squeeze the most out of the other side. After peaking, time erodes the advantage, and less can be won.

Thus, the Taliban are coming to negotiate. Not the big-wigs (like Mullah Omar), but some of the elite near the middle that are feeling the pinch and the pain. Omar himself can't afford to appear to be willing to negotiate with an occupying power for an instant--too large a proportion of his followers (as well as is Pakistani ISI patrons) oppose such negotiations, and are likely to outright kill him if he becomes a collaborator.

The same risk applies to the leaders coming to negotiate. That said, they are not nearly as safe as they used to be in Pakistan, given the uptick in the frequency and success of US drone attacks against leadership of this level.

NATO is doing an excellent job of promising and reliably giving safe transport and harbor to those coming to negotiate--it might be personally safer for many of these leaders to come to talk, rather than hide in Pakistan.

But, ultimately, the top Taliban leadership is not declaring any readiness to negotiate--even if they may be leaning towards it. But in the end, the Taliban will not be able to sweep through Afghanistan and claim victory as NATO leaves. There will either be a negotiated settlement or a crippling civil war, and the former is more likely.

The biggest deciding factor for the top Taliban leadership will be whether they actually think their advantage is going to grow into the future. If it becomes obvious that their bargaining position is declining, the hard line against negotiations from the top will begin to soften--and many of the middle-level elite leaders will already have the initiative in talks.

The Fascinating CIA-Army Campaign in AfPak

As the US looks to spin down its campaign in Afghanistan (looking towards draw-downs in 2011), it has two current objectives towards which it is racing:

1) Eliminate and prevent the resurgence of al-Qaeda links in the AfPak region that can contribute to worldwide terror attacks.

2) Sufficiently reduce the influence of the Taliban that it cannot take hold and later become a stable harborer of terrorism / Global Jihad.

Unfortunately, these two objectives stand in some conflict, particularly where Pakistan is concerned. Pakistan largely lacks the capacity to hit al-Qaeda targets in its northwest on its own, so the United States has been sending "covert" drone attacks over the border to eliminate them. This alone seriously increases tensions, but worse was that a drone attack recently killed 3 Pakistani soldiers by mistake--US-Pakistani relations are often strained, and should they break the US would lose what intelligence and military support it has against militants in northwestern Pakistan, which serves as a "safe zone" for the Taliban to retreat, regroup, reorganize, refresh, and re-enter Afghanistan anew.

The US is pursuing its two objectives with two very interesting campaigns.

The first: Petraeus is launching a full-scale Counterinsurgency campaign, actually much different from the combined COIN/civil war stabilization/insurgent-hunting programme used in Iraq. The strategy is a full "take-and-hold" style campaign, in which the US simply "moves in" to Taliban-heavy areas and tries to install a local government and security force--area by area (rather than seeking out and killing the Taliban). The campaign has met limited force-to-force resistance so far, mostly because full battles against NATO forces fare poorly for the Taliban--they continue to use hit-and-run or booby-trap tactics to wear down NATO as NATO tries to win hearts & minds with security & handouts.

The second: The CIA (with the President's go-ahead) has stepped up drone attacks on Pakistani soil to new highs--in its most recent publicized attack, the CIA killed 5 German militants, just after news broke that European citizens were part of a planned string of Mumbai-style attacks in Europe (this particular attack not only disrupts al-Qaeda in Pakistan, but likely does well to partially shore up confidence from the US' European allies that its presence in the AfPak region has the potential to make them safer). This campaign is likely tactically very effective--it is diplomatically extremely costly, and would be an unlikely direction for the Obama administration to take if it didn't seem to have a military effect.

To be fair, Pakistan is still looking towards a full campaign into the Waziristan area (after a relatively successful campaign in the Swat area), but it is not ready. Floods throughout the country have tied up much of its military (in relief efforts) and drawn attention away from the Taliban threat. If-and-when Pakistan moves north towards the Taliban strongholds in Waziristan, the tide of the battle may turn. Sadly, I've been saying this for a long time.

