Quick Guest Article from Fair Observer -- the Failure of the American Drone War

A really fascinating (if slightly depressing) article on drone strikes in Pakistan and Yemen, the nature of the Obama policy, and the growing anti-Americanism / extremism that it's causing. Very much worth a read.

http://www.fairobserver.com/article/obamas-war-the-failure-of-drone-strikes


Image: Copyright © The Bureau of Investigative Journalism.

A Breakdown of US Presidential Candidates' Foreign Policies

This will be our second breakdown of presidential foreign policies in as many presidential elections, making the event at this point a bit of a tradition. Our aim is to keep it simple, objective, and to the point.

So what of the candidates' foreign policies? Ultimately, despite attempts to simulate wide gaps, there are few. The president has, over the past four years, moved to a more traditionally conservative foreign policy stance, and Romney has more or less given up trying to find new ways to be even more aggressive on the international stage.

There are a few key differences, but we can mostly summarize their vision for the United States as such:

Obama, channeling Teddy Roosevelt, advocates that we "speak softly and carry a big stick."

Romney, on the other hand, differs mostly on the desire to "speak loudly and carry a bigger stick."

(Bonus points to readers who caught the Looney Tunes reference, though the comparison to Sam is not meant to be derisive of the Romney approach.)

Because they're more interesting, let's highlight the differences first.

Actual Differences:

Rhetoric: This is important to highlight because you may notice some other glaring gaps in the list of differences below. Romney and Obama obviously believe in having very different rhetoric (Romney's of a "strong America" and Obama's of a more "understanding America") behind very similar policy behavior. Romney is likely genuinely concerned that soft rhetoric is going to weaken the United States' credibility of deterrence (critical in the Pax Americana state in which the US tries to keep a lid on major warfare), where Obama believes that the United States will lose its ability to lead if it is not loved.

Both approaches have flaws. Obviously opinion of the United States crashed during the Bush administration of tough-talk, but it has also gone down since Obama took office in 2009, particularly in Muslim countries where the attempts of compassionate rhetoric have been strongest.

Russia: Romney sees Russia as a long-term threat that must be contained, where Obama sees it as a nation that can be bargained with and potentially partnered with. No doubt Russia's influence and military might are growing, and the United States must address Russia (where in the '90s it was largely able to ignore Russia completely). The two questions on the table here are whether Russia is a credible future threat and whether the US should be moving to oppose it and contain it, or whether it should be working with Russia to make it part of the wider "good guy" community. 

Israel: Short version: Romney sees Israel as an ally that can take action in the Middle East that the US simply is unable to, and can serve as the bastion of force against Iran. Obama sees it as a dangerous ally that can get the US reined into unwanted conflicts. Paraphrasing Bill Clinton on Netanhayu, "he doesn't know who the superpower is." 

Priorities in US Military Spending (and Strategic Approach): Obama's priorities in US military spending have focused on the ability to execute tactical strikes to deal with terrorist threats--more funding for drone strikes and a focus on special forces has been his focus (where Navy and Air Force spending--the big ticket items--has dropped). Romney, though unlikely to decrease this, wants to beef up the size of the US Navy with two extra Aircraft Carrier Groups in order to better position the US strategically against potential threats with more credible "hard" assets like Iran, Russia, and China. These Carrier groups would be used to protect the Strait of Hormuz, Taiwan/Japan/Korea, and the Baltics, as well as generally make sure that the US controls trade sea trade routes throughout the world.

Iraq?: There's a question mark here because it's not clear whether there will be any real change in action or just rhetoric. Romney is frustrated at the lack of the Status of Forces Agreement over the past 4 years and wants to use US troops to keep influence in Iraq and serve as a second force bastion against Iran.

Key Similarities:

While the candidates share a great deal in common, we will highlight the key--and sometimes surprising--similarities between their approaches. 

American Primacy / Exceptionalism: Despite Obama's 2008 rhetoric about the United States being a bit of a bully, his rhetoric has changed to embrace US Exceptionalism and, generally, its role in the world. Romney and Obama differ on how the US should posture itself with rhetoric and "outreach," but generally they both see the US as the force that should be running around keeping a cap on bad stuff. Both believe in "Pax Americana."

Iran: Ultimately both sides see the critical need to stop Iran from developing a nuke and want to oppose Iranian influence at all turns, which is why Obama (for example) is supporting the rebels in Syria. Romney is tougher-worded but not foolish enough to want war with Iran--both will have similar policies there.

War on Terror: Both will continue the new "precision" style War on Terror that was pivoted into around 2007 as the War in Iraq started to wind down. It will be a war of precision strike from drones and special forces as the US continues to support operations by Afghanistan, Kenya, Somalia, Egypt, Iraq, etc to eliminate terrorists locally.

Afghanistan: The War in Afghanistan is unpopular and will come to an end no matter who is president. It is unpopular as well to pull out immediately (fears of a Vietnam-style collapse remain) so the 2014 departure will be stuck to by both presidents.

China: Both will be aggressive with China about trade policy and keep the implicit threat of the Mutual Defense Treaty with Japan on the table in case there is any tricky business in the Senkakus, but neither is going to either back down on Beijing nor try to incite war. 

Author's Notes: Both candidates are going to have statements on their websites different from those above. We encourage you to take a look, and we're also writing with some interpretation and analysis (rather than simple aggregation of what's already written). Our intent is to write what we believe will be actual policy enacted (or attempted) by each candidate, rather than simply what they're declaring.

We can talk at length about why they have strong incentives to say-one-thing-and-do-another--we obviously saw a great deal of this from Obama in the 2008 campaign and how much the presidency has changed its tone since coming to office--ultimately, a state's security interest generally takes over unless something very strange happens, and there's no reason for that to happen here, which is why we'll see so many similarities going forward. 

The Changing US Strategy in the AfPak Region

There is writing that is moving from the walls directly to the Oval-Office-sealed paperwork: the United States will be removing the vast majority of its presence from Afghanistan, and soon.

A few pretty obvious signs are pointing to this:
-Defense Secretary Gates is stepping down
-The extremely popular General Petraeus has been moved to the position of CIA Director
-The President is making it clear he plans to accelerate troop withdrawal from Afghanistan
-The US and Pakistan are finally working together to hunt down a list of Al-Qaeda / Taliban leadership using CIA/ISI resources

These signs are indicative of 2 major changes:
1) The US strategy in Afghanistan is becoming one that focuses on anti-leadership attacks
2) The US has discussed this strategy with Pakistan--and finally gotten real cooperation

As we discuss this strategy, we must keep in mind the US' overall goal: to prevent jihadist groups from being able to either unite the Middle East against the West, and from being able to organize and launch coordinated trans-national attacks.

The US has largely succeeded in its first goal. The Arab Spring is (mostly) a relatively liberal-democratic movement, rather than a jihadist one. The US has won the "hearts-and-minds" campaign; al-Qaeda and its affiliates lack support from large populations, except perhaps in Yemen and Somalia.

In the second, the US has largely succeeded in all places but Yemen and the AfPak region. Yemen poses a different problem, but the AfPak region can be managed without the total collapse of the Taliban.

In fact, much of the Taliban these days consist of a Vietnam-style nationalist movement. Yes, they're still unsavory folks that want to bring a twisted form of Sharia to Afghanistan, but that is largely not the US' problem, as much as we may cringe to say it. There's little indication that much of the Pashtun Taliban know much about al-Qaeda or, if they do, care for the trans-nationalist doctrine.

On the other hand, much of the hardened leadership of the Taliban and other associated groups pose the bigger threat to the US' interests. These leaders can and sometimes will coordinate strikes, as we've seen in Pakistan and India. The new strategy calls for their systematic elimination by drones or CIA/ISI strike teams coordinating both tactics and intelligence. So far, it looks like it stands a chance at being relatively effective.

