Possible Hezbollah Connection in Israeli-Lebanese Border Skirmish

Stratfor thinks there's a lot of good reasons that Hezbollah has its hand in the recent Israeli-Lebanese border skirmish. Quick summary:

1) Hezbollah has control of a large portion of the lower ranks of the military.
2) The UN is probably going to indict a number of high-ranking Hezbollah in the murder of the Lebanese Prime Minister.
3) Hezbollah wants to show Lebanon that it's a valuable/necessary force by making Israelis look like aggressors against Lebanon.

My worry is that it will actually work.

(Stratfor below)

STRATFOR
---------------------------
August 3, 2010


ISRAEL, LEBANON: POLITICAL MOTIVATIONS IN THE BORDER CLASH

Hezbollah Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah said in a speech Aug. 3 that his organization will "not stand silent" on the border clash between Lebanese and Israeli troops that resulted in the deaths of three Lebanese soldiers earlier in the day. In a line reminiscent of many Iranian speeches, Nasrallah said "the Israeli hand that targets the Lebanese army will be cut off." He also offered his organization's support to the Lebanese military, saying that the "smartest thing is to behave how we behaved. We told the Lebanese military -- we are prepared, we are with you, and we will help if needed."

Rumors are circulating that Hezbollah fighters were on the scene of the border clash and intended to escalate the situation. STRATFOR sources in the Lebanese military do not believe Hezbollah fighters were directly involved in the skirmish, but there is reason to suspect the group was behind the instigation of the fighting. Hezbollah has significant influence over and an established presence in the already weak and fractured Lebanese army. The organization makes it a point to discharge a portion of its recruits after they serve two years in the military wing and then enlists them in the Lebanese army. This allows Hezbollah to both control the composition of the army's ranking officers and influence specific operations. This latest border skirmish could be an illustration of Hezbollah's influence over the Lebanese army.

Given that the Lebanese army typically refrains from confronting Israel Defense Forces (IDF) personnel during routine activities, such as maintenance and repair work on the security fence and perimeter, the decision by the Lebanese army patrol to fire on the IDF forces is anomalous, suggesting that the move was preplanned and perhaps driven by Hezbollah interests. The chief of Israel's Northern Command, Maj. Gen. Gadi Eizenkot publicly described the incident as a "deliberate ambush."

Hezbollah -- and its patrons in Iran -- have a strong interest in raising the threat of a broader military confrontation, but Hezbollah has little desire to escalate the situation further and provoke an actual fight with the IDF for fear of incurring massive losses. Hezbollah is already under fire in Lebanon over a Special Tribunal probe into the 2005 assassination of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik al Hariri that is expected to indict Hezbollah members. The group is attempting to deflect blame and attention away from this probe and is using the incident to justify its existence as a resistance movement since the Lebanese army is incapable of defending itself on its own. The Lebanese army chief, as one source earlier indicated, could have also welcomed the border distraction to divert attention from the crisis over the tribunal (the army has no interest in confronting Hezbollah in such a domestic crisis and would rather have the focus shift to the Israeli threat). Meanwhile, Iran is attempting to use a crisis in Lebanon as a flashpoint in its negotiations with the United States over Iraq and the nuclear issue by illustrating another hot spot in the region where it holds the cards to cause trouble should Iranian demands go unfulfilled.

Though a number of political motivations appear to be in play with this border skirmish, and Iran can be expected to continue prodding Hezbollah, there is little indication so far that either Hezbollah or Israel intends to escalate the border clash into a more serious military confrontation.


Copyright 2010 STRATFOR.

STRATFOR's Take on the ICJ Decision in Kosovo

STRATFOR takes a more regional view of the potential consequences of the ICJ decision.

"KOSOVO: CONSEQUENCES OF THE ICJ OPINION

Summary
A July 22 ruling from the U.N. International Court of Justice affirmed the legality of Kosovo's declaration of independence from Serbia. The Kosovar government will use the ruling as a mandate to strengthen its sovereignty over the whole of the country, while the government in Belgrade will attempt to continue its diplomatic fight for Kosovo in the United Nations as a way of winning over nationalists in the country's electorate. These moves will lead to increased tensions -- and possibly violence -- in the region.

