I'll Pat My Own Back: Kurds On The Offensive Out of Kobani

As predicted, the Kurds are on full offensive after retaking Kobani.

They've taken back a bit over 1/3 of the villages around Kobani at this point, and are looking to round out all 350 or so.

Many of the villages themselves aren't particularly strategically important to ISIS, so the Kurds sometimes face limited resistance. They're getting the most resistance to the west, as Manbij (the larger town to the west) and the Tishrin bridge (to the south) are critical for ISIS to be able to resupply Aleppo from ar-Raqqah.

As far as total land area, the Kurds appear to have made modest progress so far...

But let's compare to Jan 27th--a mere 14 days ago.

I predict that in another two weeks, the Kurds will have taken back the Tall Abyad crossing, enabling them to link up with other Kurd forces in the east, reinforcing their more modest progress (but note that it is indeed positive progress; ISIS may be retreating from this area and consolidating).

This operation is, of course, being heavily supported by US airstrikes to soften each advance. It's not clear to me whether the US is able to take advantage of retreating ISIS units to hit them in open field when they retreat, but the US and Kurds have so far been very well-coordinated. The Kurds may also be more tolerant of civilian casualties from military action and less likely to be upset with the US for strikes that have collateral damage.

Jordan has also gotten deeply involved, beginning its revenge campaign against ISIS. The effort has been tremendous: 56 strikes were carried out in the first 3 days against barracks, weapons depots, fuel depots, and training centers. Jordan, after declaring "this is just the beginning," has certainly carried out more since then, even utilizing UAE fighter-bombers in the effort. Likely they are working on targets somewhat further from the action as it would be a bit tougher for them to coordinate with the Kurds as well as the US and hit targets with an equal amount of precision (both in timing and location).

Jordan makes the possibly-outrageous claim that it has killed 7,000 fighters and eliminated 20% of ISIS' capability. I am skeptical specifically because I would be surprised that the first 4 months of air campaign (with over 3,000 attack sorties) would have left that much low-hanging fruit.

But even if these numbers are inflated (and I don't know that they are), it's causing massive mayhem and disruption for ISIS, and it will struggle to effectively reinforce forces near Kobani and even those in northern Iraq--much less counter-attack--as the Kurdish assault from Kobani continues and the Iraqi offensive (with Iraqi army regulars, allied militias, and Kurdish fighters) towards Mosul begins in a few weeks.

Jordan's blistering response and moral leadership in the fight against ISIS also opens the political door for NATO to take a bigger role--frequent bombings over both Iraq and Syria are becoming the norm, and we can expect the US to try to repeat its Libya strategy of softening targets and harassing/eliminating heavy weapons (tanks, artillery, gun emplacements, etc) as the local ground forces push forward.

Things are looking somewhat hopeful for Iraq and northern Syria, but the fight will be far from over. Ar-Raqqah is still immune from takeover, as no force currently exists that can muster the forces to take it (again, the Syrian regulars and rebels are too busy fighting each other), and even if it does fall, we've learned from both Libya and Iraq that winning the war is only the beginning of bringing peace.

It's also worth noting that Jordan's response has been so decisive--and its population so supportive of the action--that ISIS' strategy to bring Jordan deeper into the war may be backfiring tremendously.

Why I Was So Damn Wrong About ISIS--Or Was I?

So I was pretty optimistic about Iraq's ability to go get ISIS after they slowed down in their march towards Baghdad.

Oops.

ISIL owns the Red and claims the Pink. Looks pretty bleak. (Wikipedia)

ISIS has held onto much of the territory it gained back then, and then started totally ripping up northern Syria. I'm sure you've all heard about Kobani, where the Kurds are about to lose their last major stronghold in the north.

A not-too-dramatized depiction of Kobani's current situation. 

It's gotten bad enough that young(ish) girls are taking up arms against ISIS. The good news about this is that ISIS superstition states that being killed by a woman means no virgins in heaven, so they're actually a little squeamish about fighting women and are apparently not quite as effective.

Kurdish women defending Kobani. (NYT)

So it looks pretty bad, and certainly the Iraqis and Syrians haven't been able to just clean up this problem like it's no big deal. I had been wondering, "how the heck did I get this so wrong? Where did ISIS' magical power come from?"

So I did some digging around, and it turns out I'm not as wrong as I thought. Let's look at things big picture, then piece-by-piece.

The Messy Situation in Iraq & Syria. Grey is ISIS, Yellow is Kurd, Purple is Iraqi gov't, Red is Syrian Gov't, Green is Syrian Opposition. Big version here.

