Showing posts with label Kurds. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Kurds. Show all posts

Sunday, June 26, 2016

Flash Update: Fallujah Liberated

ISIS has been driven completely out of Fallujah, and mop-up operations have begun to clear the highways between Fallujah and Ramadi. But ISIS troops there have nowhere to hide, and the Iraqi Army has the numerical and mechanical advantage. It should take a few weeks.

What's quite amazing is that Fallujah actually had 4,000 ISIS troops, and the Iraqi Army dealt with them pretty quickly once they punched in. It's an amazing victory and shows that the spear tip of the Iraqi Army is quite sharp. Well-done.

After that mop-up, the road to Mosul is clear.

I'm getting updates from here, by the way: http://isis.liveuamap.com/en/2016/25-june-iraqisf-soldiers-have-raised-the-iraqi-flag-in-the


Manbij is taking much longer than I thought, in part because my troop counts weren't up to snuff. The Kurds are slowly working their way to the edge of the city, and keep repelling ISIS counter-attacks.

In a way, this is good: the Kurds are quite stiff of spine, and have so much territory around Manbij surrounded that, if they are successful, they will likely destroy the 2,000+ unit in the city. So it will take some time, but momentum is definitely in the hands of the Kurds and SDF (Syrian Democratic Forces).


Stay tuned for more updates.

Tuesday, June 23, 2015

The Kurds' Strategic Chokehold of ISIS

The Kurds are moving so fast that the venerable Wikipedia article map on the ISIS war hasn't caught up yet. Enjoy your well-deserved vacation, user/editor Eratosthenian.

After taking Tall Abyad, the Kurds pushed south to secure Ain Issa and the nearby Brigade 93 army base. First, I'll draw it on the Wikipedia map I've been using for some time to give general context.


Looks like a march to al-Raqqah! Don't get too excited: the Kurds have no intentions of assaulting the city. But there's still very good news afoot: the Kurds are setting up their final choking of ISIS, which will assist the war efforts in both Iraq and Syria even if the Kurds sit around doing a whole lot of not-much once they regain Kurdish territory.

Let's look at a map with some roads for context--I doodled on Google Maps to get the idea across. The lines aren't that accurate mile-by-mile, but bear with me.


In the lower-right of the map we see al-Raqqah. Route 6 goes north to Tall Abyad, which is the closest crossing out of ISIS territory, to Turkey. We know that for some time, people, goods, and arms were flowing out of Turkey into Syria from the border crossing there. Now they're not. Already ISIS-held territory is seeing a spike in the price of food and other basic goods (according to the Syrian Observatory on Human Rights), which means shortages could loom if they're not able to establish another supply line elsewhere: the Euphrates has limited agricultural capacity and most domestic food comes from the West, which is not under ISIS control (and Syria is a net importer of many staple goods, like wheat). ISIS may be facing food shortages in the future, which could cripple the regime far faster than airstrikes.

Why is Ain Issa (the red-black marker on the map north of al-Raqqah) significant? Ultimately, it blocks ISIS from having access to the M4, which means the Kurdish rear is secure for an assault on Manbij. To get West from al-Raqqah, ISIS must travel along route 4 to the south of the Euphrates. Expect the Kurds to be regrouping quickly from the Tall Abyad assault, consolidating Samin, and then racing across the Euphrates via the M4 to take Manbij and Al Bab, both of which are heavily-settled Kurdish areas. Given recent Kurdish success so close to al-Raqqah and their new-found positioning advantage from taking Ain Issa, I expect the Kurds' chances are good.

The Kurds' final push in Syria will be to link up with their forces in the northwest and establish a secure front just north of Aleppo and across the Turkish border. Once they do this, they'll control all border crossings to Turkey, cutting ISIS off completely from foreign trade or smuggling. Securing al-Hasakah will also cut ISIS off from a concentrated area of arable land.

(I've included USDA agricultural maps of Syria and Iraq below to emphasize that ISIS' holdings are largely a bunch of non-arable desert).




