The Coming North/South Sudan Split

I had the pleasure of doing some work Conflict Dynamics (a UN-partner NGO) on the question of Sudanese independence. My boss at the time (Gerard Hughes) was contracted to do some work on alternative models for the South Sudanese independence vote coming in 2011.

(Background: the vote was part of a peace deal ending a 30-year civil war between the predominantly black traditionalist/spiritualist south and predominantly Arab Muslim north.)

In short, there are a number of models out there that exist in a continuous spectrum between "unity state" and "two separate unity states." There are a number of "federal" style unions, including the US, Germany, Russia, UAE, Bosnia, etc, that have varying levels of legal autonomy at the state level, and (at least) unified defense and representation at the central level. The EU represents a union of a number of states, but with free transit/trade across borders, and some collectivization of resources, defense, etc. Other options exist, too. In fact, Sudan already had a semi-federal state where the South was given some legal autonomy.

Ultimately, I left Conflict Dynamics before we finished the work, but the report that came out aimed to help the UN, AU, and North/South Sudanese governments create options besides total unity and total independence. If implemented, the risk was (of course) confusion as to the details of an arrangement, which could make the referendum a disaster.

In the end, the report (and those of us that worked on it) were unable to garner political support for a more complex, nuanced relationship between North and South Sudan, and the referendum is coming, with two options: Unity and Independence (see photo). And last I checked, the measure had over 90% support amongst Southern Sudanese, who see it as an obviously better alternative than growing closer to Khartoum. Let's assume the referendum will pass.

The result is likely to be disastrous. Southern Sudan has most of Sudan's oil. Currently, a wealth-sharing mechanism is in place, but there's no plan in place for wealth-sharing after independence. Khartoum will lose a great deal of money... and Southern Sudan will be land-locked, and will likely have to pipe its oil through Northern Sudan, anyway. Piping costs will be a massive point of contention.

Three regions between Northern and Southern Sudan are in conflict (as to which side they belong). Only one is going to have a referendum on its choice for sides in 2011--the other two have no solid plans as of yet.

Northern Sudan is currently accusing Southern Sudan of supporting Darfuri rebels, and threatening war.

And, generally, there remain many displaced people (from the war) on either side of the border, and where they fall out in the census is questionable.

But ultimately, oil is going to be the big sticking point, and there's likely not a great solution for it that can be built after the referendum. I could be wrong, but the two sides are sufficiently uninterested in productive discussion, and the groups leading the mediation are sufficiently ineffective, that war may be coming. Again. Even if the disputed territories (disputed largely due to being chock-full of oil) are resolved "democratically," neither side is interested in accepting defeat and establishing a status quo out of their favor.

And, in the end, the great powers have very little interest in doing more than making enough noise to look like they're not ignoring the situation. Strategically, war would lead to a number of interesting alliances. Darfur and Southern Sudan would almost certainly combine their efforts (if the JEM is interested in independence, as well), and may even see more support from Chad and Eritria if victory looks possible. Al-Bashir, though, will shore up military support he needs before engaging in war, and may well gain support from Egypt and China, both of whom have a strong strategic interest in political stability and central power in oil-rich Sudan.

It'll be a situation worth keeping an eye on, and one that might begin chewing through one of the few tentative areas of peace in east Africa.

Lessons from the Coming Darfur Peace Deal

Let me first say that I'm a bit skeptical about the long-term prospects of the Darfur truce. I'm mostly not clear that the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) and other groups in Darfur will be able to reach a sufficient common understanding that they can successfully negotiate with Khartoum as a united front.

Nonetheless.

