The Political Scientist's Approach to the Current Middle East Crisis

As a political scientist, I scrunch my eyebrows a bit at the current crisis in the Middle East. It tickles my sensibilities in the wrong way: can one man setting himself on fire in Tunis really bring down a well-established regional system of government?

Obviously, the answer is "not on its own." More deeply, the answer is, frankly, "not at all." Generally speaking, the Realist school of political science sees events like the self-immolation in Tunis as minimally significant to the broader brushstrokes of geopolitics.

What I mean is this: many folks in many countries at many times (including much of the Middle East) have set themselves ablaze, gone on hunger strike, or otherwise protested for change, and gotten nowhere. To say that the "conditions were ripe" in the Middle East under-attributes the importance of the conditions themselves.

An historical example:
After the assassination of the Archduke Franz Ferdinand, tensions were high between the Austrians and Serbs. But the Austrians and Russians were largely ready to settle on a "March to Belgrade" by the Austrians, in which they'd simply hold the Serbian capital as the internal revolts were brought under control.

Two main factors led to World War I itself: offensive war methodology (the ubiquitous and profound belief that the best defense is a good offense), and Germany's border instability and desire to create buffer zones in Central and Western Europe.

Similarly, the election of Abraham Lincoln had ultimately little to do with the start of the Civil War. The Gulf of Tonkin incident had literally nothing to do with the American intervention in Vietnam.

Ultimately, all these events were caused by broad geopolitical factors that small, relatively random (in the scope of world politics) perturbations like a sacrificial protest cannot meaningfully change.

There will always be events that could lead to a crisis. Whether such a crisis emerges depends entirely on the geopolitical conditions going in. The Middle East is no different.

The reason for the current political instability is, ultimately, financial instability caused by decades of mismanaged central planning that led to sufficient dissatisfaction with the current regimes.

Oppression and suppression of alternative political groups is not a trivial point, but traditionally has not been enough in the past forty years of the Middle East to facilitate a popular change in government.

Ultimately, yes: the same geopolitical forces that drove the beginnings of the World Wars, the fall of the Soviet Union--these, too, drive the changes we're currently seeing in the Middle East.

Conventional War Dominance and the Railgun

Loyal Readers,

We're taking a break from the bleak world of WikiLeaks, Afghanistan, the Korean Peninsula crisis to focus on the longer-term picture of the world's superpowers. Here's why:

1) WikiLeaks will actually blow over. Sorry, Assange: one man can't bring down the Westphalian model of international relations.

2) Afghanistan will end. Whether it goes like Iraq (with a quiet, humble, half-victory) or like Vietnam (with a humiliating defeat), it won't have a long-term impact on the behavior (or, frankly, the security--terrorist attacks just aren't a serious threat to the stability of the United States, even if people die) of the major world powers.

3) The Korean Peninsula crisis won't become a war. No country in the mix (Russia, China, North Korea, South Korea, the US, or Japan) can actually gain from the measure, and North Korea knows it won't have Chinese support, and would thus get rolled over quickly. As unpredictable as North Korea is, it's not suicidal.

Anyway, now that you're not worried about any of that anymore, I want to think about the future--the control of the world as we know it, who will hold the reins, and how.

So we'll start out small: let's talk Railguns. My first caveat is that railguns will be horrifyingly expensive for a while, at least until one finds a way to fire a railgun projectile without destroying the rail itself (keep up the good work, engineers!). Some pretty awesome technological/business developments have been afoot (I won't repeat these narratives here).

A quick technical recap (longer, more exciting technical recap by Anton here): Railguns use magnets to launch projectiles at hypervelocity (Mach 7.5 or so). The projectiles have no explosives; the kinetic impact does the damage. Direct fire will lead to a near-instant kill; indirect fire allows travel of a few hundred miles in a few short minutes (the delay being due to the projectile lifting to about 500,000 ft to avoid air drag).

