More protests and clashes in Iran this weekend; after a protest-turned-violent over the death of the leading opposition cleric, this weekend's unrest came during a Shiite religious festival (of sorts) in honor of the 7th century martyrdom of Mohammed's grandson.
The protests are certainly getting their fair due of attention in Iran, and wearing on the nerves of the ruling "conservatives," but are they effective? Good question. A progressive opposition movement's exposure usually does, over time, lead to an increase in popularity (like in the United States during Vietnam). And as much as violent crackdowns have a serious human toll, they may be winning sympathy for the opposition movement from any fence-sitters left. In addition, the crackdowns are hardening the young men and women (especially women) in the movement now--over time, the old men of the conservatives will die off, and the progressives will strike themselves a big win, maybe in 2014.
But will they run out of steam by then? Or even if they do win, will it be too late for the US to close the Iranian nuclear pandora's box, as it were?
Thinking about this has gotten me to try to get into the head of the President, and figure out what he's doing. He's shown a great deal of restraint with Iran, which a lot of folks oppose. But think about this: should we authorize a strike to take down the Iranian nuclear program, we'd be giving Ahmedinejad and his crew the most incredible propaganda that they could hope for to harden their position. A strike would further radicalize the Iranians, make them more Western-phobic, and even undermine the legitimacy of the opposition movement (Ahmedinejad would have some credence to his accusations of Western influence and manipulation in Iran). No, a strike might be disastrous.
But just how much is the US staying out of Iranian affairs? Surely, opportunities for subtle propaganda influence are not simply being ignored. Even something as simple as Voice of America, a shameless, open alternative network to the Iranian state-run media, is having an effect.
The Iranians are not nearly as good at information control as the Chinese, and the United States is probably taking advantage of that fact as much as Iran's own opposition movement is. This, of course, is a guess. No overt cooperation will happen with the opposition movement, both to protect its legitimacy and to protect its integrity: no Iranian wants to be an American stooge, and the Green Movement won't allow itself to be a puppet.
But the incredible restraint shown by the Obama administration towards the Iranian regime may indicate some intelligence that we don't have. Will there be an internal overthrow of the regime? I think it's unlikely (the population is divided and poorly armed), but if popularity for the opposition movement in 2014 is strong enough, truly sweeping reform could be on the way. And I might be wrong about the level of armament of the population--the Basij militiamen are technically civilians, and are allowed to keep weapons in their homes. Surely, there are guns floating around Tehran in numbers. And the opposition movement is surely making efforts to show that the Ahmedinijad/Khaimeni regime has violated Shiite Islamic law. Under Shiite law, the population has not only a right, but a duty to overthrow regimes that are antithetical to the tenets of Islam. Certainly the motivation and legitimacy for armed revolt are there. If the means are there, too, then the Obama administration's stance makes perfect sense--stay out of Iranian internal politics as much as possible, and let the opposition's support grow slowly over time, until it is ready.
But then again, when was the last time an armed revolt took down a modern, well-armed government? It's been a while.
Showing posts with label Tehran. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Tehran. Show all posts
Wednesday, December 23, 2009
Wednesday, June 24, 2009
All Doors Closed in Tehran
Yesterday, Khamenei announced that the regime would support election results against "any cost;" today, the Guardian Council announced that the partial recount re-affirmed Ahmedinejad's victory, despite admitted irregularities that included 50 cities in Iran having more votes than registered voters, and 3 million "mystery votes."
The leadership has, obviously, eliminated all political options for overturning the results of the election. Protests continued today, but they were apparently quite violently broken up by Basij and riot police that outnumbered the protesters approximately 2 to 1.
At this point, continuing protesters have no realistic chance at achieving an outcome close to what they want, but many will certainly want to continue to defame and illegitimize the regime in the long-term, both domestically and internationally. The toughest part of such a strategy is that the only weapon a protester can use to fight the regime is, ultimately, his or her own body.
The leadership has, obviously, eliminated all political options for overturning the results of the election. Protests continued today, but they were apparently quite violently broken up by Basij and riot police that outnumbered the protesters approximately 2 to 1.
At this point, continuing protesters have no realistic chance at achieving an outcome close to what they want, but many will certainly want to continue to defame and illegitimize the regime in the long-term, both domestically and internationally. The toughest part of such a strategy is that the only weapon a protester can use to fight the regime is, ultimately, his or her own body.
Saturday, June 20, 2009
Team Mousavi Prepares for Martyrdom
After being told that death was the punishment for further disruption, Mousavi and thousands of protesters came back for more, clashing with riot police and the Basij. There are sporadic reports of capsicum (pepper spray) being dumped from helicopters to break up the crowd, reports of gunfire, and numbers of violent clashes that have apparently left hundreds of riot police injured. Busses, cars, motorcycles, mosques, and the Ahmedinejad supporters' Headquarters have all been set on fire. The Shrine of Khomeini has been bombed by a suicide bomber,
Sporadic clashes continue, though the police seem to have managed to break up much of it without actually killing protesters--excellent execution on their part.
But it is highly unclear that the regime has ended the protests, or seriously slowed them down. @BreakingNews on Twitter had the following:
"BULLETIN -- IRANIAN OPPOSITION LEADER MOUSAVI SAYS HE IS "READY FOR MARTYRDOM" AND WILL CONTINUE HIS PATH."
There is almost certainly a hardcore group of protesters ready to follow him to the end (see last post). They will continue to make life incredibly difficult for the regime until they are rounded up.
Sporadic clashes continue, though the police seem to have managed to break up much of it without actually killing protesters--excellent execution on their part.
But it is highly unclear that the regime has ended the protests, or seriously slowed them down. @BreakingNews on Twitter had the following:
"BULLETIN -- IRANIAN OPPOSITION LEADER MOUSAVI SAYS HE IS "READY FOR MARTYRDOM" AND WILL CONTINUE HIS PATH."
There is almost certainly a hardcore group of protesters ready to follow him to the end (see last post). They will continue to make life incredibly difficult for the regime until they are rounded up.
Friday, June 19, 2009
More Doors Close on Tehran's Future
The Ayatollah made a speech today that pretty clearly solidified his hardline stance. A few highlights:
1) No protests, no really, he means it this time. And he might, that's the tough part. Bullets may begin to fly with very little prejudice.
2) "How can you cheat by 11 million votes?" An exact (translated) quote, signifying that while a recount is happening, it's just not going to change the outcome.