In the general push for Afghan security, a few benefits arise:
1) Focusing on the leadership hampers the Taliban's ability to coordinate, resupply, etc, when facing offensives
2) Withdrawing troops hurts the Taliban's nationalist message
3) The Taliban actually do want a negotiated settlement, and seem to be willing to do so once the US withdraws. Yes, they will have much more bargaining power then, but a negotiated settlement (at this point) is a much more palatable option than continued warfare for either side. They have reached a "painful stalemate," and are ready to talk.

Ultimately, we must remember that most of the Taliban are folks with very well-defined and limited aims, that don't include attacking the US (as angry as they may be). To a large extent, we can use the NVDA/Viet Cong as an analogy for most of these fighters, even if international interests are involved in funding them.

The most important part, though, is finally getting Pakistan's full help. Pakistan is shifting for 2 reasons:
1) US promises of quick withdrawal have now made helping the US politically palatable. The Taliban are not popular in most of Pakistan, and carry out attacks against the Pakistani people all the time. If Pakistan can help the US in a way that is politically palatable, it will--the US has just given it that opening.
2) With the US withdrawing, Pakistan is now legitimately worried about the Taliban threat growing, and is going to take higher responsibility to deal with it, and take control of the Waziristan region. The US withdrawal has been a bit of a "wake-up" moment for both the Pakistani leadership and its people.

Ultimately, total defeat of the Taliban is unlikely. Unlike Iraq, where the there was a small group of "irreconciliables" that were systematically destroyed, the Taliban represent a large group that is afraid of marginalization (much like the Sunnis in Iraq felt), and it must be negotiated with and brought into the government in some way.

Focusing on strikes against the leadership is likely the way that the US can bring this negotiation to the forefront, while keeping the Taliban as weak as possible, and ultimately preventing any transnational attacks from occuring.

Tradeoffs and Wisdom in Obama's Afghan Strategy

You guys read the speech. If not, read the speech.

"Our resolve is unwavering." But, perhaps, only for the next 18 months.

Seems a strange message. And it is. But it may not be unsound.

(Quick summary: 30,000 additional troops, some begging for 5,000 more from NATO, will take a crack at the Taliban while other troops, particularly from NATO, train Afghan forces at absolutely breakneck speeds. Then, 18 months from now, we begin the drawdown.)

This looks quite a bit like the surge strategy in Iraq. And it is. General Petraeus, now in charge of CENTCOM, is probably relatively satisfied. McChrystal certainly is.

The major criticisms from the left are pretty simple--this is a waste of life, of money, we should be leaving. I think the counter-argument here is that there are a few serious points at stake: the first was brought up by the President. There is a serious security risk here. Certainly more than there was in Iraq. And certainly, this is something that we should weigh on its own as a benefit against the cost of the next 18 months, rather than succumbing to the tragedy of sunk costs. The second point is that the odds of winning are probably higher than the left probably thinks. Like it or not, Petraeus, Gates, and Bush showed that "doubling down" in a region has the potential to break the fighting will of folks that have spent the past many years slowly grinding and dying in the mountains to eek out momentum. Afghanistan will be harder than Iraq, due largely to an even-more-dysfunctional central government (and much less centralized society), but it can be done. Third, the cost of losing can go beyond simple security in the medium-term. Victory and defeat can significantly affect the relationships between the United States and other significant powers (Iran, Russia, etc); Vietnam and Afghanistan are both excellent examples. When the US lost Vietnam, its security was not threatened by Vietnam, but the Soviet Union gained a long momentum (as the US wallowed in relative misery and indecisiveness), and the momentum switched after the Soviet Union lost Afghanistan. So I think, as a whole, there is a lot to gain, and a decent chance to get it.

The criticism from the right is, as far as I can tell, centered around "sending the wrong message," as Senator McCain said. The worry, in essence, is that the US is not able to project the will necessary to break the will of the Taliban--they may simply spend the next 18 months hiding in wait, knowing the exact date at which they should spring forth to take down the Afghani government. It is not an entirely illegitimate claim. But if the Taliban does actually take an 18-month break (or relative break) from the fight against ISAF, then ISAF will have two luxuries: one, it will get to spend its massive resources in building up the Afghan Army and government (likely, the Army will have the bulk of the legitimacy of government forces, like in Iraq for some time). Two, it will allow the US to get aggressive and claim territory, hunt bad guys, etc, rather than play guard duty. Every force likes being on the offensive, and the Taliban will have to choose between actively seeking engagement with NATO troops or hoping that they can hide and be just disruptive enough to not give ISAF the luxury of relaxing and building.

Additionally, it will instill some urgency (and, frankly, panic) in the Karzai government. For all his corruption, Karzai is committed to beating the Taliban and holding onto his power base--he won't achieve his own objectives by sitting back and hoping. Knowing that the US commitment (and thus the NATO commitment) has a time limit is likely to motivate him to get his government in good enough shape to keep it together on its own, rather than free-ride off US and NATO efforts.

All in all, there is a trade-off between the message to the Afghan government and the message to the Taliban, but I think the trade-off is being managed pretty well. Furthermore, the trade-off management might actually make enough Republicans and moderate Democrats happy enough that he'll get the requisition he needs to pull it off.

My confidence here isn't quite as high as it was with the Iraqi surge, but it's probably about the best bet the US has right not to pull a win in Afghanistan (even if, yes, "win" was not a word Obama used. Deal with it.) and walk home with not only a safer Middle East, but a much-inflated geopolitical position compared to 2004.

An Alternative Theory on the S. Waziristan Assault

So you all probably know about the recent string of attacks by the Taliban in Pakistan, against police stations, army headquarters, and random civilians, by raid or by suicide bomb, in Peshawar or Lahore or Islamabad. The Taliban has grown particularly tough and gutsy, and it's not 100% clear to what end. Certainly they have won the ire of the Pakistanis, who are (finally) launching a long-awaited operation into South Waziristan. The BBC provides an image of the approach below:

The Army is approaching from the North, East, and West, which is probably largely a courtesy to ISAF and NATO: this way, fleeing Taliban will be going south, into the waiting jaws of Pakistani reserves, rather than north and west, where they can regroup with Afghani Taliban.

The Pakistani Army is sending 30,000, backed by artillery, helicopters, and the works. Though I'm not sure whether there will be a serious commando presence. The Taliban is perhaps 10,000 strong, with some 500-5,000 Uzbek al-Qaeda affiliated allies in the area. It's a big force. The Army is pouring in and taking civilised territory pretty quickly, though they're likely to struggle significantly in the mountains.

This fight brings up two big questions: 1) Why did the Taliban provoke Pakistan? and 2) Is Pakistan's heart really in it?

1) Most analysts seem to think that the Taliban were hoping to divide Pakistani opinion with a wave of attacks, to try to dissuade the long-planned South Waziristan invasion. I think this analysis is, frankly, naive.

Frankly, I think that the Taliban has realized at this point that launching attacks, especially against civilians, will unite/enrage the country. Expensive offensives are difficult when the status quo is peaceful, but not when the status quo is hellish, at the hands of a brutal enemy. No, I believe that the Taliban knew full well that their attacks would provoke a serious counter-attack; they knew they would not cow the Pakistanis into complacency by murdering civilians. But why would they want the Pakistanis to attack?

