Dear Readers,
I apologise for my long absence from the blog. I've been busy, but I've also been holding back and feeling out the European situation before I wanted to say anything definitive about it.
As the European Debt Crisis worsens, we are starting to see the fault lines in the "Blocanization" of Europe grow wider and deeper. The core EU is torn between total control of its periphery, and jettisoning it completely. The former Soviet bloc countries continue to huddle together, waiting to ride out the eurozone storm and hold the Russians at bay when they come to capitalize on the fracturing of the Eurozone. Turkey's previous desperate love affair with the EU has become nearly a joke.
In the end, we're seeing Europe, as a concept, fall apart. The EU still exists, but it may dissolve in the next few years. If Greece or Italy leave, it will set a precedent that countries like the Czech republic, Poland, and the United Kingdom (all of whom have grown massively Euroskeptical) may take on and jump ship. This will happen, without a doubt, before any of these countries allow themselves to be pulled down by the Eurozone's debt crisis.
Even if these countries don't leave, they'll weaken the EU and make sure they are not as dependent on the fiscal responsibility of periphery countries in the region. Nationalism is coming back in Europe, and with ferocity. This nationalism, which many thought was being eroded away by Pan-Europeanism, will lead to European countries acting, once again, as independent entities, rather than a united force.
Geopolitically, it eliminates Europe from contestants for the role of 21st century hegemony. Despite its national pessimism, the United States is once again the front-runner--it remains the center of gravity of world trade and commands the seas. A growing Russia may be able to challenge the United States over the next 50 years. China continues to focus inwardly, and risks its own end similar to the "Japanese Miracle" if it cannot navigate its way out of the toughest bubbles in world history.
Look for surges in activity and influence-building from all three of these nations in the next decade or so, as they try to feel out what the new geopolitical system is going to look like.
Showing posts with label Europe. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Europe. Show all posts
Wednesday, November 9, 2011
Monday, August 22, 2011
Baltic Solidarity to an Emerging Russia
1) The Visegrad 4: Eastern Europe as a Major Player
2) The Re-Emergent Russian Bloc
3) Baltic Solidarity to an Emerging Russia
4) The EU Periphery: "Core" EU's Albatross
5) The Atlantics: A Return to Arms-Length Continental Management
Dear readers,
Sorry about the wait. Today we conclude our 5-part series on the Blocanization of Europe with our final installment: Baltic Solidarity to an Emerging Russia.
The Baltics have worried about Russia for a long time, likely surprising nobody. When Russia looks west, it sees both vulnerability and opportunity. Its vulnerability comes from open plains stretching from Moscow all the way to the Alps, giving potential invaders an easy route in (which we've seen taken advantage of many times), as well as St. Petersburg being potentially bottled up by European maritime powers in the Baltic sea. Russia thus seeks to create buffer space and exert influence over its western neighbors in order to protect its land and sea periphery.
The opportunities are in natural resources (Finnish timber, Norwegian oil, etc). Russia has made moves to squeeze control of these resources or the processing of them out of the Nordic holders.
So Russia has thus spent most of the 20th and 21st centuries attempting to exert control over these areas to in order to protect itself and realize financial opportunities.
So the Baltics have been traditionally fearful. Much like the V4, their faith in NATO has started to erode. Estonia has been the constant victim of political manipulation and cyber-attacks for a decade; Finland has been pressed by tariffs.
So the rest of the story is short. The Baltic countries are looking to each other for solidarity, especially military. Sweden and Norway sport surprisingly powerful military forces that will make any incursions by Russia a much more painful contest than the invasion of Georgia.
In particular, Sweden and Poland are discussing potential alliance-making; nothing as strong as the V4 itself or the Baltic's grouping, but something that could potentially functionally replace NATO altogether.
