Tikrit Falls to Iraqi Forces; US Solidifies Role as Leader Against ISIS

Tikrit has fallen.

Mop-up operations are underway, but the Iraqi national flag now flies over the city, and ISIS is broken.

Iraqi forces should be moving quickly north to secure the Baji road and oil refinery before securing, regrouping, and supporting Ramadi to make sure the ISIS advance there is halted. And then, of course, there will be a few-months' ramp-up to take Mosul.

Key Takeaways:

The advance into Tikrit was halted around March 6th as the army/Shiite militias faced heavy sniper fire and dug-in pockets of resistance.

US airstrikes started up just under a week ago after the Iraqi government requested the support to break ISIS resistance. Those airstrikes prompted most of the 20,000 Shiite militiamen--who generally don't like the US and see themselves as more closely aligned with Iranian interests--to boycott the siege and go home, leaving about 3,000 Iraqi Army troops, 1,000 Sunni fighters, and about 2,000 Shiite fighters. It left a lot of glaring holes in the siege.

But the airstrikes proved decisive.

After softening ISIS targets (which had probably thought themselves unlikely to have to face such airstrikes), the US suspended its operations and the Shiite militias quickly came back to launch the final assault.

The city fell one day after the air campaign, after 3 weeks of no progress.

The US is gloating a bit, and with good reason. US officials are taking the opportunity to show that Iran can't alone support the Iraqi advance. This is a precedent-setting kind of event: the US was "snubbed" last month when Iraq's government moved into Tikrit with Shiite militias and Iranian ground support, without informing the US or requesting support.

Giving in to request the support was a sign the Iraqis had realized they need it. The fact that the city was taken so quickly after the strikes cements the US' future role.

This means one of two things: either the US and Iran will work more closely together, or the Iranians will have a much-reduced role in the Iraqi offensives in the future.

This cementing also means that the US is going to be leading the assault on Mosul, which is about 20x larger than Tikrit and has many more ISIS fighters dug in. It's clear that the Mosul operation is a non-starter without that air support.

Shiite militias will make a lot of noise about not needing the US, but I do believe that Tikrit will be weighing heavily on their minds when they are planning the Mosul advance, and that despite the high tensions, the militias will begrudgingly go in with US air support.

It's worth noting: Tikrit probably had far more than the 2,000 ISIS fighters initially estimated--the Iraqi government cites about 13,000, but this is probably inflated. The good news is that this means the Iraqis have shown that they can win with about 2:1 odds, rather than the 10:1 or 15:1 previously thought. Mosul also has about 12,000 ISIS fighters, so the fight will not be an order-of-magnitude difference (though will obviously take much longer and be more complicated due to Mosul being about 20x larger in land mass).

But ongoing US airstrikes are making it hard for ISIS to dig in as deeply as it would like, and the ISIS governor ("Prince of Mosul") and Mosul's top ISIS military commander have both been killed by airstrikes.

Why Does the US Have So Many Aircraft Carriers? And a New Project!

Readers!

Great post today that deviates significantly from my normal "analyze a cool current situation" style. It's an educational piece designed to get you thinking, in the spirit of a new project that I'm launching where I'll be putting in a lot of effort, called Something to Consider. It's a blog/forum/community designed to go after the problem of broken political dialogue, and I do the blogging (and everything else)! I'm really excited about it and would love if you took a look.

Alright, back to it.

When we discuss the US’ military spending, we can frequently see that by some measures it spends more than the next 9 countries combined (6 of which are US allies).

But even more skewed than simple spending is the US’ navy might, represented primarily by its aircraft carriers. It has a whopping 19, 10 of which are “supercarriers” that travel the world in strike groups, accompanied by destroyers, cruisers, submarines, and supply ships.

This is more than the rest of the world put together by a healthy chunk.

(Credit: Hubpages. Note 21 carriers listed here--the US decommissioned 2 in a slight sizing-down)

It’s even more stark a comparison when you see that not all aircraft carriers are made equal. The US’ 10 super-carriers are rivaled only by one each from France, Russia, and China.

This enables the US to carry about 3x the aircraft on the sea as the rest of the world (and these aircraft are far more advanced than almost anyone else’s--making most potential battles highly one-sided).

Credit: Hubpages

Holy smokes. That’s a lot. And it costs a lot.

But why?

The fundamental underlying theory is based loosely in the idea that “someone has to.” In some circles it’s known as “Leviathan” theory, which says that security stability is best preserved when a single force has credible and overwhelming power--if anyone “misbehaves,” that force can quickly dispatch with them.

(We’ll stay out of the moral “should” or “should not” here.)

Most of us are accustomed to the seas being free for trade. So accustomed to it, in fact, that we have very little concept of a world without free trade, and the incredible economic and social benefits that come from it.

Before the end of World War II, trade disruption was common, either by privateering (legitimized piracy), blockades (enforcing non-trade policies by different countries in economic “competition”), or outright naval attacks. The lost trade was measured of course not only in blocked/attacked ships, but by the innumerable ships that never made the trip because of these disruptions.

It was bad news.

At the end of World War II, the US generated a whopping 60% of the world’s GDP and had a navy larger even than the British Empire. It made a very clear policy decision to be the keeper of global free trade by having an uncontested rule of the sea.

What did the US have to gain, besides being the “good guy?”

Obviously everyone gains from having free trade routes along the sea, so the US bearing the burden itself seems like a classic “freerider” problem--one party pays, everyone benefits.

But the US is uniquely positioned geographically to benefit from free seas. It spans the continent and has easy sea access to Europe, Asia, and South America--no other country can say this (excepting maybe Mexico). Europe and Asia must travel a long and difficult route to trade with each other; the barriers to trading with the US are much lower.

In the 2nd half of the century, the American Age began, as US trade with Europe (and then Asia) skyrocketed.

The US also benefits from free trade in other countries as it has moved to being a tech and services economy: it imports many products and the prices of those products are lower when manufacturing countries have easy access to raw materials or specialized parts.

As a net hydrocarbon exporter, the US benefits greatly here, as well.

The US being cut off from trade anywhere would hurt its economy significantly. The US loses not only from being blockaded (as ridiculous a concept as that is, currently) but from being cut off in limited areas.

Consider for example piracy near Somalia in the late 2000’s. It could have highly disrupted trade through the Red Sea and Suez Canal if the US was not able to mount an effort to counter the piracy by bringing overwhelming force to the area.

Image courtesy Wikipedia

Consider also the Persian Gulf, where the US and others trade with Kuwait, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the UAE. Iran has at times threatened to shut the gulf down, but overwhelming US naval strength makes that prospect unlikely (and very costly/debilitating for Iran if it gets to shooting).

