Showing posts with label strategy. Show all posts
Showing posts with label strategy. Show all posts

Friday, June 10, 2011

The Changing US Strategy in the AfPak Region

There is writing that is moving from the walls directly to the Oval-Office-sealed paperwork: the United States will be removing the vast majority of its presence from Afghanistan, and soon.

A few pretty obvious signs are pointing to this:
-Defense Secretary Gates is stepping down
-The extremely popular General Petraeus has been moved to the position of CIA Director
-The President is making it clear he plans to accelerate troop withdrawal from Afghanistan
-The US and Pakistan are finally working together to hunt down a list of Al-Qaeda / Taliban leadership using CIA/ISI resources

These signs are indicative of 2 major changes:
1) The US strategy in Afghanistan is becoming one that focuses on anti-leadership attacks
2) The US has discussed this strategy with Pakistan--and finally gotten real cooperation

As we discuss this strategy, we must keep in mind the US' overall goal: to prevent jihadist groups from being able to either unite the Middle East against the West, and from being able to organize and launch coordinated trans-national attacks.

The US has largely succeeded in its first goal. The Arab Spring is (mostly) a relatively liberal-democratic movement, rather than a jihadist one. The US has won the "hearts-and-minds" campaign; al-Qaeda and its affiliates lack support from large populations, except perhaps in Yemen and Somalia.

In the second, the US has largely succeeded in all places but Yemen and the AfPak region. Yemen poses a different problem, but the AfPak region can be managed without the total collapse of the Taliban.

In fact, much of the Taliban these days consist of a Vietnam-style nationalist movement. Yes, they're still unsavory folks that want to bring a twisted form of Sharia to Afghanistan, but that is largely not the US' problem, as much as we may cringe to say it. There's little indication that much of the Pashtun Taliban know much about al-Qaeda or, if they do, care for the trans-nationalist doctrine.

On the other hand, much of the hardened leadership of the Taliban and other associated groups pose the bigger threat to the US' interests. These leaders can and sometimes will coordinate strikes, as we've seen in Pakistan and India. The new strategy calls for their systematic elimination by drones or CIA/ISI strike teams coordinating both tactics and intelligence. So far, it looks like it stands a chance at being relatively effective.

In the general push for Afghan security, a few benefits arise:
1) Focusing on the leadership hampers the Taliban's ability to coordinate, resupply, etc, when facing offensives
2) Withdrawing troops hurts the Taliban's nationalist message
3) The Taliban actually do want a negotiated settlement, and seem to be willing to do so once the US withdraws. Yes, they will have much more bargaining power then, but a negotiated settlement (at this point) is a much more palatable option than continued warfare for either side. They have reached a "painful stalemate," and are ready to talk.

Ultimately, we must remember that most of the Taliban are folks with very well-defined and limited aims, that don't include attacking the US (as angry as they may be). To a large extent, we can use the NVDA/Viet Cong as an analogy for most of these fighters, even if international interests are involved in funding them.

The most important part, though, is finally getting Pakistan's full help. Pakistan is shifting for 2 reasons:
1) US promises of quick withdrawal have now made helping the US politically palatable. The Taliban are not popular in most of Pakistan, and carry out attacks against the Pakistani people all the time. If Pakistan can help the US in a way that is politically palatable, it will--the US has just given it that opening.
2) With the US withdrawing, Pakistan is now legitimately worried about the Taliban threat growing, and is going to take higher responsibility to deal with it, and take control of the Waziristan region. The US withdrawal has been a bit of a "wake-up" moment for both the Pakistani leadership and its people.

Ultimately, total defeat of the Taliban is unlikely. Unlike Iraq, where the there was a small group of "irreconciliables" that were systematically destroyed, the Taliban represent a large group that is afraid of marginalization (much like the Sunnis in Iraq felt), and it must be negotiated with and brought into the government in some way.

Focusing on strikes against the leadership is likely the way that the US can bring this negotiation to the forefront, while keeping the Taliban as weak as possible, and ultimately preventing any transnational attacks from occuring.

Monday, October 25, 2010

The Pessimistic View of the War in Afghanistan

General Petraeus is painting a relatively rosy picture of the path forward in Afghanistan. US intelligence agencies are saying somewhat else. It can be summed up thus (By Strafor):

"As U.S. Col. Harry Summers so clearly articulated, negotiation is achieved militarily when military power is applied in such a way as to impose upon the enemy a choice: negotiate on American terms and on American timetables, or be destroyed. Negotiation with the Taliban must be understood first and foremost as lacking that latter possibility."

