Flash Update: Fallujah Liberated

ISIS has been driven completely out of Fallujah, and mop-up operations have begun to clear the highways between Fallujah and Ramadi. But ISIS troops there have nowhere to hide, and the Iraqi Army has the numerical and mechanical advantage. It should take a few weeks.

What's quite amazing is that Fallujah actually had 4,000 ISIS troops, and the Iraqi Army dealt with them pretty quickly once they punched in. It's an amazing victory and shows that the spear tip of the Iraqi Army is quite sharp. Well-done.

After that mop-up, the road to Mosul is clear.

I'm getting updates from here, by the way: http://isis.liveuamap.com/en/2016/25-june-iraqisf-soldiers-have-raised-the-iraqi-flag-in-the

Manbij is taking much longer than I thought, in part because my troop counts weren't up to snuff. The Kurds are slowly working their way to the edge of the city, and keep repelling ISIS counter-attacks.

In a way, this is good: the Kurds are quite stiff of spine, and have so much territory around Manbij surrounded that, if they are successful, they will likely destroy the 2,000+ unit in the city. So it will take some time, but momentum is definitely in the hands of the Kurds and SDF (Syrian Democratic Forces).

Stay tuned for more updates.

US Strategy in Syria is Just Insane

As I've been writing my other book, I've been taking breaks and reading a lot about Syria and Iraq because I keep hoping we're going to do something different.

We're not.

I'm not going to talk here about why the US might be choosing such a terrible strategy, but simply outline the ways in which it is so terrible in light of surprisingly limited criticism.

(It has helped me to replace "President Obama" with "President Bush" whenever I read articles about Syria to get a sense of how the public would be reacting if it was making stronger connections to the initial Iraq invasion and that goofy Texan everyone loves to hate.)

So let's tell the Syrian story in some context.

The Arab Spring

Early 2011, a whole bunch of countries in the Arab World start protesting their heavy-handed secular governments. These protesters tended to be some combination of:

• Western-looking, clean-shaven, tee-shirt wearing liberals (not "progressives" but "liberal" in the sense of "a liberal democracy") that wanted a liberal democracy of their own
• Oppressed ethno-religious minorities or majorities
• Hard-core Islamists that wanted to replace these very secular regimes with some form of Sharia

(First, I'll leave it as an exercise to the reader to determine which of these groups are most and least likely to form powerful, long-term militias if anarchy begins in the state.)

Western media mostly portrayed the protests of the first group in places like Benghazi, Homs, Cairo. The protests of ethno-religious minorities in places like Bahrain that were put down by Saudi military action got much less attention.

Libya

In 2011, Qaddafi decided to put down the protests before they could become a rebellion, so he began a pacification campaign from Sirte going east towards Benghazi.

The US and some of its EU allies decided to intervene with air support to keep tanks from rolling in and slaughtering Benghazi, which seemed like a nice thing to do.

Scope creep took over, and the West decided that really the only way to keep the people  of Benghazi and elsewhere safe was to provide air support to militias to defeat the Libyan army and overthrow the regime.

That happened quite successfully, and Obama was clever enough to not get on a giant aircraft carrier with a "Mission Accomplished" banner because he is better at managing the media than Bush was, but the US decided we were done.

Immediately after Qaddafi fell, we left, and the militias that had fought against him looted army bases and armories as the army dissolved.

A democracy was formed, but it was plagued by well-armed militias and now-unemployed (and pariah) former army and government personnel. Violence and skirmishes plague the country for 3 years.

(Again, I encourage the reader to replace "Libya" with "Iraq" and "Qaddafi" with "Hussein.")

The story evolves a bit in 2014 as elections are won by Islamists who are pretty terrible, who then immediately get voted out but--oops--decide not to respect the election and use their militias to hold Tripoli. Libya dissolves into a (very slow) civil war between the new Libyan army and the Islamist militias. In the meantime, a whole bunch of different Islamist militias (called the Shura Council) take over half of Benghazi and the Islamic State decide to move in because the place is such a mess that they can get a foothold in there; ISIS takes over Derna and Sirte. And then some other local militias, who are tired of everyone, carve out their own territories. There are now 6 groups fighting each other in Libya. 

(Libya also makes for strange bedfellows: the Tobruk gov't is supported by the US, Russia, UAE, Algeria, Jordan, and Egypt; the Islamist government in Tripoli is supported by Qatar, Sudan, and Turkey.) 

Wikipedia

It's been a stalemate for the past 2 years.

"Fogg, what does this have to do with Syria?"

While one could give the US the excuse of thinking that "the intervention in Syria will totally be different from Iraq because we're not putting boots on the ground and trying to run the show from Washington," the lessons from Libya leave no such excuse, even for so inexperienced a foreign policy team that led the State Department when the US got involved in Syria.

(When I say Libya's civil war is slow, I mean slow. About 5,000 people have died since the beginning of 2014. 

Syria, on the other hand, has led to probably 300,000 deaths, 130,000 captured or missing, 8 million internally displaced people, and 4 million refugees. )

The one thing that the US and Western allies did right in Libya was support the rebels decisively, which at least knocked Qaddafi out of the fight. This has led to far fewer deaths and a much more "soft" civil war. 

Syria

Syrian protests started in 2011 because Assad has ruled with an iron fist as a pretty terrible dude, oppressing the Arab majority, generally putting his cronies in charge, having a Gestapo-like secret police make people disappear, etc. 

Things really blew up when he decided to torture a kid that spraypainted some critical stuff on a wall. Homs quickly got basically taken over by protesters. Assad reacted just like Qaddafi would have, had the US and allies not provided decisive air support: he's been bombing the heck out of rebel strongholds to try to end the rebellion as quickly as possible, and sending in troops with that air support wherever he can.

So what are we doing in Syria? The US has been supporting "moderate rebels" since 2011. But the word "supporting" is an odd one. We are funneling some weapons and supplies to them (which we did in Libya), but we are not bombing Assad. This is probably to keep from open conflict with Russia. 

Just as a reminder, the US and allies like Germany have been steadfast that Assad has to go before any political settlement can be reached. The US considers a totally dysfunctional patchwork of Syrian rebel representatives to be the "government of Syria," which is at least as silly as insisting for 22 years that the Taipei exile government was the "legitimate government of China" and that the Communists were just upstarts that would go away someday. 

