The Syrian Uprising: Part II, "The Military Reality on the Ground"

Just to make sure I'm adequately managing expectations: the military situation on the ground in Syria is very fuzzy, and is made up of very contradictory reports of government supporters and Free Syrian Army supporters. We'll do what we can.

What we do know is that the Free Syrian Army is now capable of occasionally holding serious bits of territory. The Syrian Army recently took back a big chunk of Damascus suburbs, and the rebels seem to have taken a suburb of Homs.

That said, I don't think this is going to be a territorial war like Libya was (this is closer to "everywhere at once"), nor as much civilian terrorism as Iraq (though that certainly is happening). It is definitely a wide-ranged insurgency, designed to keep the Assad government off its toes and on the defensive. And it may be working: the anti-Assad international community is increasingly excited about supporting it, though nobody has ponied up (officially) yet. (But more on their prospects later.)

It's still tough to figure out the current size of the FSA. The Army itself says their fighters are above 40,000--and with the amount of trouble they're causing over increasingly large areas simultaneously, this may be right. But it's hard to tell. And if they do have 40,000, they won't all be armed. Many will be in support and logistics roles, coordinating ambush-style attacks. But we know that the FSA is capable of hitting and destroying Syrian tanks (which are mostly sitting ducks in city streets against insurgencies), attacking major bases (like airfields), and even setting up roadblocks in areas near Damascus.

But keep in mind: the Iraqi insurgency, which was far larger, better-funded, and better-armed, failed against the US-led coalition and the burgeoning Iraqi military. That said, the Syrian army is not equivalent of the US army, but the will to remain is incredible. Like the Ghaddafi regime, the Assad regime is very unlikely to willingly go until near the end. Assad is very likely less delusional than Ghaddafi, and will therefore call it quits before death, but a prolonged insurgency won't be enough to cause him to voluntarily leave.

In short: the rebel opposition, made up mostly of the Free Syrian Army, is vast, increasingly organized, and has a safe haven in Turkey. It has serious staying power... as long as it is funded (the Syrian army has coffers to pay their soldiers; the FSA does not). We will see many continued months of insurgent attacks against the Syrian army, likely attempting to convince rank-and-file soldiers or even entire companies to defect. The Assad regime does not have total control on the ground, and this should be a matter of serious concern for the regime.

More to come on what this means with respect to the FSA's prospects for victory, but it'll have to wait until next time.

The Syrian Uprising: Part I, "The Nature of the Opposition Movement"

Syria is not Egypt, is not Tunisia, is not Libya, is not Iraq, is not Afghanistan. Getting a sense of the nature of the uprising will require a relatively detailed analysis that requires us to more-or-less throw out any preconceived model we have based on these previous uprisings. Let's take a look.

What we'll discuss over the next few posts:
1) The nature of the opposition movement.
2) The military reality on the ground.
3) Prospects for opposition victory.
4) Options for foreign powers and the directions the conflict could go.

Today, we're discussing: 1) The nature of the opposition movement.
Libya's opposition was largely regional: the east and west were largely separated by vast desert, and had developed very separate identities.
Bahrains was largely religious (Shiites dominated by Sunnis).
Afghanistan's is ethnic (mostly Pashtuns).
Iraq's was both ethnic and religious (Sunni Arabs dominated Shiite Arabs and Sunni Kurds).

Of course, the above descriptions are grossly oversimplified (Tripoli had major protests until they were quashed, for example), but give us an idea of where the base of power of the opposition movements come from.

The opposition movement in Syria appears to be primarily Sunni in nature (which is interesting in that Sunnis are the largest ethnic group in the country and the largest group represented by the government), and regionally diverse. If we use protester deaths as a proxy for the intensity of the opposition activity in Syria, we can see below that we have intense protests in all of Syria's major geographical areas, and that they do not focus on a particular religious area. Interestingly, we also don't see significant unrest in areas of Kurdish majority, which has been the case in neighboring Iraq & Turkey (although the Kurds are demanding greater rights & protection under the government).




There are scattered reports that the protesters have an anti-minority bend, particularly against Christians and Alawites. The opposition is, in turn, accusing the Assad government of inciting religious violence. It's not clear how much sectarian violence is actually happening, and how much of it (that is happening) is government-caused.

The demographic diversity of the movement helps us understand the nature of its political aims. The opposition, beyond calling for Assad to step down, is apparently seeking wider democratic reforms and civil rights. This has, of course, been the banner of the opposition movements in other countries, though the opposition groups do seem to be keeping in line with their original ideas so far.