Analysis


The International Court of Justice (ICJ), the highest U.N. court, has issued a nonbinding opinion July 22 stating that Kosovo's February 2008 unilateral declaration of independence from Serbia "did not violate general international law." The court's interpretation of the question was narrow, only addressing the legality of the declaration and not of Kosovo's perceived status as an independent country.

The ruling is a blow to Serbia, but it does leave the country an opening. Belgrade can claim the narrow ruling means Kosovo's status is still an open question, one Belgrade wants the U.N. General Assembly to take up in September. But it presents a public perception problem, since the United States and most of the West are already interpreting the decision as supporting Kosovo's independence and thus ending discussion on the issue.

The West remains unconcerned about Belgrade's complaints on Kosovo because of Serbia's stated goal of joining the European Union. As long as Serbia seeks EU membership, its continued indignation on the matter will have no real repercussions and will be something the West can continue to ignore.

(click here to enlarge image)

However, there are indications from the European Union that Serbia may have to wait until well into the 2020s to join. The question then becomes whether Belgrade's current pro-EU government will continue in power or whether it will be replaced with a more nationalist one that is less inclined to preserve Serbia's self-imposed limits on response options to Kosovo's independence.

Thus, whether or not Belgrade's efforts at continuing the discussion on Kosovo are successful, Serbia's government has a domestic political logic for continuing the fight, as Serbian leaders see the continuous diplomatic effort on Kosovo as a way to establish credentials with the nationalist side of the electorate.


For Kosovo, the ruling is a sign that it can begin exerting its sovereignty more forcefully over the whole of the country. Pristina has had to temper its attempts to press its sovereignty north of the river Ibar, where a substantial Serbian minority -- roughly 70,000 -- remains. Even very limited efforts by Pristina -- such as cutting Serbian lines of telecommunication or establishing a government office in the Serbian part of the divided town of Mitrovica -- have elicited violence.

STRATFOR therefore expects to see the decision embolden Pristina and raise tensions north of Ibar, potentially leading to violence. This will force the Serbian government to reconsider its position of using only diplomacy and potentially force Belgrade to begin considering non-diplomatic ways to support Serbs in Kosovo. Ultimately, the impasse over Kosovo could force President Boris Tadic's government to reconsider its pro-EU stance, especially if the electorate decides EU membership will have to wait a decade, or potentially longer.

Copyright 2010 STRATFOR."

And Now For Disaster

Karzai reached 54% of the vote in the preliminary announcement this weekend, though the IEC continues to cite dozens of cases of fraud.

Those tribal leaders that complained earlier? Karzai apparently took 100% of the votes in that district. Oops.

The West is cautiously calling for recounts, and possibly re-votes. The right answer here is to declare that the election was too marred to determine a winner, and have a run-off between the two candidates, though it begs the question: can more oversight be brought into the process? Or will Karzai (and/or his goons) steal this one, too?

If Abdullah leads a protest (and I'm not saying he shouldn't), an Iranian-style situation might arise... except that the Afghan state has extremely limited security powers, and the protesters will have Kalichnikovs. Things are going to get worse before they get better, if they do.

Bandaiding Won't Work in Somalia

The "Somali Government," which I shall now and for probably a long time refer to only with sneer quotes, has requested a big chunk of international funding to create a Navy. How quaint.

There are probably a lot of folks in the international community that would like to throw some money at this problem and be assured that it will go away. It won't. And anybody that thinks it will is a fool looking to throw money away.

Somalia is in anarchy. Its government exists only by name--it has no influence. It was propped up briefly by the Ethiopians with the support of the West, but as soon as the Ethiopians left, Mogadishu was overrun by the Union of Islamic Courts, a group that the Ethiopians thought they had finished off a few years ago.Some work has been done to regain some bit of administrative control over some of Somalia by the Western-supported government, but to the south, Islamic militants reign. Puntland and Somaliland to the north are essentially autonomous. And the small swath of land administered by the Somali government is one that is highly unstable, highly variable, and full of citizens with very little national identification or loyalty.