Back to Assad. Assad knows that if he "goes," he faces a chopping block, and so do his cronies. The West is too ideologically pure to cut a deal and say, "look, we'll buy you guys a sweet island and grant you immunity." Dictators like Assad face "justice." So the US has pretty explicitly said, "Assad, you have to win this war or you and your family will die."

So there's a lot of motivation for Assad to keep fighting, even as Syria crumbles.

The US' half-hearted supported for Syrian rebels is just enough to keep the fight going. They have enough armaments to keep shooting and not collapse.... at least as long as they're allied with the al-Nursa Front, who is literally al-Qaeda. These guys are the really intense, zealous fighters that are really sticking it to the Syrian regime. Also, just in case we forgot, ISIS was classified as "part of the rebels" early in the war and between 2011 and 2013 we were still arming them. 

Sure, we tried to train some new "moderate" Syrian rebels so that they'd be more powerful, but we managed to train four or five of them before giving up. 

So now we're basically allied with al-Qaeda against Assad, because the "moderate" rebels are really kindof just the hood ornament. 

Imagining Victory

Let's imagine for a moment that we provided air cover and gave the rebels enough support to actually topple Assad. (This is possible if we support the southern front of Rebels with serious air cover, knock out Syrian bases and air power and supply lines, etc.) We could have done this with the "red line" excuse: back in 2013, Obama promised a big thick red line of Assad used chemical weapons. He went ahead and used them about 17 times, and we said, "er, well," and kept up our current strategy.

Anyway. Let's say the Syrian regime collapses, and let's say it collapsed before ISIS took over half the country. You've got Kurds in the northeast that want their own country, and then you've got the moderate rebels that number 40,000-50,000, and a bunch of al-Qaeda-and-friends (which includes a lot of groups) that number between 100,000 and 160,000. 

They duke it out. Guess who wins?

Basically, I don't see how the US imagines any outcome of the collapse of the Syrian regime besides al-Qaeda or ISIS or both taking over Syria.

But Forget That, Because Victory Ain't Happenin'

The Syrian regime is very, very different from the Qaddafi government and the Hussein government: it has pretty broad popular support, decisively controls the fertile heartland of Syria, and has the steadfast support of heavy-hitters like Iran, Hezbollah, and Russia (who are willing to put troops on the ground and are willing to bomb the heck out of the rebels, unlike the West). So we're not the only guys parachuting weapons and providing intel: the Syrian government is getting it, too. This is an all-out proxy war, which was not the case in Iraq, Libya, Afghanistan.

So these groups have been tearing each other to pieces. Guess who gets to step in and fight at their convenience wherever these two groups are weak? You guessed it: ISIS. Remember that Obama called ISIS "the JV team" of al-Qaeda and we grossly under-estimated their potential strength (which he later lied about). 

But now ISIS has taken over tons of oil resources and is actually constructing some semblance of a functional state--something that no radical Islamist militia has been able to do since the Taliban emerged out of US support for the mujaheddin back in '89.  Now that they've more or less decided not to mess with the Kurds (who are a very united force thanks to their long history of shared ethnic oppression), they get to pick their battles and operate with a great deal of impunity.

The Syrian regime and the Rebels are too concerned fighting each other to be able to oppose ISIS with any serious fervor. Each hopes it's going to win and can then turn its attention against ISIS with united support from the international community. The Kurds aren't going to come in and save Syria--they have no interest in shedding their blood for that. 

(Wikipedia. Note the green "rebels" are the loose alliance of the "moderate" and Islamist rebels.)

The US and allies are bombing ISIS, yes, but ISIS is highly resilient. Remember when we bombed the Viet Cong and North Vietnam for 13 years and the North Vietnamese totally just gave up? Me neither.

So This is Officially Pretty Insane

The depth of delusion at the highest levels of the US government--and the utter refusal to learn and adapt--is frustrating and frankly mind-boggling. 

To summarize:

• The US is half-heartedly supporting rebel troops just enough to extend a war, but definitely not win it, which gives ISIS plenty of room to grow
• Oh right, we also armed ISIS for a few years
• The US is currently allied with al-Qaeda and a bunch of other Islamist groups and that totally won't be just like the Mujaheddin in Afghanistan 
• If the US decided to whole-heartedly take down the Syrian regime, al-Qaeda-and-friends would almost certainly smother the fractured moderate rebels and take over the country

All scenarios here lead to utter disaster, for decades.

The only way one can support the Syrian rebels and even hope for them to come out on top is to commit Iraq-level troops and support for probably just as long and just as bloody a conflict. And even then, you might just end up with the same kind of corrupt, fractured government that you have in Afghanistan and Iraq. 

But what we're doing right now is just terrible.

Enter Russia

Before I get started, readers should know by now that I'm generally extremely critical of Russia's foreign policy and territory-grabbing, to the point where I sometimes have to re-write posts to keep my frustration to a minimum.

At the UN, basically looking right through to the US Ambassador towards the White House, Putin says, "Do you now realize what you've done?"

For once, I've got to hand it to the guy. 

Russia has actually decided to end the war. It's putting troops in Syria and providing air cover to help Assad's troops carve back territory from rebels and ISIS alike. Russia's aim is to keep Assad in power, yes, but ending the war decisively will bring the nightmare of Syria to an end. 

Russia is actually the best opportunity the US has to get out of this. I know I said I wouldn't speculate on why we insist on such a stupid Syrian policy, but I think some of it is an attempt to "be consistent" and generally save face: we're not going to suddenly start supporting our named "bad guy" in the fight. And we've already backed down once on a line we drew in the sand (chemical weapons). We're probably resistant to coming out and admitting we're wrong.

But we're wrong, and it's killing lots of people.

Russia has proposed a political solution: the rebels ally with Assad to take out ISIS, and in 2 years after everything has settled a bit (which is pretty ambitious), you have elections. If the Syrian people want Assad, he stays, even if he's awful.

"Erik, are you saying we should change policy and prop up Assad?" Absolutely. We should have done it years ago, before each army was beat to snot, but while the best time to plant a tree is 20 years ago, the 2nd best time is now.