The question for The West will be: is this an opposition that wants a liberal democracy, or one that wants a more Islamist democracy? The former will tend to be more Western-friendly, and the latter tends to be more at odds with US allies like Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Israel. It'll be tough to say--the Muslim Brotherhood definitely has a strong showing in the area, but in Syria, many other faces make up the various oppositions, and all sorts of strange alliances might arise (and, to be fair, the Muslim Brotherhood is relatively moderate).

So, to some extent, there is a wait-and-see on the political reality of this opposition movement, just as there has been in previous revolutions across the Middle East.

But before we think about it too hard, we need to get a good sense of the military reality on the ground in Syria, which we'll discuss next time.

Checking In on Middle East Unrest Predictions

Never let it be said that Foggofwar doesn't hold itself accountable to its predictions. Let's go back and see how we did. For now, we won't cover everything--only the interesting ones.

Libya: Certainly the most interesting case, Libya would give Foggofwar the excuse of "intervention by the world's most powerful military alliance." Ironically, we may not even need this prediction: Protests have still not reached Tripoli, and the Rebel/NATO alliance seems to be showing a serious inability to mount an assault across the long stretch of desert, and thus won't overthrow the Gaddafi regime: the West will lose interest before Gaddafi loses will or military capability. As Predicted.

Morocco and Jordan: Protests here have died down largely due to reforms enacted by the governments that have given protesters what they wanted. As Predicted.

Syria: Protests continue to rock the country, despite (or because of) Abbas' crackdowns. Abbas has the ability to keep a lid on the populous through serious security and political liberty reforms, which he may want to do in order to court the West, anyway. But Abbas has infuriated his country and squandered a strong, loyal security establishment. Increased Risk.

Yemen: Rumors fly that the Yemenese president is working with Saudi and US allies to transition out of government... and out of the country. It's been a surprisingly long, sustained fight, but it looks like this current regime is on its way out. As Predicted.

Bahrain: Bahrain has fallen out of the news sphere as of late, as the active unrest has stopped. Interestingly, the sustained crackdown continues, trying to marginalize the supporters of the protests. The regime is safe--for now. But the Shiite majority of the country has been alienated completely. Long-term, the regime will continue to face risk. As Predicted.

Briefly speaking, no other country has surprised us yet in the magnitude of risk or, more importantly, in regime change. Overall, we've done pretty well so far.

But we're happy to be proven wrong if things change.

Middle East Protests and Regime Security as of Feb 18

As we continue to cover the Middle East crisis, I wanted to give an update as to my current understanding of regime security throughout the Middle East in light of the current protests that seem to be spreading throughout the entire region.

We've discussed briefly some of the reasons behind the protests, and these geopolitical forces will generally apply to countries besides Tunisia and Egypt.

Below, I've summarized the countries of the greater Middle East* and taken my best shot at assessing the risk to the regime based on the current level of protests and the greater structural factors behind the unrest in the country. In addition, I've color-coded the countries by risk on a map here. I'm happy to release the map into the public domain (this means you can use it as you wish, though I do appreciate credit).

The low attention span summary is that despite the protests, very few Middle Eastern countries face significant risk of regime change. Yemen is likely to see a change in government, and Algeria and Bahrain face an unclear future, but other regimes are relatively secure.



Secure Regimes, Few or No Protests:
-Saudi Arabia: I mention Saudi Arabia due to a surprising lack of unrest. As extremist violence has grown in the country, house Saud has struggled to balance its need for stability with calls for reform, but so far it has managed its oil wealth well enough (and dealt with extremism with a sufficiently fair and progressive hand) that it seems to have warded off too many fundamental causes of instability.
-Iraq: Sporadic protests have erupted in the north and the south of the country, but not in Baghdad. Ironically, the weakness of the current government (and the factious parliamentary system of the country) means that there exists neither a scapegoat (to protest against) nor a hero (to replace him).
-Turkey
-Israel
-Lebanon
-Qatar
-United Arab Emirates
-Oman
-Kuwait

Secure Regimes with Significant Protests:
-Iran: Mousavi and Kharoubi have once again emerged as leaders of the opposition movement, which is forming "green"-style rallies across Iran. Tehran's geopolitical stability is even higher than it was in 2009,

-Jordan: Jordan has often faced demographic instability (due largely to many Palestinian refugees living within its borders), but has generally handled it with some amount of grace. The king has won approval from the opposition by sacking his prime minister and cabinet, and appointing new leaders under a long-term economic and political reformist plan.

-Libya: It's tough to say just how large the protesters in Libya are; Kadafi's media control is significant. Certainly, there are protesters calling for Kadafi's removal in cities across Libya, but Tripoli seems relatively quiet compared to many other Middle Eastern capitals, and the "Day of Anger" seems to have flopped (due in part to security force intimidation). Libya is both willing to crack down hard on protesters and relatively economically secure, making overthrow unlikely.