Frankly, how can money create a competent Navy? It takes much more than steel, guns, and technology to get a Navy working in a way that can fight piracy. If a Navy is to fight an internal menace, then some internal control is necessary. Some internal intelligence is critical. And even if that is achieved, years of training are necessary to create well-trianed sailors that can competently hunt and destroy the pirates.

It might probably even be cheaper to send a UN-approved force to whack the Somali pirates in their dens, then to throw a bunch of money at a Somali Navy that will not exist for a very long time, if at all. Trying to outsource this problem is a fool's errand.

Western IGOs' Misguided Altruism May Doom Darfur

As you, dear reader, probably know by now, the International Criminal Court issued a warrant for the arrest of Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir on March 4th. I'll admit, even I was a bit excited over the matter, when it was first leaked. Though Mr. Bashir's reaction to the leak (before the point of no return on unsealing the warrant) started to worry me, and it turns out there were good grounds for such worry.

The ultimate problem with such a warrant is that it greatly escalates a conflict between Sudan's government and the International Community. For Bashir himself, it takes away any residual incentive that might have possibly been left for him to cooperate, therefore turning him into a rational--and dangerous--rogue actor (this failure to understand incentives is actually something I have had the opportunity to criticize the UN and ICC on in a report that we haven't published openly yet). Now Bashir has every incentive in the world to make sure that people with a loyalty to an ICC member state, the UN, or the International Community in general is expelled from the country, lest they are able to find a way to make his life more difficult, or make sure he is arrested. And, given that he is not being given any options to win his way to redemption, he has no incentive to make his life even marginally more difficult to be helpful (even in cases that might not directly endanger his life or freedom).

Furthermore, it gives him perverse domestic incentives. As much as it is surprising to believe, Bashir has an electing constituency, and is facing elections this very year! And, indeed, he is using the ICC's action to whip up nationalist fervor in Sudan. For the moment, Sudan's executive electoral system is still one-vote majoritarian run-off (meaning that each person votes once, and the winner is that with 50% of the vote; if they do not get 50%, the top two candidates run-off), and the Arabic-speaking-Muslim population of Sudan is well more than 50% of the country. And they're not happy. The warrant is seen as a pinnacle of international meddling in what many Sudanese see as a nasty civil war, started and perpetuated by non-patriotic Darfurian rebels (which is a partially-true story of the civil war). To get an idea of why this reaction is happening, imagine if the ICC had issued a warrant for the arrest of President Bush, while he was about to run for re-election. Suddenly, his decision to (probably) torture captured combatants, and his War in Iraq that led to hundreds of thousands of deaths becomes much less important than the fact that Europe is trying to actually gank the American president, while in power, humiliate the country, and throw him in jail. Now imagine you've been told that Europeans are out to crush your very religion, and that they are primarily responsible for your economic woes (of which you have many). Then imagine that you have been fighting some sort of civil war for the last 30 years, and how much you actually care about collateral damage. Then you'll get some idea of how well-received this warrant might be among the larger chunk of Sudanese people.

So, it's out with foreign aid agencies. In addition to protecting himself from potential agents of the ICC, Bashir is using a strong response as a sign that he's "not going to take it anymore" from seemingly condescending, cappuccino-sipping, Ivory-Tower Europeans, and that's going to make him outrageously popular. Also, he's marking a deterrent, for what it's worth. The ICC and UN are not the same body, but they're much like two cousins that you have a lot of trouble telling apart. Oh, and by the way: it was the UN Security Council that unanimously referred the Darfur case to the ICC (the ICC would have been powerless without that referral). So now that the UN has decided to try and mess with Bashir and the sovereign leadership of his country, it's actually a pretty popular move to boot out everyone even remotely related to the UN or ICC, if for no other reason than to teach them a lesson, and to not be a sucker.

