Highlight: A Fractured Anti-American Islamist Movement

Al Qaeda released an article in its English newsletter Inspire calling Iran's President Ahmedinijad a conspiracy theorist, and that he should stop blaming the US for 9/11.

This is more than just boasting by Al-Qaeda. It's not simply that they want the credit for the attack on the WTC, but specifically, they want to be distanced from the US. Inadvertently, Ahmedinijad is claiming that Al-Qaeda are collaborators with the US, rather than sworn enemies. If the US was involved in a coordinated way, it would undermine Al-Qaeda's anti-US credibility.

Even if Ahmedinijad claims the US wasn't coordinating actively with Al-Qaeda, but simply knew about it beforehand and prepped for the attack, it would undermine Al-Qaeda's credibility in effective attacks. If 9/11's mastery was really at the hands of the US, then Al-Qaeda has summarily failed to attack the US on its soil since 1993 (which was ineffectual at best).

The split is a sign that different Islamist groups, while anti-American, are far from being able to unite in the cause. It's a sign that US foreign policy--to keep the Middle East broken up and fractured--is working.

Is Iran's Opposition Growing or Shrinking?

More protests and clashes in Iran this weekend; after a protest-turned-violent over the death of the leading opposition cleric, this weekend's unrest came during a Shiite religious festival (of sorts) in honor of the 7th century martyrdom of Mohammed's grandson.

The protests are certainly getting their fair due of attention in Iran, and wearing on the nerves of the ruling "conservatives," but are they effective? Good question. A progressive opposition movement's exposure usually does, over time, lead to an increase in popularity (like in the United States during Vietnam). And as much as violent crackdowns have a serious human toll, they may be winning sympathy for the opposition movement from any fence-sitters left. In addition, the crackdowns are hardening the young men and women (especially women) in the movement now--over time, the old men of the conservatives will die off, and the progressives will strike themselves a big win, maybe in 2014.

But will they run out of steam by then? Or even if they do win, will it be too late for the US to close the Iranian nuclear pandora's box, as it were?

Thinking about this has gotten me to try to get into the head of the President, and figure out what he's doing. He's shown a great deal of restraint with Iran, which a lot of folks oppose. But think about this: should we authorize a strike to take down the Iranian nuclear program, we'd be giving Ahmedinejad and his crew the most incredible propaganda that they could hope for to harden their position. A strike would further radicalize the Iranians, make them more Western-phobic, and even undermine the legitimacy of the opposition movement (Ahmedinejad would have some credence to his accusations of Western influence and manipulation in Iran). No, a strike might be disastrous.

But just how much is the US staying out of Iranian affairs? Surely, opportunities for subtle propaganda influence are not simply being ignored. Even something as simple as Voice of America, a shameless, open alternative network to the Iranian state-run media, is having an effect.

The Iranians are not nearly as good at information control as the Chinese, and the United States is probably taking advantage of that fact as much as Iran's own opposition movement is. This, of course, is a guess. No overt cooperation will happen with the opposition movement, both to protect its legitimacy and to protect its integrity: no Iranian wants to be an American stooge, and the Green Movement won't allow itself to be a puppet.

But the incredible restraint shown by the Obama administration towards the Iranian regime may indicate some intelligence that we don't have. Will there be an internal overthrow of the regime? I think it's unlikely (the population is divided and poorly armed), but if popularity for the opposition movement in 2014 is strong enough, truly sweeping reform could be on the way. And I might be wrong about the level of armament of the population--the Basij militiamen are technically civilians, and are allowed to keep weapons in their homes. Surely, there are guns floating around Tehran in numbers. And the opposition movement is surely making efforts to show that the Ahmedinijad/Khaimeni regime has violated Shiite Islamic law. Under Shiite law, the population has not only a right, but a duty to overthrow regimes that are antithetical to the tenets of Islam. Certainly the motivation and legitimacy for armed revolt are there. If the means are there, too, then the Obama administration's stance makes perfect sense--stay out of Iranian internal politics as much as possible, and let the opposition's support grow slowly over time, until it is ready.

But then again, when was the last time an armed revolt took down a modern, well-armed government? It's been a while.

FLASH: Mousavi Declares Victory

Mir Mousavi, the longshot challenger to Ahmadinejad in the Iranian presidential race, may have just won in the first round.

The election took place today, after weeks of very heavy street campaigning, with a party-like atmosphere. Mousavi was the leading reformist candidate, and started (seemingly) picking up support late in the campaign. Most Iranian elections go to two rounds (the first round being a free-for-all, the second being a run-off between the top 2 candidates if neither receives 50% of the vote); getting more than 50% in the first round would be unprecedented, especially in a race that went from Ahmadinejad-edged to very close only in the last few weeks. But today, large numbers of middle class, youth, and women packed the polls, in an election that is expected to have a greater than 80% turnout. Ahmadinejad's supporters tended to be more poor and rural.

A Mousavi victory would have significant implications for US and Iranian policy. He supports economic liberalization, detente with the West, and social reform. He is said to even have the political clout/connections to be able to stand up to and influence the religious leadership (a often-cited failing of the last reformist President that Iran had). It would give the US and Iran an at-least-4-year opportunity to start patching relations, and potentially work together to influence policy in the Middle East. More coming on the actual poll numbers as they arrive.