The lesson of the day is that Realpolitik still trumps idealism in the international sphere. 7 years of grandstanding, diplomatic pressure, protests, and even International Criminal Court (ICC) action (which was largely ignored by Sudan and its neighbors) had done precious little to change the state of the war. Then why the sudden change? As far as I can understand, there are 2 key issues:

1) The Chadians are backing off. Khartoum regulars have seized sufficient ground in Darfur that Chadian action in the area is becoming more futile (and ultimately detrimental). Because of this, Chad declared an end to its proxy war with Sudan in the area, accepting a minor political defeat and retrenching in its own country. Without Chadian support, Darfurian rebels have a newly-diminished bargaining position. Sensing a potentially closing window of opportunity, Khartoum hopes to enter negotiations with the Darfurian rebels at their weakest, in order to end the war with the best-possible negotiated settlement (maximizing Khartoum's power in the area and over the country as a whole in the long-term). Such a favorably-settled peace will also boost al-Bashir's popularity, helping him secure victory in the next election.

2) Khartoum's priorities have shifted to Southern Sudan. Two big issues are coming up in Southern Sudan--the 2011 referendum on independence for Southern Sudan, and the decision on Abyei. If the referendum goes through, Southern Sudan would become an independent state (and given the current political organization proposed in the referendum, it would lead to massive political tension and possibly war). Khartoum wants its military forces to move south to be able to prepare for and deal with the fallout of an independence movement which has a great deal of popularity in the south. Furthermore, the region of Abyei is currently in dispute over where the north/south border lies. In particular, the dispute is over the location of the border with respect to a massive oil well that would either become northern or southern given its resolution (even if Southern Sudan remains part of Sudan, Khartoum ends up with more of the oil wealth than it would otherwise if the Abyei oil fields are located in the north). For Khartoum, a great deal of resource wealth is at stake in the south, where Darfur's threat is greatly diminished by Khartoum's relative control over the region.

Khartoum is ultimately moving on from the Darfur war because it largely won its political objectives and now has higher priorities in its path to political and economic consolidation. The takeaway here is that realpolitik still dominates action in the geopolitical sphere, despite the best intentions of the most powerful nations of the world. It's an important lesson to take away as we (the liberal West) continue to try to craft the world in our image.

Western IGOs' Misguided Altruism May Doom Darfur

As you, dear reader, probably know by now, the International Criminal Court issued a warrant for the arrest of Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir on March 4th. I'll admit, even I was a bit excited over the matter, when it was first leaked. Though Mr. Bashir's reaction to the leak (before the point of no return on unsealing the warrant) started to worry me, and it turns out there were good grounds for such worry.

The ultimate problem with such a warrant is that it greatly escalates a conflict between Sudan's government and the International Community. For Bashir himself, it takes away any residual incentive that might have possibly been left for him to cooperate, therefore turning him into a rational--and dangerous--rogue actor (this failure to understand incentives is actually something I have had the opportunity to criticize the UN and ICC on in a report that we haven't published openly yet). Now Bashir has every incentive in the world to make sure that people with a loyalty to an ICC member state, the UN, or the International Community in general is expelled from the country, lest they are able to find a way to make his life more difficult, or make sure he is arrested. And, given that he is not being given any options to win his way to redemption, he has no incentive to make his life even marginally more difficult to be helpful (even in cases that might not directly endanger his life or freedom).

Furthermore, it gives him perverse domestic incentives. As much as it is surprising to believe, Bashir has an electing constituency, and is facing elections this very year! And, indeed, he is using the ICC's action to whip up nationalist fervor in Sudan. For the moment, Sudan's executive electoral system is still one-vote majoritarian run-off (meaning that each person votes once, and the winner is that with 50% of the vote; if they do not get 50%, the top two candidates run-off), and the Arabic-speaking-Muslim population of Sudan is well more than 50% of the country. And they're not happy. The warrant is seen as a pinnacle of international meddling in what many Sudanese see as a nasty civil war, started and perpetuated by non-patriotic Darfurian rebels (which is a partially-true story of the civil war). To get an idea of why this reaction is happening, imagine if the ICC had issued a warrant for the arrest of President Bush, while he was about to run for re-election. Suddenly, his decision to (probably) torture captured combatants, and his War in Iraq that led to hundreds of thousands of deaths becomes much less important than the fact that Europe is trying to actually gank the American president, while in power, humiliate the country, and throw him in jail. Now imagine you've been told that Europeans are out to crush your very religion, and that they are primarily responsible for your economic woes (of which you have many). Then imagine that you have been fighting some sort of civil war for the last 30 years, and how much you actually care about collateral damage. Then you'll get some idea of how well-received this warrant might be among the larger chunk of Sudanese people.