Iraq:

Much like an American election, looking at the colors in terms of square miles really makes things look pretty lopsided. Let's look first at Iraq. See those little purple strands stretching out like fingers to the northwest? That's the Tirgis and Euphrates. Yeah, that cradle of civilization thing. Where all the people actually live because the rest is desert (see the blue dots? Those are towns). Months ago, ISIS had all that stuff. So in Iraq, most of that grey is... desert. ISIS holding Mosul, Tikrit, and Fallujah is bad news, but it's not existential if the tide is turning.

Now it's certainly not all peaches, especially just west of Baghdad. Those who have been wonking about Iraq for the past decade will immediately notice that this is Fallujah, the toughest enclave of anti-Shia/government sentiment and a perennial tough spot (to put it almost hilariously lightly) since 2003. That will be the last nut to crack in the ISIS counter-offensive. Tikrit, which is the town-of-size just north of Baghdad, will probably be much sooner.

Baghdad is actually currently working (albeit slowly) on taking a few nearby towns, including Ramadi, Haditha, and Muqdadiyah. Iraq just took Baiji today. Now that Iraq is starting to win some fights, the chances of its troops dropping their guns and fleeing at the first sight of enemy forces has dropped (at the very least, Iraq is starting to figure out which troops are relatively reliable).

So it's pretty good news in Iraq... at least by comparison (I don't want to underplay that this whole mess is a little terrifying and also an incredible human tragedy). "But why not more?" I hear you ask!

In short, the Iraqis are taking their time and making sure they're darn well prepared for a major assault. The Americans are doing a bunch of training and will likely lead the planning (and of course provide coordinated intel and air support, which will actually be a pretty big deal) in order to make the counter-assault something that's swift... when they get around do it. That's coming in 2015. For now, if you live in Mosul, "sorry."

CNN has a pretty long article that, while irritatingly unwilling to take a stand on anything, is quite informative, called "Has ISIS Peaked?" It talks about some of the other gains that Iraq is making, including interrupting supply lines, counter-siegeing, and being able to predict ISIS movements (and then call American airstrikes) that prevent them from being able to quickly take territory anymore. The blitzkreig is definitely done, and wasn't enough to break Iraq's back.

So we'll keep an eye on this but get excited for early 2015, when the Iraqi army launches its counter-offensive. We can be optimistic largely because ISIS is not like the Taliban: where the Taliban is largely an insurgent army that controls its territory by having a relatively strong support base and Kabul's capacity to assert itself is weak in its areas, ISIS is a small and hated organization that happens to have gotten its hands on a lot of money and tanks. Where the Taliban can melt away and come back, ISIS will have to hold its ground in its urban controllings and fight a conventional war, as attempting to flee will mean the loss of its hardware (either by leaving it behind or having it bombed) and money. If they come back, they'll no longer have the element of surprise and, hopefully, the Iraqi army will be trained just enough to fire a few shots back before retreating, which should be enough given the army's vastly overwhelming numerical advantage (about 10:1, and the offensive can likely concentrate that further).

Syria:
Unfortunately, Syria's prospects area not nearly so good.

In Syria, one literally has 4 groups all fighting each other: the Government, the Opposition, the Kurds, and ISIS. ISIS even recently signed an agreement with al-Qaeda there to stop fighting each other. It's bad news. The Kurds and the Opposition teamed up for a while in Aleppo, but they're now too broken apart to help each other.

As much as Assad is a bad guy, the fact that the Government, Opposition, and Kurds are all fighting each other means that ISIS will continually have opportunities to exploit wedges and move into weak points (as these groups move troops to fight each other). If, for example, the Government forces are being pressed at one side, the Opposition won't back off in order to help the Government repel ISIS--they'll take advantage of the weakness themselves and move in. It means that nobody (except maybe the Kurds, who are so cornered that they're out of the Gov/Opp civil war) can fight ISIS without worrying about being stabbed in the back.

To deal with Syria, the anti-ISIS "coalition" (really, the US) needs to play a game of containment until Iraq is handled. The Kurds have the best chance at actually seriously fighting ISIS at the moment (they seem to be taking Kobani back), and they're getting help from Iraqi and Turkish Kurds as reinforcements. The Westphalian implications of this multinational joint Kurdish effort will not be lost upon the keen student of political science, but I'll avoid digressing.