The way out is to work together with Russia and Iran, withdraw our support for the Syrian rebels, and tell them they get no more weapons or air cover unless they stop fighting Assad and turn all their guns on ISIS, full-stop. Any group that doesn't becomes our enemy.

It would be embarrassing to admit. But diplomacy is weird: everyone can know we're doing something stupid, but we somehow save face by not admitting it.

But what we're doing in Syria is immoral. 300,000 people have died, the country is a giant pile of rubble, 12 million people have left their homes (only 1/3 of which have made it to the tent-camps of other countries). The moral move in Syria is to end the war. The only way to do that--excepting an Iraq-style commitment that risks direct conflict with Russia--is to support Assad. Full-stop. 

This is Way, Way Worse than Iraq

Hopefully you have been reading this with my instruction to draw parallels to Bush and Iraq.

Syria's worse. Way worse. It has led to the deaths of maybe half of Iraq's 600,000 (and led to the deaths of more than 3x Afghanistan's 100,000) body count, but Iraq also has twice the population of Syria--so in much less time, as much of the country has been killed. Far more have lost their homes.

And unlike Iraq, there is absolutely no end in sight, and the destruction of Syria has been far more thorough than the destruction if Iraq. Iraq has cities, and an economy. Its GDP per capita (PPP) is about $15,000 per year and has been growing every year since the Hussein regime fell. Syria's GDP per capita (PPP) has dropped to maybe $2,000 after having lost more than 60% of its economic output (without the war, it would probably be about $7.000). Its HDI is hard to measure, but basically imagine that everyone in Aleppo, Homs, Hama, Derna, Idlib, Palmyra, etc, is living in bombed-out concrete husks without access to basic supplies, and 10% of the population is stuck under ISIS. 

The Syrian war's human toll--and long-term consequences--make Iraq pale in comparison. And it's the way it is because of US policy since 2011.

The Controversy over Syrian Refugees is Comically Depressing

The outrage over some in the US not wanting to take 10,000 Syrian refugees is not wrong, but it's completely misplaced. The idea that our moral duty here is primarily to 10,000 people currently in Turkish or German or Greek camps, and not to the 17,000,000 Syrians we're subjecting to a protracted, nightmarish war so the current administration can try to save face, is absurd.

Why the same Americans that protested Iraq aren't in the streets now protesting Syria is beyond me, but my current guess is that the guys in charge are wearing the Blue Team jersey rather than the Red Team jersey.

Screed over.

The Kurds' Strategic Chokehold of ISIS

The Kurds are moving so fast that the venerable Wikipedia article map on the ISIS war hasn't caught up yet. Enjoy your well-deserved vacation, user/editor Eratosthenian.

After taking Tall Abyad, the Kurds pushed south to secure Ain Issa and the nearby Brigade 93 army base. First, I'll draw it on the Wikipedia map I've been using for some time to give general context.

Looks like a march to al-Raqqah! Don't get too excited: the Kurds have no intentions of assaulting the city. But there's still very good news afoot: the Kurds are setting up their final choking of ISIS, which will assist the war efforts in both Iraq and Syria even if the Kurds sit around doing a whole lot of not-much once they regain Kurdish territory.

Let's look at a map with some roads for context--I doodled on Google Maps to get the idea across. The lines aren't that accurate mile-by-mile, but bear with me.

In the lower-right of the map we see al-Raqqah. Route 6 goes north to Tall Abyad, which is the closest crossing out of ISIS territory, to Turkey. We know that for some time, people, goods, and arms were flowing out of Turkey into Syria from the border crossing there. Now they're not. Already ISIS-held territory is seeing a spike in the price of food and other basic goods (according to the Syrian Observatory on Human Rights), which means shortages could loom if they're not able to establish another supply line elsewhere: the Euphrates has limited agricultural capacity and most domestic food comes from the West, which is not under ISIS control (and Syria is a net importer of many staple goods, like wheat). ISIS may be facing food shortages in the future, which could cripple the regime far faster than airstrikes.

Why is Ain Issa (the red-black marker on the map north of al-Raqqah) significant? Ultimately, it blocks ISIS from having access to the M4, which means the Kurdish rear is secure for an assault on Manbij. To get West from al-Raqqah, ISIS must travel along route 4 to the south of the Euphrates. Expect the Kurds to be regrouping quickly from the Tall Abyad assault, consolidating Samin, and then racing across the Euphrates via the M4 to take Manbij and Al Bab, both of which are heavily-settled Kurdish areas. Given recent Kurdish success so close to al-Raqqah and their new-found positioning advantage from taking Ain Issa, I expect the Kurds' chances are good.

The Kurds' final push in Syria will be to link up with their forces in the northwest and establish a secure front just north of Aleppo and across the Turkish border. Once they do this, they'll control all border crossings to Turkey, cutting ISIS off completely from foreign trade or smuggling. Securing al-Hasakah will also cut ISIS off from a concentrated area of arable land.

(I've included USDA agricultural maps of Syria and Iraq below to emphasize that ISIS' holdings are largely a bunch of non-arable desert).

 ISIS has been funded primarily through plunder and extortion, rather than production: without places to trade, their (admittedly vast) reserves of cash will become far less valuable. It will become very hard, very quickly, to get access to foreign fighters, weapons and ammunition, and food. The Kurds completing their conquests of northwestern Syria and the areas around al-Hasakah will complete a trade, recruitment, and agricultural choke-hold of ISIS, meaning time will no longer be on ISIS' side. And that's a really, really big deal.

Kurds Close the Gap in the North

The Kurds have, in a few days, closed the gap around Tall Abyad and pushed south of the river in the east towards Hasakah. In a series of Middle Eastern wars that have chugged along with agonizing sluggishness, this arena has moved shockingly quickly.

In Tall Abyad, fighting continues, but Kurdish forces made sure to surround Tall Abyad from the south, creating pockets to squeeze in on and eliminate the ISIS forces there, rather than letting them flee towards all-Raqqah, which should dampen the risk of a major counter-offensive.

Via @kairbdamoyd, on Twitter

The Syrians will be grateful for the closing of the Tall Abyad border crossing. This will mean a bit of long-term relief from ISIS so they can focus on killing each other instead.

In the east, the offensive to the east of Hasakah will make inaccessible both Route 1 and Route 47 that head to Mosul.