So, it's out with foreign aid agencies. In addition to protecting himself from potential agents of the ICC, Bashir is using a strong response as a sign that he's "not going to take it anymore" from seemingly condescending, cappuccino-sipping, Ivory-Tower Europeans, and that's going to make him outrageously popular. Also, he's marking a deterrent, for what it's worth. The ICC and UN are not the same body, but they're much like two cousins that you have a lot of trouble telling apart. Oh, and by the way: it was the UN Security Council that unanimously referred the Darfur case to the ICC (the ICC would have been powerless without that referral). So now that the UN has decided to try and mess with Bashir and the sovereign leadership of his country, it's actually a pretty popular move to boot out everyone even remotely related to the UN or ICC, if for no other reason than to teach them a lesson, and to not be a sucker.

So, the ICC, and the UN, have indirectly (though rather clumsily) made life a lot harder for the victims of the Darfur war. Lots of critical aid is either gone, or will be within a year. Food will stop being delivered, refugee camps will stop being protected, civil service will fall apart, etc etc. It will be bad. Heck, even the Obama administration's plans are being derailed by the expulsion of NGOs and aid groups. Lots of people are going to suffer. The ICC could probably cut a deal with Bashir and withdraw the warrant in exchange for a reinstatement of all these aid programs, but it won't do that. And, to be fair, it probably can't--it would destroy forever what little effectiveness the ICC and the UN may now have. But they played chicken with Omar al-Bashir, and for now, he will probably sleep well knowing that all those that slighted him are bearing great guilt over the excess death and suffering of millions of people.

Now, many will say, "hold on, this is Justice." And indeed, it is, and Justice needs be served, in particular to make the next genocidal maniac tinpot dictator think twice about doing this ever again--because, indeed, Bashir deserves a thousand life sentences, and more. And, more importantly, we want to have institutional capabilities to make sure this doesn't happen again.

But, as they say, discretion is the better part of valour. And the ICC this month has forgotten their discretion in the name of glory and grandstanding. The timing could not have been worse. Bashir is up for re-election this late spring or early summer, and is constantly campaigning. He obviously can't afford to look weak. Additionally, the Darfurians and Sudanese had literally just sat down in Qatar and agreed to new rounds of peace talks--talks that the JEM felt might finally end their impetus to fight, and, at the very least, end government support of the Janjaweed. Additionally, just when the UN needs the help of the African Union, Sudan's neighbors, and the international community, it has managed to fully alienate almost every predominantly-Muslim state in Africa. (Eg: Egypt, the Arab League)

Perhaps not all of these outcomes were predictable, but some of them certainly were, and it boggles the mind to think that nobody clever in the UN or the ICC though that a genocidal maniac dictator might find a way to react negatively to a warrant for his arrest by a bunch of Europeans. The ICC even has the discretion to keep a warrant sealed, and they chose to unseal it. Waiting, in this case, would have been wise--at least to see where the new Qatari peace talks were going.

But, today, the UN and the ICC stand guilty of grossly misguided altruism. A "we must do something" attitude can so often lead to terrible consequences, and here they come. This warrant may have set back the Darfur peace process, aid and relief process, and even justice process farther than it has been set back in a long time.

Progress in Sudan

Sudan has appeared to be largely stagnant in progress towards ending its war in Darfur over the past few years, and worse, it appears to be entering a new conflict in South Sudan. This is, unfortunately, largely true, despite Sudan's ability to make peace (mostly) with its Northeastern rebels (yes, it's got lots of rebels).