Possible Hezbollah Connection in Israeli-Lebanese Border Skirmish

Stratfor thinks there's a lot of good reasons that Hezbollah has its hand in the recent Israeli-Lebanese border skirmish. Quick summary:

1) Hezbollah has control of a large portion of the lower ranks of the military.
2) The UN is probably going to indict a number of high-ranking Hezbollah in the murder of the Lebanese Prime Minister.
3) Hezbollah wants to show Lebanon that it's a valuable/necessary force by making Israelis look like aggressors against Lebanon.

My worry is that it will actually work.

(Stratfor below)

STRATFOR
---------------------------
August 3, 2010


ISRAEL, LEBANON: POLITICAL MOTIVATIONS IN THE BORDER CLASH

Hezbollah Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah said in a speech Aug. 3 that his organization will "not stand silent" on the border clash between Lebanese and Israeli troops that resulted in the deaths of three Lebanese soldiers earlier in the day. In a line reminiscent of many Iranian speeches, Nasrallah said "the Israeli hand that targets the Lebanese army will be cut off." He also offered his organization's support to the Lebanese military, saying that the "smartest thing is to behave how we behaved. We told the Lebanese military -- we are prepared, we are with you, and we will help if needed."

Rumors are circulating that Hezbollah fighters were on the scene of the border clash and intended to escalate the situation. STRATFOR sources in the Lebanese military do not believe Hezbollah fighters were directly involved in the skirmish, but there is reason to suspect the group was behind the instigation of the fighting. Hezbollah has significant influence over and an established presence in the already weak and fractured Lebanese army. The organization makes it a point to discharge a portion of its recruits after they serve two years in the military wing and then enlists them in the Lebanese army. This allows Hezbollah to both control the composition of the army's ranking officers and influence specific operations. This latest border skirmish could be an illustration of Hezbollah's influence over the Lebanese army.

Given that the Lebanese army typically refrains from confronting Israel Defense Forces (IDF) personnel during routine activities, such as maintenance and repair work on the security fence and perimeter, the decision by the Lebanese army patrol to fire on the IDF forces is anomalous, suggesting that the move was preplanned and perhaps driven by Hezbollah interests. The chief of Israel's Northern Command, Maj. Gen. Gadi Eizenkot publicly described the incident as a "deliberate ambush."

Hezbollah -- and its patrons in Iran -- have a strong interest in raising the threat of a broader military confrontation, but Hezbollah has little desire to escalate the situation further and provoke an actual fight with the IDF for fear of incurring massive losses. Hezbollah is already under fire in Lebanon over a Special Tribunal probe into the 2005 assassination of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik al Hariri that is expected to indict Hezbollah members. The group is attempting to deflect blame and attention away from this probe and is using the incident to justify its existence as a resistance movement since the Lebanese army is incapable of defending itself on its own. The Lebanese army chief, as one source earlier indicated, could have also welcomed the border distraction to divert attention from the crisis over the tribunal (the army has no interest in confronting Hezbollah in such a domestic crisis and would rather have the focus shift to the Israeli threat). Meanwhile, Iran is attempting to use a crisis in Lebanon as a flashpoint in its negotiations with the United States over Iraq and the nuclear issue by illustrating another hot spot in the region where it holds the cards to cause trouble should Iranian demands go unfulfilled.

Though a number of political motivations appear to be in play with this border skirmish, and Iran can be expected to continue prodding Hezbollah, there is little indication so far that either Hezbollah or Israel intends to escalate the border clash into a more serious military confrontation.


Copyright 2010 STRATFOR.

Potentially Negative Repercussions of the Wikileaked Afghanisan Logs

Disclaimer: I haven't even started to pour through these. That said:

There can be a lot of debate over certain leaks--a good example is the video of an attack helicopter mistakenly gunning down a group of civilians in Iraq. Whether that's good for the country or morally sanctioned is a bit of a back-and-forth game.

I don't think the Afghanistan Logs (or at least some portion of them) fall into such a gray area. The biggest issue: Anti-Taliban informants have been compromised. The Taliban has begun hunting them down.

This is going to seriously discourage future cooperation in any areas that aren't under full Afghan government control. It's a major setback for the war that we're already losing.

Frustrations of the Westphalian Model of Sovereignty

President Karzai expressed some frustrations with the Westphalian model of sovereignty in dealing with the Taliban:

"BreakingNews>
Afghan Pres. Karzai asks at news conf: Why is NATO unwilling to hit Taliban bases in Pakistan?"