3) Moderates both in elected government and religious government were dramatically missing from his side during prayers this Friday--Ahmedinejad, however, was prominently featured.
4) He called Ahmedinejad's victory "definitive," and that there would be no re-vote. He stressed that democracy does not work when the losing side takes to the streets and demands an annulment every time they lose--with this, he tried very hard to undermine the credibility of the protesters.
5) Interestingly, he criticized both sides for attacking each other, and said that all candidates had great records of service to the Islamic Republic.
6) Of course, these protests are the fault of Israel, the US, and the UK. This, more than anything, probably angers the youngsters beyond comprehension. It is one thing to stand firm against a protest, but to call it ingenuine and fabricated by state enemies is insulting enough to probably fan the flames.
Pro-Mousavi websites have not yet announced any alterations to a plan to march on Saturday from Revolution Square to Freedom Square. If the Ayatollah is going to follow through on his promises of crackdown, tomorrow is the time--or else he starts to lose credibility. Mousavi and the reformists take incredible risk if they do not cave, but if they do cave, they largely solidify the precedent that the regime can simply rig the elections however it wants from here until doomsday. By standing up to the Ayatollah, Mousavi and the reformists send a very stern warning to the leadership that the Iranian people will not sit down and tolerate election fraud--and such a statement would hold firm even if they were broken by sufficient violence. The Guardian Council does not want this kind of violence to happen every four years, and may reconsider its rigging policies if the conflict actually comes to a head.
Perhaps, then, Mousavi knows he will be a Martyr, to instill hope in future generations. It would be a sad and dim fate for him and his supporters, but surely they must now sense some level of hopelessness in the political situation; they do not have the political power nor the violent force to overcome the regime. They can embarrass it, vilify it, and doing so will have significant implications on future policy. But changing the outcome of the election is almost certainly a battle that is lost.
1) No protests, no really, he means it this time. And he might, that's the tough part. Bullets may begin to fly with very little prejudice.
2) "How can you cheat by 11 million votes?" An exact (translated) quote, signifying that while a recount is happening, it's just not going to change the outcome.
3) Moderates both in elected government and religious government were dramatically missing from his side during prayers this Friday--Ahmedinejad, however, was prominently featured.
4) He called Ahmedinejad's victory "definitive," and that there would be no re-vote. He stressed that democracy does not work when the losing side takes to the streets and demands an annulment every time they lose--with this, he tried very hard to undermine the credibility of the protesters.
5) Interestingly, he criticized both sides for attacking each other, and said that all candidates had great records of service to the Islamic Republic.
6) Of course, these protests are the fault of Israel, the US, and the UK. This, more than anything, probably angers the youngsters beyond comprehension. It is one thing to stand firm against a protest, but to call it ingenuine and fabricated by state enemies is insulting enough to probably fan the flames.
Pro-Mousavi websites have not yet announced any alterations to a plan to march on Saturday from Revolution Square to Freedom Square. If the Ayatollah is going to follow through on his promises of crackdown, tomorrow is the time--or else he starts to lose credibility. Mousavi and the reformists take incredible risk if they do not cave, but if they do cave, they largely solidify the precedent that the regime can simply rig the elections however it wants from here until doomsday. By standing up to the Ayatollah, Mousavi and the reformists send a very stern warning to the leadership that the Iranian people will not sit down and tolerate election fraud--and such a statement would hold firm even if they were broken by sufficient violence. The Guardian Council does not want this kind of violence to happen every four years, and may reconsider its rigging policies if the conflict actually comes to a head.
Perhaps, then, Mousavi knows he will be a Martyr, to instill hope in future generations. It would be a sad and dim fate for him and his supporters, but surely they must now sense some level of hopelessness in the political situation; they do not have the political power nor the violent force to overcome the regime. They can embarrass it, vilify it, and doing so will have significant implications on future policy. But changing the outcome of the election is almost certainly a battle that is lost.
Wednesday, June 17, 2009
The Very Dangerous Tehran Game
The situation as it currently stands was obviously not inevitable. Mousavi could have decided not to risk his family's life in challenging the election; the Guardian Council could have decided that rigging the election was not worth the (probably) minor policy changes that would occur under Mousavi (this is assuming Mousavi would be winning on his own, which is still worth debating, despite obvious rigging). But rig they did, and caught they got.
In the past day I've talked to some folks smarter than myself (most notably my friend Clint), and our conversations revealed some tremendous insight.
There was one major mistake along the way that could have been avoided completely, and it has put all parties in the situation in difficult corners: Ayatollah Khameini, rather than waiting the traditional (and possibly legal?) 3 days to announce the winner of the election, the Supreme Leader chose a mere hour after the election to announce the "divine victory" of Ahmedinejad. Why? If we assume that the election was rigged, and that the Supreme Leader was involved, then he has a very strong incentive (and probably a bit of worry) to make the elections seem as legitimate as possible. So when Mousavi declared victory (claiming, even that he had a leak from the election commission), Khameini did everything he could to try and crush from the outset any momentum Mousavi may have gained, in an attempt to stop what's happening now from ever happening.
This was an error for two reasons. First, it was so very odd that it could not be seen as anything but calculated. Never before has the Ayatollah called an election before 3 days have passed, and calling it in a mere hour is obviously a strategic move. Such suggests that something is amiss (in this case, it bolstered the already-significant evidence that the election was rigged from the top). But more importantly, it put the Supreme Leader firmly in the Ahmedinejad camp, giving him very little room to maneuver, and very few good exits if things didn't go smoothly.
And then they didn't go smoothly. Now, Mousavi and his gang of youngsters are standing up and demanding the vote be annulled. Obviously if Khameini annulled the vote after praising it, he would have serious legitimacy problems himself. His leadership would be questioned, his impartiality would be laughed at. So he has compromised a bit--he is supporting a "recount," but insists that any serious challenges to the regime will be met by the Republican Guard. The recount is a 12-day total event, which is strategic as well: it is just long enough that he hopes to sap the protesters of some energy and momentum, and short enough that it does not make sense to stage a full-time sit-in in Freedom Square (ala Tiananmen).