-Syria: I am wary to group Syria into the same category as Iran and Libya, but the Syrian government has made a few concessions to a relatively small and wary group of protesters, and has also taken moves to suppress the protests that show at least some nervousness in the regime.

-Morocco: Morocco's liberalization efforts since the 1970's (including free trade agreements with the US and EU) have led to significant economic transformation in time. But Morocco's economic fates have worsened since 2008, and this stagnation hurts particularly in a country with nearly 20% youth unemployment and high illiteracy rates. Protests have sprung up, but the regime enjoys relatively wide popular support, and the success of a relatively capitalist approach in the last few decades make alternative economic models (and their standard-bearers) less attractive.

Regimes With Protests, at Risk:
-Sudan: After the Southern Sudanese secession referendum, it seemed tempting to believe that al-Bashir might consolidate power over a now-majority Arab country. Interestingly, Southern Sudan was one of the out-groups that was helping al-Bashir hold together a fragile coalition of Arab Nationalists and Islamists. Now, both Islamists and non-Arab opposition groups are emboldened and trying to push their agenda. To hold power in the short-term, al-Bashir is likely going to have to move closer to an Islamist group he's been trying to distance, which will likely pit him against the 45% non-Arab groups of his country, leading to a prolonged struggle for the future of Sudan.

-Algeria: Food price spikes have exacerbated the unemployment in Algeria, and trade unions have joined protests demanding change. Ultimately, the number of protesters has been kept small, due in large part to security force repression. But long before the Tunisian "Jasmine Revolution," president Bouteflika has faced an increasingly strong rivalry from the Directorate of Intelligence and Security (DRS) for power. The protests give the DRS, which grew powerful during the civil war against Islamist fundamentalists, an opportunity to side with "the people" and attempt a regime change similar to the military-stewarded removal of Mubarak in Egypt.

-Bahrain: Bahrain has one fundamental threat to its regime stability: demographics. Like pre-2003 Iraq, Bahrain is a majority-Shia country ruled by a Sunni dynasty. Unlike Iraq, it is an economic powerhouse with relatively low poverty rates and has been driving moderate reform since 1999. The current Shia community is demanding an end to alleged discrimination against the Shia population in both politics and employment. The situation may have remained low-risk, but Bahrain has become a battleground between Saudi Arabia and Iran, much like Iraq was during its sectarian civil war. Iran sees this as an opportunity to potentially create an ally in the region. Bahrain has reacted surprisingly desperately, violently driving protesters out of Pearl Square, killing 3 and injuring hundreds. Bahrain may have to depend on sustained security repression to keep the Pearl Square incident from leading to a backlash of even more protests.

-West Bank Abbas is highly embattled, though this is due less with the current crisis (and the socioeconomic or demographic causes behind it), and more with the Wikileaks-prompted revelation that he planned to cede significant Palestinian territory to Israel in return for state recognition. The current wave of protest has increased pressure, but has little impact on the long-term endgame of how that will play out for the current Fatah regime.

Regime Change Likely:
-Yemen: Massive protests in Yemen, supported by both an impoverished majority and a radical religious fringe, are likely to take down president Saleh. Massive unemployment, illiteracy, and general poverty (made worse by poor government economic policy) make Yemen a prime target for regime change. Saleh's promise of neither running for re-election nor passing the presidency to his son has done nothing to quell the unrest.

Regime Change Partially Occurring:
-Egypt: The military is working hard to make sure the next regime is friendly (and under the military's control), without looking like it's turning a "revolution" into a coup. Expect the new boss to be similar to the old boss, but more savvy about unemployment and monetary policy.

-Tunisia: Massive protests across Tunisia were led by the 30%-unemployed youth against a regulatory system that left them with no prospects for employment or advancement, and are largely credited as being the "spark" that has set off the current Middle East crisis. President Ben Ali resigned and fled the country, with the Speaker of the Parliament taking his place in an "interim" role. The Tunisian protests continue (in a reduced state, though many of the protesters have no work to which to return), and will likely not abate completely until a compelling plan to meet their demands is formed by the transitional government.

*Note that Afghanistan and Pakistan are left out of this analysis--the current crisis has little to do with the significant regime risk both countries face.

Coup in Egypt Downs Mubarak

The quick version:

Mubarak stepped down as President of Egypt today, almost certainly from coercion from the Army.

The longer version:

Due to massive pressure Egyptian protesters, everyone (Egyptian Army, CIA, protesters) thought Mubarak would step down on the 10th of February. He made it clear he had no intentions of doing so.

It's unclear why he did this, but it looks like there may have been an internal struggle within the military leadership. The military's Supreme Council released a second Communique on the 11th supporting the idea of Mubarak sticking around, with the Vice President taking some undefined large share of the power (after a first Communique which implied that the army wished for Mubarak to step down). This second Communique suggests that the pro-Mubarak faction of the army had enough influence to stave off the coup and keep Mubarak in power.