In the AfPak region, Westphalian Sovereignty is, frankly, no more than an abstract concept. Tribalism, ethnic territorialism, and warlordism cut up the landscape. The line between Afghanistan and Pakistan is very arbitrary (see the ethnic map and map of "Pashtunistan").

Karzai wants NATO to take the fight to the Taliban, and believes the most effective military targets are in Pakistan (which makes sense--the Taliban keep more secure bases in the relatively safer region). Karzai is actively challenging the Westphalian model.

He's not the first to do it. Woodrow Wilson challenged the old European concept of territorial stability by suggesting that "a people" should have autonomy (though what defines "a people" is a vague concept, at best). The Israelis have constantly struggled in Lebanon where they have an enemy of extremist Hezbollah, but attacking Hezbollah in its own base means going to war with "Lebanon," where there are many neutral parties and even some allies.

Many Pashtuns want a "Pashtunistan," and many Baluchis want a "Baluchistan." Creating these areas would re-set the Westphalian territorial boundaries in the Afpak region to something more ethnically sensible, though obviously Pakistan and Afghanistan have little interest in giving up these large territories (unless they become so troublesome to hold onto that they are let go). The geopolitical need to hold onto them is relatively powerful, especially for Pakistan.

The Western dedication to the Westphalian Model may become a big contributor to the fall of the Afghan state, should it fall. But right now, the West has few alternatives. There is not another viable alternative to take Westphalia's place.

India's Military Purchases: A Sign of Relationship Strength

India recently made a significant military purchase from the UK, according to Breaking News:

"BreakingNews>
British official: India agrees to buy 57 Hawk jets worth about $800 million from Britain - AP"

The Hawk serves either as a low-cost combat aircraft or as a trainer.

India often moves back and forth between buying Russian and Western military equipment. That it continues to buy UK equipment is a good sign for Indo-Western relations, despite the tensions in the region caused by the continuing Afghan War.

North Korean Nuclear Brinksmanship

North Korea threatened nuclear war over US/South Korea wargames off the Korean peninsula. A few readers asked if this was at all legitimate.

The threats are vacuous--North Korea doesn't have any serious deployment capability. Their nuclear testing in the past has been technically successful, but not particularly impressive.

Frankly, the most damage they can currently do is rolling out a bunch of artillery and shelling Seoul into the ground. It would take a few hours at most.

This new brinksmanship is two things:
1) A litmus test to see if the US/South Korea will play more cautiously than North Korea. Turns out the answer is no, which is probably a good thing (or the precedent will be set that the US/ South Korea will retreat at threats).
2) Pump up domestic support for the nuclear program as North Koreans starve.

More interesting is the fact that Beijing's protests to wargames in the Yellow Sea caused the US & South Korea to move to the eastern shores of the peninsula. China is being particularly tough-nosed about the South Korean response to the sinking of the Cheonan, and I'm not yet sure why (unless, again, it is a part of propping up the Kim regime to keep stability strong).

Ultimately, North Korean brinksmanship will push the US and South Korea closer together. Any threats to North Korea's stability will push China and North Korea closer together. It may be the biggest foreign policy area over which China and the US will spar (barring, perhaps, American trade protectionism) now that Taiwan's Ma has taken the middle road approach to China.

An Afghan Exit Strategy

A conference in Kabul was held today about the international exit strategy from Afghanistan. A few things came out of it:

1) There's a goal date for Afghan Army leadership of every province in the country for 2014. Karzai and international forces are agreed on it (though it's non-binding).
2) The US will still keep drawing down forces in 2011. It will probably start slow--it's not the optimal time to draw down, but Obama has domestic promises he'll need to keep.

That said, let's think about the strategy itself.

First, what's the minimum goal of ISAF? To prevent an al-Qaeda (or other anti-Western international terror force) from taking hold. Certainly, if the Taliban takes over Afghanistan (or controls a large portion of it in a stable way), the risks of this will be very high--the war will be a failure.

The more control that the Kabul government has over Afghanistan, and the weaker the Taliban is, the higher the chances a pro-Western stable equilibrium will arise. Thus all the focus on state-building.