If the Taliban do not actually see their position weakening over time, effective negotiations will not occur--they may be willing to humor negotiations at the last minute as NATO leaves, in order to avoid a civil war, but the NATO bargaining position at that point will be nearly zero.

The question that's not yet clear to me is this: how strategically effective is the US "Surge" in Afghanistan? How effective are the attacks on senior leadership and the counter-insurgency movements on the ground? I just don't know.

Wednesday, September 22, 2010

The Struggle Between Two Bad Options in Afghanistan

The Tension of Two Bad Options in Afghanistan

The War in Afghanistan remains in a frustratingly ambiguout state; the US is neither decisively winning, nor losing.

Colin Powell says that he is "not sure" whether the US is winning or not. General Petraeus is fighting a number of "soft" offensives, attempting to take-and-hold Taliban-dominated regions and build an Afghani security presence, rather than attack and decisively defeat the Taliban (which may not even be necessary, if they maintain a large political base).

Of course, success depends in part on Pakistan's ability (and willingness) to contain the Taliban on its side of the border. Islamabad's inability to recover from the floods in the Northwest not only strengthen the Taliban's presence there, but have brought murmuring rumors of a military coup.

Afghanistan remains in a bad, but ambiguous state.

This is one of the more politically difficult situations a leader can be in--the President can be blamed either way given a decision. If the US "doubles down" and commits heavily to Afghanistan, it might become a classic "quagmire," and will smear him (and would be a more costly defeat).

Unfortunately, politics are getting in the way of what might be the right decision (This being Bob Woodward's "Obama's Wars").

Obama's military aides have been pushing for a larger, longer commitment--one of the risks identified is that if the US nails down a withdrawal deadline while the Taliban are strong, then there's no incentive for the Taliban to deal--only to sit back and avoid major conflict until the US departs (along, surely, with the rest of ISAF).

Obama's tenuous political position has brought out some (if accurate) potentially damning quotes about his motivations behind his strategy, including:
"I have two years with the public on this," and
"I can't lose the whole Democratic Party."

Domestic motivations in a war effort are nothing new--indeed, they're often the primary motivator in many war decisions (unfortunately), including staying in Vietnam (where there was no real threat to the United States' national security). Interestingly, it may be domestic politics that will drag the US out of Afghanistan.

The infighting amongst Obama's aides and the power of domestic politics in war strategy will be a boon to the Taliban. This is a classic case of the "war burnout" from which many Democracies suffer.

Friday, July 2, 2010

Afghan War Intensity Up--A Sign of Hope?

100 ISAF servicemen died in June--the most since the Afghanistan war began. it's a terrible number and a tragedy, absolutely.

But: there is a sign of hope in the increased intensity of the Afghan war.

The Taliban is increasingly on the offensive--bold (and sometimes reckless) attacks against American and Afghani targets are well on the upswing.

What's this mean? Why the change? The easy answer is to say, "they're getting stronger, and want to deal a finishing blow." This is, certainly, what the attacks are meant to imply.

But the story is more complicated.

The question to ask is: what is the Taliban's winning strategy?

The answer, by the way, is to wait out the US. The US will leave eventually. It will not stay there forever. If the Taliban can slowly swell its safe base of operations, it will win, as the US will eventually grow tired and fade away.

Three series of events are happening in parallel:
1) The US is stepping up drone/special operations in Taliban strongholds in Southern Afghanistan (like Helmand).
2) Pakistan is stepping up full-scale military assaults in Taliban strongholds in northern Pakistan (like Swat and Northern Waziristan).
3) The Taliban is stepping up bold offensives against the Pakistani Government, the Afghani Government, and ISAF.

I think you might be able to see where I am going.

Why the boldness, if the Taliban wants to wait for the US to leave?

The obvious guess is that the wait-it-out strategy is not currently viable.

ISAF and Pakistan are working together on an offensive. As we saw in Iraq, offensives cost lives. They hurt, the numbers look bad, and the American public grows quickly impatient.

But, potentially, they work. Certainly, a lack of offensives will fail. Preventing at all turns a stronghold for the enemy is a necessary (though not sufficient) part of COIN. It seems like this costly measure is starting to pay off: bold Taliban attacks on ISAF sites imply that there may be a desperation on the part of the Taliban to pressure NATO out of Afghanistan quickly. If that's the case, then the Taliban thinks that waiting is no longer in its favor.

The alternative hypothesis is that the Taliban is so strong that it's trying to deliver the "final blow." First, this doesn't make particular sense, strategically--the Taliban is traditionally quite terrible against ISAF in straight-up gun battles, as the past month has shown. If the waiting-game is a winning strategy, then there's no reason the Taliban would grow impatient and start putting its fighters at higher risk. It's been fighting a 25-year war for Independence. Its time horizon is much longer than a few months.