Once (if I'm right) Iraq is somewhat taken care of, the Iraqi Kurds are likely to form an offensive to help liberate northern Syria. To be fair, they're likely to stop after they liberate all of Kurdish territory, leaving the remnants of ISIS from the Kurd regions and from Iraq to focus what's left of their power on the rest of Syria.

US policy will focus on a dubious strategy of trying to arm the rebels and use airstrikes against ISIS to help the Opposition fight both ISIS and the Government at the same time. I don't think it's a fight that the Opposition can win. To achieve both a limit of bloodshed and a swifter, surer end to ISIS, the US may need to give up on the Opposition and make sure Syria is more united. But it won't happen.

A Foggofwar Short: Arab (Mostly Sunni) Coalition Forming Against ISIS

US, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Jordan and Qatar all sent fighters, drones (US only) and cruise missiles (US only) to bomb ISIL/ISIS/IS/whatever-you-want-to-call-these-assholes targets in Syria. Really a show of political unity more than something particularly tactical, but holy smokes--it's actually a really big move for all of these countries to more-or-less violate the Westphalian notion of sovereignty in Syria.

http://www.voanews.com/content/us-arab-partners-air-strikes-islamic-state-syria/2459099.html

Here are the really interesting/relevant points to take away:

• Syria probably didn't give any explicit permission for the strikes--not clear if Assad agreed in private. If not, then there is a somewhat-dangerous precedent being set of US/its allies hitting countries whose current governments aren't on board (see: Pakistan). The Westphalian model of territorial sovereignty might be breaking down, and the long-term consequences for global stability are a bit disconcerting.
• It's Sunni-majority or Sunni-led (Bahrain) countries, exclusively, carrying out these strikes. Not too surprising, but it's a sign that the more Western-style (Westphalian, really) governments that are in the Middle East are resisting the idea of a unified Sunni state in principle. Also not surprising: those in power want to stay in power, and that general inertia means there won't be a great Arab/Islamic unity movement (a la Nasser or the Ottoman empire) any time too soon unless it's grass-roots/revolutionary (this mirrors anti-Muslim Brotherhood behavior in most of these countries).
• Airstrikes have had mixed results in the past. It's not clear whether they're working in Pakistan/Afghanistan, but in that Pashtun region, the Taliban has major local support. It's worked better in support of competent ground forces in places like Somalia, Libya, northern Afghanistan. ISIS doesn't have a whole lot of local support in most of these places--they're just too awful. 
• The US risks a new "quagmire." 
• Democrats are becoming much more hawkish.
• Obama is effectively building an Arab coalition and leading it--rather than, for example, Turkey, Russia, Egypt, or someone else.
• Egypt and Turkey are also notably absent from this coalition.
• NATO is probably not going to join strikes against Syria, but will stay in Iraq. This needs to look like an Arab local policing thing, rather than "Western aggression."
• The realllllllly complicated part if figuring out what ground forces will come through after these strikes and "take over." Iraq and Syria are a terrible mess and are fracturing into more localized, non-official government groups doing the local governance. The Kurds seem to have their act together more than pretty much anyone else, and may fill a lot of the void, but they really don't want to (and shouldn't) govern outside of Kurdish territory. 
• The US will try to support the "moderate rebels" in Syria, but they're of course fighting a war on 2 fronts, which makes the whole thing a truly terrible mess, and it will be hard helping them focus when they're being pressed by Assad. Assad is definitely looking to take advantage of getting some relief from ISIS to go after the moderate rebels. This will undermine anti-ISIS efforts.
• In Iraq, the new prime minister Al-Abadi has to bring "reconciliable" Sunnis (the "Sunni Awakening" types) back into the fold to go after ISIS in its western areas so the army can focus on Mosul. Taking back Fallujah would happen last--it's going to be the tough nut to crack.
• This is all going to take a very long time. 

Aleppo Primed to Fall

It may take a few months, but it looks like Aleppo is primed to fall to the rebels. After months of painfully incremental progress, the rebels have made a major push in the south and appear to be circling around towards the artillery base and military academy at lightning speed, while seemingly halting regime advances in the center of the city. The airport is cut off and encircled--it will fall, freeing up forces there to push west.

The good news: Ending the fighting in Aleppo will bring relief to citizens there and likely grind down the administrative capacity/legitimacy of the regime (it would be like the US losing New York). 

The meh news: The regime won't walk away; it will simply retreat to protecting the western parts of the country where it is stronger.

The bad news: extremist Islamists make up an increasingly large and influential portion of the northern rebel movement (where the south is more controlled by the moderate/secular FSA)--if the regime does fall, there is likely to be an ongoing war between the FSA and these Islamist extremists (as well as an ongoing sectarian conflict).