2) The Re-Emergent Russian Bloc
3) Baltic Solidarity to an Emerging Russia
4) The EU Periphery: "Core" EU's Albatross
5) The Atlantics: A Return to Arms-Length Continental Management
Dear readers,
Sorry about the wait. Today we conclude our 5-part series on the Blocanization of Europe with our final installment: Baltic Solidarity to an Emerging Russia.
The Baltics have worried about Russia for a long time, likely surprising nobody. When Russia looks west, it sees both vulnerability and opportunity. Its vulnerability comes from open plains stretching from Moscow all the way to the Alps, giving potential invaders an easy route in (which we've seen taken advantage of many times), as well as St. Petersburg being potentially bottled up by European maritime powers in the Baltic sea. Russia thus seeks to create buffer space and exert influence over its western neighbors in order to protect its land and sea periphery.
The opportunities are in natural resources (Finnish timber, Norwegian oil, etc). Russia has made moves to squeeze control of these resources or the processing of them out of the Nordic holders.
So Russia has thus spent most of the 20th and 21st centuries attempting to exert control over these areas to in order to protect itself and realize financial opportunities.
So the Baltics have been traditionally fearful. Much like the V4, their faith in NATO has started to erode. Estonia has been the constant victim of political manipulation and cyber-attacks for a decade; Finland has been pressed by tariffs.
So the rest of the story is short. The Baltic countries are looking to each other for solidarity, especially military. Sweden and Norway sport surprisingly powerful military forces that will make any incursions by Russia a much more painful contest than the invasion of Georgia.
In particular, Sweden and Poland are discussing potential alliance-making; nothing as strong as the V4 itself or the Baltic's grouping, but something that could potentially functionally replace NATO altogether.
Friday, July 15, 2011
The Atlantics: A Return to Arms-Length Continental Management
1) The Visegrad 4: Eastern Europe as a Major Player
2) The Re-Emergent Russian Bloc
3) Baltic Solidarity to an Emerging Russia
4) The EU Periphery: "Core" EU's Albatross
5) The Atlantics: A Return to Arms-Length Continental Management
Today we continue our 5-part series on the Blocanization of Europe by discussing the changes that will happen to the UK, US, Canada, and Iceland as the Continent splits into blocs.
The Atlantics are largely a classic story, and largely a bloc that has existed since the beginning of the second World War. The question of The Atlantics bloc has always been about just how much the Atlantic powers get distracted from each other.
To be clear, the Atlantics consist, fundamentally, of the United States, Canada, and the United Kingdom--I've (controversially, I supppose) tacked on Iceland due to perceived mutual benefit and a few historical interactions.
The United States, Canada, & United Kingdom have the exact same interest on the Continent: prevent any power from amassing enough wealth, power, and influence that it could project that power out of the Continent. For the UK, this threat is more immediate. But for the US & Canada, the fall of the UK to a Continental power would spell long-term disaster (if one consolidated the Continent from Moscow to London, its economy would be a bit larger than that of Washington & Ottowa combined).
We saw this during the first and second World Wars, as well as the Cold War--the US, Canada, and UK have a "special relationship" not despite geopolitics but because of it (which generally makes such a relationship more reliable and less fickle). It will continue to be so.
So why are we even discussing this? Trends looked, briefly, like they would turn awry for the North America / UK relationship in the 2000s, while Europe was upset with the US over Iraq and wildly enamored with its own experiment: a politically strong European Union. It appeared as if the UK had turned its attention towards the Continent, and would actually embrace a unified Continental power.
But this was never to be. The UK managed to sneak in a Eurozone deal in which it had the option of keeping the Pound as a currency for as long as it wanted (it will keep the Pound, for sure). The UK has lobbied against a stronger European military or foreign policy cooperation, preferring to limit its involvement to free trade, and a few domestically popular legislative concepts.
The UK has been skeptical of its involvement with the European Union, and has now grown exceptionally so. Unlike the United States, the European Union would not go to war with itself to maintain its cohesion--there is too much Nationalism at the level of each country, and the EU's tendrils of cohesion are already too weak, and getting weaker. As the UK pulls away, the European Union will do little to stop it.