This would essentially cut off Mosul from ISIS reinforcements in Syria, where they're strongest. To get to Mosul, ISIS would have to run convoys through the desert and well away from major metropolitan areas, making them easy pickings for coalition jets. The Iraqis will be grateful.

In the medium-term, if the Kurds can hold off any ISIS counter-attacks (which seems likely--Syrian ISIS are bogged down in the west), they'll move west to take Manbij and close the gap between their central forces and their forces hanging out in the northwest of Syria, which would make the Kurds in control of all predominantly Kurdish territory in both Syria and Iraq.

The Kurds are likely hoping for at least an autonomous zone in Syria, like they have in Iraq--and depending on how long/damaging the Syrian civil war is, they might just be able to break off and form their own country. They're showing a capacity to defend and govern in Syria, where the Assad and rebel governments have not. The expansion of Kurdish territory in Iraq is likely to also expand Kurdish governance in those areas in the long-term, though the Iraqi government is not so broken-apart that they'll allow the Kurds to break away entirely.

Iraq & Kurds on Lightning Offensive in ISIS Weak Spots

This war is a roller-coaster ride: ups-and-downs, victories and defeats. Today we get to focus on some good news.

ISIS seems to have weakened itself in some areas in order to launch offensives in others. According to CIA estimates it only has a few tens of thousands of troops (20-30k), and it's trying to fight over a vast territory. It's bound to have weak spots.

We also know that Iraq is much better at offensives than on the defense: being able to pound targets with artillery and US airstrikes and assault once they're "softened" is much easier than trying to hold out by standing around, waiting for a bunch of nearby cars to all blow up at once.

Iraqi Shiite militias are also about as tough as the Kurds, so in areas where Iraq can employ them (in the east), they also tend to have greater successes.

Such has been at the root of a recent decisive territorial gain by Iraq.

Iraq

Iraq counter-attacked not in Ramadi to try to dislodge ISIS there, but in Baiji, north of Tikrit. In about a day they were able to move in and take the city center and refinery, and are now mopping up suburbs, engaged around the entire area. If it's anything like post-Tikrit, we should expect that whole area to be red in a week.

It sets the Iraqis up to be able to push north towards Mosul, which they may do next rather than getting too entangled in Anbar in their march to break the back of ISIS.

Kurdish Syria

Over the past two weeks the Kurds have been ripping across ISIS-held territory, liberating hundreds of villages. They're looking just weeks away from closing the gap in the north and linking up at Tall Abyad.

Some quick detail on the map, from left to right:

1) The Kobane forces--hardened, reinforced, and supported by US airstrikes--are pushing east after consolidating territory to the south. 

2) Forces from the east are pushing west to link up with them, though a bit more slowly. They're showing no signs of stopping right now.

3) After being bottled up for months at the Tall Tamer river crossing, the Kurds broke through and have liberated a densely-populated Kurdish population there, securing the west side of Hasakah.

4) We can see Kurdish forces have also broken through the river at Tall Brak, and are pushing south, likely to surround ISIS forces in Hasakah and secure the border crossing into Iraq from the other side.

If the Kurds are successful, they'll make their next push west, towards Manaj, and secure a line towards Aleppo. This would cover all heavily-Kurdish territory in the north, so the Kurds would slow down (or stop expanding entirely), but very good news will stem from their success:

1) It will stop the flow of fighters and arms coming from Turkey into Syria, so it will be harder for ISIS to refill its ranks and supplies in Syria.

2) It will mean the continued killing of ISIS troops.

3) It will make it harder for ISIS to reinforce Mosul--they'll be down to one highway in the desert (they won't be able to sneak north through more populated areas) so their supply trains will be highly vulnerable to airstrikes if they attempt reinforcement and resupply during the Iraqi/US assault.

Dark and Bright Spots on the Middle Eastern War Maps

Over the past few weeks, ISIS has made a major comeback in Iraq and has gained significant ground in all the non-Kurdish parts of Syria. They're expanding territory in eastern Libya amid the renewed civil war there, and hold almost all of eastern Yemen. It's looking bad. The American/Jordanian-led air campaigns are just not enough to keep them bottled up.

In Anbar (Iraq) and northern Syria, there are a few bright spots that are worth highlighting.

Iraq

Ramadi fell to ISIS a few weeks back, despite a significant numerical advantage on the part of Iraqi forces. US command says the Iraqi forces lost their will to fight, which is surprising, given the number of attacks they'd repelled in the previous weeks. 

Iraq is responding by sending in the Shiite militias, though right now it seems that they're working on surrounding Fallujah rather than Ramadi, which suggests that ISIS forces had been dispatched from Fallujah to take and hold Ramadi, leaving Fallujah open to attack. Shiite militias in Sunni-dominated Anbar will doubtless be a major problem, but Iraq is stuck choosing between bad options if its regular forces turn tail when attacked.

Syria

In all non-Kurdish territory, ISIS keeps pushing south and west. They've taken Palmyra and are now holding positions near both Damascus and Daraa. I'm thinking that the best hope to end the war is that ISIS threatens Damascus and other major population centers like Daraa and Homs so much that the rebels and gov't form a deal to deal with them.

The one bright spot is that the Kurds have gone on a major offensive. They finally crossed the river in the northeast to reclaim hundreds of villages that ISIS held, and they're moving fast. They've alleviated pressure on Qamishli and are surrounding Hasakah from the west. From Kobane, they're moving east towards Tall Abyad, albeit more slowly--this crossing is an important supply line from Turkey for ISIS and they'll fight for it. But the Kurds are looking poised to link up in the north. I also anticipate they'll keep moving south from Qamishli to surround Hasakah from the east... but they'll probably stop there and hold, as liberating al-Raqqah (ISIS' capital) is not on their agenda. They're looking out for their own.

Yemen

In Yemen, the government forces are so pressed by Houthi forces in the west that their eastern backyard has been almost entirely taken over by ISIS. There's little in the way of good news there, and the stalemate--like in Syria and Libya--just means more room for ISIS to maneuver. Saudi Arabia and Syria are more concerned with the Houthis than ISIS right now, so ISIS gets to roam free.