And many friends of mine have likened this situation to that of Tiananmen, but there are a few differences. First, it's short (Tiananmen was a month in coming before the major crackdown). Second, the youngsters/reformers have not yet taken control of the city (whereas China had lost all control of Beijing by the time the tanks had to smash in). Third, new technology (and limited control by the Iranians over it) has allowed for constantly-shifting information and communication sources, proxies, etc, that are evading government attempts to shut it down. Finally, the protesters are actually making an ultimately much smaller, much more legitimate, and much more conceivable demand: instead of asking for Democracy from scratch, they are simply asking that the vote be counted honestly--and Mousavi is (or at least was) not a major challenger to the legitimacy of the Religious regime (though Khameini may have forced him into that camp, and Mousavi has taken advantage of it: rather than appealing to Khameini, he appealed to the more religiously academic Guardian Council, who were the first to note the irregularities). But most importantly, the kids of Tehran are very different from the kids of China. While the Chinese regime was built on a rebellion, Confucian culture had, for thousands of years, emphasized the importance of the relationship between leader and subordinate. It is ingrained in Chinese culture, even today--the Cultural Revolution was a very strange departure from that, and it was one that the Chinese very firmly put behind them as soon as it was over. Rebellion was a bit strange and foreign to many of the Tiananmen youngsters, and when they got shot at, they scattered.
But it will not be so easy for the Iranian regime. Already, the volunteer Basij (a pro-government milita) stormed the university that many protesters were camped in, smashing, looting, and beating. Basij has shot and killed 8 protesters, and wounded 28 more. There have been street clashes with rocks, batons, fire. The protesters have already set fire to a Revolutionary Guard building that the Basij worked out of. These are unlikely the makings of a successful violent revolution, but it is clear that the protesters are not afraid of violent conflict.
And so we look to Iran's history for the explanation of such an embrace. Shia Islam was built, thousands of years ago, on rebellion. It was a proclaimation that the Sunni Caliphate was illegitimate, and that disobedience of evil leadership was a virtue. The Shiites were (in the past) the primary terrorists/assassins of Islam, and the Iranian Revolution was a predictable (rather than strange) consequence of the CIA-installed Shah. Since then, Iran has proudly indoctrinated its children with this rebellious spirit--it's why Iran's domestic politics allow its foreign policy to be so rogue and confrontational in nature. In the war against Iraq, millions of youngsters donned red bandanas and literally ran across open desert, unarmed, at machine gun emplacements and tanks, howling like banshees, climbing over their dead brethren, in order to either join the Martyrs or rip the Iraqis apart with their own hands. They suffered immense casualties, but their will never broke. This is the legacy that these kids inherit. And now, Iran's most dangerous weapon to any outsider has now been turned, in part, on the regime. These kids will accept conflict, violence, and casualties, and they are not afraid to inflict them. Trying to break up the millions of Tehran protesters will be a whole heck of a lot harder than breaking up Tiananmen. And it will turn a huge chunk of the country (even tentative supporters of Ahmedinejad) against the regime for a very long time, should it happen. It would seal that the regime rules by force, terror, and authoritarianism, rather than by the will of its people. Such an outcome would be disastrous, even if the protesters went home.
So Khameini must find some way to end this. If he does not, he is doomed. But he is in a very difficult position, and that makes him incredibly dangerous: he cannot simply call Mousavi the winner. He would undermine his own authority and anger a different very large chunk of the population in a similar way. The recount still has the potential to lead to another vote--either that, or it will simply erode Ahmedinejad's lead and declare him the winner anyway. Both moves are difficult. But I do not believe that telling the protesters, "recount done, Ahmedinejad won, go home," is likely to work. Any exit now is going to be bad for the regime, but perhaps, the least bad way is to rig the "recount" such that there is a second vote, and let Mousavi squeak by with a victory.
If Khameini is foolish (and he rarely is), he will seek some exit where he takes almost no political flak. This would make him the most dangerous of all, as he would do something neither I nor my friends have yet predicted. But tomorrow, millions (likely) will assemble in Freedom Square, once again defying Khameini's decree, to mourn the dead protesters with Mousavi leading the entire gang. While foreign journalists are not prestent, Twitter and Facebook still are, and their ever-watching eye will make this public. Mousavi is putting the regime in a difficult place: let him stand up defiantly and do as he pleases, or brutally force him out and kill dozens, hundreds, or even thousands of Iran's finest youngsters? Both options are terrible. Tomorrow will be a dangerous day, and Mousavi knows this. Many of his supporters know this.
Even if they manage to kill Mousavi, there are others. Kharoubi is an excellent second choice for the reformers, and even more liberal than Mousavi. He could take the helm, with a newfound fury from the reformers.
But Khameini is clever, despite his recent mistakes. And the Guardian Council's support of the recount means he is under a lot of pressure to not simply try and crush this defiance. I am not sure what he will do in the long term. Tomorrow, he is likely to send the police to try to keep the protesters off-balance, but is unlikely to authorize deadly force. Unfortunately, this is likely to have little effect. All we can do from here is watch and hope, and see what he will do.
I leave you with some of the more compelling pictures of the conflict so far.
Protesters in Tehran.
Fire-barricades to Ward Off Police.
Recent demonstration in Freedom Square.
Ahmedinejad with Basij Commanders.
Protesters Outside of Iran (As Evidenced by Lack of Headscarves)
A Woman with "Man = Woman" in Farsi on her Hands.
The 2-Million Strong Rally
A Riot Police Officer Confronts a Protester (Peacefully).
Revolutionary Guard Compound Ablaze.
A Man Shot or Beaten by Basij or Police.
Riot Police Chase and Beat a Protester.
In the past day I've talked to some folks smarter than myself (most notably my friend Clint), and our conversations revealed some tremendous insight.
There was one major mistake along the way that could have been avoided completely, and it has put all parties in the situation in difficult corners: Ayatollah Khameini, rather than waiting the traditional (and possibly legal?) 3 days to announce the winner of the election, the Supreme Leader chose a mere hour after the election to announce the "divine victory" of Ahmedinejad. Why? If we assume that the election was rigged, and that the Supreme Leader was involved, then he has a very strong incentive (and probably a bit of worry) to make the elections seem as legitimate as possible. So when Mousavi declared victory (claiming, even that he had a leak from the election commission), Khameini did everything he could to try and crush from the outset any momentum Mousavi may have gained, in an attempt to stop what's happening now from ever happening.
This was an error for two reasons. First, it was so very odd that it could not be seen as anything but calculated. Never before has the Ayatollah called an election before 3 days have passed, and calling it in a mere hour is obviously a strategic move. Such suggests that something is amiss (in this case, it bolstered the already-significant evidence that the election was rigged from the top). But more importantly, it put the Supreme Leader firmly in the Ahmedinejad camp, giving him very little room to maneuver, and very few good exits if things didn't go smoothly.