The United Kingdom is very worried about recent Franco-Russo-German cooperation in military & economic matters. In the 19th and 20th centuries, it was usually 2 of these powers versus the other, and the United Kingdom always sided with the underdog to prevent Continental consolidation. But the UK shudders to think of facing all three at once, and will turn increasingly towards the US for support if this cooperative trend continues on the Continent among its major powers.
And of Iceland? Iceland has no military at all, and depends on NATO for protection. But if NATO's cohesion weakens (which it will), it will need to cling to one of the Blocs for security. Why the Atlantics, and why not the Baltics?
As we'll discuss in our final installment on The Blocanization of Europe, the Baltics are too preoccupied with defending their borders from Russia to reach out to protect Iceland. The US, UK, and Canada will pick up the slack--the US rarely backs off an opportunity to have a forward base of operations in exchange for military protection, and will take the opportunity here as Russia's power grows (as much as Iceland may hold its nose during the deal).
Ultimately, the US, Canada, and UK will work together to play European powers off each other and try to keep the continent divided. They will back the underdog (in this case, the Visegrad 4) against powers like Russia & Germany that are looking to expand their influence across larger swaths of the Continent. North American / UK cooperation will only grow into the future as the Atlantics return to their old strategy of managing Europe at an arms length.
2) The Re-Emergent Russian Bloc
3) Baltic Solidarity to an Emerging Russia
4) The EU Periphery: "Core" EU's Albatross
5) The Atlantics: A Return to Arms-Length Continental Management
Today we continue our 5-part series on the Blocanization of Europe by discussing the changes that will happen to the UK, US, Canada, and Iceland as the Continent splits into blocs.
The Atlantics are largely a classic story, and largely a bloc that has existed since the beginning of the second World War. The question of The Atlantics bloc has always been about just how much the Atlantic powers get distracted from each other.
To be clear, the Atlantics consist, fundamentally, of the United States, Canada, and the United Kingdom--I've (controversially, I supppose) tacked on Iceland due to perceived mutual benefit and a few historical interactions.
The United States, Canada, & United Kingdom have the exact same interest on the Continent: prevent any power from amassing enough wealth, power, and influence that it could project that power out of the Continent. For the UK, this threat is more immediate. But for the US & Canada, the fall of the UK to a Continental power would spell long-term disaster (if one consolidated the Continent from Moscow to London, its economy would be a bit larger than that of Washington & Ottowa combined).
We saw this during the first and second World Wars, as well as the Cold War--the US, Canada, and UK have a "special relationship" not despite geopolitics but because of it (which generally makes such a relationship more reliable and less fickle). It will continue to be so.
So why are we even discussing this? Trends looked, briefly, like they would turn awry for the North America / UK relationship in the 2000s, while Europe was upset with the US over Iraq and wildly enamored with its own experiment: a politically strong European Union. It appeared as if the UK had turned its attention towards the Continent, and would actually embrace a unified Continental power.
But this was never to be. The UK managed to sneak in a Eurozone deal in which it had the option of keeping the Pound as a currency for as long as it wanted (it will keep the Pound, for sure). The UK has lobbied against a stronger European military or foreign policy cooperation, preferring to limit its involvement to free trade, and a few domestically popular legislative concepts.
The UK has been skeptical of its involvement with the European Union, and has now grown exceptionally so. Unlike the United States, the European Union would not go to war with itself to maintain its cohesion--there is too much Nationalism at the level of each country, and the EU's tendrils of cohesion are already too weak, and getting weaker. As the UK pulls away, the European Union will do little to stop it.
The United Kingdom is very worried about recent Franco-Russo-German cooperation in military & economic matters. In the 19th and 20th centuries, it was usually 2 of these powers versus the other, and the United Kingdom always sided with the underdog to prevent Continental consolidation. But the UK shudders to think of facing all three at once, and will turn increasingly towards the US for support if this cooperative trend continues on the Continent among its major powers.