Libya

Similarly, stalemate here means ISIS gets room to play. The Tobruk government just can't bottle ISIS up in the east, and they're taking control of population centers. Ansar al-Sharia, an ISIS ally for the moment, holds parts of Benghazi. It looks like the government offensive towards Tripoli has stalled out completely. What's odd about this conflict is just how little fighting is actually happening. Looking at the Wikipedia article gives a sense of how oddly quiet the past few months have been, and how few casualties there are. I'm not sure why it's slowed down, particularly in the east (although gov't forces are still fighting in Benghazi).

Finally, a bit of good news. An ISIS member took a selfie at a big Syrian ISIS HQ, posted it with a location to the Internet, and that gave the US the intel necessary to bomb the HQ, destroying it completely. 

Tides Reversing in Middle Eastern Wars

Looking at maps is my way of procrastinating, so I get to find the seemingly little changes going on week-to-week in the Middle Eastern conflicts in Libya, Iraq, Syria, and Yemen.

Go check our most recent post on these wars that show progress by US-supported forces.

For clarification, the US supports:

• In Libya: the Tobruk government (red)
• In Syria: the "moderate" rebels (green)
• In Iraq: the government & allies (red)
• In Yemen: government forces (red)

Here's the update:

Libya

Libya Dawn (Tripoli government) has broken the siege of Tripoli and is pushing back. The Tobruk government's attack is floundering.

If we look to the south, we see some angry Tuaregs (who I imagine as pretty hardened mountain-fighters) have managed to capture a large swath of Libya for themselves and are challenging Tobruk's power there. I'm not sure what their goal is: maybe power-sharing, maybe independence.

Other unaffiliated local groups in Bani Walid and Tawergha have taken control from Libya Dawn--I believe they're actually old Gaddafi loyalists who are uninterested in either group. 

In general, we're seeing the fighting between Tripoli and Tobruk, meaning doors are left wide open in their own backyards for smaller groups to start some form of self-rule/splintering, which is going to be a recurring theme.

Iraq

The attempt to surround Ramadi is failing right now, and I'm not sure what the heck the Iraqi forces are doing with themselves--they should be able to outnumber and overwhelm Ramadi, but it may be the case that without Shiite militias, they're going to continue to struggle. In the past weeks, they had taken some of this territory and pushed deeper into Ramadi, along with repelling ISIS counter-attacks. But the once-imminent surrounding of Ramadi has been held up at best. Let's see if Iraqi forces reinforce further to finish off the fight. 

If Ramadi is taken, Iraqi forces would be able to comfortably cut off Fallujah for a protracted siege.

Syria

"Moderate" rebel advances in the south along the border with Israel have been pushed back. Slogging north that way would have given the rebels plausible access to Damascus that wouldn't involve taking Daraa--if they fail here, they'll be quite bottled up.

Another option for the rebel forces appears to be trying to link up between Inkhil and Tubna to cut off Daraa and besiege the city, but their forces seem to be committed to the north and in Umam Walad.

Yemen

The Houthis have made a major counter-assault in Ma'rib and Tai'zz, taking back Tai'zz and surrounding Ma'rib. They've also pushed back in Ataq and halted the southern coastal advance by government forces. It's looking increasingly bleak for government forces.

We're seeing, of course, that forces committed to red/green battle lines are allowing ISIS to make advances in ignored areas, so they've managed to pop up in the middle there, which will prove hugely frustrating (in addition to just terrible for the people of Yemen).

For the sake of beating ISIS, decisiveness--one way or another--is key in these civil wars. The continuing ambiguity is going to give them space to grow.

Quick Update on Libya, Iraq, Syria, Yemen

There's been moderate but notable movement in the past few weeks across war fronts in Libya, Iraq, Syria, and Yemen; I'll highlight them below.


Libya:
After having been initially repelled, army troops (loyal to the elected government) have moved to encircle Tripoli with support from Zintan militias. They've also moved into Ras Lanuf and Bin Jawad from the east, taking those towns back from ISIS.

Iraq:

Government reinforcements have almost surrounded Ramadi, and will counter-siege the ISIS troops in the city. If they take it, expect the government to attempt to similarly encircle Fallujah, just to the east.

Northern Syria:
Kurdish troops are making very slow progress across the Nar al Khabur river into a densely-populated area of Kurdish villages under the control of ISIS. They're battling desperately to take these villages back after finding mass graves in the area.

Southern Syria:
Free Syrian Army troops are making agonizingly slow progress against Syrian government troops in the south, around Daraa. They've recently taken the Nassib crossing and reinforced the Quintera crossing. Closing off Daraa has been attempted and repelled a few times, but would give the FSA access to the highway going north towards Damascus, their final target. They may attempt to circle in from the west, near Quinteria, to link up with pockets of troops to the southwest of Damascus.

Yemen:
The Saudi coalition's air campaign has reversed the Houthi tide, and government troops are making some gains. They're barely holding on to Aden, and are trying to relieve pressure by taking surrounding areas to the west, northwest, and north of the city. They've also moved west from Madrib and are attempting to use Saudi air support to seriously threaten Sana'a.

And, because it will make everyone's day: ISIS and the Taliban have declared jihad against each other.


Sources: All images from Wikipedia:

• ISIS War
• Yemeni Civil War
• Libyan Civil War

Infographic: Major Conflicts in the Middle East

I decided to try my hand at an infographic to get everyone caught up in all the major mayhem in the Middle East currently going on.

If everyone likes it, more will come to try to give the big picture on some individual conflicts.

Enjoy! (Click here for bigger version of the infographic)

Quick Update: Advances Against ISIS, and What to Expect in Tikrit

Readers keep telling me they love the maps, so you get maps and a bit of "implications." We'll also touch very briefly on Tikrit.

1) Kurdish forces out of Kobane have successfully pressed ISIS out of the space west of Kobane by trapping them against the river/lake and eliminating them. They've made modest progress in the east but I think we can expect the Kurdish forces to shift a bit south, but mostly east, to capture Tall Abyad crossing and cut off a supply line for ISIS from Turkey.

2) In northeast Sryia, ISIS has totally collapsed. That huge box on the right was all formerly ISIS, right up to the southern edge of that big red blotch (government fighters). It appears the Kurds and government troops have a truce, which has allowed them to push out. There is likely a bit of a "race" to secure space around Hasakah between Peshmerga and government forces. We also see in the western box that Kurdish forces have successfully crossed a river and are assaulting villages there, likely hoping to scoop up the smattering of black just to the south.