This faction likely hoped that the army's support (and a "gradual transition") would depress protesters and mark the beginning of the end of the demonstrations.

It wasn't to be so.

On Feb. 11, the ranks of protesters swelled immensely. Protesters in Suez took over government buildings, and thousands in Cairo began marching towards the Presidential Palace.

The Army was directed to protect the Palace, and surrounded it with troops and tanks. The issue was thus pushed to a critical climax, giving the army 3 options:
1) Risk a violent confrontation with the protesters.
2) Stand by idly and let the protesters overthrow the President, risking the collapse of the entire regime.
3) End the stand-off before it starts by couping Mubarak themselves.

The massive risk of option 1 likely caused a sufficient subset of the pro-Mubarak faction of the army to defect to the anti-Mubarak faction that a consensus to coup was likely reached in the afternoon of the 11th.

The third option was the safest for the army; it allowed the army to fall on the side of the vast majority of the population's wishes. It means that, while there will be a major change in government, Egypt's trust in its army will only swell, making sure that the army will be able to maintain its influence and power in the regime, no matter what happens next.

We'll keep you updated.

Savvy Muslim Brotherhood Could Win Western Support

The Muslim Brotherhood has been illegal in Egypt for decades.

Since Mubarak began to teeter on the edge of demise, the MB has risen up to lead much of the protesting. It is certainly a large, and potentially quite influential force in Egypt.

Thus far, it has been a relatively moderate force, with relatively moderate discourse.

The West's fear in general is that the MB appears moderate and inoffensive only so that it could stay off Cairo's radar during the past 30 years, and that further down, there is a more strict Islamist agenda.

Whether that's true is tough to say. Other MB organizations have (likely) been indirectly involved with extremist-style violence, and have generally advocated for strong Islamist states.

The Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood started hitting the PR trail virtually as soon as the protests began. They maintained popularity in Egypt despite the ban, and have the potential to be a formidable force in the next round of Egyptian politics.

The risk, of course, was that a power grab (especially early) could make both Western countries and the Egyptian Army sufficiently worried that anti-MB opposition might arise. Given that the Army is far and away the most powerful political group in Egypt, staying on the Army's good side will be critical to avoiding a drag-out political war.

And so, the MB's media office released a statement: "We are not seeking power." They've promised to not field even field a presidential candidate in the next election, and have declared that, "we reject the religious state."

In this move, the Egyptian MB has moved itself far from other Muslim Brotherhood organizations. Ultimately, the Egyptian MB no longer needs as much external help as it once did--it is no longer illegal, and enjoys great popular support in what may become a semi-functional democracy before the year is through.

These moves of reassurance will keep pressure off the MB as it establishes a stronger legitimate presence, and will likely gain even more popularity by being seen as a force that exists to help the common Egyptian citizen.

It's a strong enough stance that it's one the MB would struggle to pull away from (without appearing to betray its its promises). But there is certainly no reason that the MB should not field a presidential candidate in the second presidential election, nor take a significant holding in Parliament in this first election, even if it is unlikely to change its agenda in the short term.

The Political Scientist's Approach to the Current Middle East Crisis

As a political scientist, I scrunch my eyebrows a bit at the current crisis in the Middle East. It tickles my sensibilities in the wrong way: can one man setting himself on fire in Tunis really bring down a well-established regional system of government?

Obviously, the answer is "not on its own." More deeply, the answer is, frankly, "not at all." Generally speaking, the Realist school of political science sees events like the self-immolation in Tunis as minimally significant to the broader brushstrokes of geopolitics.

What I mean is this: many folks in many countries at many times (including much of the Middle East) have set themselves ablaze, gone on hunger strike, or otherwise protested for change, and gotten nowhere. To say that the "conditions were ripe" in the Middle East under-attributes the importance of the conditions themselves.

An historical example:
After the assassination of the Archduke Franz Ferdinand, tensions were high between the Austrians and Serbs. But the Austrians and Russians were largely ready to settle on a "March to Belgrade" by the Austrians, in which they'd simply hold the Serbian capital as the internal revolts were brought under control.

Two main factors led to World War I itself: offensive war methodology (the ubiquitous and profound belief that the best defense is a good offense), and Germany's border instability and desire to create buffer zones in Central and Western Europe.

Similarly, the election of Abraham Lincoln had ultimately little to do with the start of the Civil War. The Gulf of Tonkin incident had literally nothing to do with the American intervention in Vietnam.

Ultimately, all these events were caused by broad geopolitical factors that small, relatively random (in the scope of world politics) perturbations like a sacrificial protest cannot meaningfully change.