Expensive as they are, they're going to change the future of warfare, in a few ways that we should think about:

1) Even when we start killing each other in space, control of the oceans will remain the ultimate factor in geopolitical strength. When one controls the oceans, one controls international trade and transport. The US currently effectively controls international waters approximately everywhere (rare exceptions include areas near China), and will continue to do so. Russia and China are its biggest competitors for regional waters in the Pacific, but they are not positioned to control the Atlantic, and will end up competing against each other for control over the Pacific (where the US will continue to keep key alliances in South Korea, Japan, and the Philippines that allow it to project significant power in the area).

2) The United States will be "in the lead" in this technology, by a significant margin. Russia and China are not yet (at least to my knowledge) doing any serious work here. Russia has the pesky "Moskito," a powerful anti-ship weapon, but it fires at slower speeds and has a shorter range than a railgun (making it easier to potentially knock out of the sky).

3) Railguns are ultimately offensive weapons. Many weapons on modern US vessels are "defensive," in that they can be launched second and still be effective (modern jet fighter, AEGIS systems, etc). The railgun would win a naval battle with a coordinated first-strike; firing first means the engagement is over early, and firing second would probably just mean mutual destruction. The incentive with a railgun is to fire it first, rather than wait--thus the "offensive" descriptor.

The result of all this is that the world will likely remain relatively US-centric for some time, as it continues to control the seas. But it also means that there will be a new, natural instability in great power confrontations. For indeed, if the first shooter should win (or, at least, if the second shooter should suffer massive losses), then trigger fingers tend to get itchier.

The best example of this is World War I. Europe thought it has offensive technology (it didn't, but that's another story), and thus rushed to mobilize and press forward during a crisis that could have otherwise been spun down. In contrast, in World War II, Europe thought it had defensive technology (except the Germans, who realized otherwise), and thus cautiously appeased Germany while building the Maginot line.

When everybody believes they have offensive technology (they will), they're more prone to attack if they think they can win.

To be fair, China and Russia are unlikely to believe they can win against the US any time soon--the US has naval power projected everywhere and still has the military-industrial capability to start pumping out war machines at a moment's notice. The lesson of Pearl Harbor has been forgotten by no-one.

So what does it mean? If Russia and China see the world accurately, they will actually be less likely to want to confront the US on the seas, as any military confrontations with them will be likely to be even shorter and more decisive than before.

Russia will continue to focus internally and in its regional periphery for some time, trying to rebuild the military-industrial infrastructure necessary to challenge the European continent (where the US has much less military advantage). China, for its sake, will likely focus on regional power and influence, ensuring strong trade relations and security at its borders. Frankly, as much as there's a great deal of Sino-phobia out there, China has so many demographic problems building up that it will be focusing on its interior for decades as it attempts to avoid a socio-economic collapse. World Domination is not in Beijing's plans (though it may be in Moscow's).

So in the long-term, the US will remain the one power that exerts influence anywhere and everywhere, as long as it wants to. It will be able to bring powerful, high-speed offensive technology to bear in a short period, and be unchallenged in open waters. It will continue to struggle on land. It will worry about a Russian "takeover" of Europe (and eventually a German one) or a Turkish "takeover" of the Middle East, rather than Russian or Chinese challenges at sea.

There's more to this prediction than the railgun, but the railgun is the piece of technology that will push the Russians and Chinese to delay any plans to expand beyond their land influence for some time.

Signs of a Balancing Force Against Iran

Syria often uses its relationship with Hezbollah to exert influence in Lebanon. It's a strange alliance, and it caused Syria to be close to Iran for a long time.

But Syria and Saudia Arabia recently jointly showed up to Lebanon to make it clear that Hezbollah would have no support during the UN investigation of the 2005 assassination of the Lebanese Prime Minister. According to STRATFOR, it's likely that a number of Hezbollah agents will be thrown to the wolves.

The Saudi-Syrian cooperation has been rare in the past few decades. But that it is starting back up (and that Syria is working with Turkey to try to make peace with Israel) is a sign that Syria is joining a small-but-growing anti-Iranian coalition.