 ISIS has been funded primarily through plunder and extortion, rather than production: without places to trade, their (admittedly vast) reserves of cash will become far less valuable. It will become very hard, very quickly, to get access to foreign fighters, weapons and ammunition, and food. The Kurds completing their conquests of northwestern Syria and the areas around al-Hasakah will complete a trade, recruitment, and agricultural choke-hold of ISIS, meaning time will no longer be on ISIS' side. And that's a really, really big deal.

Tuesday, June 16, 2015

Kurds Close the Gap in the North

The Kurds have, in a few days, closed the gap around Tall Abyad and pushed south of the river in the east towards Hasakah. In a series of Middle Eastern wars that have chugged along with agonizing sluggishness, this arena has moved shockingly quickly.


In Tall Abyad, fighting continues, but Kurdish forces made sure to surround Tall Abyad from the south, creating pockets to squeeze in on and eliminate the ISIS forces there, rather than letting them flee towards all-Raqqah, which should dampen the risk of a major counter-offensive.


The Syrians will be grateful for the closing of the Tall Abyad border crossing. This will mean a bit of long-term relief from ISIS so they can focus on killing each other instead.

In the east, the offensive to the east of Hasakah will make inaccessible both Route 1 and Route 47 that head to Mosul.


This would essentially cut off Mosul from ISIS reinforcements in Syria, where they're strongest. To get to Mosul, ISIS would have to run convoys through the desert and well away from major metropolitan areas, making them easy pickings for coalition jets. The Iraqis will be grateful.

In the medium-term, if the Kurds can hold off any ISIS counter-attacks (which seems likely--Syrian ISIS are bogged down in the west), they'll move west to take Manbij and close the gap between their central forces and their forces hanging out in the northwest of Syria, which would make the Kurds in control of all predominantly Kurdish territory in both Syria and Iraq.

The Kurds are likely hoping for at least an autonomous zone in Syria, like they have in Iraq--and depending on how long/damaging the Syrian civil war is, they might just be able to break off and form their own country. They're showing a capacity to defend and govern in Syria, where the Assad and rebel governments have not. The expansion of Kurdish territory in Iraq is likely to also expand Kurdish governance in those areas in the long-term, though the Iraqi government is not so broken-apart that they'll allow the Kurds to break away entirely.

Tuesday, June 9, 2015

Iraq & Kurds on Lightning Offensive in ISIS Weak Spots

This war is a roller-coaster ride: ups-and-downs, victories and defeats. Today we get to focus on some good news.

ISIS seems to have weakened itself in some areas in order to launch offensives in others. According to CIA estimates it only has a few tens of thousands of troops (20-30k), and it's trying to fight over a vast territory. It's bound to have weak spots.

We also know that Iraq is much better at offensives than on the defense: being able to pound targets with artillery and US airstrikes and assault once they're "softened" is much easier than trying to hold out by standing around, waiting for a bunch of nearby cars to all blow up at once.

Iraqi Shiite militias are also about as tough as the Kurds, so in areas where Iraq can employ them (in the east), they also tend to have greater successes.

Such has been at the root of a recent decisive territorial gain by Iraq.

Iraq

Iraq counter-attacked not in Ramadi to try to dislodge ISIS there, but in Baiji, north of Tikrit. In about a day they were able to move in and take the city center and refinery, and are now mopping up suburbs, engaged around the entire area. If it's anything like post-Tikrit, we should expect that whole area to be red in a week.



It sets the Iraqis up to be able to push north towards Mosul, which they may do next rather than getting too entangled in Anbar in their march to break the back of ISIS.

Kurdish Syria

Over the past two weeks the Kurds have been ripping across ISIS-held territory, liberating hundreds of villages. They're looking just weeks away from closing the gap in the north and linking up at Tall Abyad.

Some quick detail on the map, from left to right:
1) The Kobane forces--hardened, reinforced, and supported by US airstrikes--are pushing east after consolidating territory to the south. 
2) Forces from the east are pushing west to link up with them, though a bit more slowly. They're showing no signs of stopping right now.
3) After being bottled up for months at the Tall Tamer river crossing, the Kurds broke through and have liberated a densely-populated Kurdish population there, securing the west side of Hasakah.
4) We can see Kurdish forces have also broken through the river at Tall Brak, and are pushing south, likely to surround ISIS forces in Hasakah and secure the border crossing into Iraq from the other side.