3) From the department of "great things come in small packages," the Kurds have successfully captured the roadway and villages around the bridge where Route 1 crosses the Tigris, cutting Mosul off from its most direct western supply line. This is a form of kicking the proverbial hornet's nest that may bring ISIS fighters out of dug-in fortifications to try to take the highway back. They're going to have plenty of time--Iraqi forces will be bogged down in Tikrit for a while.

4) Iraqi forces are probably trying to encircle Ramadi by taking villages to its north (lower-left box) and have entered Tikrit. In Tikrit, government forces are similarly trying to encircle the city before moving in, and are being slowed down by roadside/car bombs and suicide bombers. The little black dot south of Tikrit is being shelled at time of writing, and the dot to the north of Tikrit is being de-bombed.

Once Tikrit is surrounded, it may take up to a month to move in and finish off ISIS forces. Iraq is sporting 25,000 troops between regulars, Shiite militias, and Sunni militias. They likely outnumber ISIS forces 10:1--but just remember that Iraqi forces had similar odds when they were overrun in Mosul last summer.

Iran is supporting this operation rather than the US, which means no air support. It's clearly not an experiment ("can Iraqi forces handle this on their own?")--now's just not the time to be having such experiments, as Tikrit is probably the junior varsity version of trying to take Mosul.

What's more likely--I think--is that Iraq and Iran are going alone, without US "permission." Iraq has been frustrated with coalition support and it's possible (though I have predicted otherwise) that the US announcement of the Mosul offensive created some distrust--Iraq may have decided that the US couldn't be trusted with the intel.

Evidence suggests the US wasn't even told about the offensive--a US general said that the offensive was "no surprise," which is very different from saying "we're in the loop."

It'll be great news if Iraq can take Tikrit without US air support, though there are huge complications with making this a "Shiite" operation--Shiite militia abuse is a big part of why ISIS was able to get traction in western Iraq in the first place.

But we'll deal with that another time.

Short: Why is Libya Important to the Islamic State?

Reader Nathan asked if I would make a Libya post and then, helpfully, gave me some truly awesome source information. Thanks, Nathan!

The big question here is: why ISIS is putting so much effort into expanding into Libya when it's losing ground in Iraq and having mixed success in Syria? (To elaborate a bit: ISIS does need to put recruiting, training, and physical resources into Libya, and foreign Jihadis going to Libya aren't going to Iraq/Syria to reinforce there, so it's definitely an investment.)

The article starts with a translation of an ISIS strategy document, which outlines to ISIS and fellow Islamic extremist groups the motivations for going to Libya.

I'll briefly sum up the main points below, but the key takeaway is that ISIS isn't looking to Libya primarily or urgently for attacks in Italy. Despite its apocalyptic machinations, ISIS' first priority is to actually establish the Caliphate: to them, that includes a very ambitious plan that is way bigger than the previous Caliphate of the dark/middle ages.

Adding to this of course are the gains that the Ottomans made in the 1200s-1400s that included areas in India, the rest of Turkey, the known Muslim areas in northern Africa, and some of the Balkans. IS wants all of this stuff and, for whatever reason, all of India. Why IS would want to rule India is not yet clear to me.

via The Daily Mail

The summary of the strategic document, in short:

• The Islamic State really does want to cover all of the Muslim World
• Libya is a window of opportunity: the strength of militants, rise of Jihadi groups, and government division mean that IS can establish a foothold there
• It's under less pressure than Iraq and is a pretty free operating space for regional operations (where IS is on the defensive in Iraq and still under lots of bombing/Kurdish pressure in Syria)
• It has access to nearby states that IS wants to spread to, many of which have potential allies (particularly Niger, Mail, and Algeria)
• It has access to battle-hardened recruits in Libya, Algeria, and Sudan [added after post]
• Indeed it does have access to Southern Europe--there are human trafficking operations that could more easily move militants to Italy and elsewhere for expanded terror operations--probably "some 20 militants shooting up Rome for a few hours" kind of mayhem

Is the President's Request for Authorization of Force the Right Package? Is the Mosul Announcement Crazy?

(Total reading time: about 10 minutes)

Reader Andrew asked me for my opinion on the efficacy of the Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF) that President Obama requested from Congress earlier in the month.

Part of what prompted the question was an email from Andrew's representative Michael Capuano (D-MA) stating why he was against the authorization as-written. In short, his objections:

• "Half measures are a recipe for failure and this resolution is a half measure." It doesn't allow US forces to take part in military operations necessary to win
• The US' record in the Middle East usually includes success on the ground followed by disaster--either quagmire (Afghanistan and Iraq) or post-war collapse without us there (Libya and post-2013 Iraq); there's currently no plan on how to make this work
• The US is not directly threatened by ISIS; we could play a support role for more directly threatened nations (Turkey, Jordan, Saudi Arabia) that lead the assault, but leading it does not make sense from a national security perspective

Presumably if Jordan/Egypt/Turkey/Saudi Arabia (along probably with the UAE, Kuwait, Bahrain, and Qatar for good measure) led a ground force, they'd be stuck with managing the aftermath--good both because the US doesn't have to get stuck in another quagmire and also because these countries will have a better chance of managing the peace (more cultural affinity and "pulse" of the situation). Spoiler alert: they probably won't.

Before I add my two cents, let's review a very brief summary of the draft sent to Congress.

Key Points of the AUMF

• The AUMF is for 3 years (a year beyond the remainder of the President's term) and has no geographical restrictions
• It's clear enough that it's specifically ISIS-related that it probably can't be used to go after every terrorist organization out there (I'll leave out commentary on the 2001 "Global War on Terror" AUMF and the question of constitutionality of recent operations)
• Ground forces can advise local troops, conduct search-and-rescue operations for coalition members captured by ISIS, coordination for airstrikes and allied ground movements (think: helping coordinate airstrikes to soften targets for Kurdish advances), and "special operations" (SEALs and whatnot) to take out ISIS leaders
• Ground forces cannot participate in "enduring" (this is probably intentionally vague) offensive ground operations...
• The 3,000 troops in Iraq are exempt from this restriction, meaning they'll probably be participating in the Iraqi spring offensive

It's Actually Pretty Good

After reading Rep. Capuano's letter, I was feeling pretty prone to side with him on opposing the AUMF for similar reasons. I'm generally critical of the President's half-measures to deal with problems like Russia, Syrian chemical weapons usage, and other matters.