There will always be events that could lead to a crisis. Whether such a crisis emerges depends entirely on the geopolitical conditions going in. The Middle East is no different.

The reason for the current political instability is, ultimately, financial instability caused by decades of mismanaged central planning that led to sufficient dissatisfaction with the current regimes.

Oppression and suppression of alternative political groups is not a trivial point, but traditionally has not been enough in the past forty years of the Middle East to facilitate a popular change in government.

Ultimately, yes: the same geopolitical forces that drove the beginnings of the World Wars, the fall of the Soviet Union--these, too, drive the changes we're currently seeing in the Middle East.

And Now For Disaster

Karzai reached 54% of the vote in the preliminary announcement this weekend, though the IEC continues to cite dozens of cases of fraud.

Those tribal leaders that complained earlier? Karzai apparently took 100% of the votes in that district. Oops.

The West is cautiously calling for recounts, and possibly re-votes. The right answer here is to declare that the election was too marred to determine a winner, and have a run-off between the two candidates, though it begs the question: can more oversight be brought into the process? Or will Karzai (and/or his goons) steal this one, too?

If Abdullah leads a protest (and I'm not saying he shouldn't), an Iranian-style situation might arise... except that the Afghan state has extremely limited security powers, and the protesters will have Kalichnikovs. Things are going to get worse before they get better, if they do.

All Doors Closed in Tehran

Yesterday, Khamenei announced that the regime would support election results against "any cost;" today, the Guardian Council announced that the partial recount re-affirmed Ahmedinejad's victory, despite admitted irregularities that included 50 cities in Iran having more votes than registered voters, and 3 million "mystery votes."

The leadership has, obviously, eliminated all political options for overturning the results of the election. Protests continued today, but they were apparently quite violently broken up by Basij and riot police that outnumbered the protesters approximately 2 to 1.

At this point, continuing protesters have no realistic chance at achieving an outcome close to what they want, but many will certainly want to continue to defame and illegitimize the regime in the long-term, both domestically and internationally. The toughest part of such a strategy is that the only weapon a protester can use to fight the regime is, ultimately, his or her own body.

More Doors Close on Tehran's Future

The Ayatollah made a speech today that pretty clearly solidified his hardline stance. A few highlights:

1) No protests, no really, he means it this time. And he might, that's the tough part. Bullets may begin to fly with very little prejudice.
2) "How can you cheat by 11 million votes?" An exact (translated) quote, signifying that while a recount is happening, it's just not going to change the outcome.
3) Moderates both in elected government and religious government were dramatically missing from his side during prayers this Friday--Ahmedinejad, however, was prominently featured.
4) He called Ahmedinejad's victory "definitive," and that there would be no re-vote. He stressed that democracy does not work when the losing side takes to the streets and demands an annulment every time they lose--with this, he tried very hard to undermine the credibility of the protesters.
5) Interestingly, he criticized both sides for attacking each other, and said that all candidates had great records of service to the Islamic Republic.
6) Of course, these protests are the fault of Israel, the US, and the UK. This, more than anything, probably angers the youngsters beyond comprehension. It is one thing to stand firm against a protest, but to call it ingenuine and fabricated by state enemies is insulting enough to probably fan the flames.

Pro-Mousavi websites have not yet announced any alterations to a plan to march on Saturday from Revolution Square to Freedom Square. If the Ayatollah is going to follow through on his promises of crackdown, tomorrow is the time--or else he starts to lose credibility. Mousavi and the reformists take incredible risk if they do not cave, but if they do cave, they largely solidify the precedent that the regime can simply rig the elections however it wants from here until doomsday. By standing up to the Ayatollah, Mousavi and the reformists send a very stern warning to the leadership that the Iranian people will not sit down and tolerate election fraud--and such a statement would hold firm even if they were broken by sufficient violence. The Guardian Council does not want this kind of violence to happen every four years, and may reconsider its rigging policies if the conflict actually comes to a head.

Perhaps, then, Mousavi knows he will be a Martyr, to instill hope in future generations. It would be a sad and dim fate for him and his supporters, but surely they must now sense some level of hopelessness in the political situation; they do not have the political power nor the violent force to overcome the regime. They can embarrass it, vilify it, and doing so will have significant implications on future policy. But changing the outcome of the election is almost certainly a battle that is lost.

The Very Dangerous Tehran Game

The situation as it currently stands was obviously not inevitable. Mousavi could have decided not to risk his family's life in challenging the election; the Guardian Council could have decided that rigging the election was not worth the (probably) minor policy changes that would occur under Mousavi (this is assuming Mousavi would be winning on his own, which is still worth debating, despite obvious rigging). But rig they did, and caught they got.