And of Iceland? Iceland has no military at all, and depends on NATO for protection. But if NATO's cohesion weakens (which it will), it will need to cling to one of the Blocs for security. Why the Atlantics, and why not the Baltics?
As we'll discuss in our final installment on The Blocanization of Europe, the Baltics are too preoccupied with defending their borders from Russia to reach out to protect Iceland. The US, UK, and Canada will pick up the slack--the US rarely backs off an opportunity to have a forward base of operations in exchange for military protection, and will take the opportunity here as Russia's power grows (as much as Iceland may hold its nose during the deal).
Ultimately, the US, Canada, and UK will work together to play European powers off each other and try to keep the continent divided. They will back the underdog (in this case, the Visegrad 4) against powers like Russia & Germany that are looking to expand their influence across larger swaths of the Continent. North American / UK cooperation will only grow into the future as the Atlantics return to their old strategy of managing Europe at an arms length.
Sunday, June 13, 2010
The Nationalist Spike in Europe
This is more an observation than a strict analysis, but very interesting, nonetheless. Nationalism seemed to die in much of Eastern Europe towards the end of the 20th century as Europe reeled from centuries of war. It seemed unlikely to many that it would return soon. But, of course, geopolitics marches on. Nationalism is back in Europe, and back in a big way. A few examples of interest:
Germany: The Germans have pushed for a leadership role in Europe with the onset of the Greek crisis. Rather than an isolationist nationalism, Germany seeks to exert its will over Southern Europe, lest the debt crisis bleed it dry. The Germans are likely to come out of the debt crisis with a considerable amount of power in Europe--which is the only way they can make the EU work for them. Otherwise, they will consider leaving--the EU will only be a deal the Germans will tolerate so long as it is not one that tears them down.
Hungary, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Bulgaria, Austria: Right-wing (sometimes seriously so) nationalist parties have made huge gains over the past two years. Much of this is in response to the Russian resurgence (where the options are to fight or join). But this resurgence makes for a potentially rivalrous situation in Eastern Europe. Territorial squabbles may arise and prevent Eastern European unity against Russia.
Denmark, Switzerland, France, and Holland: Right-wing and largely anti-Islamic parties have made great gains in Denmark and Holland in their last elections, signaling a reaction against growing Muslim influence in much of Europe due to massive immigration. France has banned burqas, and Switzerland has banned minarets. Anti-Islamism has become a relative European hallmark. Europe is set for a strong showdown with the Islamic world, but one very different from that of the US.
Belgium: Perhaps the most interesting of the nationalist movements, the Flemish movement has made big gains in Belgium, capturing 20% of seats (far more than any other party). Unlike previous separatist movements, this independence party is largely mainstream (rather than right-wing), and hopes to see a gradual dissolution of Belgium into Flanders (a Dutch region) and Wallonia (a French region). Belgium is probably closer to its end than ever before.
The return of Nationalism to Europe will make it a geopolitically interesting continent once again (after two decades of relative calmness, saving the Balkans).
Thursday, June 10, 2010
Turkey Moves East
The EU's rejection of Turkey as a member (which was not an outright rejection, but a bureaucratic stagnation to death) has pushed Turkey towards the Arab world, away from the West. The latest evidence is in its decision to lead the Arab Free Trade Zone.
The implications are potentially large. Turkey has the potential to lead the Middle East and, as I spoke of before, unite it.
Turkish ascension to the EU probably made geopolitical sense, from a strictly national power perspective. It's not clear whether anti-Turkish racism in central Europe was the primary driver to keep Turkey out, or whether it was simply a European implosion over issues like the financial crisis.
But either way, the shift in rhetoric and action by Turkey likely suggests a long-term drift away from the West, and towards the Middle East.
The implications are potentially large. Turkey has the potential to lead the Middle East and, as I spoke of before, unite it.