The idea, then, is that while everyone else benefits without paying, the US might consider its naval carrier spending to be a good investment for its own economy anyway.

Does it pay off? Impossible to tell: one simply cannot estimate how much trade would not have happened and what kinds of disruptions would have occurred (or how investment confidence might have been lowered) if there was not a Leviathan force keeping the seas free.

So if you were wondering why the US keeps such a mighty fleet: that’s why.

For more educational and thought-provoking content, go check out the Something to Consider blog. Go sign up for RSS or email and hope to see you in the comment threads!

Why I Was So Damn Wrong About ISIS--Or Was I?

So I was pretty optimistic about Iraq's ability to go get ISIS after they slowed down in their march towards Baghdad.

Oops.

ISIL owns the Red and claims the Pink. Looks pretty bleak. (Wikipedia)

ISIS has held onto much of the territory it gained back then, and then started totally ripping up northern Syria. I'm sure you've all heard about Kobani, where the Kurds are about to lose their last major stronghold in the north.

A not-too-dramatized depiction of Kobani's current situation. 

It's gotten bad enough that young(ish) girls are taking up arms against ISIS. The good news about this is that ISIS superstition states that being killed by a woman means no virgins in heaven, so they're actually a little squeamish about fighting women and are apparently not quite as effective.

Kurdish women defending Kobani. (NYT)

So it looks pretty bad, and certainly the Iraqis and Syrians haven't been able to just clean up this problem like it's no big deal. I had been wondering, "how the heck did I get this so wrong? Where did ISIS' magical power come from?"

So I did some digging around, and it turns out I'm not as wrong as I thought. Let's look at things big picture, then piece-by-piece.

The Messy Situation in Iraq & Syria. Grey is ISIS, Yellow is Kurd, Purple is Iraqi gov't, Red is Syrian Gov't, Green is Syrian Opposition. Big version here.

Iraq:

Much like an American election, looking at the colors in terms of square miles really makes things look pretty lopsided. Let's look first at Iraq. See those little purple strands stretching out like fingers to the northwest? That's the Tirgis and Euphrates. Yeah, that cradle of civilization thing. Where all the people actually live because the rest is desert (see the blue dots? Those are towns). Months ago, ISIS had all that stuff. So in Iraq, most of that grey is... desert. ISIS holding Mosul, Tikrit, and Fallujah is bad news, but it's not existential if the tide is turning.

Now it's certainly not all peaches, especially just west of Baghdad. Those who have been wonking about Iraq for the past decade will immediately notice that this is Fallujah, the toughest enclave of anti-Shia/government sentiment and a perennial tough spot (to put it almost hilariously lightly) since 2003. That will be the last nut to crack in the ISIS counter-offensive. Tikrit, which is the town-of-size just north of Baghdad, will probably be much sooner.

Baghdad is actually currently working (albeit slowly) on taking a few nearby towns, including Ramadi, Haditha, and Muqdadiyah. Iraq just took Baiji today. Now that Iraq is starting to win some fights, the chances of its troops dropping their guns and fleeing at the first sight of enemy forces has dropped (at the very least, Iraq is starting to figure out which troops are relatively reliable).

So it's pretty good news in Iraq... at least by comparison (I don't want to underplay that this whole mess is a little terrifying and also an incredible human tragedy). "But why not more?" I hear you ask!

In short, the Iraqis are taking their time and making sure they're darn well prepared for a major assault. The Americans are doing a bunch of training and will likely lead the planning (and of course provide coordinated intel and air support, which will actually be a pretty big deal) in order to make the counter-assault something that's swift... when they get around do it. That's coming in 2015. For now, if you live in Mosul, "sorry."

CNN has a pretty long article that, while irritatingly unwilling to take a stand on anything, is quite informative, called "Has ISIS Peaked?" It talks about some of the other gains that Iraq is making, including interrupting supply lines, counter-siegeing, and being able to predict ISIS movements (and then call American airstrikes) that prevent them from being able to quickly take territory anymore. The blitzkreig is definitely done, and wasn't enough to break Iraq's back.

So we'll keep an eye on this but get excited for early 2015, when the Iraqi army launches its counter-offensive. We can be optimistic largely because ISIS is not like the Taliban: where the Taliban is largely an insurgent army that controls its territory by having a relatively strong support base and Kabul's capacity to assert itself is weak in its areas, ISIS is a small and hated organization that happens to have gotten its hands on a lot of money and tanks. Where the Taliban can melt away and come back, ISIS will have to hold its ground in its urban controllings and fight a conventional war, as attempting to flee will mean the loss of its hardware (either by leaving it behind or having it bombed) and money. If they come back, they'll no longer have the element of surprise and, hopefully, the Iraqi army will be trained just enough to fire a few shots back before retreating, which should be enough given the army's vastly overwhelming numerical advantage (about 10:1, and the offensive can likely concentrate that further).

Syria:
Unfortunately, Syria's prospects area not nearly so good.

In Syria, one literally has 4 groups all fighting each other: the Government, the Opposition, the Kurds, and ISIS. ISIS even recently signed an agreement with al-Qaeda there to stop fighting each other. It's bad news. The Kurds and the Opposition teamed up for a while in Aleppo, but they're now too broken apart to help each other.

As much as Assad is a bad guy, the fact that the Government, Opposition, and Kurds are all fighting each other means that ISIS will continually have opportunities to exploit wedges and move into weak points (as these groups move troops to fight each other). If, for example, the Government forces are being pressed at one side, the Opposition won't back off in order to help the Government repel ISIS--they'll take advantage of the weakness themselves and move in. It means that nobody (except maybe the Kurds, who are so cornered that they're out of the Gov/Opp civil war) can fight ISIS without worrying about being stabbed in the back.

To deal with Syria, the anti-ISIS "coalition" (really, the US) needs to play a game of containment until Iraq is handled. The Kurds have the best chance at actually seriously fighting ISIS at the moment (they seem to be taking Kobani back), and they're getting help from Iraqi and Turkish Kurds as reinforcements. The Westphalian implications of this multinational joint Kurdish effort will not be lost upon the keen student of political science, but I'll avoid digressing.

Once (if I'm right) Iraq is somewhat taken care of, the Iraqi Kurds are likely to form an offensive to help liberate northern Syria. To be fair, they're likely to stop after they liberate all of Kurdish territory, leaving the remnants of ISIS from the Kurd regions and from Iraq to focus what's left of their power on the rest of Syria.