Let us assume for a moment that the South Waziristan assault was inevitable. It probably was. The government promised to do it, the US is pressuring them to do it, and the troops were already massing all around the region. So if Meshud (the new Pakistani Taliban leader) knew they were coming, he'd want them to come on his own terms. So it is quite reasonable to believe that he has kept his troops on high alert and sent some out to perform the raids/suicide bombs to get the Army to attack both when Meshud was strong and before mobilization preparations were complete, giving Meshud as high an advantage as possible. I find this scenario far more likely than one in which the hardened Taliban fooled themselves into hoping they could break the Pakistani people into submission with a few bombs.

But this is the fourth time since 2004 alone that Pakistan has tried to regain control of South Waziristan. The first three have failed, and the Army was trying to make sure it was as prepared as possible for the fourth assault. This accelerated assault has it a bit off-kilter, whether or not the Army will admit it, and it was frankly an excellent strategic choice by Meshud--Pakistan is fickle and its opinion changes quickly. It does not--like the US or UK--have a "sunk costs" psychology, and it is not afraid to retreat and admit defeat from even its own soveriegn territory.

2) A touger question. Much tougher. Canadian intelligence certainly suggests that a large portion of Pakistani Intelligence is in favor of a strong Taliban presence in Afghanistan, and that some may have been behind coordinating the Taliban raids in Pakistan. And it's almost certainly true. One of Pakistan's toughest security risks is its own intelligence security services, and unless it can clean house and put them in line, it will never off finish the Taliban in its own country. And as long as these elements remain, much of the Pakistani efforts will continue to support the Taliban in Afghanistan. The commitment of the government as a whole is worth serious question.

If the US cannot win enough factions in the Pakistani government such that it will make genuine efforts to oust the Taliban from regions useful to the US (Khyber, Kurram, Bajur, Chitral, and especially Balochistan), then ISAF will unlikely be able to "break the back" of the Afghani Taliban--they will receive too much support from across the border.

So, we shall see. Perhaps the Taliban will be foolish enough to burn a great deal of resources in support of Waziristan, and exhaust itself. Perhaps NATO will be smart enough to take advantage of Pakistani distraction to launch a heavy assault.

But Obama has made it clear that there will not be a major Afghanistan decision until the election results are more sure (they're still being recounted). Without more troops, there will not be a major offensive. This may be a missed opportunity. But it may become academic.

If the US cannot get the Pakistani government on its side nor the Afghan government to play by the rules and attempt to win the hearts/minds of its people, then the Afghanistan war is likely all but lost.

Will the Afghan Gamble Pay Off?

The thing that I like about the Surge-like offensive in Afghanistan is that it is likely to produce a more decisive strategic-political path within a few months than a more conservative approach was likely to determine.

There are obviously problems--the biggest is deaths, both the number and the type. After a short two days, there are already 9 coalition deaths, all of which were from roadside attacks or other ambushes, rather than from coalition-led assaults. As I've mentioned before, this is tough on morale. If this rate of death keeps up, the US public is going to seriously reconsider the wisdom and efficacy of leaving troops as sitting ducks in Helmand.

The Brits are already getting ready to leave. Public opinion in the UK is dismal--over half of Brits think that the war is unwinnable and that troops should be withdrawn right away. The increasingly-popular Tories are having trouble resisting the political temptation to pull for withdrawal.

The offensive is clearly a gamble; the Brits need results either to improve public opinion or to simply see themselves as accomplishing as much as possible before an increasingly-inevitable pullout. But the loss of the Brits would be an incredible blow to the already-stretched thin Americans, and a boon for the Taliban. It is difficult to imagine the war being won if the UK were to disappear in the near future.

The other tough part about the offensive is the difficulty in which one observes tangible results. The Taliban denied NATO the satisfaction of sticking around and fighting. Now, training and development dominate US/UK strategy, along with the occasional hunting mission--but the Taliban remain elusive. And when the US/UK inevitably leave Helmand (some time after the elections), they will certainly emerge from their hiding places to reclaim their place--the question is whether the US/UK will have created a sufficiently impressive security environment that they can resist collapse and dissolution under insurgent pressure (the Taliban are unlikely to give the US/UK the easy option of engaging Afghan forces directly in a conventional, protracted battle, lest the US send air cavalry right back in).

Whether this security training is sufficient is a nearly unanswerable question from my deskchair in Cambridge, but it is the crux of the gamble. The US must train hard, fast, and well, create buy-in from the populace (such that the Taliban does not have an extensive network of safehouses, informants, etc, upon their return), and keep enough reserve troops on-hand for long enough to provide pinpoint support to any brash assaults from the Taliban--at the same time, the military must protect itself and prevent casualties from spiraling, lest necessity take over and lead to their premature withdrawal. It is a daunting task.

If the US/UK can "win" in Helmand, I expect they are likely to use it to improve the bargaining position of the Afghani government with any Taliban. Currently, the Taliban refuse to come to the bargaining table until all foreign troops have left, but the US/UK/Afghan governments fear (with good reason) that a unilateral withdrawal at this point would lead to another Taliban takeover of the country. Withdrawal, therefore, is only an option as much as a loss of objectives is.

Anxiety Over Helmand Offensive

The Marines stormed into Helmand with force, speed, fury. Offensives are really the Marines' game, and the ride into Helmand was no different. Had anyone been there to fight them, it would have been quite the horror show.

But. There was nobody there to fight them. The Taliban apparently did the smart thing and disappeared when the Americans showed up, rather than stick around to try to repel them. In fact, the Taliban have fared quite poorly for the past 8 years when they have taken Americans toe-to-toe. But this is asymmetric warfare, and as long as the Taliban shows patience, they have a shot.

I wondered whether the Taliban would be wise enough to disappear, rather than fight, after their disastrous stand at Swat. These Afghan Taliban are more hardened than their Pakistani brethren, though I figured much of that hardness would have trickled south by now. More likely, these Taliban are under wiser command that heard of and learned from the Swat disaster.

After disappearing, the Taliban have picked (apparently quite well) opportunities to attack both the Americans and the British. 8 Brits have died in the past two weeks, and the British will to keep fighting is seriously starting to falter. The Taliban may be concentrating on them specifically to try to kick them out of the fight, eliminating the second-largest troop presence in Afghanistan. But the primary casualties from the last few weeks have been from bombs and traps--not head-to-head fighting. It's terrible for troop morale, and it means little is getting done. The offensive should be offense--otherwise, it's just high exposure.

There is good reason to be anxious over the Helmand offensive--so far, it looks like a failure. Are the bulk of the Taliban hiding in Pakistan? In the mountains? It is apparently somewhat unclear. Unless the US and UK can find them and hit them hard, this offensive is going to be a failure.

Pakistan Prepares to Assault Waziristan

After 8 years of absurd domestic politics that can be most briefly described as "bullshit," the past few months in Pakistan have been a dramatic and critical turnaround in the very frustrating war on the Taliban. While Swat valley is not yet a thriving pillar of liberty, justice, and security, the Taliban spine in the area has been broken (though, let me say, Taliban spines have had a very odd history of remote post-mortem reassembly). But the Pakistani army is, cleverly, recruiting former People's Militiamen and those whose lives were most thoroughly destroyed by the Taliban to become a loyal local police force that will not only keep these people fed (hearts & minds!) but, more importantly, provide a presence that will be difficult for the Taliban to overcome.

Next: Waziristan. Waziristan is a much bigger and more daunting challenge for the Pakistani Army. Waziristan serves as the primary base of operations for the Afghani Taliban--they fled after the 2001 US invasion and set up shop in this rough, tribal area; they have acted with relative impunity since. The area is full of tribalists who are quite used to their autonomy, and do not like state intervention--unlike the people of Swat, they will not be welcoming the Pakistani Army with open arms. There are many more Taliban per capita, they are more entrenched, and they know the terrain a whole lot better than the Army. And, unlike Swat, they will not give up easily--where would they go?