In the past day I've talked to some folks smarter than myself (most notably my friend Clint), and our conversations revealed some tremendous insight.

There was one major mistake along the way that could have been avoided completely, and it has put all parties in the situation in difficult corners: Ayatollah Khameini, rather than waiting the traditional (and possibly legal?) 3 days to announce the winner of the election, the Supreme Leader chose a mere hour after the election to announce the "divine victory" of Ahmedinejad. Why? If we assume that the election was rigged, and that the Supreme Leader was involved, then he has a very strong incentive (and probably a bit of worry) to make the elections seem as legitimate as possible. So when Mousavi declared victory (claiming, even that he had a leak from the election commission), Khameini did everything he could to try and crush from the outset any momentum Mousavi may have gained, in an attempt to stop what's happening now from ever happening.

This was an error for two reasons. First, it was so very odd that it could not be seen as anything but calculated. Never before has the Ayatollah called an election before 3 days have passed, and calling it in a mere hour is obviously a strategic move. Such suggests that something is amiss (in this case, it bolstered the already-significant evidence that the election was rigged from the top). But more importantly, it put the Supreme Leader firmly in the Ahmedinejad camp, giving him very little room to maneuver, and very few good exits if things didn't go smoothly.

And then they didn't go smoothly. Now, Mousavi and his gang of youngsters are standing up and demanding the vote be annulled. Obviously if Khameini annulled the vote after praising it, he would have serious legitimacy problems himself. His leadership would be questioned, his impartiality would be laughed at. So he has compromised a bit--he is supporting a "recount," but insists that any serious challenges to the regime will be met by the Republican Guard. The recount is a 12-day total event, which is strategic as well: it is just long enough that he hopes to sap the protesters of some energy and momentum, and short enough that it does not make sense to stage a full-time sit-in in Freedom Square (ala Tiananmen).

And many friends of mine have likened this situation to that of Tiananmen, but there are a few differences. First, it's short (Tiananmen was a month in coming before the major crackdown). Second, the youngsters/reformers have not yet taken control of the city (whereas China had lost all control of Beijing by the time the tanks had to smash in). Third, new technology (and limited control by the Iranians over it) has allowed for constantly-shifting information and communication sources, proxies, etc, that are evading government attempts to shut it down. Finally, the protesters are actually making an ultimately much smaller, much more legitimate, and much more conceivable demand: instead of asking for Democracy from scratch, they are simply asking that the vote be counted honestly--and Mousavi is (or at least was) not a major challenger to the legitimacy of the Religious regime (though Khameini may have forced him into that camp, and Mousavi has taken advantage of it: rather than appealing to Khameini, he appealed to the more religiously academic Guardian Council, who were the first to note the irregularities). But most importantly, the kids of Tehran are very different from the kids of China. While the Chinese regime was built on a rebellion, Confucian culture had, for thousands of years, emphasized the importance of the relationship between leader and subordinate. It is ingrained in Chinese culture, even today--the Cultural Revolution was a very strange departure from that, and it was one that the Chinese very firmly put behind them as soon as it was over. Rebellion was a bit strange and foreign to many of the Tiananmen youngsters, and when they got shot at, they scattered.

But it will not be so easy for the Iranian regime. Already, the volunteer Basij (a pro-government milita) stormed the university that many protesters were camped in, smashing, looting, and beating. Basij has shot and killed 8 protesters, and wounded 28 more. There have been street clashes with rocks, batons, fire. The protesters have already set fire to a Revolutionary Guard building that the Basij worked out of. These are unlikely the makings of a successful violent revolution, but it is clear that the protesters are not afraid of violent conflict.

And so we look to Iran's history for the explanation of such an embrace. Shia Islam was built, thousands of years ago, on rebellion. It was a proclaimation that the Sunni Caliphate was illegitimate, and that disobedience of evil leadership was a virtue. The Shiites were (in the past) the primary terrorists/assassins of Islam, and the Iranian Revolution was a predictable (rather than strange) consequence of the CIA-installed Shah. Since then, Iran has proudly indoctrinated its children with this rebellious spirit--it's why Iran's domestic politics allow its foreign policy to be so rogue and confrontational in nature. In the war against Iraq, millions of youngsters donned red bandanas and literally ran across open desert, unarmed, at machine gun emplacements and tanks, howling like banshees, climbing over their dead brethren, in order to either join the Martyrs or rip the Iraqis apart with their own hands. They suffered immense casualties, but their will never broke. This is the legacy that these kids inherit. And now, Iran's most dangerous weapon to any outsider has now been turned, in part, on the regime. These kids will accept conflict, violence, and casualties, and they are not afraid to inflict them. Trying to break up the millions of Tehran protesters will be a whole heck of a lot harder than breaking up Tiananmen. And it will turn a huge chunk of the country (even tentative supporters of Ahmedinejad) against the regime for a very long time, should it happen. It would seal that the regime rules by force, terror, and authoritarianism, rather than by the will of its people. Such an outcome would be disastrous, even if the protesters went home.