US policy will focus on a dubious strategy of trying to arm the rebels and use airstrikes against ISIS to help the Opposition fight both ISIS and the Government at the same time. I don't think it's a fight that the Opposition can win. To achieve both a limit of bloodshed and a swifter, surer end to ISIS, the US may need to give up on the Opposition and make sure Syria is more united. But it won't happen.

Quick Guest Article from Fair Observer -- the Failure of the American Drone War

A really fascinating (if slightly depressing) article on drone strikes in Pakistan and Yemen, the nature of the Obama policy, and the growing anti-Americanism / extremism that it's causing. Very much worth a read.

http://www.fairobserver.com/article/obamas-war-the-failure-of-drone-strikes


Image: Copyright © The Bureau of Investigative Journalism.

Guest Post: Economic Complications of the Senkaku Island Dispute

I get a lot of requests for guest posts and am quite picky in what I put forward--this one I like a lot.

My guest author today is from One Minute MBA, and they break down the economic complications of the Senkaku Islands dispute between Japan and China, going a bit deeper than I have in the past. They illustrate the story below, pointing out some of China's options if the US takes a stronger pro-Japan stance than it has now.

My take:

1) I think China's economic retaliatory responses are all much more painful to China than they are the US. The US does have a few options to move some of its outsourcing (to Malaysia, the Philippines, Vietnam, etc), and cheap selling of US bonds would cost the Chinese hundreds of billions--more than the damage done to Japan so far.

2) A boycott of US goods would hurt some key exporters and would likely prompt some US aid for some of the exporters if they would otherwise go under. If the US similarly boycotted Chinese goods, it would need to be selective. Consumer goods boycotts would hurt US retailers; industrial goods boycotts would hurt US manufacturers. 

3) I must admit my previous post on the Senkaku Islands, framing it as a distraction, was ultimately wrong. Whether it was originally intended as a distraction (for I'm still not sure of another good reason why the Chinese would escalate it after so many decades) or not, it has become a mainstay of Chinese foreign policy that they're not currently willing to put down.

4) The Chinese are unlikely to let the matter go entirely. As Professor M Taylor Fravel points out in "Strong Borders, Secure Nation," (a book I contributed some research to way back in the day), Chinese foreign policy is focused largely on maintaining territorial integrity, which (to Beijing, at least) requires a very consistent stance on territorial claims made at the end of the civil war, based on Ming dynasty maps of Chinese territory. In Beijing's eyes, giving up on any of these (including the Spratlys, the dispute it India, and the Senkakus) opens them up to lower bargaining power on future territorial disputes of greater import to their ultimate security.

Senkaku Islands Dispute as a Distraction for the Chinese Public

You've probably heard about major protests, warship movements, and maybe even talk of war over a few islands between China and Japan. These are called the Senkakus (by the Japanese--"Daiyou" by the Chinese, but we're going to stick with Senkaku for simplicity and the fact that you'll hear "Senkaku" on the news. Dear Chinese readers--please note that I am not taking a side on this conflict by using the word "Senkaku."), and they're a small chain of almost entirely uninhabited rocks with very little strategic value (unlike the Spratlys, which may have all sorts of oil / gas underneath and have East Asian countries in an ongoing dispute, as well).

I wanted to take a quick moment to share my own pet theories on the conflict. First, some background:

The Senkakus were occupied by the United States after WWII until 1970, at which point they were transferred to Japan. Of course, much of Japanese territory at the end of WWII did not necessarily belong to Japan  beforehand, but most of it went right back.

The complicated part about the Senkakus is that they were uninhabited islands, so there was no really obvious indicator as to who they belonged to. If you look back over history, both Japan and China have, at different times, had official maps/documents that both claimed them as sovereign and also marked them as belonging to the other country. So both sides have fairly questionable claims on them (I won't get into the details on this because they are boring and not helpful here), but nobody else has any claim at all, so they're up in the air between the two countries. Since the 70's, there has been some tension between the two countries as to who should have them, but the Japanese have "administered" the islands for the past forty years and have occassionally

But the recent flare-up makes little sense without context. Suddenly, it seems, the Chinese have become particularly aggressive about Japan's control of the islands. Some of this is likely provoked by the Japanese government purchasing the islands to solidify its claim, but the reaction is blown somewhat out of proportion. What we're seeing in China is massive protests that have led to huge damage in Japanese buildings / businesses in China (and leading to the Japanese shutting down factories in China for protection), Chinese activists heading to the Senkakus to plant flags, Chinese government vessels and even Chinese warships going to the area.

Let me be clear here: these islands are of zero import. They are about 7km total area, devoid of natural resources, and uninhabited. On their own, it seems absurd to be upset about them. To be fair, China is obsessed with not giving any ground on its territorial claims (consistency is very important for China to have precedent in case they have major territorial disputes over places like Taiwan, Xinjiang, Tibet), but territorial claims here through the 70's have been inconsistent and China loses little by making a more strategic decision about whether to pursue or renounce the islands.
For China, the issue is almost certainly one of distraction. If we look at China internally (and China's only real focus is internal, as it has ever been), we see two things going on: first, there are economic issues bubbling up. Second, there is a power struggle in the Communist Party.

Economic issues are sufficiently obvious that they're somewhat out in the open. Even the People's Daily, a state-sanctioned paper, is writing articles about how the economy needs to change (though certainly the Party is already planning on this if it's being written about). China's wealth gap continues to grow, even as hundreds of millions are brought out of poverty, and the wealth gap is always a painful, risky thing. Inflation was high and growth slow during the past few years, and a lot of fear of a "hard landing" is still out there. Wall Street Journal says the "hard landing" has been avoided, but that doesn't mean the population is convinced of it yet. To be clear: the Communist Party's grip on power depends almost entirely on its ability to continue to drive unprecedented growth in the country, and a Japanese-style "lost decade" would be crippling to its power. It's also clear to the populace that massive corruption within the party and it's "friends" is unfair to them and potentially bad for the economy as a whole, so it will mean that the population can find ways to blame the party for their own troubles.

Second, you may have seen lots of news about Bo Xilai and the murder trials going on around him. Bo was the predicted heir apparent in China and the sudden, public scandal is clearly the result of a power struggle within the party that he lost, setting up rival factions to potentially take power at the next Congress. The use of the murder trial and other very personal charges is an attempt to take the spotlight away from the Party itself, but there is still the risk that the Party is seen as divided and weak. During this power struggle, until the dust settles, all factions in the Party have a strong incentive to make sure the public doesn't pay too much attention.

Thus, there's a lot of reason right now for a distraction to happen, and the Japanese provided just the excuse. Let me emphasize something: mass protests do not happen in China without government consent--at least not without a massive crackdown. The fact that these protests went on so long and caused so much damage before police intervention means that they were sanctioned and encouraged by the Chinese government. The government is making very sure to stoke anger about the Senkaku islands to bolster nationalism and keep frustration focused on Japan, rather than internal issues in China.