Second, the US is already scheduled to start pulling out of Afghanistan--there is no particular need or reason to try to "hurry" them. This is the perfect situation to, if possible, keep the "wait-it-out" strategy going.

If the Taliban is on the offensive, it's because it can't be on the defensive. Its strongholds and safe areas are being threatened and broken up. For sure, we know its lines of communication are being disrupted--making its attacks decreasingly coordinated and effective.

There is hope. There is a whole lot more to do than disrupting the Taliban's footing in the AfPak region to ensure victory in Afghanistan. But it is necessarily the first and most important step in winning the war (creating a stable, functional, credible central government to take its place is another story altogether).

Keep your eyes up in the next few months for Petraeus to continue to apply his modified strategy from Iraq--potentially successfully.

Sunday, July 5, 2009

Thoughts on the Helmand Offensive

It's getting... some news. Not too much.

But it's the biggest military offensive in Afghanistan since the invasion in 2001, and the stakes are high. The outcome is important. The implications will be enormous.

The whole thing smells a bit sweetly of a General Petraeus plot. Large surge of troops, offensive against the seriously bad guys, and long-term boots on the ground to provide security and institutional organization where there is a vacuum. Petraeus trained the US army in doubling as a low-level government, and those skills will be critical in winning the long-term security of the province. Hearts-and-minds.

It is very hard, to say the least, to tell how the offensive is going. Bad guys are dying, good guys are dying. The folks in Helmand aren't sure whether they're more angered by the presence of the Taliban or the presence of foreign troops.

But if US marines and UK army troops are able to achieve victory (loosely defined as restoring peace and security to the region), then a number of benefits follow:

1) Helmand and Kandahar will be more secure areas in which the US can operate and prevent Taliban from pouring across the border during the Waziristan operation in Pakistan. This is critical. If Helmand and Kandahar remain in Taliban hands, then even a successful assault in Waziristan will be worth little to the long-term war against the Taliban. On the other hand, if the US and UK can hold the area and patrol the border, then they will pinch the largest concentration of Taliban in the entire Afpak region, and have a good shot at delivering the first crushing blow in a very long time. But these Taliban are wiser, tougher, and smarter than their brethren out in Swat, and will not go down so easily.

2) Voting in the area will be secure. Giving the Pashtun majority the ability to vote in full (where currently the only secure voting areas are in northern, non-Pashtun areas) will legitimize the election and potentially prevent post-election violence.

3) The ISAF will strike a significant psychological blow to the Taliban--and bolster the confidence of anti-Taliban citizens in Afghanistan, much like the Pakistani assault in Swat did. The ISAF needs to regain the momentum of this war; the Taliban can out-wait foreigners rather indefinitely if it is not soundly beaten.

Losing, of course, means that the momentum is very squarely in the hands of the Taliban. But, frankly, the US and UK are unlikely to simply give up this fight--they will stick around and make life rather difficult for the Taliban for a long time. Total defeat seems unlikely, and they should at least be able to operate with enough presence to support the Waziristan assault in Pakistan (at which point the US should have an easier time "mopping up" Helmand and Kandahar, as the Taliban will have no safe zones). It may be messy and long, but I believe the US is likely to turn a victory here.

But if it doesn't, serious questions will be asked about whether it is worth it to stick around much longer.

Tuesday, June 30, 2009

Speculating on US-Pakistani Cooperation

The evidence that the US and Pakistan are coordinating quietly in the tribal border regions of the Pakistani state is increasing. Increased US drone attacks suggest both permission and intelligence from the Pakistani army--these attacks provide the Army with not only a great psychological advantage (previously safe spots are no longer safe for the Taliban), but a tactical one (they frequently enough kill enemy commanders). Precision strikes by the Pakistani Army suggest US aerial and satellite intelligence in real-time, allowing jets and artillery to pinpoint their attacks.

The "softening" operation has prompted the Taliban in Waziristan to abandon a peace agreement they had with the government (which, frankly, I did not know was officially in place at all). Such an abandonment will mean more attacks on civilians--and if they come quickly, the Army will be forced to act more quickly than it might otherwise like. But with the spectre of civilian deaths hanging over the Army, they will utilize their American allies more to hit the Taliban hard and keep them off-balance as the Pakistani Army prepares for its assault in Waziristan.