But here, close to the Afghani border, Pakistan has the advantage of extensive NATO intelligence, support, and firepower. NATO will almost certainly press from the north right to the border, and happily shoot across. The Taliban will need to fear drones and incoming missiles if they expose their positions in order to attack the invading Pakistani Army. The Taliban can dissolve and try to fight an insurgency, but like Swat, psychology may limit their ability to so quickly give up control of the area for a more tactically advantageous (but very, very long-term) strategy. If they hold firm, they will inflict casualties, but if the Pakistani Army can withstand those casualties, the likely-firm stance of the Taliban will shatter.

Now, it is not entirely clear this will work--the last time the Pakistani Army ventured into Waziristan, they were crushed, and left with tail between legs. But this will be different, for a number of reasons:

1) Public opinion gives the Pakistani Army the political capital it needs to both bring many troops and inflict some local civilian casualties.
2) The Pakistani Army has new leadership that is making much better use of its array of options--standard troops, paramilitary guards, commandos, airpower, etc.
3) The Pakistani Army has the political ability to cooperate with the US in this operation. That will be a huge advantage.
4) Without Swat, the Taliban is a bit off-balance. As they run out of alternative safe-havens, they have fewer places to re-group, train, supply, etc, for long-term campaigns.

The Pakistani Army is trying to soften up the positions of Talibani commander and al-Qaeda ally Meshud with airpower. Current militant casualties are estimated at about 50, which isn't many, but is enough to shake the Taliban a bit. If the Pakistani Army can continue to inflict such casualties using long-range attacks, the psychological implications (especially for a force that has enjoyed peace in its home base) will be significant.

As the Army hits the heavy enclaves of the Taliban, citizens militias are actually forming around the northwest and working with paramilitary/police to trap, separate, and kill extremists that had over-extended in attempts to push their influence further into Pakistan. Such militias may be self-propagating--stories of success may encourage otherwise fence-sitting men to take arms to help, giving them an even greater advantage. If nothing else, they will provide serious disruption to the physical network of Taliban between their strongholds, giving the Army a much-needed logistical advantage.

The Taliban Confirms Army Successes

In a very rare and politically costly concession of fact, the Taliban recently asked the Pakistani government very nicely for a return to a recent past that now seems so rosy and delightful in retrospect. The Taliban have formally sought a return to the Sharia-for-disarmament peace deal. Pakistan has rejected the deal, offering an ultimatum--leave or be arrested. Submit to arrest or be killed.

The government has also made it clear that any Sharia-style law in any province of Pakistan will necessarily submit to the Pakistani Constitution, which was violated in almost all possible ways in the few weeks that the Taliban had state-approved authority in Swat.

The Taliban surely knew that asking formally for peace would be a long-shot, at best. And if they indeed knew this to be the case, then facing the public embarrassment of begging for peace indicates incredible desperation--and desperation indicates hurting on their side. The Taliban have effectively signaled to Pakistan and to the world that the government's military actions are working, and extraordinarily well.

Such an admission is going to boost the morale of the Pakistani people, and boost their confidence in the decision by their leaders to pursue a decisive military option. It's the first really tangible sign of military results in a very, very long time by the Pakistani Army, and this admission may be a mistake that dooms the Taliban well into the future.

I've also heard from a friend that the Pakistani Ambassador to the US went on televised news and claimed that the Pakistani government only enacted the Swat peace deal to show the population that the Taliban would break it, which they they (correctly) guessed would lead to public support for decisive military action. This statement could indeed be a complete lie, though it seems intuitive enough to not be totally outrageous; indeed, it's almost certain that at least someone in the Pakistani government was convinced by his colleagues to support the deal on the prediction that it would fail miserably. So either it was dumb luck or incredibly clever planning, or a bit of both, but it's paying handsomely now.

I suppose, given Pakistani sensitivities, that it would be counter-productive to openly root for the Army, but I will say that things are looking pretty good for them right now.

Retaking Mingora--and Pakistan

Mingora has been called "Taliban City" over the past few years. While the Taliban have a large presence in many districts of NWFP and FATA, this was their power base. But the Pakistani military offensive has proven either brilliant or lucky over the past month, leading to an increasing likelihood that the military will score a shattering victory over the Taliban in this particular offensive. I'll discuss below a few points of interest.

Taliban Hubris and Error: The Taliban grew incredibly confident in their ability to walk all over the Pakistani government over the past few years, and they reverted from their insurgent campaign to a largely-conventional stance in many areas, Mingora included (the advantage of a conventional stance is that it is easier to suppress and control the population, set up a government, costs less to operate: one does not need to hide in caves, etc). But such a stance makes the Taliban incredibly vulnerable to a better-trained conventional force. With the incoming Pakistani offensive, the clever thing to do might have been to slip out to fight another day, leaving traps to greet the incoming soldiers--Army personnel would have died (in some number) and spent a great deal of time pouring house-to-house to find nothing. It would have been tough on morale, and allowed the Taliban to regroup and re-assess. But the Taliban--many of them--chose to tough it out and fight house-to-house, and all reports indicate that they're being crushed. Those that chose to escape have a surprise in waiting...

The Commando Raid: 300 or so Commandos from the Pakistani Army raided a Taliban base located 14 miles to the north of Mingora over the past two weeks. The fighting was difficult--massive trench and tunnel networks in the mountains prevented large ammunition from having any effect, so the Commandos had to eliminate Taliban the hard way. But the Army claims that the raid was successful. In all likelihood, paramilitary and Commandos await the arrival of fleeing, disorganized Taliban that hope to seek refuge in the mountain base. If this is the case, it would be an incredibly efficient and effective use of force. The Commando raid is going to be a particularly effective bolster to domestic support: the camp was used as a training ground for forcibly recruited children to make them suicide bombers--dozens of children were rescued. PR doesn't get much better than that.

House-to-house in Mingora: There are about 10-20,000 civilians trapped in Mignora, which is making the fighting incredibly slow and deliberate. But from what little reporting I've dug up, the Army seems to be in possession of most of Mingora, having killed about 1000 militants (and having lost about 50 of its own). These numbers may be wrong, but time will tell. Nonetheless, civilian casualties seem to be extremely low, and Mingora appears to be all but captured. If civilian casualties are kept to a minimum, then the Army will have proven itself to its people as capable of dealing with the Taliban threat--and the days of ineffectual "peace" deals will be over. The Army would have the opportunity to turn on its toes and continue pursuit all the way to the Afghan border.

Pushing North:The Pakistani military has taken two significant towns to the northwest of Mingora, as well. The choice seems to be an attempt to not only isolate the Taliban in Mignora from reinforcements and resupply, but also to capture or kill any escaping militants--such a move would be a sign that Pakistan is putting as much effort as possible into making this victory as decisive as possible.

Steadfast Commitment:Maj. General Abbas, who leads the Pakistani army's PR department, has made it clear through a number of press statements that the Pakistani military is committed to continuing the campaign. The recapture of Swat will be the beginning: he has claimed that it will be a "blueprint" for other areas, specifically Khyber, North and South Waziristan. These three provinces all border Afghanistan, signaling that the Pakistani government understands the need to eliminate Taliban influence throughout the AfPak region--rather than just the buds growing near Islamabad. And if this operation ends as well as it has begun, the army will have all the political support it needs to get the job done.