But at the end of the day, Afghanistan does not even have to be as strong and stable as Iraq to be a "success." That said, they're very different situations--Iraq was mostly a sectarian civil war, and Afghanistan is mostly an ideological insurgency (a la Vietnam, as much as that's a scary thought).

The strategy suddenly sounds a lot like the Petraeus strategy in Iraq. It includes:
1) Get the troops out onto the ground. Have them standing side-by-side with Afghani soldiers as patrollers in the streets. This not only trains the Afghani soldiers, but helps keep NATO soldiers looking like the good guys.
2) Focus on handing over one province at a time. Kabul will need to slowly and gradually develop its statecraft. Readers from 2006/2007 may remember Foggofwar's close tracking of the progress of province handover. I continue to believe this will be an important performance indicator. The strategy will allow NATO to continually consolidate troops into more and more troublesome provinces, as "easier" provinces are taken by Afghani troops. The "easier" provinces will provide areas to build experience for the Afghani Army, so that veterans can be cycled to "tougher" provinces that fall under Afghani control after stints in these "easier" provinces.
3) A focus on aggressive raids. The trick here will be to continually deny safe haven to the Taliban. Special forces should be employed at night to make it as scary for the Taliban to sleep as it is for pro-Western collaborators. Constant raids in Iraq against al-Qaeda and other insurgent groups went a long way in eliminating the actual insurgent part of the war.

Some new parts of the strategy:
1) A high reliance on Pakistan. The US needs to continue to be very diplomatic with the Pakistani people. Luckily for the US, it has managed to make drone bombings in northwest Pakistan enough of a status quo that it doesn't seem to be making the Pakistani people angrier. The US will almost certainly be sending special ops to assist Pakistan in offensives in Northern Waziristan and other hot spots to deny the Taliban cross-border support and organization. We'll continue to stress here at Foggofwar the importance of making sure there aren't "safe zones" for the Taliban to fall back, regroup, heal, resupply, organize, command, communicate, etc. It must be made into a fractured and confused force if it can be broken.
Pakistan also has a fair amount of success in breaking the Pakistani Taliban, though the Pakistani Taliban is generally considered to be "softer" and less experienced than its Afghani counterparts (who have been fighting a tough guerrilla war for most of the last 25 years). That said, lessons can be learned by the thoroughness of the Pakistani offensives.
2) Dealing with supply problems. Iraq really had few supply problems for the US. Basrah, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia all provided easy entry points for supplies. As news of attacks on NATO supply convoys in Pakistan/Afghanistan suggests, NATO must sometimes operate with fewer supplies than it would like. This can easily hamper offensive efforts.

That said, conditions in Afghanistan are currently terrible. Roadside bombings in Q1 2010 are double those in Q1 2009. June was the deadliest month in the 9-year war for ISAF forces. A previous post of mine suggests that this may be a better sign thatn one would immediately think, but it does indeed still risk running ISAF (or parts of it) out of Afghanistan. For every country that breaks and peels away, the Taliban strikes a victory.

They also have control of most of the southwest of the country--it's a big territory with a fair number of people. Getting potential sympathisers to work with the Afghan government will require such a massive and sustained disruption of Taliban operations there that they cannot hunt and kill the sympathisers at night--one of their most effective terror tactics.

Going forward, NATO will have to keep drone missiles, special ops, and the occasional small offensive in the Pashtun region (along with brilliant cooperation with Pakistan into the north) as it consolidates northern provinces under Afghani government control, in order to prevent the Taliban from mobilizing into a full offensive itself. As the Afghani Army grows, NATO will need to prepare a full invasion force--prepped by special operations, spearheaded by the Marines & Army, and then garrison by massive numbers of Afghani police and army, to take control of the Pashtun region. It will need to be huge, swift, and incredibly costly.

The exit strategy is a tough one. This is a much more difficult war than Iraq ever was. Ultimately, it will depend on being able to win over parts of the Taliban, and breaking the top-level leadership to prevent sufficient collaboration by the various Taliban factions for a full takeover.

Afghan War Intensity Up--A Sign of Hope?

100 ISAF servicemen died in June--the most since the Afghanistan war began. it's a terrible number and a tragedy, absolutely.