And then they didn't go smoothly. Now, Mousavi and his gang of youngsters are standing up and demanding the vote be annulled. Obviously if Khameini annulled the vote after praising it, he would have serious legitimacy problems himself. His leadership would be questioned, his impartiality would be laughed at. So he has compromised a bit--he is supporting a "recount," but insists that any serious challenges to the regime will be met by the Republican Guard. The recount is a 12-day total event, which is strategic as well: it is just long enough that he hopes to sap the protesters of some energy and momentum, and short enough that it does not make sense to stage a full-time sit-in in Freedom Square (ala Tiananmen).
And many friends of mine have likened this situation to that of Tiananmen, but there are a few differences. First, it's short (Tiananmen was a month in coming before the major crackdown). Second, the youngsters/reformers have not yet taken control of the city (whereas China had lost all control of Beijing by the time the tanks had to smash in). Third, new technology (and limited control by the Iranians over it) has allowed for constantly-shifting information and communication sources, proxies, etc, that are evading government attempts to shut it down. Finally, the protesters are actually making an ultimately much smaller, much more legitimate, and much more conceivable demand: instead of asking for Democracy from scratch, they are simply asking that the vote be counted honestly--and Mousavi is (or at least was) not a major challenger to the legitimacy of the Religious regime (though Khameini may have forced him into that camp, and Mousavi has taken advantage of it: rather than appealing to Khameini, he appealed to the more religiously academic Guardian Council, who were the first to note the irregularities). But most importantly, the kids of Tehran are very different from the kids of China. While the Chinese regime was built on a rebellion, Confucian culture had, for thousands of years, emphasized the importance of the relationship between leader and subordinate. It is ingrained in Chinese culture, even today--the Cultural Revolution was a very strange departure from that, and it was one that the Chinese very firmly put behind them as soon as it was over. Rebellion was a bit strange and foreign to many of the Tiananmen youngsters, and when they got shot at, they scattered.
But it will not be so easy for the Iranian regime. Already, the volunteer Basij (a pro-government milita) stormed the university that many protesters were camped in, smashing, looting, and beating. Basij has shot and killed 8 protesters, and wounded 28 more. There have been street clashes with rocks, batons, fire. The protesters have already set fire to a Revolutionary Guard building that the Basij worked out of. These are unlikely the makings of a successful violent revolution, but it is clear that the protesters are not afraid of violent conflict.
And so we look to Iran's history for the explanation of such an embrace. Shia Islam was built, thousands of years ago, on rebellion. It was a proclaimation that the Sunni Caliphate was illegitimate, and that disobedience of evil leadership was a virtue. The Shiites were (in the past) the primary terrorists/assassins of Islam, and the Iranian Revolution was a predictable (rather than strange) consequence of the CIA-installed Shah. Since then, Iran has proudly indoctrinated its children with this rebellious spirit--it's why Iran's domestic politics allow its foreign policy to be so rogue and confrontational in nature. In the war against Iraq, millions of youngsters donned red bandanas and literally ran across open desert, unarmed, at machine gun emplacements and tanks, howling like banshees, climbing over their dead brethren, in order to either join the Martyrs or rip the Iraqis apart with their own hands. They suffered immense casualties, but their will never broke. This is the legacy that these kids inherit. And now, Iran's most dangerous weapon to any outsider has now been turned, in part, on the regime. These kids will accept conflict, violence, and casualties, and they are not afraid to inflict them. Trying to break up the millions of Tehran protesters will be a whole heck of a lot harder than breaking up Tiananmen. And it will turn a huge chunk of the country (even tentative supporters of Ahmedinejad) against the regime for a very long time, should it happen. It would seal that the regime rules by force, terror, and authoritarianism, rather than by the will of its people. Such an outcome would be disastrous, even if the protesters went home.
So Khameini must find some way to end this. If he does not, he is doomed. But he is in a very difficult position, and that makes him incredibly dangerous: he cannot simply call Mousavi the winner. He would undermine his own authority and anger a different very large chunk of the population in a similar way. The recount still has the potential to lead to another vote--either that, or it will simply erode Ahmedinejad's lead and declare him the winner anyway. Both moves are difficult. But I do not believe that telling the protesters, "recount done, Ahmedinejad won, go home," is likely to work. Any exit now is going to be bad for the regime, but perhaps, the least bad way is to rig the "recount" such that there is a second vote, and let Mousavi squeak by with a victory.
If Khameini is foolish (and he rarely is), he will seek some exit where he takes almost no political flak. This would make him the most dangerous of all, as he would do something neither I nor my friends have yet predicted. But tomorrow, millions (likely) will assemble in Freedom Square, once again defying Khameini's decree, to mourn the dead protesters with Mousavi leading the entire gang. While foreign journalists are not prestent, Twitter and Facebook still are, and their ever-watching eye will make this public. Mousavi is putting the regime in a difficult place: let him stand up defiantly and do as he pleases, or brutally force him out and kill dozens, hundreds, or even thousands of Iran's finest youngsters? Both options are terrible. Tomorrow will be a dangerous day, and Mousavi knows this. Many of his supporters know this.
Even if they manage to kill Mousavi, there are others. Kharoubi is an excellent second choice for the reformers, and even more liberal than Mousavi. He could take the helm, with a newfound fury from the reformers.
But Khameini is clever, despite his recent mistakes. And the Guardian Council's support of the recount means he is under a lot of pressure to not simply try and crush this defiance. I am not sure what he will do in the long term. Tomorrow, he is likely to send the police to try to keep the protesters off-balance, but is unlikely to authorize deadly force. Unfortunately, this is likely to have little effect. All we can do from here is watch and hope, and see what he will do.
I leave you with some of the more compelling pictures of the conflict so far.
Protesters in Tehran.
Fire-barricades to Ward Off Police.
Recent demonstration in Freedom Square.
Ahmedinejad with Basij Commanders.
Protesters Outside of Iran (As Evidenced by Lack of Headscarves)
A Woman with "Man = Woman" in Farsi on her Hands.
The 2-Million Strong Rally
A Riot Police Officer Confronts a Protester (Peacefully).
Revolutionary Guard Compound Ablaze.
A Man Shot or Beaten by Basij or Police.