Fighting for Freedom: Their confidence bolstered by the coming success of the Army's campaign, villagers in Pakistan are taking up arms against the Taliban in hopes of driving them out (knowing that reinforcements will not be coming for their regional overlords). Such a move is a bit dangerous--if it fails, it will spell disaster. But there exists a tipping point, at which if enough villagers do indeed take up arms against the Taliban, the Taliban's ability to deal with such uprisings will be overwhelmed, and their control over any area with such a critical mass will collapse. If they're thinking on their toes, Pakistan should be pushing their paramilitary forces to these areas to support and encourage disruption in the Taliban's power base, which would further degrade the Taliban's organization (and reduce support to the Afghan Taliban).

The Future: A Full Pincer Offensive? If the Pakistani military is going to push into Waziristan and Khyber, then the Afghani Taliban is certainly going to lose critical support from its rear, making it more vulnerable than it has been in years. The Afghani Taliban is much smarter and more hardened than its Pakistani brethren--it has been fighting NATO since late 2001. It remains in an "insurgent" stance, but the strength of such a stance often depends on some base from which insurgents can receive weapons and ammunition, supply, etc. With NATO in control of areas north of Taliban territory, a Pakistani Army conquering of NWFP and FATA could potentially leave the Afghani Taliban without a route through which to bring arms and ammunition, making the fight (at worst) a war of supply attrition, which NATO could easily (if slowly) win. It is unclear whether the people of Pakistan see the Taliban as a sufficiently deadly enemy that they are willing to put aside their long-standing sourness towards the United States, but if they are, the cooperation between Afghanistan, Pakistan, and NATO would likely together be enough to scatter the Taliban and finally begin to provide real security.

The Emerging Wisdom of Pakistan's Military Strategy

Pakistan is sending hundreds of commandos into a Taliban hideout near Mignora. And while the over-arching strategy is not announced (it's unclear whether the US administration even knows what the strategy is), there is a good story to be told in what such a strategy might be. Below I submit a proposal for what the Pakistanis might be doing, with some evidence for it.

With 5000 Taliban militants (and only 15000 military to combat them), Pakistan fell far below the "standard" 10:1 ratio of counter-insurgents to insurgents. Simply trying to stick troops in the area and hope they could provide security was foolish. So Pakistan first asked its civilians to move out of Mignora. They are now refugees, and this has made life terribly difficult for both the government and said civilians, but mixed results seem to suggest that Pakistan is up to the challenge. In doing this (and I've talked earlier about how tough it would be for the Taliban to try to sneak up with these civilians), Pakistan was largely able to turn a counter-insurgency campaign into an urban warfare campaign. But 3:1 are still pretty bad odds against a dug-in urban enemy--things would get pretty bloody, at best.

So Pakistan, possibly ready to reimburse owners of whatever houses the Taliban holed up in, decided instead to throw a bunch of explosives at them, instead. To a large extent, the Taliban broke out of their dug-in areas in fear, and fled the streets when the Army showed up to intercept them. Such a tactic was a brilliant stroke of taking advantage of the Taliban's lack of military discipline and rigor--the Taliban might have had an advantage if the fight had gone how the Taliban had prepared, but they had not prepared for how to deal with heavy bombing campaigns, and decided (wisely), not to fight the Army on the Army's terms.

And then, Pakistan gets even smarter. As the 5000 fighters retreat (after about 750 casualties), many of the slightly-less-nutty Taliban (especially the youngsters) may be rethinking their long term life plans, and deserting. The Army estimates that only about 1500 are total die-hards, and the rest are new/young/coerced recruits. This mass retreat is a good opportunity for them to run to the paramilitary (scattered all over the outskirts of the city) with their arms in the air, and get 3 squares and a cot to sleep on. Why would they surrender? Well, this is probably the hardest that the Pakistani military has hit the Taliban in many years, and many of the new recruits have likely gotten more than they bargained for.

But it gets better. There are 1500+ remaining die-hards to deal with. This is where the Commandos come in. There is a pretty big mountain base that seems an obvious retreat location for a scattered and disorganized Taliban that has no other place to go. It is apparently well-stocked, and well-guarded. But what if the Pakistani Army flew (in helicopters) ahead of the Taliban retreating on foot to this base, with hundreds of Commandoes, in order to shut it down? If these Commandoes are successful (and frankly, they likely will be), these retreating Taliban will be a long way from any friendly territory, disorganized, under-supplied, and without morale. Their capture will likely be relatively easy with the 15,000 troops sent to the area. And, voila, Mingora will be cleaned up, if all goes to plan.

But, frankly, Mingora is only the start of a much greater, more pervasive Taliban problem. It's big. The BBC provides an excellent map (shown here) of where it thinks the Taliban is in control. The Pakistani government, of course, contests the extent of alleged Taliban control, but even if it's a bit less, it's a lot. The Pakistani Army has a very long way to go if it is actually going to break Taliban control over this swath of its country.

FLASH: Taliban-Pakistan Peace Deal Officially Over

Prime Minister Gilani made an overnight announcement that the Pakistani Army is to "eliminate" militants and terrorists in the Swat region, until it is restored to normalcy. This announcement is the most potent signal yet that the Pakistani government is going to remove the safe havens in Pakistan that the Taliban have enjoyed for years, and is the first official sign from the government that the peace deal has been nixed--the Pakistani military is on the offensive. Public opinion seems to be behind him. If this resolve holds, the fight against the Taliban in Afghanistan may welcome a new advantage that it had not previously seen. Without safe havens, thousands of Taliban in Afghanistan may lack logistics, command, intelligence, and safe haven that they once enjoyed, giving NATO/Afghani military forces a significant advantage. If NATO/Afghanistan can capitalize on this, then a brokered peace deal with a western twinge might be sought. More on this as matters develop.

How Pakistan's Relationship with the Taliban Changed

I have spent a lot of time and many words in this blog banging my head against a brick wall over why the hell the Pakistani people, their government, its military, wanted to sit idle over the Taliban. "If only they could act," I lamented, over and over. As did the Bush administration. As does the Obama administration. Pakistan's formidable army could turn the tide of NATO's war to end Taliban hegemony and secure Afghanistan, if only the will existed to bring it to bear.

But I've done a lot of reading and thinking since then. And I believe I have a compelling story that explains both the behavior of the Taliban and the responses of the Pakistani government until now.

Hardline Muslims of Pashtun descent have lived in Pakistan for a very long time. They lived in the far northwestern reaches of British India, and remained right where they were when Punjabi/Sindhi peoples of Muslim and Hindu belief cross-migrated over the line drawn between India and the new Pakistan. The Pashtuns wanted little or nothing to do with the new Pakistan, and arranged a large amount of autonomy in the Northwest Frontier Province and (especially) in the Fedrally Administered Tribal Areas. And for a long time, these Pashtuns lived a mostly isolationist existence, with very close ties to their Afghan brethren across the border (mostly not concerned with the lines that the rest of the world considered sovereign).

Enter the Soviet Union. Their invasion of Afghanistan prompted the West (the US in particular) to arm the Afghanis and train them. The CIA often chose the most fanatic and enthusiastic of Afghani warriors, ready and hellbent to kill Soviets. The mujahideen drove the Soviets out, and began to fight amongst themselves for control of Kabul. The Taliban, a Pakistan ISI-backed Pashtun Islamic group, emerged victorious. By 2001, they had mopped up most of Afghanistan. The support of this Pashtun group by the Pakistan government pleased Pashtuns in Pakistan enough that they remained quiet.

But like most militant groups supported by states, the Taliban did not listen to their ISI backers indefinitely. Their radical version of Islam called for a foreign jihad to destroy oppressors of Islam, those that stood in its path. The Taliban supported the international terrorist organization, al-Qaeda, in order to further their ideological goals.