But: there is a sign of hope in the increased intensity of the Afghan war.

The Taliban is increasingly on the offensive--bold (and sometimes reckless) attacks against American and Afghani targets are well on the upswing.

What's this mean? Why the change? The easy answer is to say, "they're getting stronger, and want to deal a finishing blow." This is, certainly, what the attacks are meant to imply.

But the story is more complicated.

The question to ask is: what is the Taliban's winning strategy?

The answer, by the way, is to wait out the US. The US will leave eventually. It will not stay there forever. If the Taliban can slowly swell its safe base of operations, it will win, as the US will eventually grow tired and fade away.

Three series of events are happening in parallel:
1) The US is stepping up drone/special operations in Taliban strongholds in Southern Afghanistan (like Helmand).
2) Pakistan is stepping up full-scale military assaults in Taliban strongholds in northern Pakistan (like Swat and Northern Waziristan).
3) The Taliban is stepping up bold offensives against the Pakistani Government, the Afghani Government, and ISAF.

I think you might be able to see where I am going.

Why the boldness, if the Taliban wants to wait for the US to leave?

The obvious guess is that the wait-it-out strategy is not currently viable.

ISAF and Pakistan are working together on an offensive. As we saw in Iraq, offensives cost lives. They hurt, the numbers look bad, and the American public grows quickly impatient.

But, potentially, they work. Certainly, a lack of offensives will fail. Preventing at all turns a stronghold for the enemy is a necessary (though not sufficient) part of COIN. It seems like this costly measure is starting to pay off: bold Taliban attacks on ISAF sites imply that there may be a desperation on the part of the Taliban to pressure NATO out of Afghanistan quickly. If that's the case, then the Taliban thinks that waiting is no longer in its favor.

The alternative hypothesis is that the Taliban is so strong that it's trying to deliver the "final blow." First, this doesn't make particular sense, strategically--the Taliban is traditionally quite terrible against ISAF in straight-up gun battles, as the past month has shown. If the waiting-game is a winning strategy, then there's no reason the Taliban would grow impatient and start putting its fighters at higher risk. It's been fighting a 25-year war for Independence. Its time horizon is much longer than a few months.

Second, the US is already scheduled to start pulling out of Afghanistan--there is no particular need or reason to try to "hurry" them. This is the perfect situation to, if possible, keep the "wait-it-out" strategy going.

If the Taliban is on the offensive, it's because it can't be on the defensive. Its strongholds and safe areas are being threatened and broken up. For sure, we know its lines of communication are being disrupted--making its attacks decreasingly coordinated and effective.

There is hope. There is a whole lot more to do than disrupting the Taliban's footing in the AfPak region to ensure victory in Afghanistan. But it is necessarily the first and most important step in winning the war (creating a stable, functional, credible central government to take its place is another story altogether).

Keep your eyes up in the next few months for Petraeus to continue to apply his modified strategy from Iraq--potentially successfully.

Untangling the Korean Peninsula Conflict

Mystery shrouds the current Korean Peninsula conflict about as much as it shrouds the North Korean government itself. A few readers have asked me, "what the heck is going on up there? Why the heck did North Korea attack South Korea?" Good question! It had me thinking & reading for a bit.

Why did the North Koreans sink the Cheoan?

There's no clear answer for this. The government officially denies doing it (which is not surprising), but it seems a relatively irrational thing to do. To understand the most likely possibility, one must understand the politics of North Korea. At least a bit.

Like most dictatorships, North Korea's government is propped up by elites (in this case, primarily military elites). And, like all governments, they faction. Long story short, Kim is old & frail, he's picked a potentially weak successor, and an opposition faction is likely trying to make a play for power. If South Korea had retaliated, chaos would ensue (North Korea would be caught unprepared for a war), and an opposition faction would have a much stronger opportunity to seize power from Kim (and likely quickly declare an end to the war by being a new regime).



As such, the coup likely failed. Whether there has been a purge is probably going to be unclear, but North Korea's lack of followup to the attack (and lack of military readiness at the time of the attack) both indicate that it was not an order from the top, but rather an order from much lower on the chain of command--likely meaning some attempt at insubordination.