Short: Illustration of the Rebels' Slow March in Aleppo

A very short illustration with a bit of commentary:
Wikipedia's primary contributor to the Syrian Civil War page, futuretrillionaire (whose identity is unknown to me) has been building neighborhood-by-neighborhood maps of the Battle for Aleppo since September. Below I post four snapshots, each with a bit of commentary about what's happening and what may be next.

A quick legend:
Light green - rebel control
Dark green - under contest
Pink - regime control
Yellow - Kurdish (rebel ally) control
Orange - under contest (only in old maps)

Late Sep 2012: Rebels press on multiple fronts, before Aleppo is resupplied.

Mid-Oct 2012: Resupply and reinforcement of Syrian regime troops has denied rebels access to the international airport and driven them back from the main army base in the west. Counter-attacks occur throughout the front in downtown.

Mid-Nov 2012: Rebels push in from the northwest, attempting to push towards the critical air defense and army bases. The front line in the center of the city is a mess but is largely not moving.

Mid-Dec 2012: Minimal movement of the front lines in the center of the city, which has become a meat-grinder. Painfully slow rebel progress in the northwest, attempting to inch towards the army base. At this point, Rebels have massively limited the regime's ability to reinforce and resupply Aleppo--predictions at this point were that Aleppo might be surrounded and fall within the next few months.

Early February 2013: A long gap between maps because front lines just had not moved much. Rebels, in early February, make a massive push in the south and east (as of Feb 12, they may have broken regime defenses around the international airport, as well as seized another air base near Aleppo (not pictured on the map), but may abandon it if it's going to be bombed). The regime, on the other hand, is pushing rebels back in the center of the city and seems to have a major advantage there.

If the rebels can consolidate gains in the airport region and cut off regime troops there, they may be able to spend the next few months (yes, it'll be slow) encircling from the south and the northwest. It appears to be their strategy--the press into the southeast has been somewhat sudden and may signal a more sophisticated approach to trying to take territory--fighting on these outskirts will be quicker and less deadly than in the center, and these outskirts hold more military bases, including an artillery base (currently under threat of capture by the rebels), military intelligence, an air base, an army base, and the military academy and research center--it's almost certain that each of these serve as strategic strong points for the regime, and would be much higher-payoff targets than city-center blocks (which are largely bombed out shells now) that they seem to be giving some ground on.

Update on Syria: Ground and Political Situation, 12/12

I'd like to make a quick update on the ground situation in Syria. The short version:
1) It's slow and likely will be a long and protracted stalemate
2) The rebels are slowly gaining and may win in the long term
3) The Kurds and extremists may be the big winners

Young rebel fighters in Aleppo

GROUND PROGRESS/REGIONS OF CONTROL:
(Brown indicates rebel/Kurdish control, green indicates regime control, and blue indicates a contested city/town)

Map of Control of Syria, 12/12/12. Green indicates regime, brown opposition, blue contested

Desert/East: Majority towns under rebel control with the largest towns still under regime control, but with limited interest on either side to mount an offensive. Note on the map that many small towns off the coast are in rebel control or are contested--Rebels enjoy much of their support from the countryside.

Northern Border: Firmly under rebel and Kurdish control. The rebels use this open operating area to get access to Turkey for supply support, medical treatment, and to create a safe haven for opposition command, likely operating with NATO intelligence support. It is unlikely to fall to the Syrian military any time soon and will keep the battle for Aleppo  fierce as long as it remains open.

The Kurds are participating in the battle of Aleppo, but are hedging their bets to some extent by spending energy entrenching their positions in northern Syria. In any stalemate outcome, Kurds will likely be able to begin partially autonomous administration of this area with support from Iraqi Kurdistan. Interestingly, a decisive rebel win may cause the most reprisal here for earlier Kurdish support of Assad.

Damascus: Firmly held in the center by the government, but the biggest suburbs are under rebel control, with all surrounding suburbs held by rebels. This has held for the past half-year and is unlikely to change too soon.

Homs: 70% under regime control, with battle lines fairly solid. While Homs used to be the center of anti-regime protests, it is now quiet. Don't expect much movement here.

Hama: Firmly under regime control.

Coast: While a few small towns west of Hama are under rebel control, they're not enough of a priority for the regime to be dealt with yet. Most cosmopolitan towns along the coast here are surprisingly peaceful and functional as the war rages on elsewhere. Rebels simply lack the support or geogrpahical presence to make an impact here.