Enter the Americans. NATO invaded Afghanistan and quickly ousted the Taliban with the Northern Alliance. Many have criticized the invasion of Iraq as hasty. But the Bush Administration prepared that for years. The invasion of Afghanistan was planned for in a few weeks. The Taliban fled, and NATO thought their back had broken. But in retrospect, failing to trap and destroy the Taliban's leadership in Tora Bora proved to be one of a number of crucial mistakes. The Taliban retreated to Pakistan, where they joined sympathetic Pakistani Taliban. They spoke the same language, they looked the same, they worshipped very similarly. They got along well. The Pakistani Taliban hoped to see their Afghani brethren return to power; they helped. And the Afghani Taliban, hardened and experienced by two decades of endless war, began to advise, teach, and then militarily lead the Pakistani Taliban.

The West put incredible pressure on Pakistan to not let the Taliban operate in the northwest with impunity. Musharraf, a tough secular realist, was willing to cooperate to some extent, but operations into the Northwest ended in disaster: civilians and Pakistani troops died in large numbers, and the public reacted with rage. Pakistanis did not want their army to be a tool of the West, especially the US. They did not want to attack their own Pakistani people to please the foreign devils they hated. Retaliatory attacks by the Taliban were seen as terrible, but the public viewed them with sympathy: they were stern messages that there had been a deal for a long time, and it had worked. Leave us alone, leave you alone. But if you break it, we will hurt you.

But the Pakistani government has also been cripplingly short on money for a very long time. And as much as it is in the interest of the West to keep Pakistan propped up, it does mean that the Pakistan government has a very weak bargaining position. International pressure would mount, particularly when convoys were destroyed, and reach a local maximum, and the Pakistani army would launch an operation to take control of some valley or pass. The Taliban would react, and the public would be enraged. Then the army would back off.

International pressure has grown in the long term, too, as the Afghan war has dragged on and Talibani offensives have led to more deaths of both NATO soldiers and Afghani civilians. The Pakistani Taliban, largely influenced by the even-more-radical Afghani Taliban, saw that the situation might not end favourably for them if they did nothing. And so they have launched offensives to drive government troops out of Pashtun areas and create a state with stronger autonomy. Recently, this desire for autonomy has taken the form of buffer zones--and thus, the Taliban move into Kheber district.

And there are some Taliban that hope to take over Pakistan completely. Victories over the past seven years have convinced many Taliban, whose power has grown, that Pakistan (whose government they consider largely puppeted by the West) should be their next target if and when they drive the West out of Afghanistan and re-establish hegemony there.

These offensives for buffer zones were a grave error by the Taliban. As much as international pressure was difficult and people did die, the Taliban did not appear a threat to the existence of Pakistan, or the lives of most Pakistani people. But the Taliban have broken the Swat Peace Deal, and it has become painfully obvious that the deal was an attempt to make strategic military gains by using sly negotiating, and create a safe haven near offensive zones. (the Taliban in the area remain armed, patrolling the streets, extracting resources from the local population, indoctrinating new recruits, and arming/organizing/planning for operations elsewhere.)

The Pakistani people have now seen how the aspirations of the Pakistani Taliban have changed. Formerly a status-quo actor (hoping to maintain Talibani hegemony in Afghanistan and independence in the Pakistani Northwest), the Pakistani Taliban have now become a powerful and threatening revisionist actor as their power has approached parity with the government. And now, a growing number of people in Pakistan are supporting that the government use its formiddable army to put down the Taliban while there is still hope of doing so.

The costs will be high. Civilians will die. Good soldiers will die. The Taliban will respond and terrorize Karachi, Islamabad, and other civilian centers to intimidate the population. But this new resolve in the Pakistani people is real, and exists for good reasons. And if it sticks, it might be the key to winning the war in Afghanistan.

So that's my story: how Pakistan's relationship with the Taliban changed.

A New Resolve in Pakistan?

There may be a new resolve in Pakistan to beat back the Taliban. This resolve may bring a shimmer of hope to an otherwise dreary picture in the "crucible of Terror."

Very rare "Save Pakistan, Stop Taliban" protests popped up in Karachi recently. Most public opinion in the past has been relatively neutral towards the Taliban (though I frankly cannot imagine why--they have been killing Pakistanis for years), until the Taliban advance out of the Swat valley (and the undermining of the peace deal). Additionally, the media is starting to paint the Taliban in a bad light--something that has brought threats from the Taliban that there would be "dire consequences" for any media that report negatively on them (this is reminiscent of the "behead those who insult Islam" meme, at least to me). Such desperate attempts to intimidate are a sign that the Taliban are, in some ways, on the defensive.

The Pakistani army offensive into the northwest continues. But will the will remain? Can they pull troops from the Indian border, or will their obsession with their southern neighbor handicap them? The US is trying to encourage the new turning of tide, and is threatening sticks if the Pakistanis cannot deal. The US is now openly considering sustained operations in Swat valley, which would be a huge escalation (and would be breaking all sorts of international law, unless you question the actual sovereignty of Pakistan over the area [which is plausible, given a complete lack of administration, control, and now, effort]). In short, "Stop the Taliban, or we will."

Swat Deal Going South

As Pakistani Taliban march (mostly unopposed) closer and closer to Pakistan's capital, Pakistani leadership is starting to get jittery. While not canceling the peace deal altogether, President Zardari has given the military a go-ahead to hit the Taliban hard and push them back. Fighting has broken out already; the Pakistani military is showing its training gives it a hard edge over the Taliban in conventional battles.

It's unclear what this particular operation is besides a knee-jerk reaction, and it--frankly--probably will not on its own be the beginning of an offensive into the northwestern frontier regions. But it may be a sign that opinion polls are starting to change. The closer the Taliban gets to the capital, the more it becomes clear to the Pakistani people that the Taliban are a threat to the security of everyone in the country and to the very existence of the Pakistani state as we know it. Until now, most Pakistanis thought that the problem would go away if the US pulled out, and that the Taliban did not have aspirations to conquer the region. It's becoming more clear that they do.

The Taliban have not held up their end of the Swat deal to lay down their arms and halt expansion. As discussed earlier, a deal with the Taliban had the strong potential to turn Swat valley into an untouchable safe haven from which to train, arm, organize, and then launch attacks elsewhere. And it looks like that's exactly what the Taliban are doing. But while breaking the Swat deal may have given the Taliban a tactical advantage, they may push the Pakistani people over a threshold of sufficient resolve to begin an all-out offensive. Such an offensive, which could be heavily funded, supported, and aided by the US, might have the potential to seriously rout Taliban leaders that have spent the past few years not having to deal with conventional warfare. More than likely, the Taliban have taken a path-of-least-resistance in the northwestern frontier regions, letting themselves operate more openly and conventionally in a region where they were not being bothered, and supporting their more guerrilla brethren in Afghanistan. If this is true, bringing to bear the might of the Pakistani army might leave them disorganized long enough for the US to be able to make an offensive in Afghanistan.

Should such a pincer maneuver work, the next step would require the hasty-but-effective deployment of indigenous local security forces loyal to the Pakistani and Afghani states. Such a task is easier said than done, but it is something that will be much easier done with a scattered and disorganized Taliban than a fully entrenched and offensive one.

Hopefully, Mr. Obama is ready to take advantage of the Swat deal going south. He needs to be able to propose a better alternative--and this alternative would include getting India to back off long enough for Pakistan to shift some troops to the north. But India is going to want attention dealt to the Kashmir region, as well, which is full of largely Pakistani Intelligence-supported insurgents and terrorists.

Swat Valley Update: Ceasefire is Go

It seems Pakistan's Swat region is going to settle down. At least for the moment. The Taliban (by which I mean the local Cleric-Warlord, Sufi Muhammed) has signed off on an "indefinite ceasefire" with the government. Apparently there isn't any fighting right now, either--but there's usually only sporadic killing/bombing/terrorizing when government troops aren't there. So there's little to say on effectiveness yet.