Janjaweed Militants

Bush actually sent a lot of aid to the region, which has helped in relieving some of the agony of being an Internally Displaced Person (and appreciation runs high--UN reports a strangely high number of babies being named George W. Bush among Darfurian refugee camps), but the AU/UN security efforts have been largely ineffective at stopping the violence. And why? Some of it is a lack of resources (money, manpower, etc), sure, and that's what most people are complaining about. But the real problem is a lack of spine, frankly. AU and UN troops are operating under a very tight Rules of Engagement (RoE), and largely cannot deal with most problems they face, and certainly is not going to deter the Janjaweed or the Sudanese government from acting. The Government of Sudan is willing (currently) to drink what trade embargoes and UN Sanctions are on its shoulders in order to finish dealing with its Darfur problem (which is mostly that Darfurians are rebelling over socioeconomic mistreatment, and/or want their own country, and Sudan needs the land for oil, and does not want to be caught paying someone to stop giving them a hard time).

A Village Razed by the Janjaweed in Sudan

But very recently, some progress has been made. First, the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM, one of Darfur's main rebel groups) is in peace negotiations with Sudan in Qatar, asking for (frankly) not much. Khalil Ibrahim, JEM's leader, said "We are fighting for pure water supply, education, primary health care, electricity, food, job opportunities and participation in taking decisions." There are ways for the Sudanese to accommodate these wishes, but they will likely require electoral reform and cooperation with outside mediators (mostly to enforce promises, particularly demobilization).

Sudanese President, Omar al-Bashir

Second, the International Criminal Court (ICC) has added Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir to a growing list of big-wigs in Sudan that have a warrant for their arrest for War Crimes in Darfur. This is the first time the ICC has issued a warrant for a head of state--quite a bold move. He is highly unlikely to be caught, but he may be feeling the pressure a bit--the Western world is continuing to step up its actions against Sudan's government for the Darfur catastrophe. And, if Bashir should travel to any of the ICC's member states, he'll be arrested and brought to The Hague. The warrant also more explicitly indicts the entire state as a genocidal pariah, rather than a bureaucracy of incompetence that was unable to deal with the Janjaweed. It is going to stop the fighting? Not today. But it's likely to give the JEM (who are not the rosiest of rebels, to be fair) some added bargaining power in Qatar.

But even if the external forces, the electoral reform, and the peace deal can be mustered, the Janjaweed has to be rounded up and demobilized. That's going to be tough, to say it lightly.

My Spring Plans

This New Year's Eve, I'm on a bus to Boston--thus my excuse for writing now and not partying.

My excuse for writing about me is that there is absolutely nothing interesting going on in the world, especially Gaza, Bangladesh, India, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Iraq, China, Russia, Ukraine, the United States, Israel, or Cuba.

Since, this New Year's Eve, the world is at peace, I'm going to take a break myself from criticizing soul-crushingly foolish government errors and analyzing gut-wrenchingly hopeless security spirals, and talk a bit about me, and what I'm doing this spring.

I'm not talking about this summer or the fall after that because I don't know what I'll be doing yet. I'm still looking for a job.

But that's not all I'm doing this spring. I have indeed landed myself an internship, which I'll be starting on the 5th of January, and continuing at ~20 hours/week through May. The internship is at Conflict Dynamics, International, a non-profit firm that works with the UN and lots of liberal-democracy governments to make specific policies on the sources of contention or insecurity in wars to try and end them (or prevent them from restarting). The president, Gerard Mc Hugh, has enough of a reputation with the folks that the works with that he gets to propose his own project ideas to them. Pretty cool stuff.

When I interviewed at CDI, I was continually distracted by the many maps on the walls. Very detailed, well-used maps of the Darfur region, and settlements, ethnoreligious densities, conflict sites, refugee camps, were all over the walls. Mr. Mc Hugh didn't mind my jaw-dropping in his office, and calmly asked me how my education was going.

"Great," I said. "I'll be finishing in 4 years." I was boasting a bit. But I was trying to impress the guy. Very few people work in that company, and I needed to show that I wouldn't be wasting CPU cycles, ink, coffee, or oxygen.

"Four years with a master's? That's impressive."

"I'm impatient," I replied. I am, it's true. But he probably didn't need to know that.

He chuckled. He has an Irish accent that took me the longest time to pin down: "I know the feeling."

"Oh? You get your Master's in 4 years, too?"