If the Kurds are successful, they'll make their next push west, towards Manaj, and secure a line towards Aleppo. This would cover all heavily-Kurdish territory in the north, so the Kurds would slow down (or stop expanding entirely), but very good news will stem from their success:

1) It will stop the flow of fighters and arms coming from Turkey into Syria, so it will be harder for ISIS to refill its ranks and supplies in Syria.
2) It will mean the continued killing of ISIS troops.
3) It will make it harder for ISIS to reinforce Mosul--they'll be down to one highway in the desert (they won't be able to sneak north through more populated areas) so their supply trains will be highly vulnerable to airstrikes if they attempt reinforcement and resupply during the Iraqi/US assault.

Tuesday, March 3, 2015

Quick Update: Advances Against ISIS, and What to Expect in Tikrit

Readers keep telling me they love the maps, so you get maps and a bit of "implications." We'll also touch very briefly on Tikrit.

1) Kurdish forces out of Kobane have successfully pressed ISIS out of the space west of Kobane by trapping them against the river/lake and eliminating them. They've made modest progress in the east but I think we can expect the Kurdish forces to shift a bit south, but mostly east, to capture Tall Abyad crossing and cut off a supply line for ISIS from Turkey.


2) In northeast Sryia, ISIS has totally collapsed. That huge box on the right was all formerly ISIS, right up to the southern edge of that big red blotch (government fighters). It appears the Kurds and government troops have a truce, which has allowed them to push out. There is likely a bit of a "race" to secure space around Hasakah between Peshmerga and government forces. We also see in the western box that Kurdish forces have successfully crossed a river and are assaulting villages there, likely hoping to scoop up the smattering of black just to the south.


3) From the department of "great things come in small packages," the Kurds have successfully captured the roadway and villages around the bridge where Route 1 crosses the Tigris, cutting Mosul off from its most direct western supply line. This is a form of kicking the proverbial hornet's nest that may bring ISIS fighters out of dug-in fortifications to try to take the highway back. They're going to have plenty of time--Iraqi forces will be bogged down in Tikrit for a while.


4) Iraqi forces are probably trying to encircle Ramadi by taking villages to its north (lower-left box) and have entered Tikrit. In Tikrit, government forces are similarly trying to encircle the city before moving in, and are being slowed down by roadside/car bombs and suicide bombers. The little black dot south of Tikrit is being shelled at time of writing, and the dot to the north of Tikrit is being de-bombed.

Once Tikrit is surrounded, it may take up to a month to move in and finish off ISIS forces. Iraq is sporting 25,000 troops between regulars, Shiite militias, and Sunni militias. They likely outnumber ISIS forces 10:1--but just remember that Iraqi forces had similar odds when they were overrun in Mosul last summer.


Iran is supporting this operation rather than the US, which means no air support. It's clearly not an experiment ("can Iraqi forces handle this on their own?")--now's just not the time to be having such experiments, as Tikrit is probably the junior varsity version of trying to take Mosul.

What's more likely--I think--is that Iraq and Iran are going alone, without US "permission." Iraq has been frustrated with coalition support and it's possible (though I have predicted otherwise) that the US announcement of the Mosul offensive created some distrust--Iraq may have decided that the US couldn't be trusted with the intel.

Evidence suggests the US wasn't even told about the offensive--a US general said that the offensive was "no surprise," which is very different from saying "we're in the loop."

It'll be great news if Iraq can take Tikrit without US air support, though there are huge complications with making this a "Shiite" operation--Shiite militia abuse is a big part of why ISIS was able to get traction in western Iraq in the first place.

But we'll deal with that another time.

Tuesday, February 10, 2015

I'll Pat My Own Back: Kurds On The Offensive Out of Kobani

As predicted, the Kurds are on full offensive after retaking Kobani.

They've taken back a bit over 1/3 of the villages around Kobani at this point, and are looking to round out all 350 or so.