So, the ICC, and the UN, have indirectly (though rather clumsily) made life a lot harder for the victims of the Darfur war. Lots of critical aid is either gone, or will be within a year. Food will stop being delivered, refugee camps will stop being protected, civil service will fall apart, etc etc. It will be bad. Heck, even the Obama administration's plans are being derailed by the expulsion of NGOs and aid groups. Lots of people are going to suffer. The ICC could probably cut a deal with Bashir and withdraw the warrant in exchange for a reinstatement of all these aid programs, but it won't do that. And, to be fair, it probably can't--it would destroy forever what little effectiveness the ICC and the UN may now have. But they played chicken with Omar al-Bashir, and for now, he will probably sleep well knowing that all those that slighted him are bearing great guilt over the excess death and suffering of millions of people.

Now, many will say, "hold on, this is Justice." And indeed, it is, and Justice needs be served, in particular to make the next genocidal maniac tinpot dictator think twice about doing this ever again--because, indeed, Bashir deserves a thousand life sentences, and more. And, more importantly, we want to have institutional capabilities to make sure this doesn't happen again.

But, as they say, discretion is the better part of valour. And the ICC this month has forgotten their discretion in the name of glory and grandstanding. The timing could not have been worse. Bashir is up for re-election this late spring or early summer, and is constantly campaigning. He obviously can't afford to look weak. Additionally, the Darfurians and Sudanese had literally just sat down in Qatar and agreed to new rounds of peace talks--talks that the JEM felt might finally end their impetus to fight, and, at the very least, end government support of the Janjaweed. Additionally, just when the UN needs the help of the African Union, Sudan's neighbors, and the international community, it has managed to fully alienate almost every predominantly-Muslim state in Africa. (Eg: Egypt, the Arab League)

Perhaps not all of these outcomes were predictable, but some of them certainly were, and it boggles the mind to think that nobody clever in the UN or the ICC though that a genocidal maniac dictator might find a way to react negatively to a warrant for his arrest by a bunch of Europeans. The ICC even has the discretion to keep a warrant sealed, and they chose to unseal it. Waiting, in this case, would have been wise--at least to see where the new Qatari peace talks were going.

But, today, the UN and the ICC stand guilty of grossly misguided altruism. A "we must do something" attitude can so often lead to terrible consequences, and here they come. This warrant may have set back the Darfur peace process, aid and relief process, and even justice process farther than it has been set back in a long time.

Progress in Sudan

Sudan has appeared to be largely stagnant in progress towards ending its war in Darfur over the past few years, and worse, it appears to be entering a new conflict in South Sudan. This is, unfortunately, largely true, despite Sudan's ability to make peace (mostly) with its Northeastern rebels (yes, it's got lots of rebels).

Janjaweed Militants

Bush actually sent a lot of aid to the region, which has helped in relieving some of the agony of being an Internally Displaced Person (and appreciation runs high--UN reports a strangely high number of babies being named George W. Bush among Darfurian refugee camps), but the AU/UN security efforts have been largely ineffective at stopping the violence. And why? Some of it is a lack of resources (money, manpower, etc), sure, and that's what most people are complaining about. But the real problem is a lack of spine, frankly. AU and UN troops are operating under a very tight Rules of Engagement (RoE), and largely cannot deal with most problems they face, and certainly is not going to deter the Janjaweed or the Sudanese government from acting. The Government of Sudan is willing (currently) to drink what trade embargoes and UN Sanctions are on its shoulders in order to finish dealing with its Darfur problem (which is mostly that Darfurians are rebelling over socioeconomic mistreatment, and/or want their own country, and Sudan needs the land for oil, and does not want to be caught paying someone to stop giving them a hard time).

A Village Razed by the Janjaweed in Sudan

But very recently, some progress has been made. First, the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM, one of Darfur's main rebel groups) is in peace negotiations with Sudan in Qatar, asking for (frankly) not much. Khalil Ibrahim, JEM's leader, said "We are fighting for pure water supply, education, primary health care, electricity, food, job opportunities and participation in taking decisions." There are ways for the Sudanese to accommodate these wishes, but they will likely require electoral reform and cooperation with outside mediators (mostly to enforce promises, particularly demobilization).