The Pakistani assault is not, contrary to my expectations, caused NATO casualties to go down: this month was the worst in almost a year. But I have been reminded that casualty-counting during a surge in troop activity provides a false comparison: there are more troops more actively and aggressively deployed now than before, and casualties can sometimes be a sign of intense forward activity rather than enemy success. But the real US opportunity will come after a successful Waziristan assault, and the US is going to do anything it can to help that happen.

Wednesday, May 13, 2009

The Emerging Wisdom of Pakistan's Military Strategy

Pakistan is sending hundreds of commandos into a Taliban hideout near Mignora. And while the over-arching strategy is not announced (it's unclear whether the US administration even knows what the strategy is), there is a good story to be told in what such a strategy might be. Below I submit a proposal for what the Pakistanis might be doing, with some evidence for it.

With 5000 Taliban militants (and only 15000 military to combat them), Pakistan fell far below the "standard" 10:1 ratio of counter-insurgents to insurgents. Simply trying to stick troops in the area and hope they could provide security was foolish. So Pakistan first asked its civilians to move out of Mignora. They are now refugees, and this has made life terribly difficult for both the government and said civilians, but mixed results seem to suggest that Pakistan is up to the challenge. In doing this (and I've talked earlier about how tough it would be for the Taliban to try to sneak up with these civilians), Pakistan was largely able to turn a counter-insurgency campaign into an urban warfare campaign. But 3:1 are still pretty bad odds against a dug-in urban enemy--things would get pretty bloody, at best.

So Pakistan, possibly ready to reimburse owners of whatever houses the Taliban holed up in, decided instead to throw a bunch of explosives at them, instead. To a large extent, the Taliban broke out of their dug-in areas in fear, and fled the streets when the Army showed up to intercept them. Such a tactic was a brilliant stroke of taking advantage of the Taliban's lack of military discipline and rigor--the Taliban might have had an advantage if the fight had gone how the Taliban had prepared, but they had not prepared for how to deal with heavy bombing campaigns, and decided (wisely), not to fight the Army on the Army's terms.

And then, Pakistan gets even smarter. As the 5000 fighters retreat (after about 750 casualties), many of the slightly-less-nutty Taliban (especially the youngsters) may be rethinking their long term life plans, and deserting. The Army estimates that only about 1500 are total die-hards, and the rest are new/young/coerced recruits. This mass retreat is a good opportunity for them to run to the paramilitary (scattered all over the outskirts of the city) with their arms in the air, and get 3 squares and a cot to sleep on. Why would they surrender? Well, this is probably the hardest that the Pakistani military has hit the Taliban in many years, and many of the new recruits have likely gotten more than they bargained for.

But it gets better. There are 1500+ remaining die-hards to deal with. This is where the Commandos come in. There is a pretty big mountain base that seems an obvious retreat location for a scattered and disorganized Taliban that has no other place to go. It is apparently well-stocked, and well-guarded. But what if the Pakistani Army flew (in helicopters) ahead of the Taliban retreating on foot to this base, with hundreds of Commandoes, in order to shut it down? If these Commandoes are successful (and frankly, they likely will be), these retreating Taliban will be a long way from any friendly territory, disorganized, under-supplied, and without morale. Their capture will likely be relatively easy with the 15,000 troops sent to the area. And, voila, Mingora will be cleaned up, if all goes to plan.

But, frankly, Mingora is only the start of a much greater, more pervasive Taliban problem. It's big. The BBC provides an excellent map (shown here) of where it thinks the Taliban is in control. The Pakistani government, of course, contests the extent of alleged Taliban control, but even if it's a bit less, it's a lot. The Pakistani Army has a very long way to go if it is actually going to break Taliban control over this swath of its country.

Monday, March 30, 2009

Obama's Vietnam

Well to be very optimistic: This Afghanistan thing is going to get a lot worse before it gets better. And Obama's new strategy isn't going to be helping--at least, if the strategy is what he outlined.

First, a recap of recent trends. Remember that peace deal signed with the Swat valley Taliban? Well, as much as Swat is quiet (except for Taliban now running around lashing anyone that doesn't follow Allah's will), the deal is turning out to be pretty sour. First, it sets a terrible precedent: make life hard enough on the Government, kill enough people, terrorize hard enough, and the government will cave. Now, I know that there are people that attribute this problem to any peace deal, anywhere. But a peace deal must, if one side is giving more than peace, include a promise of more than peace from the other side. The Taliban are free to move (and regroup, rearm, train, propagandize, and prepare in other ways) about all they want in Swat. In 2 short years, they were able to get Pakistan to "surrender" the area to direct Taliban rule. Why stop here? Without pressure from the state, the Taliban can grow more powerful. What if they want more next year? They have no incentive to follow the peace deal (why, just because they said they would?) Now there is a Sharia mini-state in Pakistan, at the heart of all the militants running around making trouble. Frankly, it's a complete disaster. And it's a terrible model for future Taliban negotiations.