Many of the villages themselves aren't particularly strategically important to ISIS, so the Kurds sometimes face limited resistance. They're getting the most resistance to the west, as Manbij (the larger town to the west) and the Tishrin bridge (to the south) are critical for ISIS to be able to resupply Aleppo from ar-Raqqah.

As far as total land area, the Kurds appear to have made modest progress so far...


But let's compare to Jan 27th--a mere 14 days ago.


I predict that in another two weeks, the Kurds will have taken back the Tall Abyad crossing, enabling them to link up with other Kurd forces in the east, reinforcing their more modest progress (but note that it is indeed positive progress; ISIS may be retreating from this area and consolidating).

This operation is, of course, being heavily supported by US airstrikes to soften each advance. It's not clear to me whether the US is able to take advantage of retreating ISIS units to hit them in open field when they retreat, but the US and Kurds have so far been very well-coordinated. The Kurds may also be more tolerant of civilian casualties from military action and less likely to be upset with the US for strikes that have collateral damage.

Jordan has also gotten deeply involved, beginning its revenge campaign against ISIS. The effort has been tremendous: 56 strikes were carried out in the first 3 days against barracks, weapons depots, fuel depots, and training centers. Jordan, after declaring "this is just the beginning," has certainly carried out more since then, even utilizing UAE fighter-bombers in the effort. Likely they are working on targets somewhat further from the action as it would be a bit tougher for them to coordinate with the Kurds as well as the US and hit targets with an equal amount of precision (both in timing and location).

Jordan makes the possibly-outrageous claim that it has killed 7,000 fighters and eliminated 20% of ISIS' capability. I am skeptical specifically because I would be surprised that the first 4 months of air campaign (with over 3,000 attack sorties) would have left that much low-hanging fruit.

But even if these numbers are inflated (and I don't know that they are), it's causing massive mayhem and disruption for ISIS, and it will struggle to effectively reinforce forces near Kobani and even those in northern Iraq--much less counter-attack--as the Kurdish assault from Kobani continues and the Iraqi offensive (with Iraqi army regulars, allied militias, and Kurdish fighters) towards Mosul begins in a few weeks.

Jordan's blistering response and moral leadership in the fight against ISIS also opens the political door for NATO to take a bigger role--frequent bombings over both Iraq and Syria are becoming the norm, and we can expect the US to try to repeat its Libya strategy of softening targets and harassing/eliminating heavy weapons (tanks, artillery, gun emplacements, etc) as the local ground forces push forward.

Things are looking somewhat hopeful for Iraq and northern Syria, but the fight will be far from over. Ar-Raqqah is still immune from takeover, as no force currently exists that can muster the forces to take it (again, the Syrian regulars and rebels are too busy fighting each other), and even if it does fall, we've learned from both Libya and Iraq that winning the war is only the beginning of bringing peace.

It's also worth noting that Jordan's response has been so decisive--and its population so supportive of the action--that ISIS' strategy to bring Jordan deeper into the war may be backfiring tremendously.

Tuesday, January 27, 2015

Kobani Siege Ends; What's Next for ISIS

The Kurds and Americans have successfully pushed ISIS out of Kobani.
YPG Replaces ISIS Flag With Its Own. via European Pressphoto Agency


We can all take a minute and breathe a quick sigh of relief.

Then let's talk quickly about what happened, why it matters, and what's next.

Before we go on, a huge shout-out to the venerable Haghal Jagul for absolutely brilliant and tireless work in keeping these excellent maps updated with rich detail in the Wikipedia Commons.

What Happened

4 months ago, after grinding itself against the Kurds and making modest-at-best progress, ISIS decided to turn its attention towards closing off its northern front, eliminating a Kurdish force of about 2,000 in Kobani, and securing supply lines for a Western advance towards Aleppo (note the giant lake--the roads go north).



Armed with about 40 tanks (against 0 for the Kurds) and somewhere on the order of 5,000 fighters, ISIS hoped to knock this fight off pretty quickly, and in the span of about a month almost did so.