But I've changed my mind. I think this is a solid AUMF.

I do think there's a clearer plan in place than Capuano believes, but also that requiring too clear a plan before authorizing force is unreasonable. The President's military advisers need the freedom and flexibility to formulate and adjust a plan over time, and the AUMF gives them the green light to move when they're ready--it does not require that any particular action happen now.

Let's talk a bit about what might happen under the AUMF.

Offensive in Iraq

The plan for Iraq is incredibly clear and pretty sound. We've already seen that airstrike coordination in Kobane was critical in helping the outnumbered and outgunned force turn the tide (and continues to help in the counter-offensive). The 3,000 US troops should be a huge boon--both for morale and effectiveness--if they join the assault on Mosul. And they should. In fact, while it's not been announced, I suspect the wording of the AUMF makes it very clear that this would be the plan.

Mosul has about 2,000 ISIS fighters holding it right now. 25,000 Iraqi and Kurdish Peshmerga forces are going to be thrown at the city, and the big question is whether the Iraqi fighters are going to break and run as soon as ISIS troops sneeze. I believe very much that having US soldiers in the trenches--along with witnessing well-timed airstrikes just before the assault--will keep Iraqi troops confident enough to point their guns in the right direction. House-to-house fighting sucks, and ISIS is going to make it very hard for civilians to flee (making airstrikes tougher). But the Iraqis and Americans can take their time and regroup in safer areas if they get beat up in any parts of the city.

The big question is that since it's been so broadly announced, will ISIS try to shore up defenses in Mosul? Maybe. The President has gotten some funny looks from the news media and some politicians, and even the Iraqi government: "why the heck would you tell the enemy they have 2 months to fortify your primary target?" It seems totally backwards. One generally doesn't tell the enemy the time and location of one's next offensive.

Once again, I think there is some subtlety at play that is lost in the knee-jerk reaction.

One thing that we must keep in mind is that coalition forces have total air dominance. The US is hitting targets in Mosul probably as you're reading this, and probably while you're sleeping, too. So obviously the coalition has a few months to "soften" Mosul.

But what about a flood of reinforcements? Let's take a look at the region around Mosul:

Thanks for being awesome, Wikipedia

Mosul has some space around it where it could draw fighters back from the front line--I don't know how many are there, but they're actively fighting Kurdish troops in the east, so if they turned tail, the Kurds would be able to recover some territory and place heavy guns within striking distance. At a rough guess, I'd say the local villages, if abandoned, could beef up Mosul to about 4,000 troops. Remember that while these guys are zealous-and well-armed, they are not particularly expertly trained and don't have military intelligence to help at all. The intelligence gap was probably a big part of why the US was able to lead the Kurds so effectively to pick off fog-blinded pockets of ISIS resistance in Kobane.

But obviously the concern is that reserves from other places not under pressure (like ar-Raqqah or elsewhere) could send columns of these guys and turn Mosul into a bloodbath. Let's look at Mosul another way to consider this:

Thanks, Google Earth and MS Paint

Around Mosul is a whole bunch of wide open desert, and I can guarantee you that desert has a few drones circling overhead constantly (for those who have seen the movie "Zero Dark Thirty," recall the drones constantly circling over Bin Laden's hideout for a few hundred days), taking a look at those two roads coming in from the west and south in addition to scouting targets for US airstrikes.

If anyone out there has a good idea of how to sneak in hundreds of troops or dozens of heavy weapons along those highways, I'd love to know (leave thoughts in comments). But I really don't think it's possible.

And here's what I really think is going on; if I'm right, I tip my hat to the administration:

I believe the President is trying to goad ISIS into trying to reinforce Mosul. 

"Wha?"

If a huge column of trucks and heavy weapons starts rolling from more fortified positions, it will have to travel through a lot of desert and be exposed for at least 3 hours (if coming from the closest ISIS town, al-Qamishili).

Thanks, Google Maps.

American or Jordanian fighter-bombers can get where they need to go in about 30 minutes.

If the coalition doesn't totally blow it, Route 1 would become 2015's Highway of Death.

Thanks, Wikipedia

Is ISIS going to fall for it? Maybe. As we talked about in an earlier post on Kobane, ISIS' power comes from legitimacy and a sense of divine inevitability. Taking Mosul made it horrifying and seemingly irresistible. But nobody likes betting on a loser, so their recruiting (and intimidation) strategy depends in part on winning. I'd be surprised if ISIS was really willing to let Mosul go without a big fight. Furthermore, if they were able to defeat the best efforts that Iraq/the US could put up to root them out of Mosul, it would be a massive symbolic (and military) victory that would probably convince the Iraqis that resistance is just totally futile. There is a whole lot at stake, and I'd be mighty surprised if ISIS was willing to commit to a fight they're probably going to lose.

So it could work. It's even possible the Iraqi defense minister is actually in on the plan and is complaining to make ISIS think reinforcing is a good idea. If so, once again: well done.

The other option, of course, is to abandon Mosul if it looks like it's unwinnable and not suffer a humiliating military defeat. If ISIS believes Mosul is doomed, it is unlikely to cling to the city. There's some evidence it might be thinking this way: ISIS is apparently ditching the big base south of Mosul that they have held for 7 months. The announcement about the Mosul offensive may mean that ISIS would want to focus forces for a counter-attack elsewhere that is not under heavy bombardment and scrutiny, to keep the Iraqis off-balance.

Fallujah, Tikrit, and other areas along the Euphrates in Iraq will require significantly more work than Mosul. Think of Mosul as a place the Iraqis can cut their teeth and gain some confidence for the real work ahead in Sunni-dominated regions.

What about Syria?

Syria is a theater that remains somewhat impervious to anything but a massive ground invasion. I'll repeat: the government and rebel forces aren't going to do it until the civil war resolves in some way, which won't happen for years. The Kurds could pick up territory once the Iraqi Peshmerga forces get relief from the Mosul offensive.

We've seen that the Kurds are perfectly willing to occupy territory outside of their primary ethnic strongholds (see the map below--they're currently occupying Kirkuk and northwest Syria) and so may push in northern Syria to create buffer space. 