The second major problem is that while there has been a lull in Swat, there has been an increase of activity elsewhere (and I dare you to tell me that they're not getting all sorts of support from Swat). Pakistan was probably hoping such appeasement would get other Taliban to calm down. Quite to the contrary! Once Taliban militants saw that sufficient mayhem would get one group what it wanted, it seems they have all put their chips down. The government cannot credibly tell these groups, "we will not make concessions." So they're going to try to milk the government for all it's worth. After killing 50 worshipers at a Mosque in Peshawar, Taliban abducted 12 police officers yesterday. In Lahore, Taliban killed 8 police cadets and wounded 50 in a raid on a police academy earlier today. The Taliban is trying to break the shoddy police and paramilitary services of Pakistan by making sure that citizens are too terrified to sign up. And they're doing a pretty good job. Pakistan has its tail between its legs.

Enter President Obama, with a brilliant new strategy for Afghanistan! Obama wants to "sharpen the focus" of the war, by concentrating military might on al-Qaeda, rather than the Taliban. This is based on the premise that the Taliban are generally this very large group of nationalists/religious nuts that really hate that the West is there, that happens to include a lunatic fringe (rather than, itself, being a small lunatic fringe). The premise is correct. The strategy stemming from this premise is absolutely absurd, for a number of reasons.

First, the Taliban and al-Qaeda are not very independent in the region. The Taliban leadership supports al-Qaeda. They always have. If we go smash up al-Qaeda members with some precision strikes, give the Taliban the thumbs up to take over the region, and then go home, what makes us think that al-Qaeda is not going to come back? Will the Taliban seriously devote any resources at all to rooting out and squelching an ideologically friendly organization that happens to love killing Westerners even more than the Taliban does? And furthermore, the Taliban is blowing us up not because we're shooting them, but because we're there at all. Obama wants to increase US troops by 150%, but not fight the Taliban! The Taliban won't stop attacking US troops simply because we promise we're only going after al-Qaeda. The concept is somewhat boggling.

There has been some hand-waving about negotiating with the Taliban, but we have no idea how to do that. They certainly don't want to negotiate with us--we're foreign infidels. And Karzai is a Western puppet. Even many of the MPs in his government think he's going to steal the next election. And, currently, we have no bargaining power with the Taliban. They're growing in size, influence, power. They're acting with impunity. Why would they negotiate when they could conquer? As far as I've learned, negotiations work well at a "hurting stalemate--" when both sides are stuck, grinding, bleeding, and not getting anywhere. This isn't the case. The Taliban are only going to negotiate in an acceptable way if they're hurting, too.

The Taliban should indeed have a political voice in the Afghani government, there's no doubt--but negotiations have to center on giving them political power in exchange for laying down their arms and/or joining government forces--just like with the Sunni extremists in Iraq (that became the famed Sons of Iraq / Sunni Reawakening). But it requires putting the hurt on. In Iraq, the Shiites and Sunnis were putting the hurt on each other. Right now, nobody's making the Taliban's life difficult, and they're starting to see evidence that they can take over.

But Obama's hand-wavings about negotiations may largely sum up to letting them take over Afghanistan, which I sincerely hope is not the case. The Taliban is, deep down, a religious extremist organization that hosted al-Qaeda and promoted anti-Western terrorism long before the US was anywhere near Afghanistan. Putting them in charge again won't make US future prospects terribly peachy.

The parallels between Vietnam and Afghanistan are much stronger than those between Vietnam and Iraq, at least tactically. In Afghanistan, we see the same united, organized ideological insurgency that is based in a region we're not, but is relatively ubiquitous among the population. It's casualty-accepting, highly nationalist, and extraordinarily pissed. It's using sovereignty to its advantage, swimming through porous borders that the US cannot follow. President Obama no doubt sees these parallels. But he's drawing the wrong lessons--Obama's plan looks fatalistic: he is looking for a victory by making the victory standards absurdly low. But there is a big difference between Vietnam and Afghanistan--in Vietnam, leaving Communists in charge did precious little to the US but embarrass it. In Afghanistan, we are considering putting in charge an organization that is trying to take over Pakistan, and that has already shown full willingness to support organizations that would attack us on our own soil. And I think leaving them in charge will leave us more vulnerable than before we went in.