What the heck are the Chinese doing in response?

Another good question! China's response seems to be arbitrarily contradictory. By inviting Kim to Beijing (and leaning towards "no" on international reprimand in the UN Security Council), China is taking a major international hit... in particular with South Korea and the United States, two of its biggest trading partners. China seems to be encouraging North Korean aggression.

But after a conference with China, Secretary of State Clinton came out speaking surprisingly rosy about China. Why?

Again, we must think of Chinese politics. In a Korean Peninsula war, what does China have to lose? It cannot and will not send troops or supplies to assist North Korea, and with the help of Japan and the United States, South Korea would rout the North Korean army (though Seoul would likely take serious damage in the meantime). China would be stuck with a collapsed North Korea, and an angry (and rather economically devastated) South Korea. The collapsed North Korea would send millions of starving, brainwashed refugees into northern China--a disaster that China is not prepared to face.

China's greatest concern in Korea is stability. It cannot afford a collapsed regime. This explains its stance--first, by inviting Kim to Beijing, China makes it clear to any opposition that Beijing will back Kim's faction, and help it keep power. Beijing was also likely able to get reassurances from Kim that he will purge the aggressive opposition, and also refrain from further provocations of South Korea... at least for the time being. China must also restrain from doing too much to anger Kim, lest Kim feel isolated and threatened. By befriending Kim, China gives Kim some security, allowing Kim to refrain from any foolish lashings out. Secretary Clinton understands this position, and thus was able to express confidence that China would effectively help prevent war in the Koreas.

What will happen from here?
South Korea cut off trade with North Korea, and North Korea followed by severing all diplomatic and communication ties with South Korea, and put its army on full readiness. South Korea further retaliated by opening up propaganda messaging into North Korea, and participating in anti-submarine drills with the United States. The Sunshine Policy is over.

For now, the conflict will drive South Korea (to some extent) away from China and towards the US/Japan. South Korea will seek stability in US strength. China will show North Korea that it is ready to defend North Korea from internal threats, but will not support it in a war against South Korea--North Korea's only rational recourse would be peace.

North Korea will desperately attempt to retain face by growing increasingly perturbed over accusations that it carried out the attack. It will accuse the South Koreans of setting up the attack themselves to provoke a war (sounds far fetched as an accusation, but many Americans think the same of the 9/11 attacks).

As far as war, I think it is unlikely. Neither country has a serious interest in it. Sino-American relations will not be particularly strained by this, but China will see any actions against North Korea as being a favor to the US (stacked on top of any favors that China does for the US with respect to Iran).

The Peninsula's best hope of a reemergence of peace might, unfortunately, be the death of Kim and a new regime leader.

NATO's Persistent Karzai Problem

It's tough propping up a government when said government seems to want to fight you every step of the way.

Hamid Karzai has gone on a recent bender of accusations against, in particular, the United States, but also the UN and NATO in general. The particular meat of the accusations is that Western powers have "meddled" unjustly in Afghan elections, undermining the legitimacy of said elections and giving the Taliban a political talking point (specifically, the most recent rants mention the throwing out of 1/3 of the votes for Karzai in the first round of presidential elections).

The accusation is probably rather preposterous, but I might be wrong. Either way, the lower house of the Afghan parliament unanimously (that being everyone) voted against Karzai's decree that the UN can no longer hold 3/5 majority of the electoral fraud commission--instead, Karzai would himself appoint the entire body. Unfortunately, the upper house (1/3 of which are hand-picked by Karzai) decided that, procedurally, they could not vote on the matter within a year of the elections. Unfortunately, this means the decree will stand. for the indefinite future.

This isn't the first worrisome think Karzai has said about his relationship with the West. Recently, a visit by Ahmedinejad prompted Karzai to call him a "brother" and otherwise generally cozy up to Tehran. Karzai occasionally has fits about throwing out the Western occupiers, despite his dependence on them to keep his government afloat.