Sudanese President, Omar al-Bashir

Second, the International Criminal Court (ICC) has added Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir to a growing list of big-wigs in Sudan that have a warrant for their arrest for War Crimes in Darfur. This is the first time the ICC has issued a warrant for a head of state--quite a bold move. He is highly unlikely to be caught, but he may be feeling the pressure a bit--the Western world is continuing to step up its actions against Sudan's government for the Darfur catastrophe. And, if Bashir should travel to any of the ICC's member states, he'll be arrested and brought to The Hague. The warrant also more explicitly indicts the entire state as a genocidal pariah, rather than a bureaucracy of incompetence that was unable to deal with the Janjaweed. It is going to stop the fighting? Not today. But it's likely to give the JEM (who are not the rosiest of rebels, to be fair) some added bargaining power in Qatar.

But even if the external forces, the electoral reform, and the peace deal can be mustered, the Janjaweed has to be rounded up and demobilized. That's going to be tough, to say it lightly.

A Brief on My Current Work

So a few folks have been asking me about some of the work I've been doing recently with Conflict Dynamics, so I'll update you (because it's largely the reason I've not been updating as much recently).

So I'm a consultant for the boss on two projects, the first of which I've been spending a lot of time on (and will through March), and the second I'll be working on a lot more later. The first project is work on Children in Armed Conflict (CAC), where we are generally trying to help end recruitment of children as soldiers and other violations during armed conflicts (the second is on conflict resolution in Sudan, which is a years-ongoing project that I am only really briefly helping on). Our work is actually with the Canadian government, whose delegation heads the Group of Friends, a 30-or-so-delegate union of nations specifically dedicated to the CAC problem. We have been working for some time on (still proprietary) research on how to eventually craft a UN Security Council resolution to increase the (frankly, pretty terrible) effectiveness of deterrent measures. The work is going along quite well, and I think I might be able to chat more about it during the summer (whence we might spend some time in New York making sure the resolution the Canadians write is pushed through).

Much of our research requires working with the folks that actually operate on the ground level. On Wednesday, I hopped a bus down to New York and then took the metro to the UN. The plaza was surprisingly busy, and I wondered what they were actually up to. But I actually met with my boss and a few UN workers that had spent a lot of time in the field, and presented our work so far. They were impressed, and gave us some good recommendations for moving forward. To be honest, that was really it.

We got out of meeting a bit late, and missed our second meeting, so I got to wander around a bit (I picked up a UN pin for my next visit). I made sure I was wearing a UN-blue-and-white striped shirt with a UN-blue-and-white paisley tie, so I looked the part. I think some tourists even took photos of me as I left the main UN building.

But the experience was pretty exhilarating nonetheless, and I may try applying to work at the US Mission to the UN for the fall. Additionally, I might be heading down next week to help the Boss chat with the Russians and Chinese and preempt any vetoes coming from them this summer.

More to come.

Why Darfur Remains Untouched

Lots of people in the university world like to protest about Darfur and "raise awareness;" it's a popular means for picking up women at cocktail parties. Sadly for those taking the issue seriously, I think their efforts are futile. Awareness is already pretty high; raising it more is not going to do much to pressure Western statesment into acting. It is ultimately logistical problems are keeping anyone from doing anything. It's harder than it looks.

Any intervention into Somalia would be met hostilely. Where would one land, unless one was willing to fly in shooting? The UN has serious problems with actually killing people in peacekeeping missions, and the Darfur problem would be militarily untenable for them unless they made a deal with the Sudanese government (which the Sudanese government is uninterested in).

While in my Great Power Military Interventions class today, Professor Barry Posen brought up a few more interesting points about Darfur that I had not considered. After some thinking, I realised the following, that make Darfur largely doomed for the near future:

1) Only three countries in the world have global lift. These are France, Britain, and the US. The US outstretches the other two by far, but nobody besides these three countries can actually pick an arbitrary location on the map and sustain a conflict there. The EU is purchasing C-17's (probably about 200 in 10 years), which is great; they will soon be able to supply their own foreign peacekeeping missions. But for the past 15 years, all eyes have turned to the US, UK, and France for ever-critical logistics in these affairs, giving the three serious veto power in any kind of global foreign mission.