So Khameini must find some way to end this. If he does not, he is doomed. But he is in a very difficult position, and that makes him incredibly dangerous: he cannot simply call Mousavi the winner. He would undermine his own authority and anger a different very large chunk of the population in a similar way. The recount still has the potential to lead to another vote--either that, or it will simply erode Ahmedinejad's lead and declare him the winner anyway. Both moves are difficult. But I do not believe that telling the protesters, "recount done, Ahmedinejad won, go home," is likely to work. Any exit now is going to be bad for the regime, but perhaps, the least bad way is to rig the "recount" such that there is a second vote, and let Mousavi squeak by with a victory.

If Khameini is foolish (and he rarely is), he will seek some exit where he takes almost no political flak. This would make him the most dangerous of all, as he would do something neither I nor my friends have yet predicted. But tomorrow, millions (likely) will assemble in Freedom Square, once again defying Khameini's decree, to mourn the dead protesters with Mousavi leading the entire gang. While foreign journalists are not prestent, Twitter and Facebook still are, and their ever-watching eye will make this public. Mousavi is putting the regime in a difficult place: let him stand up defiantly and do as he pleases, or brutally force him out and kill dozens, hundreds, or even thousands of Iran's finest youngsters? Both options are terrible. Tomorrow will be a dangerous day, and Mousavi knows this. Many of his supporters know this.

Even if they manage to kill Mousavi, there are others. Kharoubi is an excellent second choice for the reformers, and even more liberal than Mousavi. He could take the helm, with a newfound fury from the reformers.

But Khameini is clever, despite his recent mistakes. And the Guardian Council's support of the recount means he is under a lot of pressure to not simply try and crush this defiance. I am not sure what he will do in the long term. Tomorrow, he is likely to send the police to try to keep the protesters off-balance, but is unlikely to authorize deadly force. Unfortunately, this is likely to have little effect. All we can do from here is watch and hope, and see what he will do.

I leave you with some of the more compelling pictures of the conflict so far.

Protesters in Tehran.

Fire-barricades to Ward Off Police.

Recent demonstration in Freedom Square.

Ahmedinejad with Basij Commanders.

Protesters Outside of Iran (As Evidenced by Lack of Headscarves)

A Woman with "Man = Woman" in Farsi on her Hands.

The 2-Million Strong Rally

A Riot Police Officer Confronts a Protester (Peacefully).

Revolutionary Guard Compound Ablaze.

A Man Shot or Beaten by Basij or Police.

Riot Police Chase and Beat a Protester.

Iran's Ever-Complex Election Aftermath

Iran's post-election situation seemed rather bleak for the pro-reformers (and for the West) after the election commission announced Ahmedinejad's landslide victory. But I am getting some conflicting reports on the situation, so bear with me, but I will try to summarize and analyze as best as I can.

After the election, Mousavi and Ahmedinejad both claimed victory. The state media then announced that Ahmedinejad had achieved a pretty stunning 62% of the vote, which is a number that really nobody in the West can seriously claim is or is not a good estimate of his actual support. Mousavi called foul, claiming that members of the election commission told him that he had a serious lead (around 58%) when the polls closed (which he claims had led to his claiming victory). After crying foul, Mousavi's supporters took to the streets, in defiance of Khameini's decree, and began protesting (which, of course, turned intio rioting with busses burning, shops breaking, etc). Obviously, there have been lots of clashes between protesters and police. Sometimes, protesters were broken up--sometimes, the police ran. Lots of people have been beaten up, arrested, probably killed.

Iran arrested Mousavi and put him under house arrest at some point, though he is clearly out now. Other reformists were also arrested, as was the Supreme Leader's daughter, who has at least sympathized with Mousavi's cause. I'm not sure what her status is, currently.

Iran cut off cell phone service to Tehran, and packed it with police. It has also tried to shut down all pro-Mousavi websites, but its Internet censorship team is not anything on part with China's, and they are largely failing to keep the ever-morphing mass of information from jumping around between different websites, twitter accounts, and whatnot. People are staying informed, and organized.