The Iranian-Syrian relationship was always strange. Syria is primarily Sunni Arab; Iran is primarily Shiite Persian. A Saudi-Sryian-Egyptian relationship is much more natural (in the 1960's a Pan-Arab state was discussed, which would include Iraq, as well).

This is good news for the US, which wants enough pressure around Iran to keep it in check. In an Iran versus Israel/US world, the US would struggle. But if Iran is sufficiently isolated, there isn't too much it can do.

The long-term risk, of course, is a Turkish-Arab major coalition. It would start looking like the formidable Ottoman Empire. Subverting such a coalition is the primary reason the US wants Turkey to join the EU.

Lasting Implications of the ICJ Kosovo Ruling

The International Court of Justice (ICJ) ruling on Kosovo is much bigger news than we're currently getting from the media. The ruling is likely to have longer-lasting geopolitical consequences than the outcomes of the Iraq or Afghanistan wars.

Kosovo declared independence from Serbia in December 2008. The UN General Assembly asked for the ICJ's opinion on whether the declaration of independence was "legal" in terms of international law. The ICJ ruled that it, indeed, was.

What's likely to happen in the immediate future is that more "neutral" countries on the Kosovo issue will likely begin to recognize it as a state, and establish diplomatic relations. If the last 5 EU countries (that don't yet recognize it) begin to recognize it, talks can begin on admitting it to the EU (something that Kosovo very much wants). It might even become a NATO member. "The West" will be very pleased to have a new ally in the region. Like Albania, it's the kind of country that will place huge welcome banners for Obama, Sarkozy, Merkel, Cameron, or other big-hitting Western leaders if they come visit.
But that said, Kosovo is a small country. It's not going to shift the balance between The West and the Russian bloc. What it is going to do, though, is set a powerful precedent.

Between Westphalia and World War II, there was a very Realpolitik stress on national stability. Balance of Power was the game, and all the European heavy hitters had a strong interest in preventing destabilizing independence movements from taking hold.

The United States became the dominant world power after WWI, and had a different approach. Due to its revolutionary and liberal-democratic zeal, it encouraged new independence movements. Post WWI clout gave Wilson the power to drive the principles of autonomy and liberty into the foreign policy discussions of Europe, as they hadn't been before. After WWII, the US generally pried its European allies into letting go of their colonies (except the French... long story.), and drove independence movements in USSR-occupied areas like Hungary and the Czech republic. Yugoslavia broke up. The USSR broke up.
All this led to massive Balkan and Central Asian instability in the 1990's. Without the Soviet fist, Central Asia became a warlord-ruled drug-route. The Balkans experienced multiple wars and genocides.

A precedent of legal regional declarations of independence is dangerous. What if Chechnya, Dagestan, Abkhazia, South Ossetia, Kurdistan, Xinjiang, and all sorts of other regions begin to think they can declare independence and have the moral highground to seek UN Assembly recognition? It might be tough to manage. The permanent UN Security Council members probably have a strong enough interest in preventing such a precedent that we can expect a Security Council resolution to come out in the near future. For now, it's something that even the evangelical United States will agree to--their plate is too full at the moment to start trying to manage worldwide national shuffling.

P.S: Those flags are all Albanian flags. I think this is mostly due to the fact that 1) Most Kosovars are of Albanian descent and 2) there was not a large Kosovar flag stockpile during the independence declaration.

Turkey Moves East

The EU's rejection of Turkey as a member (which was not an outright rejection, but a bureaucratic stagnation to death) has pushed Turkey towards the Arab world, away from the West. The latest evidence is in its decision to lead the Arab Free Trade Zone.

The implications are potentially large. Turkey has the potential to lead the Middle East and, as I spoke of before, unite it.

Turkish ascension to the EU probably made geopolitical sense, from a strictly national power perspective. It's not clear whether anti-Turkish racism in central Europe was the primary driver to keep Turkey out, or whether it was simply a European implosion over issues like the financial crisis.

But either way, the shift in rhetoric and action by Turkey likely suggests a long-term drift away from the West, and towards the Middle East.