This, at least, is my own pet theory. As it turns out, we're seeing the Chinese government start to back down a bit on its rhetoric and get the protests a bit under control. This may be due in part to the US response (reaffirmation of the US-Japan Defense Treaty but non-involvement in supporting territorial claims), or the observed risk of massively damaging trade relations with Japan, which is a major source of exports for China. But as domestic politics in China settle (after the next Congress, probably), I predict we'll stop hearing about the Senkakus altogether for some time.

Breaking Down the "Oil War" Hypothesis

A friend recently used the term "War for Oil" when referring to the War in Iraq, and it got me to thinking: regardless of the intent (I will stay well away from that one as I have little to add and nobody wants their minds changed on the matter), did the US secure a significant, reliable source of oil by invading Iraq? Let's find out.

I first went to understand how Iraq's economy has changed since the fall of the Hussein regime. I knew that oil mining contracts went out in 2009, so this helped.

Browsing through Wikipedia brought me upon this great chart (don't worry, I checked the sources), which gives us an idea of whose companies are mining how much:

So the US and UK mine a fairly large amount of oil. Good, but there are a few things to note that change the equation:

1) The US and UK are being paid $2/bbl to mine the oil. While profitable, the oil mining companies bear most of the the costs of mining (including all operations costs) and are likely making somewhere between 1/10 and 1/20 the profit made at other offshore, well, and oilsands sites (this is speculation on my part based on some oil industry experience). So payback in petrodollars is fairly low.

2) The Iraqi government retains the right to sell much of the oil to whomever it wishes--the fact that the US is mining 16% of the oil does not mean that the US will import 1.5 MBpD.

On the other hand, the US is far and away Iraq's largest export partner, accounting for $11B of Iraqi exports in 2006 (according to US State Dept). 70% of the Iraqi economy is oil, so if we assume that oil dominates Iraqi exports, it means that the US is importing $11B in 2006, or 157MBbl at $70/BBL. Let's say that export rate has grown with Iraq, whose economy has about doubled since then. That's about 310MBbl per year or 0.85MBpD. How does this compare to the rest of the US oil economy?

As of 2009, the US imported 10 MBpD and produced 5 MBpD of crude. Assuming we're comparing apples to apples, Iraqi oil imports account for 5.6% of total US oil consumption.

So this looks like a decent amount, but not game-changing. And it's significant, but a few points about the oil market raise some ambiguity as to whether it has a significant impact on the US oil market.

Besides a few embargoes, the oil market is driven by bidding on open market (given different transport capabilities--some stuff is pipeline only, or rail only, some stuff goes out on barges and can go anywhere, which is the case with most Iraqi oil). Different importers (in our case, free-market refineries) will bid for crude oil and import it, turning it around on the gasoline or diesel market to suppliers that you pump your gas from. Iraq does not have any contractual, legal, etc agreement to guarantee the US any amount of oil or at any price (in particular, being part of OPEC means it has the bargaining power to do just about whatever it wants). At the end of the day, the post-war world increased Iraqi oil production significantly, which reduces oil costs for all importers, but the US has not secured a cheap or even necessarily reliable source of oil. The Iraqi government won't enter into any agreements that guarantee US refineries some portion of Iraqi exports--Iraq gains nothing by it. If the Iraqi embargo (from the Hussein era) had remained, the US would simply get its oil from elsewhere at a higher price. Compared to the $800B cost of the war, the cost-benefit doesn't make sense.

If the war in Iraq was designed to secure oil, it ultimately failed... or at least won't pay off monetarily. There's no doubt that world oil production has increased due to the fall of the Hussein regime and the end of the embargo, and this has lowered oil prices for the moment, but the costs of the war will likely far exceed the benefit from lower oil prices. At 15MBpD of consumption, if oil is worth $5/BBL less (which is more than generous given the size of the oil market), the US economy would save about $27B per year. Not including inflation, it would require about 30 years to pay back the cost of the war.

Hopefully, then, the war wasn't considered an oil investment. If it was, it was probably the worst investment the US ever made.

Some Potential Errata on Turkey & Iran

Two quick potential errata I want to point out from the past few posts I've had that relate to Turkey & Iran (I say "potential" because they are not factually wrong, but run somewhat counter to my recent predictions:)

Turkey: The Kurds of northern Syria have won a great deal of autonomy since the Syrian government has pulled back to Aleppo and Damascus. The Kurds seem less interested in being a key part of the opposition (they make up 9% of the population and likely feel that they would be marginalized in the new government), and more likely are looking to set up an autonomous zone like is found in Iraq. Lots of interesting implications if this happens, including the possibility of those two autonomous zones becoming the beginnings of a de facto Kurdish state.

There is a spike of rebel activity in southern Turkey, likely designed to take advantage of Turkish distractions in Syria and to build momentum for the development of a Greater Kurdistan. Initial thoughts suggest that this rebel activity might cause Turkey to reconsider their involvement in Syria, but they are likely "in too deep" to pull back, and may be hoping to turn a win in Syria into a means of containing the Syrian Kurds further.

Iran: I mentioned that the Arab Middle East is, in general, opposed to Iran's influence, but some recent behavior shows this isn't entirely likely:

• Iraq, which is ruled by its Shiite majority, may be helping Iran beat economic sanctions, which if true would suggest a tentative alliance.
• Egypt's Morsi will be visiting an Iranian conference on Syria (and other topics), suggesting an attempt to thaw relations (a move I don't quite understand, but will think about)

All worth thinking about. Clearly a fairly complicated region. Looking forward to any thoughts you guys have.

Foreign Interests in the North Korean Power Transition

Kim Jong Il is dead. His son, Kim Jong Un is taking over.

At least, we think so.

The North Korean regime is run, essentially, by a military oligarchy. Generals and other high-ranking officials tend to garner strong loyalties by their troops, and thus have the power to enforce their wishes.

It is thus possible for military leaders to try to stage a coup or otherwise disrupt the government if they are unhappy (we've discussed this before after the Cheoan incident). The danger in the death of Kim Jong Il is that North Korea's military leadership may not be happy with Kim Jong Un as the new leader of the country. He is young, untested, and apparently a bit unsocial and reclusive. In any such transition (even if not to a leader that is particularly inept), the temporary weakness of loyalty and stability could prompt a move by one of these military leaders.