Cranking Up the Heat on Iran

No, this isn't deja vu. We just keep doing it. I'll keep this short:

Israel launched well over 100 fighters over the Mediterranean in what it openly publicized as a dress rehearsal for a possible strike on Iranian nuclear facilities. Iran claimed that it was just psychological warfare, and probably is (as Stratfor notes, one does not publicize surprise attacks just before performing them), but this nonetheless means that Israel is happy to show a militarily aggressive posture towards Iran. Further, the Israelis noted that a nuclear "threshold" in Iran is likely to be crossed in late 2008 rather than 2009, as earlier predicted. We're not sure exactly what that threshold is, but the Israelis seem to have an idea that Iran is tumbling towards a nuclear weapons capability of some sort by the end of the year.

This all comes amid evidence found on a Swiss computer that the former A.Q. Khan weapons ring (that brought the Bomb to Pakistan and missiles to other countries) dealt with advanced missile-mounted nuclear technology (the blueprints appeared on the Swiss computer, though it's not clear how).

In addition, the EU has approved new sanctions against Iran, freezing bank accounts. France and Germany in particular have hardened their rhetoric against Iran.

And again, the US has called Iran out for shipping weapons to Iraq and training Shiite insurgent groups. The US is even publicizing a case of two of its own; two men that allegedly helped the Iranians acquire weapons.

It seems that a grand coalition of Western powers is in a quiet, unofficial agreement that Iran is a meance and must be dealt with. Bust most of the leaders of these countries have at least been aware of it for years. A clear media campaign is being waged by most of them--from military exercises to news stories to high-level meetings (and a strangely warm reception of Israel by a usually-cool EU). The UN is not a military option for the West--the Russians would clearly veto any military action in Iran. But the West seems to be preparing for something... and it is possible that they are not preparing for anything, but only trying to make it so clear that they are preparing for something that the Iranian government would crack. In the last parliamentary elections in Iran, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's party lost seats not only to the few moderate candidates that were able to run, but also to the more religiously conservative party (that aligns with the Supreme Council). Clearly, much of Iran worries over the brinksmanship being played by Ahmadinejad's executive... including the Supreme Council. If the West can emphasize this and try to worry the Council over imminent action, then it's possible a wedge might be successfully lodged into the Iranian government that Ahmadinejad's power to act will be dramatically reduced.

That, or the West is really sitting down and deciding that an airstrike needs to be launched against Iran. This seems so unwise that it is unlikely, but Iran's continued support of Hezbollah, Hamas, Al-Sadr, and its defiance of UN nuclear restrictions and sanctions shows a country that is risk-accepting, dangerous, and revisionist, with plans for domination of the region (through Iraq, Palestine, Syria, and Lebanon). Most schools of International Relations (particularly the realist varieties) would agree that defiant states exhibiting such behavior, especially as they grow in size and strength, are the most dangerous.

US Gains, Iran Gives

Yesterday, even as the UN Security Council unanimously passed new sanctions on Iran (the third round of sanctions on Iran over its weapons program), President Ahmadinejad visited the US-controlled Green Zone in Baghdad, met with Iraqi leaders, and called the "brotherly ties" between Iraq and Iran unbreakable. Such a visit gives legitimacy to an essentially US-created government in Iraq, and improves the likelihood that the US-supported Iraqi government will succeed. Such actions on the part of the Iranian leadership indicate a possible shift in disposition with respect to the United States and the Middle East.

Iran, unsurprisingly, fully denounced the UN sanctions against them, insisting that their nuclear program is peaceful, and that they will move forward with it. The US-supported sanctions are somewhat confusing; the US National Intelligence Estimate of late 2007 insisted that Iran had dismantled its weapons program in 2004, and it appeared that the United States and Iran had cut a deal; it is possible that these sanctions are a sign that relations are deteriorating.

Nonetheless, the Ahmadinejad visit did happen; it was the first Iranian presidential visit to Iraq since 1979, and shows a new shift towards a closer relationship. The visit likely shows that Iran is buying into the government, if not directly in its current form, then into what it hopes the government will become. US suspicions of Iranian military meddling in Iraq have been quiet for quite some time; it is possible the Iranians are more worried about an unstable Iraq than a secular or pro-western one.

Ahmadinejad made important and token gestures against Israel and the United States while visiting. He denounced Israeli action in the Gaza Strip, as well as a continued US presence in Iraq. Both Iraqi and Iranian officials made it clear that US troops were not used for security of the meeting building (even if the meeting was in the US Green Zone); essentially the meeting was planned and executed as if the US was not a major force in Iraq. Ahmadinejad spoke to the US as hurting Iraq with its continued occupation, but also that Iran and Iraq should help each other and stay close.

Iran may be positioning itself to act as a paternal figure in Iraq after the US leaves, or is simply looking forward to a relationship with the 25 million-person country in a post-Saddam Hussein era. Ultimately, the Iranian leadership's anger with the West and the United States may be great, but it is likely not enough that Iran would see more interest in trying to disrupt the Iraqi government simply for the sake of hurting American policy; that, or Iran recognizes that a more successful Iraqi government is likely lead to a more expedient US withdrawal.

In a final note, increased Iraqi security operations during Ahmedinijad's visit were unable to prevent two suicide attacks in Baghdad, which killed 19.