There are legitimate concerns that this is (as Prof. Barry Posen calls it) "the Pause that Refreshes," allowing the Taliban to bring up reserve troops, regroup, plan, resupply, etc. The Taliban may be cleverly fooling a desperate Pakistani army into taking the pressure off at a critical moment. Most radical Clerics are relatively evangelical and expansionist. Why stop here, if he has been able to take over 70% of the Swat region, and gains a military advantage by the ceasefire?

If Pakistan hopes to make this ceasefire final, it must regroup itself and present a credible deterrent. It must make clear, somehow, that breaking the ceasefire (in a serious way) will make the Taliban's collective lives extremely difficult. The incentives must work out: if messing with the ceasefire and trying to expand influence is not worth the cost of having to deal with the Pakistani Army, then you have a ceasefire that is likely to hold for a while.

How to make that happen is another story.

A Primer on the Taliban

I had the opportunity this semester to take a class on Warlords and Non-State Actors this semester, and jumped on it. The first class on the Taliban was a bit of an eye-opener, at least for me. Thanks to the Iraq War (which is, frankly, over at this point), I've been relatively happy to blissfully ignore the New Quagmire for a more geopolitically interesting situation. Since Professor Christina yanked me out of my cave, I've learned a few things about Afghanistan that I want to share with you.

One of the interesting studies she presented was a survey of 42 Taliban in Kandahar (somewhat non-scientific, but rather compelling nonetheless, particularly that it was conducted by a Pashtun) that revealed a bunch of interesting tendencies about the Taliban. The first is that they're so thoroughly propagandized by Talibani leadership that literally all 42 interviewed believed that NATO was specifically designed as a Western coalition to attack Muslims. Most of these guys were also pretty bent on putting down their arms and getting back to work once the "foreginers" were driven out--sadly, this probably also includes toppling the Karzai regime, as he's seen by Talibani as a puppet of the West. The last interesting observation is that these guys really have no connection to Al-Qaeda anymore--or at least not much of one. Al-Qaeda was a client of the Taliban, but the Taliban doesn't need them, and shed them when Al-Qaeda became too costly to hold on to (a sign that some aspects of the Global War on Terror are going well).

So let's take a look at ethnicity in Afghanistan. Remember the Northern Alliance? That was a bunch of Turkmen, Tajiks, and Uzbeks. If these names sound familiar, it's because they each have a majority Central Asian country (Turkmenistan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan). During the invasion, they drove south, and wiped the Taliban, who were mostly Pashtun.

But they kept their heads down, and came back. Look first at the ethnic groups; the brown area...


Now, on this graphic, see the green area; this is the Pashtun-dominated area in both Afghanistan and Pakistan.

And finally, look at the dark red areas in the map below; there you see "high Taliban presence," along with the red dots that indicate their attack patterns in 2007. As you'll notice, it's pretty clearly in Pashtun areas (and Baluchi areas and some Tajik areas). But Pashtuns, the clear plurality (and they think majority) of Afghanistan are the biggest problem. They're now a bunch of militants that are trying to drive out the US and re-establish the Sharia nutjob state that ran the show until 2001. And, of course, Afghanistan is always going to have some of these guys, and one either has to deter them, kill them, or drive them out (becuase one won't convince them). But this huge proportion of the population has been convinced to at least help out the Taliban, and this is in part due to ideology, in part due to the fact that the government cannot provide administration and security, and in part because the Taliban has coerced them through terror (they are very good at sending letters with lots of creepy details that convince everyone that they are watching at all times).



For whatever reason, these guys feel marginalized by the new government. And while a bunch of folks would be happier to buy into the government and just live their lives, the Taliban has made defection so deadly (and seemingly have eyes everywhere) that a lot of people are trapped in fighting for the guys they don't want to. So how do we separate them? Well, that's tough. But, essentially, we need to do 3 things, simultaneously: 1) provide sufficient protection to our quiet supporters such tha they can support us, 2) convince the fence-sitters (with economics!) to join our side, and 3) deter/kill/beat down the "irreconciliables."

So this actually looks a lot like the Surge strategy. It's going to require (if we throw a bunch of troops at the problem) getting into every darn village in the south, and getting our chins pretty bloody for quite a while. It is going to require undercover agents, competent translators (and lots of them), and lots of training for Afghan troops to make them ready enough to join the US on missions. Joint Afghan/US missions in large numbers will not only train Afghan troops in COIN, but also help give the US some legitimacy, tact, and context in its own missions.

But Afghanistan has become more than just a fight against a few terrorists. It did years ago, but it took us a while to admit it or get our heads around it. We're dealing with a sustained militia resistance, one that is largely bent on Islamic rule and largely bent on booting foreigners. Really, we should be negotiating with the Taliban and trying to give the majority of them sufficient buy-in to jump on the Karzai boat. This requires both increasing the benefits of joining, and increasing the costs of resisting (which requires continuing to bloody them, cut off their access to money, etc).

This is all fine and well, and would likely be achieveable in Afghanistan if it weren't for the fact that some 40% of the Taliban is across the border. One simply can't solve this problem in the long term as long as the Taliban can fester unmolested in Northwest Pakistan. And really, that's the most frustrating part about Afghanistan, whenever one thinks about it. We can have a great plan, but as long as we can't march into Pakistan and work together with the local troops there, it's going to be a waste of time. I'm excited to see what Petraeus can pull out of his pocket, because the man's brilliant. But it may be an impossible task, because there are too many variables, too many people, and too many square kilometers that aren't in his control at all.

So, we'll see. Sadly, I don't have much of an answer except to go ahead with a Surge-style boots-on-the-ground strtategy, and see if we can't convince a bunch of Taliban-turned-good-guy militias to cross back into Pakistan and do our dirty work for us.

Obama's Orders in Pakistan Vindicate Bush

There has been much speculation in the past few years over seemingly foolish strategy in Pakistan against the Taliban by the Bush Regime. Alas, I have been a rather tough critic myself of a strategy that seemed at its core designed to irritate our alleged allies in the war on the Taliban.

US missiles flung into Pakistani territory do indeed kill Talibani soldiers, but it is highly unclear just how much of a battlefield tactical effect they might have. It seemed rather obvious to we political scientists that it was a long-term strategic blunder. Ultimately, cooperation by the Pakistanis would have been much more helpful (for, indeed, ground assaults by local troops supported by US Intelligence, airpower, and special forces was just how we drove the Taliban out of Afghanistan).

But Obama's decision to so quickly continue with the missile strikes is a bit of a shock to at least myself. This new President is one that promised a completely different approach--in particular, one that was much more friendly to our allies, and even to those that don't like us (like Iran). Obama's order of a missile strike in Pakistan that killed about 20 (hopefully Taliban) seems to be a direct contradiction of that.

This contradiction can be resolved one of a few ways, some of which are more plausible than others:
1) Obama's foreign policy will be just like Bush's, for all the bad reasons we believed Bush's was bad.
Unlikely. Even Obama can't get away with calling for change and then doing the exact same thing for four straight years. Additionally, the closing of Guantanamo (despite it truly making lives in the US Justice Department painful) shows a strong commitment to national image abroad.
2) Firing missiles into Pakistan is actually so overwhelmingly important for the battlefield that we are willing to pay the price diplomatically.
Possible, though it doesn't really seem to have kept the Taliban in check so far. Might be keeping them worried/hidden/suppressed, which would in particular be helpful if there were ground forces converging, which brings me to...
3) All of this is secretly coordinated with a somewhat-cooperative (yet still questionably competent) Pakistani Army.
Given both that airstrikes are not terribly effective in the absence of infantry, and that the President was able to decisively choose to attack after only two days in office, he likely has the cooperation from relatively authoritative persons in Pakistan, probably in the army. I will note, as well, the reluctance of the Pakistani government to make much of a fuss, even if they cannot openly admit cooperation.