"Well, three, actually, but I was going to mention something else."*

So this guy, he's got a leg up on me. Got out of MIT quite a bit quicker than I did, and then decided he was going to be an independent consultant. My impression is that he started Conflict Dynamics because the demand for his time became too high for him to handle himself. So now, he's got his fingers in Sri Lanka, India, Somalia, Iraq, Afghanistan, Sudan, Columbia, probably a few other places. And me, I'm slack-jawed drooling, looking at these maps on his walls, and blubbering like an idiot as he asks me questions. I don't quite remember what I said, but it wasn't eloquent.

Sensing that I had no idea what the heck I was saying, he picks a problem for me to get my hands on: Sudan. I'll be working directly with him, right next to the guy, on a desk that was completely covered in books and papers last time I was there. I might be spending the first day cleaning it. I'll have a pretty hands-on role in (at least) electoral reform in Sudan to try to create a government with better minority representation (and better minority protection). This should do a few things:
1) Decrease the motivation for Darfurians to fight for independence.
2) Decrease the ability of the Arab-Muslim plurality to act single-handedly.
3) Try to resolve tensions between the north and south in parliament, rather than on the battlefield, which should make these Christian Africans more participatory, and allow them to act as political friends or allies of the Darfurians.

I'll probably end up working on other similar projects, too; we'll see. The coolest part is I will likely be taking a short trip to Khartoum to do some field research. Here's to hoping I don't get shot.

So that should take up most of my time that's not spent writing my thesis or going to the last few classes I have to squeak through. Then, I graduate--hopefully I'll have landed a gig by then.


*All this, of course, is paraphrasing from memory.

Why Darfur Remains Untouched

Lots of people in the university world like to protest about Darfur and "raise awareness;" it's a popular means for picking up women at cocktail parties. Sadly for those taking the issue seriously, I think their efforts are futile. Awareness is already pretty high; raising it more is not going to do much to pressure Western statesment into acting. It is ultimately logistical problems are keeping anyone from doing anything. It's harder than it looks.

Any intervention into Somalia would be met hostilely. Where would one land, unless one was willing to fly in shooting? The UN has serious problems with actually killing people in peacekeeping missions, and the Darfur problem would be militarily untenable for them unless they made a deal with the Sudanese government (which the Sudanese government is uninterested in).

While in my Great Power Military Interventions class today, Professor Barry Posen brought up a few more interesting points about Darfur that I had not considered. After some thinking, I realised the following, that make Darfur largely doomed for the near future:

1) Only three countries in the world have global lift. These are France, Britain, and the US. The US outstretches the other two by far, but nobody besides these three countries can actually pick an arbitrary location on the map and sustain a conflict there. The EU is purchasing C-17's (probably about 200 in 10 years), which is great; they will soon be able to supply their own foreign peacekeeping missions. But for the past 15 years, all eyes have turned to the US, UK, and France for ever-critical logistics in these affairs, giving the three serious veto power in any kind of global foreign mission.

2) The US has all the airlift. France and the UK only have boats--and each country only has about as much sealift as the US Marine Corps. A mission without the US would mean absolutely zero rapid response, emergency supply, etc--making it unbearably risky for most European states.

3) The US is tied down. Iraq/Afghanistan obviously have US supply vessels pretty tied up, and the US can't afford to promise dozens of such vessels for a long, difficult mission in Africa.

4) The US is politically insular. After the Iraq debacle, both international and domestic pressure flared, and any international action by the US is likely to be laughed at by policymakers that have any hopes of a pension.

5) Darfur is geographically nasty. Out west, past Khartoum and other large cities in the Sudan and away from arifields, the jungles of Darfur are highly reminiscent of Vietnam--making military commanders wince at the idea of plunging back into anti-insurgent warfare in a climate they don't yet know how to handle.

So the Darfur mess is likely to stay a mess for some time. As much as we feel good by screaming "do something!" and blaming current statesmen for inaction, neither incoming presidential candidate is going to have a magic bullet to easily and cheaply go "fix" Darfur, and wacky African dictators are likely to get away with genocide for some time to come.