This stability risk is the source of the various approaches of various major powers that have an interest in North Korea. For the most part, these countries want to avoid war and chaos. Each has its own particular stake:

China: Like in the Cheoan incident, China will be backing Kim in order to preserve stability. Its very strong, quick backing shows that it will put its weight behind Kim in order to deter actors within North Korea from attempting a coup. A war in North Korea would mean a major refugee influx into China, which it is not at all prepared to handle.

Japan & South Korea: Japan and South Korea are showing some warmth in working to keep the region stable, as well. Japan is working with China directly, highlighted by a recent high-level diplomatic visit. Japan risks being at the wrong end of ballistic missiles that North Korea has aimed at the country that could be taken over by military factions even less interested in stability than Kim was (again, see the Cheoan incident). South Korea actually sent mourners to North Korea to express regrets for Kim Jong Il's death. The move is designed to start off on the right foot with the new regime and express an interest in potentially working together. South Korea not only faces the refugee threat that North Korea does, but also potentially a direct invasion if the wrong military leaders take power. It also, long-term, seeks unification with the North, and may be testing the waters to see how Kim Jong Un responds.

Russia: Russia has been quietly supportive. It is currently looking inward at its own protests, and to its WTO ascension, and may partially be distracted. Additionally, it does not want to be too closely associated with North Korea (it gets little out of its relationship with North Korea other than North Korea can prove a useful distraction against the United States and its allies), but similarly wants stability on the peninsula.

United States: The United States sees the transition as an opportunity to resume the six-party talks aimed at dismantling the North Korean nuclear weapons program. Expect the United States to show the most aggressive posture of any of the six-party members, but it will take some time before Japan and South Korea are ready to negotiate hard with Kim. That said, the United States making its intentions clear early on can slowly and steadily build momentum.

Kim Jong Un was placed in the seat of successor very quickly, after Kim Jong Il's older two sons became politically unpopular by various means--for example, Jong Un is a 4-star general despite no military experience at all. The posturing is meant, in some ways, to project to the world that North Korea is united in its choice for successor. Some factions may be looking for an opportunity to unseat Jong Un, but so far it looks like enough military leaders of the country are behind him to give him legitimacy, and that legitimacy will grow if he plays his cards well with the great powers around him--and they'll be looking to support him unless he turns out particularly rotten.

The Aftermath of Europe's Disintegration

Dear Readers,

I apologise for my long absence from the blog. I've been busy, but I've also been holding back and feeling out the European situation before I wanted to say anything definitive about it.

As the European Debt Crisis worsens, we are starting to see the fault lines in the "Blocanization" of Europe grow wider and deeper. The core EU is torn between total control of its periphery, and jettisoning it completely. The former Soviet bloc countries continue to huddle together, waiting to ride out the eurozone storm and hold the Russians at bay when they come to capitalize on the fracturing of the Eurozone. Turkey's previous desperate love affair with the EU has become nearly a joke.

In the end, we're seeing Europe, as a concept, fall apart. The EU still exists, but it may dissolve in the next few years. If Greece or Italy leave, it will set a precedent that countries like the Czech republic, Poland, and the United Kingdom (all of whom have grown massively Euroskeptical) may take on and jump ship. This will happen, without a doubt, before any of these countries allow themselves to be pulled down by the Eurozone's debt crisis.

Even if these countries don't leave, they'll weaken the EU and make sure they are not as dependent on the fiscal responsibility of periphery countries in the region. Nationalism is coming back in Europe, and with ferocity. This nationalism, which many thought was being eroded away by Pan-Europeanism, will lead to European countries acting, once again, as independent entities, rather than a united force.

Geopolitically, it eliminates Europe from contestants for the role of 21st century hegemony. Despite its national pessimism, the United States is once again the front-runner--it remains the center of gravity of world trade and commands the seas. A growing Russia may be able to challenge the United States over the next 50 years. China continues to focus inwardly, and risks its own end similar to the "Japanese Miracle" if it cannot navigate its way out of the toughest bubbles in world history.

Look for surges in activity and influence-building from all three of these nations in the next decade or so, as they try to feel out what the new geopolitical system is going to look like.

A Complicated Libya Transition

As Gaddafi's regime ends (as now it is a mop-up exercise), "the world" must begin thinking hard about how to help Libya transition over to a functional, democratic government--and what the effect on the region will be.



The short version:
-The rebels are deeply divided about the direction they want to take post-Gaddafi.
-Gaddafi still has supporters in Sirte and other parts of Western Libya that will fear reprisals and marginalization. The rebels will struggle to bring them into the regime.
-It's unclear how much of the civil service infrastructure will be left; that is, will the civil servants that made the cogs turn pre-war keep working?

This is a great opportunity for the West to learn from its mistakes in Afghanistan and Iraq to make the transition to a new regime smoother. Mistakes not to repeat:
-Marginalizing the "old guard." They must have a reasonable place in the new regime, or they'll resist it.
-Don't declare victory too soon.
-Take a more hands-off approach: the National Transitional Council (NTC) will lose credibility if it looks like a puppet.

We'll see what the West can do. Luckily, the folks in Benghazi currently love the US to bits, so Obama has an opportunity to lead this transition well, and win back some legitimacy for the United States as a world leader.

The Atlantics: A Return to Arms-Length Continental Management

1) The Visegrad 4: Eastern Europe as a Major Player
2) The Re-Emergent Russian Bloc
3) Baltic Solidarity to an Emerging Russia
4) The EU Periphery: "Core" EU's Albatross
5) The Atlantics: A Return to Arms-Length Continental Management

Today we continue our 5-part series on the Blocanization of Europe by discussing the changes that will happen to the UK, US, Canada, and Iceland as the Continent splits into blocs.



The Atlantics are largely a classic story, and largely a bloc that has existed since the beginning of the second World War. The question of The Atlantics bloc has always been about just how much the Atlantic powers get distracted from each other.

To be clear, the Atlantics consist, fundamentally, of the United States, Canada, and the United Kingdom--I've (controversially, I supppose) tacked on Iceland due to perceived mutual benefit and a few historical interactions.

The United States, Canada, & United Kingdom have the exact same interest on the Continent: prevent any power from amassing enough wealth, power, and influence that it could project that power out of the Continent. For the UK, this threat is more immediate. But for the US & Canada, the fall of the UK to a Continental power would spell long-term disaster (if one consolidated the Continent from Moscow to London, its economy would be a bit larger than that of Washington & Ottowa combined).

We saw this during the first and second World Wars, as well as the Cold War--the US, Canada, and UK have a "special relationship" not despite geopolitics but because of it (which generally makes such a relationship more reliable and less fickle). It will continue to be so.