Riot Police Chase and Beat a Protester.Tuesday, June 16, 2009
The Recount
The Guardian Council announced today that they would be recounting "Contested" districts, but that Iranian constitutional law does not allow them to annul the vote. This is entirely possibly true, and I really have little enough interest in studying Iranian Constitutional Law to figure this out. Either way, it won't be annulled, which leaves a few options from here.
1) Recount supports status quo. If the Guardian Council wants Ahmedinejad to win, and only really cares about dampening the blow of stealing the election, then they will close the gap a bit, admit some mistakes, but let him squeak by. This, I think, is the most likely outcome.
2) Recount leads to re-vote. If the recount puts Ahmedinejad under 50% and nobody over 50%, then he and Mousavi will face off in a re-vote. The Guardian Council here would have to be either seriously dedicated to honesty or seriously terrified of unrest to go this path. It is possible this will happen if they recount (by which I mean, "accurately report in") enough districts, especially urban areas.
3) Recount leads to Mousavi victory. This is pretty unlikely. One of Mousavi's big complaints was that his districts had problems of intimidation, extortion, and woeful under-balloting--the Guardian Council is ignoring all of these problems by ordering a recount, and not an annulment. Such an outcome would also be pretty obviously admitting massive fraud, rather than just a bunch of mistakes/irregularities, and the Guardian Council would very much like to avoid that. Even if they decide Mousavi should win, they're going to send it to another vote to do that.
If option 1 is chosen, the options for the Mousavi crowd are acquiescence or revolution--the latter being particularly tough given the brutal, fanatical, and gun-toting nature of the Revolutionary Guard (and the "progressive" curtailment of citizens owning weapons in Iran). But they can make enough trouble to seriously cripple the administration in the eyes of the West and even much of the Arab world, but they're going to need to do a lot of dying to do so.
If option 2 is chosen, there is some hope, but Iran continues to block phone service, pro-Mousavi websites, etc, and continues to jail reformist politicians. Organization will be difficult, but it can be guaranteed that anyone that stayed home in the last vote will come out this time as part of the Green Revolution. This is the option where the Guardian Council gets to gain (rather than burn) some popularity by appearing to save the country from some corrupt lower bureaucrats, or something similar.
But, now all one can do is sit back and wait. The US' decision not to publicly denounce the election may be working in their favor--Iran is making a big fuss over the EU having done it, and if there's anything that can kick up Ahmedinejad support, it's the US or Israel appearing to try and interfere with Iranian politics. I give the Clinton/Obama crowd a lot of credit for that level of discretion and wisdom.
1) Recount supports status quo. If the Guardian Council wants Ahmedinejad to win, and only really cares about dampening the blow of stealing the election, then they will close the gap a bit, admit some mistakes, but let him squeak by. This, I think, is the most likely outcome.
2) Recount leads to re-vote. If the recount puts Ahmedinejad under 50% and nobody over 50%, then he and Mousavi will face off in a re-vote. The Guardian Council here would have to be either seriously dedicated to honesty or seriously terrified of unrest to go this path. It is possible this will happen if they recount (by which I mean, "accurately report in") enough districts, especially urban areas.
3) Recount leads to Mousavi victory. This is pretty unlikely. One of Mousavi's big complaints was that his districts had problems of intimidation, extortion, and woeful under-balloting--the Guardian Council is ignoring all of these problems by ordering a recount, and not an annulment. Such an outcome would also be pretty obviously admitting massive fraud, rather than just a bunch of mistakes/irregularities, and the Guardian Council would very much like to avoid that. Even if they decide Mousavi should win, they're going to send it to another vote to do that.
If option 1 is chosen, the options for the Mousavi crowd are acquiescence or revolution--the latter being particularly tough given the brutal, fanatical, and gun-toting nature of the Revolutionary Guard (and the "progressive" curtailment of citizens owning weapons in Iran). But they can make enough trouble to seriously cripple the administration in the eyes of the West and even much of the Arab world, but they're going to need to do a lot of dying to do so.
If option 2 is chosen, there is some hope, but Iran continues to block phone service, pro-Mousavi websites, etc, and continues to jail reformist politicians. Organization will be difficult, but it can be guaranteed that anyone that stayed home in the last vote will come out this time as part of the Green Revolution. This is the option where the Guardian Council gets to gain (rather than burn) some popularity by appearing to save the country from some corrupt lower bureaucrats, or something similar.
But, now all one can do is sit back and wait. The US' decision not to publicly denounce the election may be working in their favor--Iran is making a big fuss over the EU having done it, and if there's anything that can kick up Ahmedinejad support, it's the US or Israel appearing to try and interfere with Iranian politics. I give the Clinton/Obama crowd a lot of credit for that level of discretion and wisdom.
Monday, June 15, 2009
Iran's Ever-Complex Election Aftermath
Iran's post-election situation seemed rather bleak for the pro-reformers (and for the West) after the election commission announced Ahmedinejad's landslide 
victory. But I am getting some conflicting reports on the situation, so bear with me, but I will try to summarize and analyze as best as I can.
After the election, Mousavi and Ahmedinejad both claimed victory. The state media then announced that Ahmedinejad had achieved a pretty stunning 62% of the vote, which is a number that really nobody in the West can seriously claim is or is not a good estimate of his actual support. Mousavi called foul, claiming that members of the election commission told him that he had a serious lead (around 58%) when the polls closed (which he claims had led to his claiming victory). After crying foul, Mousavi's supporters took to the streets, in defiance of Khameini's decree, and began protesting (which, of course, turned intio rioting with busses burning, shops breaking, etc). Obviously, there have been lots of clashes between protesters and police. Sometimes, protesters were broken up--sometimes, the police ran. Lots of people have been beaten up, arrested, probably killed.
Iran arrested Mousavi and put him under house arrest at some point, though he is clearly out now. Other reformists were also arrested, as was the Supreme Leader's daughter, who has at least sympathized with Mousavi's cause. I'm not sure
what her status is, currently.
Iran cut off cell phone service to Tehran, and packed it with police. It has also tried to shut down all pro-Mousavi websites, but its Internet censorship team is not anything on part with China's, and they are largely failing to keep the ever-morphing mass of information from jumping around between different websites, twitter accounts, and whatnot. People are staying informed, and organized.