Turkish ascension to the EU probably made geopolitical sense, from a strictly national power perspective. It's not clear whether anti-Turkish racism in central Europe was the primary driver to keep Turkey out, or whether it was simply a European implosion over issues like the financial crisis.
But either way, the shift in rhetoric and action by Turkey likely suggests a long-term drift away from the West, and towards the Middle East.
Saturday, April 4, 2009
Obama's Got Some Diplomatic Magic
It's a big week in diplomacy for the United States, particularly in Europe.NATO and the G20 both met for some big conferences. Obama was at both.
As much as perennial protests hit G20, Obama seems to have wooed Europe's civil governments with his visit. Obama seems to have gotten some accord in the G20--not quite as much action as he was hoping for, but Sarkozy and Merkel are now likely to at least spend a bit less time railing on Obama's economic policies, and more time trying to come to a mutually beneficial solution.
Obama also held a town meeting in France, taking questions of a bunch of French and German folks, and to "listen." Apparently, they loved him.
At NATO, Obama hailed a "new chapter" in US-European relations. In a showing of support for the US, NATO handed over 5000 troops to Afghanistan to beef up security before elections. They're temporary, but it's more help than the US got in a long time, and it's the first showing in
years that Afghanistan is a NATO war, not a US war with reluctant taggers-along. Additionally, Obama managed to convince Turkey to allow the Danish Prime Minster Rasmussen to head NATO (Turkey was worried because Rasmussen was involved with the Danish cartoonist's Mohammed-terrorist snafu, and NATO works on full consensus).The US and Russia seem to be thawing a bit, which is bringing a sigh of relief to NATO. Apparently Medvedev and Obama are "comrades" now, after Obama showed up and said that Russia has "legitimate" interest in, and grievances with, NATO. Comrade Obama's clearly trying to soothe Russian frustration and try to integrate them into the European community, in hopes that they can be a part of the norm-centered Western order, rather than resorting to realpolitik.
Medvedev responded with remarks that the Russians had no intentions of trying to bust NATO, and that they look forward to continuing to work together in regional security. In a sign of new cooperation, Comrades Obama and Medvedev agreed to push for extensive bilateral nuclear disarmament. If it can be pulled off, it will be a great trust-building measure, that will make the next 8 years (where Medvedev and Obama will both likely be still working together) possibly go a bit smoother. Such disarmament will save taxpayers a good few bucks, though I'm somewhat worried about Obama's hope to "rid the world of nuclear arms." I'm much more comfortable with the Russians and Americans being able to leverage nukes on rogue states than not. More importantly, having a second-strike capability is critical to keeping countries like Iran and North Korea from doing anything too drastic if they get themselves extensive arsenals. Comrade Obama may have even defused the Eastern European missile shield snafu by pledging to work together with Russia to create a missile shield to protect Russia and Europe from missiles coming from elsewhere (probably Iran, North Korea). I see no particular reason why the NATO-side of the system couldn't also shoot down potential Russian missiles.Finally, thumbs up seem to be coming from Afghanistan and Pakistan on Obama's new strategy for Operation Enduring Freedom. In response to an earlier post of mine: it's possible that Obama and/or the media were portraying an overly-simplistic version of the strategy. In particular, if the Afghan government approves of the strategy, then it's not one that's going to leave the Taliban in charge, which means that most of the problems I cited are naught, which is frankly great news. Maybe he'll pull it off. Pakistan's even starting a symbolically and strategically very important joint operation with the US to hunt and kill Taliban leader Baitullah Meshud, who is apparently likely to become serious trouble in the near future. If such joint operations can slowly be increased, then NATO and the Pakistani army may be able to surround and squeeze the Pashtuni region and levy sufficient pressure on the Taliban to get them to the negotiating table.
It seems everyone across the pond is gaga for Obama. Maybe we can just all get along. But over the next few months, I'll at least be scrutinizing the president for real policy results.
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