The "siege," which was less about starving the Kurds out and more about pounding them into submission with artillery, was followed by a final push on Kobani that almost captured the city until US-led airstrikes started in earnest (as well as US airdrops of supplies and armaments).

The airstrikes hit ISIS positions a few times per day and the Kurds slowly gained ground. The details of the fighting are, as usual, pretty detailed in Wikipedia. But in short, through some effective coordination (Rear Admiral John Kirby, the Pentagon press secretary, said: "I think the air strikes helped a lot. It helped when we had ... a reliable partner on the ground in there who could help us fine-tune those strikes."), the US used airstrikes to lift the pressure from ISIS shelling (the tanks couldn't be out in the open) and prep the ground for Kurdish advances through the city by pinning or just totally blasting ISIS positions. Of the 1200-1500 ISIS killed in the fighting, airstrikes may have delivered about 600 of those.

Kurdish reinforcements from Iraq also crossed through Turkey to bolster the defenses, which were (now famously) made up largely by untrained civilians including young women (rumor has it that ISIS militants believe they won't go to heaven if killed by a woman).


(Photo from worldpolicy.org)

Once driven out of the city, the now-exposed ISIS fighters started moving back to cover in nearby villages. Apparently Kurdish fighters have taken back a few of those (though dozens remain in ISIS control). Personally, I don't think there's going to be a rapid expansion of Kurdish territory, but if US airstrikes can keep up, strategically-located villages can get picked back up until ISIS supply lines are eventually cut.

The other, often-forgotten outcome, is that Kobani is mostly destroyed.

Why It Matters

US Retired General John Allen (anti-ISIS coalition coordinator) said that ISIS "has, in so many ways, impaled itself on Kobani."

That's unfortunately wildly optimistic--ISIS is far from crippled. But the victory for the coalition means a few things right off the bat:
  • Political support for more airstrikes will remain high: they were very clearly the turning point in helping a beleaguered and vastly outnumbered & outgunned Kurdish force hold the town and repel ISIS. Its effectiveness means the administration will be bullish about employing it more, probably looking pretty fiercely towards the coming Iraqi offensive. This is going to be a significant shift--in October, nobody was shy about saying that the airstrikes were a total strategic failure.
  • Generally, the casualty numbers by ISIS far outstrip those of the Kurds when they go head-to-head (the Kurds claim the headcount is about 7,000 to 1,000, but this is likely inflated), which means that ISIS is getting "ground down" in its fighting with the Kurds.
  • It's a "symbolic" defeat for a force that is superstitious and driven by religious fervor. Recent recruiting has been successful due in part to a sense of inevitability and irresistibly. It will be harder to recruit if ISIS starts looking like a loser.
Why did Kobani matter so much, in all the fronts against ISIS? It's a tiny town and a bit out of the way.

Part of it was the size of the ISIS commitment: 5,000 fighters and 40 tanks is a huge force. The US wanted to defeat it to show that it could be done, even when outnumbered. Part of this is probably a lesson to the Iraqis for the upcoming counter-offensive in the north. 

Part of it is simply that the Kurds are some of the best hope to be had in defeating ISIS, and this was the first major victory that ISIS almost had over them. The US is willing to put a lot of resources into these guys because they have shown the skill and will to win, where Iraqi forces have buckled easily (the Kurds have retaken and are holding critical non-Kurd territory like Kirkuk--a political problem for another day) and Syrian forces are too busy fighting each other to be dedicated.

Once the US put its chips on defending Kobani, it had to "double-down" to win when it was losing, or else the political will to support the Kurds with airstrikes would have totally evaporated. I suspect the significant media attention to Kobani was fairly strongly encouraged by YPG and US political outlets in order to raise the symbolic importance of victory. Now the US has it.

ISIS' Progress In Other Areas

Over the past year, ISIS has generally advanced significantly in Syria and been slowly pushed back in Iraq; the progress here has generally given me hope for Iraq and pretty dark pessimism for Syria.

Progress in Syria

In August 2014, things were already pretty ugly in Syria. ISIS had ar-Raqqah, had cut off the northern Kurds, and held much of the oil-rich east.