Some allegedly-leaked information from the Interior Ministry shows Ahmedinejad in third place after the election (even after apparent ballot-rigging, extortion and intimidation, etc). The numbers:
Mousavi (Independent Reformer): 19.1 Million (45.8%)
Kharoubi (Etemad-e-Melli): 13.4 Million (32.1%)
Ahmedinejad (Abadgaran): 5.7 Million (13.7%)
Rezai (Independent Conservative): 3.5 Million (8.4%)
If these numbers are true, they have incredible implications. First, the run-off vote would be between two reformers (with Mousavi the clear favorite), basically sealing a big victory (and relief) for the West in Iran. Second, Ahmedinejad's policies are so woefully unpopular that he would have the worst incumbent turnout in any presidential election I can even conceive of. Third, and finally: massive, systemic, planned fraud from the very top was designed to make sure this election went one way. If these numbers are true, then Khameini deeply feared the results, and with good reason. Such overwhelming (almost 80%) support for reformist candidates would put great pressure on him, and great support behind the President. He does indeed answer to a series of religious elites in Iran, and many of them actually care about Iran and its people (who knew!).
And the pressure from the electorate to void these results is starting to trickle into such elite circles. A group of influential Ayatollahs have called for the election results to be nullified, and the election to be re-taken in order to win the confidence of the Iranian people. I have heard scattered reports that there are election
commission officials calling for a re-vote with better controls of irregularities. The West is finally coming out and making calls for investigations, although cautiously.
Today, Mousavi (somehow getting out of house arrest?) appeared in Tehran in front of (what an Iranian police officer said was) 1.5-2 million supporters, in defiance of the Supreme Leader and under explicit threat of deadly force. He has whipped Tehran into a fervor, and is trying to keep the energy up in order to keep the pressure on the leadership high. He has the momentum, and he knows it.
At this point, the Supreme Leader needs to seriously worry about losing control of Tehran and having to resort to an incredible massacre with the Revolutionary Guard. In order to try to assuage anger, he is actually calling for investigations into the "irregularities" cited by Mousavi.
This could be one of two things: first, he could actually be balking to pressure, and plans to call a new vote (it is unlikely he will flat-out declare Mousavi the winner). Second, and perhaps more likely, he will probably stretch out the investigation in the hopes that the energy of Tehranians will fizzle, and then declare that despite some irregularities, Ahmedinejad still won. The second path is dangerous--these youngsters are largely on summer vacation, and they don't actually have normal lives to return to in the next two months. Mousavi has almost nothing to lose, as he'll surely be thrown in jail of Ahmedinejad walks out of this with the win. That said, all these kids can threaten to do is give Iran an ever-increasing public relations scandal, and undermine Ahmedinejad's authority abroad. But will he care? Will the Supreme Leader? That is a question with bleaker possibilities.
But, frankly, there is hope. Mousavi and his band of youngsters have not only shaken up Iranian politics, they have changed the face of Iran to the West forever. Even if Ahmedinejad emerges with the presidency, the West shall always look to Iran's people with great sympathy, as their fight for liberty tugs our heartstrings. They share many of our values. They remind us of the best of ourselves. That, alone, may change the West's relationship with Iran--or at least its policy towards it. But, further, there is a chance that the Supreme Leader will decide that the safe route is a route of lower risk--one that does not involve such obvious lies and deception, but one that bends to the will of Iran's citizens, and allows Mousavi the chance to do what he can. Iran's religious leadership has weathered reformers before, and while Mousavi promises to be quite effective, it will weather them again: Khameini has very little to lose by sweeping in and playing hero to the Iranian people by using his hand to call a new vote and hand Mousavi the victory. In fact, he may decide that this moment in his legacy is one where he does, indeed, want to play the hero, rather than the villain.
victory. But I am getting some conflicting reports on the situation, so bear with me, but I will try to summarize and analyze as best as I can.After the election, Mousavi and Ahmedinejad both claimed victory. The state media then announced that Ahmedinejad had achieved a pretty stunning 62% of the vote, which is a number that really nobody in the West can seriously claim is or is not a good estimate of his actual support. Mousavi called foul, claiming that members of the election commission told him that he had a serious lead (around 58%) when the polls closed (which he claims had led to his claiming victory). After crying foul, Mousavi's supporters took to the streets, in defiance of Khameini's decree, and began protesting (which, of course, turned intio rioting with busses burning, shops breaking, etc). Obviously, there have been lots of clashes between protesters and police. Sometimes, protesters were broken up--sometimes, the police ran. Lots of people have been beaten up, arrested, probably killed.
Iran arrested Mousavi and put him under house arrest at some point, though he is clearly out now. Other reformists were also arrested, as was the Supreme Leader's daughter, who has at least sympathized with Mousavi's cause. I'm not sure
what her status is, currently.Iran cut off cell phone service to Tehran, and packed it with police. It has also tried to shut down all pro-Mousavi websites, but its Internet censorship team is not anything on part with China's, and they are largely failing to keep the ever-morphing mass of information from jumping around between different websites, twitter accounts, and whatnot. People are staying informed, and organized.
Some allegedly-leaked information from the Interior Ministry shows Ahmedinejad in third place after the election (even after apparent ballot-rigging, extortion and intimidation, etc). The numbers:
Mousavi (Independent Reformer): 19.1 Million (45.8%)
Kharoubi (Etemad-e-Melli): 13.4 Million (32.1%)
Ahmedinejad (Abadgaran): 5.7 Million (13.7%)
Rezai (Independent Conservative): 3.5 Million (8.4%)
If these numbers are true, they have incredible implications. First, the run-off vote would be between two reformers (with Mousavi the clear favorite), basically sealing a big victory (and relief) for the West in Iran. Second, Ahmedinejad's policies are so woefully unpopular that he would have the worst incumbent turnout in any presidential election I can even conceive of. Third, and finally: massive, systemic, planned fraud from the very top was designed to make sure this election went one way. If these numbers are true, then Khameini deeply feared the results, and with good reason. Such overwhelming (almost 80%) support for reformist candidates would put great pressure on him, and great support behind the President. He does indeed answer to a series of religious elites in Iran, and many of them actually care about Iran and its people (who knew!).