2) The US has all the airlift. France and the UK only have boats--and each country only has about as much sealift as the US Marine Corps. A mission without the US would mean absolutely zero rapid response, emergency supply, etc--making it unbearably risky for most European states.

3) The US is tied down. Iraq/Afghanistan obviously have US supply vessels pretty tied up, and the US can't afford to promise dozens of such vessels for a long, difficult mission in Africa.

4) The US is politically insular. After the Iraq debacle, both international and domestic pressure flared, and any international action by the US is likely to be laughed at by policymakers that have any hopes of a pension.

5) Darfur is geographically nasty. Out west, past Khartoum and other large cities in the Sudan and away from arifields, the jungles of Darfur are highly reminiscent of Vietnam--making military commanders wince at the idea of plunging back into anti-insurgent warfare in a climate they don't yet know how to handle.

So the Darfur mess is likely to stay a mess for some time. As much as we feel good by screaming "do something!" and blaming current statesmen for inaction, neither incoming presidential candidate is going to have a magic bullet to easily and cheaply go "fix" Darfur, and wacky African dictators are likely to get away with genocide for some time to come.

Cranking Up the Heat on Iran

No, this isn't deja vu. We just keep doing it. I'll keep this short:

Israel launched well over 100 fighters over the Mediterranean in what it openly publicized as a dress rehearsal for a possible strike on Iranian nuclear facilities. Iran claimed that it was just psychological warfare, and probably is (as Stratfor notes, one does not publicize surprise attacks just before performing them), but this nonetheless means that Israel is happy to show a militarily aggressive posture towards Iran. Further, the Israelis noted that a nuclear "threshold" in Iran is likely to be crossed in late 2008 rather than 2009, as earlier predicted. We're not sure exactly what that threshold is, but the Israelis seem to have an idea that Iran is tumbling towards a nuclear weapons capability of some sort by the end of the year.

This all comes amid evidence found on a Swiss computer that the former A.Q. Khan weapons ring (that brought the Bomb to Pakistan and missiles to other countries) dealt with advanced missile-mounted nuclear technology (the blueprints appeared on the Swiss computer, though it's not clear how).

In addition, the EU has approved new sanctions against Iran, freezing bank accounts. France and Germany in particular have hardened their rhetoric against Iran.

And again, the US has called Iran out for shipping weapons to Iraq and training Shiite insurgent groups. The US is even publicizing a case of two of its own; two men that allegedly helped the Iranians acquire weapons.

It seems that a grand coalition of Western powers is in a quiet, unofficial agreement that Iran is a meance and must be dealt with. Bust most of the leaders of these countries have at least been aware of it for years. A clear media campaign is being waged by most of them--from military exercises to news stories to high-level meetings (and a strangely warm reception of Israel by a usually-cool EU). The UN is not a military option for the West--the Russians would clearly veto any military action in Iran. But the West seems to be preparing for something... and it is possible that they are not preparing for anything, but only trying to make it so clear that they are preparing for something that the Iranian government would crack. In the last parliamentary elections in Iran, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's party lost seats not only to the few moderate candidates that were able to run, but also to the more religiously conservative party (that aligns with the Supreme Council). Clearly, much of Iran worries over the brinksmanship being played by Ahmadinejad's executive... including the Supreme Council. If the West can emphasize this and try to worry the Council over imminent action, then it's possible a wedge might be successfully lodged into the Iranian government that Ahmadinejad's power to act will be dramatically reduced.

That, or the West is really sitting down and deciding that an airstrike needs to be launched against Iran. This seems so unwise that it is unlikely, but Iran's continued support of Hezbollah, Hamas, Al-Sadr, and its defiance of UN nuclear restrictions and sanctions shows a country that is risk-accepting, dangerous, and revisionist, with plans for domination of the region (through Iraq, Palestine, Syria, and Lebanon). Most schools of International Relations (particularly the realist varieties) would agree that defiant states exhibiting such behavior, especially as they grow in size and strength, are the most dangerous.