By January 2015, ISIS has consolidated its holdings in the east, nearly annihilated the Kurds in the north, pushed far towards Homs/Hama, and even popped up down south. Those guys in white in the northwest are also Islamists. Again: the government and rebel forces are so busy fighting each other that ISIS is able to play to where each of them is weak. It's really, truly bad news.


There is a little  glimmer of hope. See the green circle in the lower-left? That's a slow-but-steady amount of progress by the southern rebels, pushing towards Damascus. They're getting most of the outside help and are seen as the most likely part of the rebellion to succeed. Taking Damascus would be incredibly difficult and wouldn't end the war, but it if happened and Assad was ousted, a Sunni-Alawite peace could probably be forged.

Progress in Iraq

In August 2014, things were looking really ugly in Iraq. The lightning-offensive had just occurred and ISIS forces were pushing into Western Baghdad... and working on just plain surrounding it. They'd also managed to push into some Kurdish territory (much of it not pictured).

 Despite the general weakness of the Iraqi army, they're well-armed and have significant US support. In the past few months, they've pushed back the most existentially-threatening parts of the ISIS advance and taken back a few of the lost cities. The Kurdish front seems secure and the idea that Baghdad might fall has passed. Fallujah is going to be this big grey spot for a very long time--even after Mosul falls (if it does). But slow, conservative progress is being made to establish a secure front around Iraq and hopefully surround (and then besiege) Fallujah, which would set the Iraqis up to focus on pushing north.

Not pretty, but it gives me optimism.

What's Next

Kobani might come to be seen as a mini-Benghazi. Kobani now has a lot of seasoned, well-supplied, and pissed off fighters without much of a home left. They're in effective coordination with the US and they're ready to push out. 

Immediately: if I had to guess, the US and Kurds will want to push out to take the two nearby border crossings (Jarabulus and Tall Abyad), both to "secure the area" generally and to bring Kurdish fighters, civilians, and supplies back to this area to support a further offensive. Expect action towards these areas soon.


After that, I see two goals:
  • Recapture Manbij and the Tishrin bridge to totally cut off western ISIS forces. Eventually the Kurds may try to link back up with more secure Kurdish forces in the northwest.
  • Link up with Kurds from the east moving west. The border town of Ras al-Ayn was retaken by the Kurds in mid-2013 and they've been slowly slogging their way west (fighting with Syrian government forces has been a distraction in the east, which continues to frustrate the heck out of anyone following all this)
It's going to be slow-going and I still see absolutely no hope for Syria beating ISIS in any serious way until the government-rebel civil war ends somehow. 

Iraq, on the other hand, should see a lot of relief here if ar-Raqqah is under pressure from the Kurds, which will make the probably-spring counter-offensive a lot easier.

Just keep in mind that a defeat in Kobani for ISIS is even worse than it would have been for the US, which means a second offensive is possible. The good news is that if tanks come back into the picture, the US is better-equipped to hit them as they move through the desert (again, much like as Libyan tanks approached Benghazi).

Speaking of Libya: did you know Libya has been in full-scale civil war for the last 8 months? We'll get to that one soon.

Monday, September 3, 2012

Blog Link: Smoke Filled Room's Take on Turkey's Kurdish Strategy

I found particularly fascinating here the insight on how Turkey is working together with the Kurdish government of Iraqi Kurdistan to try to gain influence over bordering Kurdish regions, particularly in Syria--in hopes that it will be able to better deal with the ongoing Kurdish crisis in its own south.

http://thesmokefilledroomblog.com/2012/09/03/biting-off-more-than-you-can-chew-turkey-syria-and-the-pkk/

Smoke Filled Room does not think, though, that this is necessarily the best idea.

Friday, August 17, 2012

The Syrian Uprising Part IV: Options for Foreign Intervention

Alright: time to pick up right where we left off. Luckily, the timing is good for The Syrian Uprising Part IV: Options for Foreign Intervention.