And the pressure from the electorate to void these results is starting to trickle into such elite circles. A group of influential Ayatollahs have called for the election results to be nullified, and the election to be re-taken in order to win the confidence of the Iranian people. I have heard scattered reports that there are election
commission officials calling for a re-vote with better controls of irregularities. The West is finally coming out and making calls for investigations, although cautiously.Today, Mousavi (somehow getting out of house arrest?) appeared in Tehran in front of (what an Iranian police officer said was) 1.5-2 million supporters, in defiance of the Supreme Leader and under explicit threat of deadly force. He has whipped Tehran into a fervor, and is trying to keep the energy up in order to keep the pressure on the leadership high. He has the momentum, and he knows it.
At this point, the Supreme Leader needs to seriously worry about losing control of Tehran and having to resort to an incredible massacre with the Revolutionary Guard. In order to try to assuage anger, he is actually calling for investigations into the "irregularities" cited by Mousavi.
This could be one of two things: first, he could actually be balking to pressure, and plans to call a new vote (it is unlikely he will flat-out declare Mousavi the winner). Second, and perhaps more likely, he will probably stretch out the investigation in the hopes that the energy of Tehranians will fizzle, and then declare that despite some irregularities, Ahmedinejad still won. The second path is dangerous--these youngsters are largely on summer vacation, and they don't actually have normal lives to return to in the next two months. Mousavi has almost nothing to lose, as he'll surely be thrown in jail of Ahmedinejad walks out of this with the win. That said, all these kids can threaten to do is give Iran an ever-increasing public relations scandal, and undermine Ahmedinejad's authority abroad. But will he care? Will the Supreme Leader? That is a question with bleaker possibilities.
But, frankly, there is hope. Mousavi and his band of youngsters have not only shaken up Iranian politics, they have changed the face of Iran to the West forever. Even if Ahmedinejad emerges with the presidency, the West shall always look to Iran's people with great sympathy, as their fight for liberty tugs our heartstrings. They share many of our values. They remind us of the best of ourselves. That, alone, may change the West's relationship with Iran--or at least its policy towards it. But, further, there is a chance that the Supreme Leader will decide that the safe route is a route of lower risk--one that does not involve such obvious lies and deception, but one that bends to the will of Iran's citizens, and allows Mousavi the chance to do what he can. Iran's religious leadership has weathered reformers before, and while Mousavi promises to be quite effective, it will weather them again: Khameini has very little to lose by sweeping in and playing hero to the Iranian people by using his hand to call a new vote and hand Mousavi the victory. In fact, he may decide that this moment in his legacy is one where he does, indeed, want to play the hero, rather than the villain.
Sunday, March 22, 2009
The War for Iran's Future
Mr. Obama's current "overtures" (as the Media seems fond of saying, this week) towards Iran have seemed somewhat naive. Simple rhetoric with Iran has proved grossly ineffective. And opening salvos of generosity with the country tend to leave the United States in a much worse bargaining position than it began, with little to show for it (see: Jimmy Carter). Potetntially, tit-for-tat deals, struck in series, could lead to a gentle "unwinding" of the currently-tense relationship between Iran and the United States.
I thought for some time that Mr. Obama's apparent optimism was due to a lack of understanding about the history of the Iran-US relationship. Many people I know think that it was Mr. Bush's placing of Iran on the "Axis of Evil" that caused relations to sour, but I'm not sure they've ever been good. The Clinton years were a period of marked denial by the West over how the non-West felt about the West (and the US in particular). Tehran was quite thrilled when the WTC fell--long before the Axis of Evil.
But while content to hold an opinion of naivete for the inexperienced American president, I was jostled recently by hearing that French president Nicholas Sarkozy was on board with Obama's plan to open up the Iranians. This seemed strange--Mr. Sarkozy is quite the conservative, recently re-joined full NATO command after 43 years of absence, and was probably the leading voice in Europe calling to deliver tough sanctions to Iran for its nuclear program. It made me think a bit.
In June, Iran holds its presidential elections. Back when Mr. Obama was elected, folks gathered in the streets of Tehran to vent their cautious optimistic energy. They tuned in to Voice of America to get the US scoop. They got excited.
Sadly, such excitement didn't mean too much, but Mr. Obama is likely trying to take advantage of it. By extending his hand to the Iranian people rather than its leadership, and in particular by giving an address that outlined specific policy changes necessary to put Iran on good terms with the West, Mr. Obama (in his video address) did a few things simultaneously. First, he snubbed Iranian leadership and made it clear that they were far too conservative and oppressive. Second, he specifically outlined what the US was offering, and in the light of current trade sanctions and general isolationism, it seems like a lot. Third, the US cast the first stone, but made it clear that a strong response was necessary--indeed, it is clear that Mr. Obama is putting himself out on a limb.
And I think that Mr. Obama got the response that he was looking for. Iranian leadership did not laugh off the video, but it did make some pretty bold demands of policy change--offering only talks or negotiations in return. The current Iranian leadership does indeed want a dialogue with the US, but feels it must stand firm against the US, lest it give credit to its moderate parties. But if Mr. Obama's videotape can ring true among the Iranian people, then Tehran's leadership clamming up will give all the credit to Iran's moderates that they need. Tehran must walk a very fine line, now. But if they are not able to, they must make a choice: balk and concede a friendly attitude and open negotiations, or remain rigid and unmoved, causing already-weary Iranian citizens to question their leadership right before the election.
So it looks like all of Mr. Obama's talk may be part of a very quiet war for Iran's future, fought through diplomacy. Should he be successful, he will have landed a victory (though a relatively small one) on the long-time agenda of conservatives in the US: regime change in Iran. Mr. Obama is in no particular rush to have these talks, but the Iranian leadership may be. Over the next few months, Obama can simply continue to put pressure-with-a-smile on Tehran, and hope that they make a mistake in either direction. In the words of the US President that Obama admires most: "Heads I win, tails you lose."
I thought for some time that Mr. Obama's apparent optimism was due to a lack of understanding about the history of the Iran-US relationship. Many people I know think that it was Mr. Bush's placing of Iran on the "Axis of Evil" that caused relations to sour, but I'm not sure they've ever been good. The Clinton years were a period of marked denial by the West over how the non-West felt about the West (and the US in particular). Tehran was quite thrilled when the WTC fell--long before the Axis of Evil.
But while content to hold an opinion of naivete for the inexperienced American president, I was jostled recently by hearing that French president Nicholas Sarkozy was on board with Obama's plan to open up the Iranians. This seemed strange--Mr. Sarkozy is quite the conservative, recently re-joined full NATO command after 43 years of absence, and was probably the leading voice in Europe calling to deliver tough sanctions to Iran for its nuclear program. It made me think a bit.