Aleppo: Aleppo is probably the big prize on the table--if one side can take it decisively, it may mark a turning point in the war. The mega-city is the cultural and economic capital of Syria (think New York City), and the most intensely contested for the past 6 months. Below you'll see the current battle lines of the city (yellow is Kurdish, green is rebel, red is regime), though they shift frequently. Rebels have been driven out of significant swaths of the city that they've taken before. Note that army bases ar in the center and west, and serve as local zones of operation for the regime.

Map of Battle of Aleppo, 12/12/12. Red indicates regime, yellow Kurdish forces, green rebels, dark green contested

Rebels have not made significant forward progress since September, but they do have the city "largely" surrounded, according to Stratfor. In particular, the rebels have launched offensives as less-defended towns and bases south and west of Aleppo, targeting its supply lines. These attacks appear to be close to capturing--or at least cutting off--the M4 and M5 highways, which would leave Aleppo completely cut off from regime supply lines (where the Rebels continue to enjoy fresh supplies from Turkey). If the rebels succeed in this offensive, I believe they should be able to slowly (although the final collapse of regime forces would be sudden) take Aleppo.

Supply Lines to Aleppo Nearly Under Rebel Control

That said, to "take" Aleppo is a tenuous term, at best. Many citizens of Aleppo are strong regime supporters, and most others simply want to stay out of the fight. Furthermore, the regime will likely continue to bomb Aleppo and ensure that the rebels cannot "get their feet under them" in the city. Likely, the best the Rebels will be able to do would be to cause a mass surrender/defeat of regime forces after a fairly long siege (in which the city remains surrounded and cut off), and then push the line forward of the city without really holding onto it too tightly. That said, this is a win that should not be under-stated.

Overall: The rebels will struggle to build any governance in major cities (Homs, Hama, Aleppo, Damascus) that they hold. The regime has shown a willingness to use heavy shelling, aerial bombardment, and even recently SCUD missiles to drive rebels out of neighborhoods they own. Unfortunately for the rebels, many locals are just as upset with the rebels as the regime for bringing the fight to their neighborhood.

This war will be slow, but I believe it is starting to look a bit like the Chinese civil war of 1945-1949. Nationalist forces moved increasingly to entrenching themselves in cities, where Communist forces were able to move fairly feely among the countryside, increase their capability, and amass forces for offensives in increasingly large towns, acquiring arms, tanks, and defectors along the way. The rebels of Syria have used similar tactics, buliding safe operating havens in the north and east, and using hit-and-run tactics on major sites--including large air force and army bases--to eliminate the regime's presence near Aleppo without giving the regime targets to hit with aerial bombardment. The regime risks a slow collapse similar to that of the Chinese Nationalist government if it is not able to go back on the offensive to break rebel logistics capability and keep them "scattered." The advantage is to the rebels but there is no quick win in sight.

POLITICAL PROGRESS:
Many Syrians remain on the sidelines in this fight--ultimately, despite many having strong opinions on the matter, most simply want to be left in peace and enjoy life. And while the regime is certainly guilty of indiscriminate bombing, torture, and many other atrocities, the rebels are not without blood on their hands. For this reason, the rebels are struggling to win the massive popular support that has been seen in many other Arab Spring uprisings.

Defections continue slowly, but they will end. Ultimately there is a large Alawite minority that is (rightly so) terrified that their fall will mean massive retributions. A good example of this was the retributions against the Sunni Arabs in Iraq that were quite painful and led to the Sunni insurgency, which lasted for years. Many of these folks know that very bad consequences await them if they were to lose outright, and nobody can provide a golden parachute for all of them.

The Syrian opposition recently unified--at least on paper--under the Syrian National Coalition, which enjoys the recognition as "the legitimate representative of the Syrian people" from over 100 countries, including most of the Arab League, Turkey, the US, UK, France, Germany, and much of the rest of the EU. This will open up more overt opportunities to fund, supply, and otherwise support the rebels, even if full military intervention remains unlikely. What's not clear is how widely it is supported at home.

In bad news, extremists continue to gain sway in Syria, with at least 30,000 Islamist Mujadeen among the rebel fighters, and many Syrians fear the rebels are picking up increasingly extremist rhetoric. A similar risk came true in a much shorter war in Libya, in which terrorists attacked the Benghazi consulate and killed the American ambassador.

As the war drags out, this extremist cell is likely to grow, and one of the first missions of whoever wins will be to stamp it out.

All included images courtesy of Wikipedia