Some allegedly-leaked information from the Interior Ministry shows Ahmedinejad in third place after the election (even after apparent ballot-rigging, extortion and intimidation, etc). The numbers:

Mousavi (Independent Reformer): 19.1 Million (45.8%)
Kharoubi (Etemad-e-Melli): 13.4 Million (32.1%)
Ahmedinejad (Abadgaran): 5.7 Million (13.7%)
Rezai (Independent Conservative): 3.5 Million (8.4%)

If these numbers are true, they have incredible implications. First, the run-off vote would be between two reformers (with Mousavi the clear favorite), basically sealing a big victory (and relief) for the West in Iran. Second, Ahmedinejad's policies are so woefully unpopular that he would have the worst incumbent turnout in any presidential election I can even conceive of. Third, and finally: massive, systemic, planned fraud from the very top was designed to make sure this election went one way. If these numbers are true, then Khameini deeply feared the results, and with good reason. Such overwhelming (almost 80%) support for reformist candidates would put great pressure on him, and great support behind the President. He does indeed answer to a series of religious elites in Iran, and many of them actually care about Iran and its people (who knew!).

And the pressure from the electorate to void these results is starting to trickle into such elite circles. A group of influential Ayatollahs have called for the election results to be nullified, and the election to be re-taken in order to win the confidence of the Iranian people. I have heard scattered reports that there are election commission officials calling for a re-vote with better controls of irregularities. The West is finally coming out and making calls for investigations, although cautiously.

Today, Mousavi (somehow getting out of house arrest?) appeared in Tehran in front of (what an Iranian police officer said was) 1.5-2 million supporters, in defiance of the Supreme Leader and under explicit threat of deadly force. He has whipped Tehran into a fervor, and is trying to keep the energy up in order to keep the pressure on the leadership high. He has the momentum, and he knows it.

At this point, the Supreme Leader needs to seriously worry about losing control of Tehran and having to resort to an incredible massacre with the Revolutionary Guard. In order to try to assuage anger, he is actually calling for investigations into the "irregularities" cited by Mousavi.

This could be one of two things: first, he could actually be balking to pressure, and plans to call a new vote (it is unlikely he will flat-out declare Mousavi the winner). Second, and perhaps more likely, he will probably stretch out the investigation in the hopes that the energy of Tehranians will fizzle, and then declare that despite some irregularities, Ahmedinejad still won. The second path is dangerous--these youngsters are largely on summer vacation, and they don't actually have normal lives to return to in the next two months. Mousavi has almost nothing to lose, as he'll surely be thrown in jail of Ahmedinejad walks out of this with the win. That said, all these kids can threaten to do is give Iran an ever-increasing public relations scandal, and undermine Ahmedinejad's authority abroad. But will he care? Will the Supreme Leader? That is a question with bleaker possibilities.

But, frankly, there is hope. Mousavi and his band of youngsters have not only shaken up Iranian politics, they have changed the face of Iran to the West forever. Even if Ahmedinejad emerges with the presidency, the West shall always look to Iran's people with great sympathy, as their fight for liberty tugs our heartstrings. They share many of our values. They remind us of the best of ourselves. That, alone, may change the West's relationship with Iran--or at least its policy towards it. But, further, there is a chance that the Supreme Leader will decide that the safe route is a route of lower risk--one that does not involve such obvious lies and deception, but one that bends to the will of Iran's citizens, and allows Mousavi the chance to do what he can. Iran's religious leadership has weathered reformers before, and while Mousavi promises to be quite effective, it will weather them again: Khameini has very little to lose by sweeping in and playing hero to the Iranian people by using his hand to call a new vote and hand Mousavi the victory. In fact, he may decide that this moment in his legacy is one where he does, indeed, want to play the hero, rather than the villain.

A Very Quiet June 4th.

I knew it would be this way. Everybody told me it would be this way. It still hurts to see it this way.

I woke up today and almost forgot it was June 4th, the 19th anniversary of the crackdown of the students protests in Tiananmen Square. I haven't been to the square, and I don't want to go--I very much don't want to go. Not because of fear. There's nothing to be afraid of. I don't want to go specifically for that reason--there is nothing to be afraid of, because there is not a pebble of thought in the minds of the Beijing people of dissent. I have not turned on the television, hoping to see hundreds of troops in the square. I know they're not there. They don't need to be. On my walk to work today, I saw fewer PLA soldiers than I'm used to. There's no tension. I think there are probably a lot of people here that don't even realize what today means.

In Hong Kong and Taiwan, they're holding a candlelight vigil. But here, in Beijing, the citizens of China are resolutely standing behind their government. The thought of opposition is untenable. The Chinese government has prevailed. The propaganda machine is ubiquitous, and it is perfect. Compliance with mass campaigns is automatic. State slogans are repeated daily. But all passively. People do not do this out of fear, they do it out of adoration. They want to support the Chinese government, they want to enhance its ability to control and affect, so that their lives can improve.

Today, because of the Olympics, dissenters had the last best hope to hold the Government's reputation hostage and protest. This opportunity is gone, not because of government repression, not because of failed action, but because of failed will. The Chinese Communist Party is here to stay for a very long time.