So why are we even discussing this? Trends looked, briefly, like they would turn awry for the North America / UK relationship in the 2000s, while Europe was upset with the US over Iraq and wildly enamored with its own experiment: a politically strong European Union. It appeared as if the UK had turned its attention towards the Continent, and would actually embrace a unified Continental power.

But this was never to be. The UK managed to sneak in a Eurozone deal in which it had the option of keeping the Pound as a currency for as long as it wanted (it will keep the Pound, for sure). The UK has lobbied against a stronger European military or foreign policy cooperation, preferring to limit its involvement to free trade, and a few domestically popular legislative concepts.

The UK has been skeptical of its involvement with the European Union, and has now grown exceptionally so. Unlike the United States, the European Union would not go to war with itself to maintain its cohesion--there is too much Nationalism at the level of each country, and the EU's tendrils of cohesion are already too weak, and getting weaker. As the UK pulls away, the European Union will do little to stop it.

The United Kingdom is very worried about recent Franco-Russo-German cooperation in military & economic matters. In the 19th and 20th centuries, it was usually 2 of these powers versus the other, and the United Kingdom always sided with the underdog to prevent Continental consolidation. But the UK shudders to think of facing all three at once, and will turn increasingly towards the US for support if this cooperative trend continues on the Continent among its major powers.

And of Iceland? Iceland has no military at all, and depends on NATO for protection. But if NATO's cohesion weakens (which it will), it will need to cling to one of the Blocs for security. Why the Atlantics, and why not the Baltics?

As we'll discuss in our final installment on The Blocanization of Europe, the Baltics are too preoccupied with defending their borders from Russia to reach out to protect Iceland. The US, UK, and Canada will pick up the slack--the US rarely backs off an opportunity to have a forward base of operations in exchange for military protection, and will take the opportunity here as Russia's power grows (as much as Iceland may hold its nose during the deal).

Ultimately, the US, Canada, and UK will work together to play European powers off each other and try to keep the continent divided. They will back the underdog (in this case, the Visegrad 4) against powers like Russia & Germany that are looking to expand their influence across larger swaths of the Continent. North American / UK cooperation will only grow into the future as the Atlantics return to their old strategy of managing Europe at an arms length.

A Few Interesting WikiLeaks Tidibts

As much as I'm marginally annoyed with WikiLeaks, they have leaked some relatively interesting information. A few tidbits:

-China is distancing itself from North Korea, and considering supporting a reunification under Seoul's command (calling North Korea's leadership a "spoiled child").
-Saudi Arabia asked the US to launch air strikes against Iran's nuclear programme.
-Israel conferred with Egypt and Fatah before attacking the Gaza Strip most recently.
-The US doesn't actually think a European missile defense system will bring real security to Eastern Europe.
-The UAE and Bahrain want Patriot batteries to defend against Iranian ballistic missiles.
-Saudi Arabia staunchly opposes the al-Maliki government in Iraq, worrying that it is an Iranian puppet.
-Secretary of State Clinton asked (perhaps pejoratively) whether the president of Argentina was completely mentally sound.
-Yemen asked the US to bomb Yemeni insurgents--and offered to tell the public that the strikes were carried out by the Yemeni military.

This is a sampling of 272 cables leaked so far. There are a total of over 250,000. Much more is to come--and it won't get prettier.

WikiLeaks is Being DDoS'd

WikiLeaks, famous/infamous for its releases of classified documents pertaining to the Iraq and Afghanistan wars, is under attack.

WikiLeaks is about to release its largest set of documents pertaining to the US, and this release may be its most scathing yet. The release is likely to cover cables/documents related to nearly every country in the world, and some are likely to be embarrassing. Secretary of State Clinton has already begun a blitz of apologies and preparations for the release.

The DDoS attack may be an attempt by one of any number of US agencies (CIA, NSA, DoS, etc), or any other pro-American group. Certainly, WikiLeaks has made a number of enemies in the past few years, and has even lost the immunity it used to enjoy in a few countries in Europe.

In the end, such a DDoS is far too late. WikiLeaks is an intelligent organization, and has many outlets by which it can share its (backed up many times over) data, including the New York Times and the Guardian.

Thus, I'm not entirely sure what the DDoS is driven by, except as a lash-out or retaliation. WikiLeaks' paranoia means it will require a much more sophisticated attack to have any hope of taking it down.

The American Response to the Korean Provocation

There are a few potential reasons for the North Korean artillery attack on a disputed South Korean island, and a few potential responses. Both are likely more complicated than meets the eye.

Potential Reasons for Attack
1) Kim is trying to re-set the "red line." In order to make sure it can secure a working nuclear weapons and deployment system, Kim Jong-Il might be trying to re-set what behavior actually leads to war (such that the nuclear program won't).

2) Kim Jong-Un is trying to display his power. Kim's successor may be trying to show domestic and international players that he is strong-armed and sufficiently aggressive that nobody thinks the shift in power will lead to a period of "softness" which could be taken advantage of.

3) An anti-Kim faction within the North Korean military may be trying to weaken the regime. After Kim Jong-Il came to power, a purge of military leadership struck fear into Kim's enemies, but also bolstered their sense of cohesion. Worries of another purge--or simply a sense of opportunism with the change of leadership--may be leading such a faction to provoke South Korea and the West into taking moves to weaken the Kim regime, up to war. Such a weakness or chaos might present an opportunity to stage a coup and replace the leadership.


Potential Responses by South Korean and Allies
1) The current response: the US joins South Korea's military exercises. The artillery shelling came during annual South Korean inter-service exercises in the Yellow Sea (which may tell us something about its motivations in North Korea). South Korea's response is measured, but the US has sent a carrier battle group to join the exercises. This serves both as a reaffirming of its commitment to South Korea's security, and also leaves open the option of precision air strikes against North Korea in the near future. Ths risk is that this response may look weak.

2) A tit-for-tat response. South Korea might attempt to show that it won't tolerate unprovoked attacks by reacting similarly: hitting a North Korean base. The risk is that North Korea may choose to escalate to show that it's willing to keep pushing to make sure it has the upper hand.

3) Tough sanctions. The US could rally a coalition for more sanctions against North Korea, but it's running out of options. Already, most countries avoid trading to North Korea in luxury goods (particularly those of which Kim Jong-Il is quite fond, like Mercedes cars). Broad sanctions would hurt an already-starving population, and would likely bolster North Korea's support for the regime, thus presenting a positive feedback to the North Korean military.