The outcome of Syria's bloody civil war has powerful implications for the regional balance of the Middle East, and the influence of great powers in the area. Besides simple humanitarian impulses, states with the power to intervene certainly have the interest to do so. Over the past 6 months since last posting, we've seen little in the way of overt action compared to the Liby aconflict, but we have seen a fair amount of diplomatic and covert movement that reveals the motivations and intentions of different states. We'll take a look by state:

Turkey:
Turkey has bet far and away the most on the victory of the Free Syrian Army, openly providing weaponry, sanctuary, and intelligence to the movement. Turkey is waging a very explicit proxy war on Damascus, and is willing to invest the capital and risk to win.

Turkey's motivation is part of a larger strategy to establish dominance over the region. After rejection by the European Union, Turkey turned back to the Middle East, an area that it dominated for hundreds of years until its defeat in the First World War. Turkey's economy and military strength have grown as it has liberalised and accepted foreign investment--at the same time, many of its traditional rivals have been torn by internal conflict and strife (Egypt, Iraq, Syria). Iran remains as its primary rival (Saudi Arabia has great influence as well, though the Sauds are currently in an uneasy alliance with the Turks against Iran), and dismantling the Iranian-backed Assad regime would be a huge blow to Iran's regional power (as an added bonus for Turkey, Iran would lose key supply lines into Lebanon to support Hezbollah). Additionally, Turkey hopes to ally closely enough with the Syrian Opposition that it is able to bake its influence into the formation of a new government.



Really, Turkey has a lot to gain and little to lose--even if the Assad regime should win, it doesn't have the means to retaliate against Turkey (it does not have the influence in the PKK or the financial/military means left to make the Kurds a more serious problem for Turkey). 

The United States:
The US is currently very aligned with Turkey's goals (dismantling Hezbollah and dealing a blow to Iran), so it's allying with the Turks when it might otherwise be quietly trying to make sure that Islamism/Jihadism doesn't take over Syria. The other note about US behavior is that it is trying to set itself up as a long-term "good guy" in the Middle East, and it sees supporting the Arab Spring as a way into the hearts of the inhabitants of the region (in particular, it was "burned" for supporting the Mubarak regime too long in Egypt and doesn't want to repeat that mistake).


Secretary of State Clinton is currently working with Turkey to determine whether it's going to use fighters in a No-Fly Zone over Syria, making US intervention in Syria extremely similar to its work in Libya and neutralizing Assad's jets and attack helicopters. The move would also allow similar scope creep to the Libya mission, in which NATO air units attacked tanks and other ground installations in Syria (under the guise of protecting their own assets). 

Currently, the US is nearly certainly using the CIA to conduct covert operations to support the rebels with advice and intelligence. The CIA is unlikely involved directly in the fighting, but would be able to coordinate airstrikes if Turkey and the US decided to launch their air power in the area. This kind of support could be a turning point in the war, just as it was in Libya. Aleppo would become the temporary "capital" of the opposition, just as Benghazi was. 

Additionally, the United States and Turkey are actively and publicly discussing the Syria "post-game," should the regime fall (which Turkey and the US are at least calling inevitable). This open discussion publicly declares that the US will be helping Turkey extend its influence into Syria in order to stabilize it and make it relatively friendly... without the US needing to get caught up in the dirtier details of the operation.

The Arab States:
The OIC (Organization of Islamic States) has booted Syria from the group over its response to the uprising, and the Arab League has called on Assad to step down. Much of the reasoning here is likely to show their own people that they don't support oppressive regimes (as this would likely spark unrest in their own states), but many of the Arab League states (Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Oman, Qatar, and Bahrain primarily) have a similar desire to see Iran weakened. 

Saudi Arabia and Qatar have openly declared that they are arming and funding the opposition. They have the option to become further involved if there is external military intervention. These two states represent the Arabs' most concerted efforts to be able to exert influence in a post-war Syria, in part to keep Turkish influence limited.

Iran:
Iran's motivations are made clear by the behavior of its enemies, above. Iran currently feels ganged-up-on. It is. Iran is short on "legitimate" allies and Syria is one of its last. Iran would lose almost all influence in the Mediterranean if Syria fell and was replaced by an unfriendly regime (which would be almost certain). 