Karzai is, no doubt, a very frustrating character for the West. Somehow, the US has managed to build a relatively rosy relationship with a country that it is illegally invading and drone-missile-attacking to squash a Taliban force that said country has some interest in maintaining (this, of course, being Pakistan), but has not managed to keep on good terms with the tinpot dictator it's trying to support. I'm not quite sure whether Clinton has muttered the words, "Well, if you really don't want us..." but Karzai might just understand that the US (and in particular, the administration) has so much to lose that unilateral withdrawal is just not an option--and if that's the case, Karzai has a great bargaining position, despite his relatively flaky power.

It's not actually all that uncommon for a propping state to have trouble keeping its client state's leadership in line. al-Maliki has been a mostly excellent partner to work with, but this is the exception. The US and UK often fight bitterly with Israel; the US leadership groaned famously over the Saigon government in Vietnam, the KMT/GMD in the Chinese Civil War, etc.

But the question that comes to mind is this: why should Karzai be such a darn pain the butt? What incentive does he have to make the lives of the US leadership as difficult as he does? Wouldn't his life be easier if he wasn't publicly ripping into his supporters? Can't we all just get along?

Well, as you probably know, Karzai's in a pretty tricky position. As much as he loathes the Taliban at a very personal level, Afghanistan is obviously a very long way from being a Taliban vs. anti-Taliban kind of show. All those pesky warlords, tribes, ethnic groups, and what have you make Iraq look like Disneyland in terms of being able to reach a unified consensus and build a unified state.

At the end of the day, Karzai's got to make a lot of rather unsavory people happy enough that they won't directly challenge his claim to power. He's also got to build legitimacy with the general population, so they'll throw support behind him directly (meaning that the other power players in Afghanistan also have to side with Karzai to keep their own popularity and legitimacy). Karzai's in a rather precarious position.

And so, of course he's going to be rather cross when a little election fraud here and there (which he may not have even ordered personally) gets dragged out of the gutter and displayed for all to see--it's going to cast a whole lot of doubt on his personal legitimacy that he probably believes would not be cast if everything looked peachy. At the same time, of course he's going to get friendly with the Iranians--Iran and Afghanistan share a border, and Afghanistan's got a non-trivial Farsi-speaking minority that Karzai needs in his opus-coalition in order to keep power.

And it makes sense that Karzai would call Clinton right after to apologise--there may be a frustrated understanding that Karzai has to look tough against the US in order to try to build legitimacy among (the winnable) tougher nationalists or Islamists, and to show that he isn't implicitly condoning the prevailing impression of election fraud (without selling out the ground-level loyalists that worked so hard to stuff ballots and intimidate voters--such a rebuke would seem like an implicit betrayal).

So the guy's in a pretty tough position. Combine said position with a truly maniacal obsession with defeating the Taliban, a slightly-bigger-than-healthy paranoia, and a penchant for micromanaging that verges on power-obsession, and you've got the Karzai we know and groan today.

But what can be done about it? Well, this is the tough part. Ultimately, the leadership positions of Afghanistan need to be shored up without turning them into tyrants in order to do so.

The big win is probably going to come in developing the Afghan army. When regular folks in Afghanistan see the friendly neighborhood soldier keeping them safe and helping them out, there will be a lot more state buy-in. This can, in theory, be done in time (the New Iraqi Army was mostly built from scratch after the US de-Ba'athification... but it was tough). Furthermore, said army will make the local warlords a decreasingly viable alternative and decreasingly important force in the new Afghanistan.

Second, NATO has to show that the Taliban is a losing alternative. To this end, first, NATO needs big, flashy, high-profile victories in places like Marjah (which haven't yet been delivered, because they are militarily difficult). Second, NATO needs to win the PR war by showing that the Taliban are actually baby-killing extremist nutbags, and won't make life better for the average Afghani. Somehow, this is easier said than done.

Finally, the local police & administration need to be developed. This will be toughest of all. As you've probably heard a bunch, Afghanistan is not used to having any sort of serious central authority. Current administration is underpaid and corrupt, either selling out the central government for cash (usually from the Taliban) or thugging on locals to help prop up their warlord, or even the state. (Step one here is clearly to use our vast sums of wealth to start paying police officers more, and hire cross-functional accountability officers).

But it's going to be tough. Karzai's going to continue to be a problem for the West, and the West is going to have to live with it and work with it, or lose Afghanistan. But the friction between Washington and Kabul shows that we've got a very, very long way to go.