4) Significant escalation. South Korea could launch heavy surprise strikes against North Korea, both damaging its ability to wage war, and delivering an unambiguous message that further provocations would lead to destruction of the North Korean military (as South Korea would not make this move without US and Japanese support). The risk here is that North Korea would respond with artillery strikes against Seoul, where 25% of the South's population lives. Currently, North Korean artillery is so numerous and well-bunkered that it would be nigh-impossible to eliminate it before serious civilian tolls were suffered in Seoul.


The Chinese Response
The Chinese response has been intentionally cautious. North Korea as a tenuous ally has proven a liability, but China is largely unable to stop supporting the regime. If the regime collapses partially or entirely, China would be left with a humanitarian disaster and a refugee flood at its border (and under the Geneva conventions, it would be required to give them "reasonable" accommodation). China's current approach to North Korea is to make sure that the regime in power--whatever it may be--is stable. Unfortunately for China, this means supporting a temperamental and unpredictable Kim. At the same time, China will try to keep Kim in line as much as possible.

But Kim knows China is unable to stop its support, so China cannot use it as a serious threat (much like Israel knows the US is unwilling to drop its support entirely, and therefore the US cannot use it as a bargaining chip). China will need to find a way to temper North Korea's behaviour if it is going to be able to keep South Korea as a friend and trading partner (lest it lose South Korea to US/Japanese influence entirely).

Wisdom in the US Response
The US response shows strength and initiative to not only North Korea and China, but to the entire world. This is particularly important in a time when countries like Iran and Russia might see the US as exhausted or resource-drained from its commitments in Iraq and Afghanistan. The movement of its carrier battle group reminds potential rivals that its sea and air forces--the primary implements it would bring to bear in any engagement that wasn't a full-scale invasion--are still free, well-funded, and willing to move.

It also shores up South Korea's confidence in the US, which has balked at supporting countries like Georgia, Poland, and the Czech Republic against growing Russian influence and assertiveness. The move has marginally damaged relations with China, but the United States is showing South Korea that such damage is worth it in order to stick to its obligations.

The Fascinating CIA-Army Campaign in AfPak

As the US looks to spin down its campaign in Afghanistan (looking towards draw-downs in 2011), it has two current objectives towards which it is racing:

1) Eliminate and prevent the resurgence of al-Qaeda links in the AfPak region that can contribute to worldwide terror attacks.

2) Sufficiently reduce the influence of the Taliban that it cannot take hold and later become a stable harborer of terrorism / Global Jihad.

Unfortunately, these two objectives stand in some conflict, particularly where Pakistan is concerned. Pakistan largely lacks the capacity to hit al-Qaeda targets in its northwest on its own, so the United States has been sending "covert" drone attacks over the border to eliminate them. This alone seriously increases tensions, but worse was that a drone attack recently killed 3 Pakistani soldiers by mistake--US-Pakistani relations are often strained, and should they break the US would lose what intelligence and military support it has against militants in northwestern Pakistan, which serves as a "safe zone" for the Taliban to retreat, regroup, reorganize, refresh, and re-enter Afghanistan anew.

The US is pursuing its two objectives with two very interesting campaigns.

The first: Petraeus is launching a full-scale Counterinsurgency campaign, actually much different from the combined COIN/civil war stabilization/insurgent-hunting programme used in Iraq. The strategy is a full "take-and-hold" style campaign, in which the US simply "moves in" to Taliban-heavy areas and tries to install a local government and security force--area by area (rather than seeking out and killing the Taliban). The campaign has met limited force-to-force resistance so far, mostly because full battles against NATO forces fare poorly for the Taliban--they continue to use hit-and-run or booby-trap tactics to wear down NATO as NATO tries to win hearts & minds with security & handouts.

The second: The CIA (with the President's go-ahead) has stepped up drone attacks on Pakistani soil to new highs--in its most recent publicized attack, the CIA killed 5 German militants, just after news broke that European citizens were part of a planned string of Mumbai-style attacks in Europe (this particular attack not only disrupts al-Qaeda in Pakistan, but likely does well to partially shore up confidence from the US' European allies that its presence in the AfPak region has the potential to make them safer). This campaign is likely tactically very effective--it is diplomatically extremely costly, and would be an unlikely direction for the Obama administration to take if it didn't seem to have a military effect.

To be fair, Pakistan is still looking towards a full campaign into the Waziristan area (after a relatively successful campaign in the Swat area), but it is not ready. Floods throughout the country have tied up much of its military (in relief efforts) and drawn attention away from the Taliban threat. If-and-when Pakistan moves north towards the Taliban strongholds in Waziristan, the tide of the battle may turn. Sadly, I've been saying this for a long time.

US Flood Aid to Pakistan: PR Success.

The US continues to directly aide Pakistan's flood victims (and, by the way, is expanding the operation), just as UN officials decry the rest of the world for not helping more.

It's a crucial part of the fight against the AfPak Taliban. With the Pakistani government struggling on its own to send aide, the Taliban might well be the primary provider of aide were it not for the US intervention.

Now, many northwestern Pakistanis are seeing US troops and Pakistani government officials / Army troops distributing aid and rescuing flood victims. It's going to have huge PR impact, and reduce the legitimacy of the Taliban, and win more "swing voters" over to the pro-Government side.

It'll also help perceptions of the US, which will make it much, much easier for Washington and Islamabad to work together against the Taliban in the future.

US Attack Plan: Posturing with Iran

Joint Chiefs of Staff Chariman Adm. Mullen said today that the United States has a plan of attack for Iran in order to prevent it from acquiring nuclear weapons.

Such a declaration is an incredibly important (and unsubtle) part of a US intimidation/containment strategy with Iran in order to prevent such an acquisition from happening.

By announcing these plans, the US is publicly showing that, despite its draining presence in Afghanistan, it is willing to commit to striking Iran's nuclear infrastructure and dealing with the painful consequences. In short, it made it clear that a nuclear Iran is a worse scenario than a war with Iran.

With that clarity, of course, Tehran must try to guess whether the US is bluffing, or if it's serious. If it's serious, Tehran must seriously begin re-thinking its decision to pursue nuclear weapons.

The US air force and navy are minimally committed in Afghanistan, and have bases all around Iran (and can invade the Persian Gulf very easily). Iran's anti-air infrastructure would probably quickly crumble, allowing the US air forces to move with relative ease throughout Iran, and blockade the country from oil experts.

The most negative consequences for the US would likely be unconventional:
-The Chinese and Russians have strong economic/oil ties to Iran, and would protest furiously, if for no other reason than to make sure the oil keeps coming.
-Iran has a lot of power over Hezbollah, Hamas, and groups in Iraq and Afghanistan. No doubt, it could make life very difficult for the United States.
-There is some risk of alienating the anti-Iranian coalition, but odds are good that Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Turkey would be, generally, in support of such action. Jordan and Syria would be the toss-ups.
-The Revolutionary Guard could actually be highly disruptive in Iraq, although if the US is able to bomb out roads heading towards Iraq, it could mitigate such issues.