CIA, via Wikipedia

But the Kurds simply have no interest in moving to the Euphrates, where ISIS is strong and rules with total impunity. I really just don't think anyone at all has a plan to deal with Syria, and the AUMF only sets up the administration to make a move if the Syrian political situation changes or Jordan/Syria/Egypt get fed up with ISIS hanging out next door and decide to go on a major ground offensive. 

It's possible that success in Iraq will be inspiring and that Jordan, which remains incredibly pissed off, and Egypt, similarly pissed off about 21 Copts being similarly brutally murdered, could decide it's just plain time to lend serious military support to Syria on top of the current airstrikes. 

But, frankly, their armies are small and their economies stretched, and they'd only enter Syria if the civil war ends and moderate forces can finally unite against ISIS.

I'll maintain that if ISIS falls in Syria, its ill-advised strategy of trying to bring Jordan and Egypt into the fight will be part of its undoing.

Libya

Libya's divided forces have opened the door for continued ISIS expansion, which now holds 3 towns (2 weeks ago, it was only Derna), having added Sirte and Nofilya. 

Seriously, Donate to Wikipedia

The grey (in Benghazi and elsewhere) is Ansar al-Sharia, who is a totally different (but ISIS-friendly) menace not covered by the AUMF. (Syria has similar pockets of these guys, though right now they're not really fighting with the "good guy" rebels, so we're making the same mistake--as with ISIS--of leaving them alone "until" the "good guy" rebels win.)

Jordan and Egypt want the UN to authorize force in Libya to nip ISIS' presence there in the bud. Egypt is already putting down airstrikes, but now that Libya is in ceasefire, it's a prime place for US special forces, trainers, and airstrike coordinators to help the Tobruk government take back Derna.

A Bit of Good News

And just because everyone likes a bit of good news: ISIS has been totally pushed out of the Baghdad environs and is getting pinned up against a river by the Kurds near Kobane. 

New territory from last week in Kobane circled in yellow.

 Still Wikipedia

New territory gained by the Iraqi government over the past 6 weeks circled in red.

I'll let you guess where I got this one

The Iraqi forces are already pushing back pretty steadily, which is a sign that, despite everyone freaking out about readiness, the Iraqis are showing they can put the fight to ISIS and win.

If you got this far, thanks for taking the time. Leave me some comments about what you want to hear about next, either about ISIS or otherwise!

Update! Kurdish Peshmerga Forces Working on Cutting Off Mosul

Reader and generally-smart-guy Shir shared with me this great article and map showing a Kurdish advance on Route 1, which ISIS is using to resupply Mosul. We discussed above the risk of sending big columns down that road, but if the Kurds can hold the area for the next few months, getting military and support resources to Mosul will be a lot harder and more dangerous--they'd be much more open to ambushes from the Kurds and airstrikes from the Americans. It makes the assault on Mosul a much more likely prospect.

The Washington Post and I seem to have some agreement on the general strategy for isolating Mosul from reinforcement in the coming counter-offensive. Exciting stuff. Expect me to be blogging obsessively about it.

I'll Pat My Own Back: Kurds On The Offensive Out of Kobani

As predicted, the Kurds are on full offensive after retaking Kobani.

They've taken back a bit over 1/3 of the villages around Kobani at this point, and are looking to round out all 350 or so.

Many of the villages themselves aren't particularly strategically important to ISIS, so the Kurds sometimes face limited resistance. They're getting the most resistance to the west, as Manbij (the larger town to the west) and the Tishrin bridge (to the south) are critical for ISIS to be able to resupply Aleppo from ar-Raqqah.

As far as total land area, the Kurds appear to have made modest progress so far...

But let's compare to Jan 27th--a mere 14 days ago.

I predict that in another two weeks, the Kurds will have taken back the Tall Abyad crossing, enabling them to link up with other Kurd forces in the east, reinforcing their more modest progress (but note that it is indeed positive progress; ISIS may be retreating from this area and consolidating).

This operation is, of course, being heavily supported by US airstrikes to soften each advance. It's not clear to me whether the US is able to take advantage of retreating ISIS units to hit them in open field when they retreat, but the US and Kurds have so far been very well-coordinated. The Kurds may also be more tolerant of civilian casualties from military action and less likely to be upset with the US for strikes that have collateral damage.

Jordan has also gotten deeply involved, beginning its revenge campaign against ISIS. The effort has been tremendous: 56 strikes were carried out in the first 3 days against barracks, weapons depots, fuel depots, and training centers. Jordan, after declaring "this is just the beginning," has certainly carried out more since then, even utilizing UAE fighter-bombers in the effort. Likely they are working on targets somewhat further from the action as it would be a bit tougher for them to coordinate with the Kurds as well as the US and hit targets with an equal amount of precision (both in timing and location).

Jordan makes the possibly-outrageous claim that it has killed 7,000 fighters and eliminated 20% of ISIS' capability. I am skeptical specifically because I would be surprised that the first 4 months of air campaign (with over 3,000 attack sorties) would have left that much low-hanging fruit.

But even if these numbers are inflated (and I don't know that they are), it's causing massive mayhem and disruption for ISIS, and it will struggle to effectively reinforce forces near Kobani and even those in northern Iraq--much less counter-attack--as the Kurdish assault from Kobani continues and the Iraqi offensive (with Iraqi army regulars, allied militias, and Kurdish fighters) towards Mosul begins in a few weeks.

Jordan's blistering response and moral leadership in the fight against ISIS also opens the political door for NATO to take a bigger role--frequent bombings over both Iraq and Syria are becoming the norm, and we can expect the US to try to repeat its Libya strategy of softening targets and harassing/eliminating heavy weapons (tanks, artillery, gun emplacements, etc) as the local ground forces push forward.

Things are looking somewhat hopeful for Iraq and northern Syria, but the fight will be far from over. Ar-Raqqah is still immune from takeover, as no force currently exists that can muster the forces to take it (again, the Syrian regulars and rebels are too busy fighting each other), and even if it does fall, we've learned from both Libya and Iraq that winning the war is only the beginning of bringing peace.

It's also worth noting that Jordan's response has been so decisive--and its population so supportive of the action--that ISIS' strategy to bring Jordan deeper into the war may be backfiring tremendously.