If said cooperation is occurring, then the Pakistanis are likely planning a relatively major crackdown in the region. Why it didn't happen during the Bush regime is a bit of a wildcard in this interpretation, to be honest, but not one without some room for interpretation. The Pakistanis certainly could not afford to show any signs of working with Mr. Bush, but the government may be waiting to see how the wind blows in its country for Mr. Obama. Obama is bringing serious non-military aid to Pakistan soon, and it may make the environment ripe enough for open coordination with the Americans. For the meantime, Mr. Obama has free reign to soften the Talibani leadership a bit. And so he will.

Israel's Confidence is High

Israel is starting to hint that they have full intent to take down Hamas with this war in Gaza (though this has been pretty obvious for a few days now). Their confidence that they can do so is surprisingly high, as well--Israeli officials are calling Hamas "crippled" in a few ways: its physical governance infrastructure is ruined (parliament building, police buildings, etc), its leadership is dead or in hiding (having abandoned its population), and its popularity is going to drop.

Though the popularity of Hamas is currently rather high, the Israelis think it will go down significantly in the next few weeks as Palestinians wonder whether a militant anti-Israel stance is one that is going to serve them well in the future. In particular, if Hamas is unable to provide governance, order, medical supplies, etc after the war ends, then their support will erode. Pre-war, Fatah already had an edge in Gaza polls. When the Palestinians have elections, probably in April 2009, Fatah will probably have quite the edge, even in Gaza. And if it does, and if Kadima can hold on in Israel, then the whole situation in Palestine looks a lot different. Israel will probably do what it can to enforce Fatah's right to govern in Gaza Strip, and help clean the strip up before working on serious two-state talks.

Such confidence is strange, coming from an Israel that lost a 2006 war in Lebanon due to overconfidence and poorly-defined campaign goals. Israel had been showing serious conservatism in its war goals early on: the air campaign was aimed at reducing rocket attacks, not even eliminating them. While Israel is not saying that they have changed their goals to the toppling of Hamas, they are certainly saying that it's likely that they will, and that they're quite happy for it. This means one of two things:

1) Israel's government did not learn a lesson from its tough defeat, even though I was able to graft that lesson from my seat in Cambridge, or,

2) Israel is actually well and truly crushing Hamas' governance and combat capabilities.

Occam's Razor says it's probably the latter.

Despite confidence, Israel remains conservative. They have not given in to goading and luring on the part of Hamas to enter Gaza City or other urban areas for street fighting. They have kept their total military casualties to one, suffered on the first night of entry. Israel's targets have been picked with deliberate caution, as well: Palestinian medical authorities have reported only 16 children dead, despite a strong incentive to over-report. Hamas has claimed that half of the over-500 killed in Gaza are civilians, but there is a strong incentive to over-report here, as well: Hamas loses face by reporting its own fighters killed, and gains support by claiming that Israel has killed civilians. Given how informally one can join the Hamas paramilitary, it will be impossible for these figures to ever be confirmed beyond academic estimates.

So things seem to be going well for Israel so far. They have a lot of work to do, and in particular, Israel must keep up strong diplomacy with Jordan, Egypt, and Lebanon, in order to keep its free military reign in Gaza. But such support should have wavered days ago if it was going to. Israel appears to have a serious shot at crippling Hamas for good and, despite the cries of many protesters to the contrary, contribute to long-term peace in the Middle East.

Analysing Israel's Gaza Tactics

After a day of war, Israel stand at one dead and about 40 wounded. They say they have killed "dozens" of Hamas militants, but they are struggling with their opposition using civilians as human shields in the fighting.

Let me first digress by expressing my own personal sympathies for Israel's difficult position. After returning full control of the Gaza strip to Palestine, Hamas used a civil war to wrest power, and has been using it as a safe haven to accumulate rockets from Iran and other sources to launch into Israel constantly, even during a six-month ceasefire in which Israel was relatively disciplined. Israel provided the majority of Gaza's fuel, food, electricity, and medical aid at no cost--despite access to the Mediterranean and Egypt, Gaza's Hamas leadership has held Gaza's economy back--gross mismanagement and excessive, corrupt government bureaucracy have made sure that Gaza's market has not spun up at all. Hamas hands out aid received by Israel, and takes credit--keeping its popularity high among its many poor and jobless. Hamas seems to take very little flak from its own people for storing weapons in Mosques and orphanages, or by using civilian human shields as they fight Israelis. The Arab world is starting to flare up in protest, and otherwise-moderate Arab governments have to condemn Israel's invasion to halt rocket fire--after relatively patient and persistent warnings to stop, offers to negotiate, and months of restraint--as a "war crime." Luckily for the Israelis, Egypt continues to stand by them (to what extent they can), and the Arab League is unable to spin up the momentum to actually meet over the crisis. The US will block any UN resolutions to officially condemn Israel in any way. Even US Senate Majority Leader, Harry Reid, has said that a ceasefire is impossible until Hamas offers to halt rocket fire. So even if this war lasts for a few weeks, the US will not be switching teams on a dime.

So Israel is now elbow-deep in this problem--what have they actually done? According to relatively scattered reports, Israel has already cut to the Mediterranean and has surrounded Gaza City and other urban centers, as far south as Netzarim, but the Israeli Army has been disciplined enough to avoid entering any major urban areas, where the Hamas militants likely have a great advantage (with huge numbers of civilians that the Israelis have to worry about, potential booby traps, and other "home turf" advantages like knowledge of the terrain, friendly homes, etc). A map I put together below should make it a bit more clear where the Israelis have gone.

Approximate Israeli Movement and Positions (Click for Larger)

Their staging ground was Sderot, on the northeast corner of Gaza. From there, Israel broke in during the night and cut power to most of the northern half of the strip, taking advantage of night fighting technology to strike their initial blow (and most of their advances in the last day). The Israelis are likely to continue using night to press their primary assaults in search of rockets, launch pads, and Hamas leadership. Note that with Gaza City surrounded (and certainly extremely strict policies for anyone escaping), Hamas leadership isn't going anywhere soon (for the Israelis control Gaza waters, as well). Special forces have an opportunity to use what intelligence that Mossad has gathered to take them down in the capital city if they weren't smart enough to get out early.

At this point, Israel looks like it is going to focus on a search-and-destroy mission in the north, and then perhaps move south to mop up militants that got out--it is unlikely to spread its 3 brigades so thin as to take the entire strip at once. Israel also has troops ready in Jerusalem and near Lebanon in case West Bank Palestinians or Lebanese Hezbollah militants try anything tricky to help out their brothers-in-arms.

So the easy part is over, with few casualties for the Israelis, but the hard part--search-and-destroy--is just beginning. The success of the rest of this mission will depend on Israeli tactical intelligence abilities more than brilliant ground war operational capabilities. Israeli unit tactical training will face a test, as well.

But this mission really has more substance than simply finding rockets, or even toppling Hamas leadership. After failing to meet its objectives in Summer 2006 in Lebanon--namely, preventing rockets from hitting Israel in the north--Israel is hoping to regain its deterrent capabilities with neighboring militant groups. Israel is unlikely to face a regular war with its neighbors in the near future--their willingness to negotiate has a lot to do with Israel's ability to bloody them up if they choose to fight. So far, Hezbollah has chosen to sit this one out (so far), and read (though I've lost the link) that there are rumors floating about Hamas heading to Egypt to talk potential ceasefire options. So maybe it's working.