Attacking Iran would be seriously costly in a number of ways, but if the US is actually committed to it (it likely is--the US has never been caught bluffing since the Bay of Pigs and the anti-Soviet Hungarian Revolution).

This could be a game-changer in the Iranian nuclear contest.

North Korean Nuclear Brinksmanship

North Korea threatened nuclear war over US/South Korea wargames off the Korean peninsula. A few readers asked if this was at all legitimate.

The threats are vacuous--North Korea doesn't have any serious deployment capability. Their nuclear testing in the past has been technically successful, but not particularly impressive.

Frankly, the most damage they can currently do is rolling out a bunch of artillery and shelling Seoul into the ground. It would take a few hours at most.

This new brinksmanship is two things:
1) A litmus test to see if the US/South Korea will play more cautiously than North Korea. Turns out the answer is no, which is probably a good thing (or the precedent will be set that the US/ South Korea will retreat at threats).
2) Pump up domestic support for the nuclear program as North Koreans starve.

More interesting is the fact that Beijing's protests to wargames in the Yellow Sea caused the US & South Korea to move to the eastern shores of the peninsula. China is being particularly tough-nosed about the South Korean response to the sinking of the Cheonan, and I'm not yet sure why (unless, again, it is a part of propping up the Kim regime to keep stability strong).

Ultimately, North Korean brinksmanship will push the US and South Korea closer together. Any threats to North Korea's stability will push China and North Korea closer together. It may be the biggest foreign policy area over which China and the US will spar (barring, perhaps, American trade protectionism) now that Taiwan's Ma has taken the middle road approach to China.

An Afghan Exit Strategy

A conference in Kabul was held today about the international exit strategy from Afghanistan. A few things came out of it:

1) There's a goal date for Afghan Army leadership of every province in the country for 2014. Karzai and international forces are agreed on it (though it's non-binding).
2) The US will still keep drawing down forces in 2011. It will probably start slow--it's not the optimal time to draw down, but Obama has domestic promises he'll need to keep.

That said, let's think about the strategy itself.

First, what's the minimum goal of ISAF? To prevent an al-Qaeda (or other anti-Western international terror force) from taking hold. Certainly, if the Taliban takes over Afghanistan (or controls a large portion of it in a stable way), the risks of this will be very high--the war will be a failure.

The more control that the Kabul government has over Afghanistan, and the weaker the Taliban is, the higher the chances a pro-Western stable equilibrium will arise. Thus all the focus on state-building.

But at the end of the day, Afghanistan does not even have to be as strong and stable as Iraq to be a "success." That said, they're very different situations--Iraq was mostly a sectarian civil war, and Afghanistan is mostly an ideological insurgency (a la Vietnam, as much as that's a scary thought).

The strategy suddenly sounds a lot like the Petraeus strategy in Iraq. It includes:
1) Get the troops out onto the ground. Have them standing side-by-side with Afghani soldiers as patrollers in the streets. This not only trains the Afghani soldiers, but helps keep NATO soldiers looking like the good guys.
2) Focus on handing over one province at a time. Kabul will need to slowly and gradually develop its statecraft. Readers from 2006/2007 may remember Foggofwar's close tracking of the progress of province handover. I continue to believe this will be an important performance indicator. The strategy will allow NATO to continually consolidate troops into more and more troublesome provinces, as "easier" provinces are taken by Afghani troops. The "easier" provinces will provide areas to build experience for the Afghani Army, so that veterans can be cycled to "tougher" provinces that fall under Afghani control after stints in these "easier" provinces.
3) A focus on aggressive raids. The trick here will be to continually deny safe haven to the Taliban. Special forces should be employed at night to make it as scary for the Taliban to sleep as it is for pro-Western collaborators. Constant raids in Iraq against al-Qaeda and other insurgent groups went a long way in eliminating the actual insurgent part of the war.

Some new parts of the strategy:
1) A high reliance on Pakistan. The US needs to continue to be very diplomatic with the Pakistani people. Luckily for the US, it has managed to make drone bombings in northwest Pakistan enough of a status quo that it doesn't seem to be making the Pakistani people angrier. The US will almost certainly be sending special ops to assist Pakistan in offensives in Northern Waziristan and other hot spots to deny the Taliban cross-border support and organization. We'll continue to stress here at Foggofwar the importance of making sure there aren't "safe zones" for the Taliban to fall back, regroup, heal, resupply, organize, command, communicate, etc. It must be made into a fractured and confused force if it can be broken.
Pakistan also has a fair amount of success in breaking the Pakistani Taliban, though the Pakistani Taliban is generally considered to be "softer" and less experienced than its Afghani counterparts (who have been fighting a tough guerrilla war for most of the last 25 years). That said, lessons can be learned by the thoroughness of the Pakistani offensives.
2) Dealing with supply problems. Iraq really had few supply problems for the US. Basrah, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia all provided easy entry points for supplies. As news of attacks on NATO supply convoys in Pakistan/Afghanistan suggests, NATO must sometimes operate with fewer supplies than it would like. This can easily hamper offensive efforts.

That said, conditions in Afghanistan are currently terrible. Roadside bombings in Q1 2010 are double those in Q1 2009. June was the deadliest month in the 9-year war for ISAF forces. A previous post of mine suggests that this may be a better sign thatn one would immediately think, but it does indeed still risk running ISAF (or parts of it) out of Afghanistan. For every country that breaks and peels away, the Taliban strikes a victory.

They also have control of most of the southwest of the country--it's a big territory with a fair number of people. Getting potential sympathisers to work with the Afghan government will require such a massive and sustained disruption of Taliban operations there that they cannot hunt and kill the sympathisers at night--one of their most effective terror tactics.

Going forward, NATO will have to keep drone missiles, special ops, and the occasional small offensive in the Pashtun region (along with brilliant cooperation with Pakistan into the north) as it consolidates northern provinces under Afghani government control, in order to prevent the Taliban from mobilizing into a full offensive itself. As the Afghani Army grows, NATO will need to prepare a full invasion force--prepped by special operations, spearheaded by the Marines & Army, and then garrison by massive numbers of Afghani police and army, to take control of the Pashtun region. It will need to be huge, swift, and incredibly costly.

The exit strategy is a tough one. This is a much more difficult war than Iraq ever was. Ultimately, it will depend on being able to win over parts of the Taliban, and breaking the top-level leadership to prevent sufficient collaboration by the various Taliban factions for a full takeover.