Iran has stood by Syria throughout the civil war, and will continue to do so until the end. Because there is essentially no chance of an Iran-friendly regime arising in Syria, Iran does not need to hedge its bets--it is all-in with the Assad regime.

To that end, Iran is providing Syria with what weapons and funding it can to keep the regime together. Odds are good that Iran has also sent black flag militias to supplant Syria's more regular forces. Iran's best hope is a crushing victory in Aleppo that gives the government an opportunity to get its feet back under itself.

Russia:
Russia has a naval base in Syria and thus a great deal to lose if an unfriendly regime should arise--Russia's support of the Assad regime so far would make this likely should Assad fall. While Russia does not depend entirely on Syria for Mediterranean access (it has Sevastopol in Ukraine), it is a key port by which Russia remains relevant in the Middle East. 

Russia has stopped providing weapons to Syria (it was previously), but it has deployed warships to the area. These ships are unlikely an attempt to stop a No-Fly Zone--US and allied fighters would launch from Syria (rather than the sea), and any attempt at an air war with US forces would end quickly and badly for the Russian military. More likely, these ships are in part symbolic, in part designed to defend the base should it come under attack, and in part a means of evacuation for Russian troops and Syrian VIPs, if necessary. Unlike the US, Russia almost certainly cannot field forces directly in the area--while the US would be halting the sorties of an unpopular regime, Russia's only options are to attack civilian populations.

Russia's best hope to keep the Syrian regime alive is to use diplomatic pressure to prevent direct US/Turkish intervention. There is a fair chance that the Syrian government's current siege in Aleppo could break the back of the opposition, given no direct military attacks on the forces that give Assad an advantage--namely, major hardware. 

Israel:
Israel's best move in the short term is to hold onto the Golan Heights and otherwise stay out of the war. It obviously has a great interest in seeing Hezbollah lose its primary sources of support, and to see a major weakening of military strength in its north. 

The greatest risk of any Israeli movement (or comment) on the matter is diplomatic: new regimes with Islamist influence (Iraq, Egypt, Libya) are still figuring out how they'll interact with the Israeli regime, and Israel's primary strategy with these states is to give them every reason to be friendly.

In the post-game, the biggest risk for Israel will be the potential proliferation of chemical weapons into the hands of Jihadists that are part of the opposition forces. Israel is preparing to enter Syria if needed to secure them. Ideally, this would be left to Turkey or one of the Arab states, but Israel would be willing to take the diplomatic blow in order to make sure these are safe. 

China:
China's primary motivator will continue to be (as it has been since the Civil War) the preservation of the right of the state to manage its internal affairs. China has little interest in the Assad regime directly, but we'll see it continue to oppose direct foreign intervention, because China sees the conflict as internal, and therefore not something which other states have a right to interfere with. Historically, this is important for China because of its "Century of Shame," where foreign domination had China on its knees until the Communists won the civil war in 1949. China's own need to potentially deal harshly with internal unrest, as well as a simple historical sense of insecurity, make its position on the Syria matter fairly straightforward. 

International Jihadists:
Foreign fighters have flooded quickly into Syria, hoping to take down the largely secularist Baath party and influence the installation of an Islamist or Jihadist government there. Currently, despite regional and Western fears of Jihadist influence, they only have serious power in Somalia (elsewhere, they are a frustration for individual states but are not in control of any real resources), and Syria would be a win that could set up a second base of operations. Frankly, Turkey and Israel are very unlikely to stand for it, and will likely intervene further if there is a Jihadist takeover.



It's worth keeping in mind that regime change would have long-term implications that not all actors may be considering as closely as they should. If we cite George Friedman's The Next 100 Years, he predicts that Turkey will successfully expand its influence throughout the Middle East (and eventually the Balkans) to become the United States' primary rival. To support Turkey's relative takeover of Syria would hasten that--or at least make it more likely. Additionally, the promotion of the legitimacy of outside intervention in regime change may come back to haunt the West, as actors like Russia or Iran cite Western-built precedent for their own regime-change operations. There is significant risk for the US and other Western states investing in changing the Syrian regime, but certainly short-term upside in pushing back Iran's expanding influence.