In June, Iran holds its presidential elections. Back when Mr. Obama was elected, folks gathered in the streets of Tehran to vent their cautious optimistic energy. They tuned in to Voice of America to get the US scoop. They got excited.
Sadly, such excitement didn't mean too much, but Mr. Obama is likely trying to take advantage of it. By extending his hand to the Iranian people rather than its leadership, and in particular by giving an address that outlined specific policy changes necessary to put Iran on good terms with the West, Mr. Obama (in his video address) did a few things simultaneously. First, he snubbed Iranian leadership and made it clear that they were far too conservative and oppressive. Second, he specifically outlined what the US was offering, and in the light of current trade sanctions and general isolationism, it seems like a lot. Third, the US cast the first stone, but made it clear that a strong response was necessary--indeed, it is clear that Mr. Obama is putting himself out on a limb.
And I think that Mr. Obama got the response that he was looking for. Iranian leadership did not laugh off the video, but it did make some pretty bold demands of policy change--offering only talks or negotiations in return. The current Iranian leadership does indeed want a dialogue with the US, but feels it must stand firm against the US, lest it give credit to its moderate parties. But if Mr. Obama's videotape can ring true among the Iranian people, then Tehran's leadership clamming up will give all the credit to Iran's moderates that they need. Tehran must walk a very fine line, now. But if they are not able to, they must make a choice: balk and concede a friendly attitude and open negotiations, or remain rigid and unmoved, causing already-weary Iranian citizens to question their leadership right before the election.
So it looks like all of Mr. Obama's talk may be part of a very quiet war for Iran's future, fought through diplomacy. Should he be successful, he will have landed a victory (though a relatively small one) on the long-time agenda of conservatives in the US: regime change in Iran. Mr. Obama is in no particular rush to have these talks, but the Iranian leadership may be. Over the next few months, Obama can simply continue to put pressure-with-a-smile on Tehran, and hope that they make a mistake in either direction. In the words of the US President that Obama admires most: "Heads I win, tails you lose."
Tuesday, March 3, 2009
Obama's Very Quiet Olive Branch to Moscow
Obama recently sent a letter to Moscow. Presidents do this quite often. As far as I know, we even have a red phone to Moscow in the Oval Office today.
But this letter is a special one. And it was supposed to be a very quiet one. Somehow, through journalistic voodoo and heka magic, the New York Times happened across the contents. It looks, for the moment, that Mr. Obama was quietly implying that the US wou
ld halt and undo its missile defense placements in Europe in exchange for Russia making sure that Iran would not be able to build ballistic missiles.
The implications are interesting. First, about the leak--it is unclear whether the letter was supposed to be leaked or not. Intentional leaks are common, in order to let the state throw its hands up and say, "we didn't mean to publicize this," and so further questions are not pressured. This may be an intentional leak--it may be an attempt to show Eastern Europe, Russia, et al, that the missile shield is not intended as an anti-Russian initiative (even though it is). This potentially gives Obama some political traction for continuing the project, should it seem necessary.
But it also makes the shield a bargaining chip with Russia. Obama says, "we know you don't like
it, but hey, it's for Iran, so if you can just make that problem go away, we won't need it anymore, and we'll stop spending money on it." It means that, if the Russians choose to (and indeed, are able to) deal with the Iranians, then Obama is willing to reprioritize on defense. The likelihood that the Russians are actually going to engage in ballistic missile brinksmanship bargaining is low... but it is not so low for the Iranians. Furthermore, the EU is actually collectively strong enough to stand up to the Russians if they are willing to get their hands dirty, where Israel is less able to do so (even if much more willing).
So Obama knows that today, one needs to sidle up to the Russians, and pressure the Iranians. Obviously, this is tough to do. Medvedev, when questioned about the leak, mostly shrugged at the situation and said that "nothing concrete" was in the letter. He knows that he is in a relatively good relative bargaining position, and is not ready to yet show his hand.
But ultimately, the missile shield in Eastern Europe is something that the Russians are willing to do a lot to get rid of. In a somewhat ironic way, Mr. Obama can thank Mr. Bush for leaving the incomplete missile shield behind so that he, in the nicest way possible, can use it as a lever to pry Moscow.
But this letter is a special one. And it was supposed to be a very quiet one. Somehow, through journalistic voodoo and heka magic, the New York Times happened across the contents. It looks, for the moment, that Mr. Obama was quietly implying that the US wou
ld halt and undo its missile defense placements in Europe in exchange for Russia making sure that Iran would not be able to build ballistic missiles.The implications are interesting. First, about the leak--it is unclear whether the letter was supposed to be leaked or not. Intentional leaks are common, in order to let the state throw its hands up and say, "we didn't mean to publicize this," and so further questions are not pressured. This may be an intentional leak--it may be an attempt to show Eastern Europe, Russia, et al, that the missile shield is not intended as an anti-Russian initiative (even though it is). This potentially gives Obama some political traction for continuing the project, should it seem necessary.
But it also makes the shield a bargaining chip with Russia. Obama says, "we know you don't like
it, but hey, it's for Iran, so if you can just make that problem go away, we won't need it anymore, and we'll stop spending money on it." It means that, if the Russians choose to (and indeed, are able to) deal with the Iranians, then Obama is willing to reprioritize on defense. The likelihood that the Russians are actually going to engage in ballistic missile brinksmanship bargaining is low... but it is not so low for the Iranians. Furthermore, the EU is actually collectively strong enough to stand up to the Russians if they are willing to get their hands dirty, where Israel is less able to do so (even if much more willing). So Obama knows that today, one needs to sidle up to the Russians, and pressure the Iranians. Obviously, this is tough to do. Medvedev, when questioned about the leak, mostly shrugged at the situation and said that "nothing concrete" was in the letter. He knows that he is in a relatively good relative bargaining position, and is not ready to yet show his hand.
But ultimately, the missile shield in Eastern Europe is something that the Russians are willing to do a lot to get rid of. In a somewhat ironic way, Mr. Obama can thank Mr. Bush for leaving the incomplete missile shield behind so that he, in the nicest way possible, can use it as a lever to pry Moscow.
Wednesday, November 5, 2008
Ahmadinejad Under Fire
The Iranian election (in 8 months) has been, and will continue to be, overshadowed by the American and Israeli elections. Ahmadinejad is up for re-election then (after a 4-year term); his election will be (in part) a referendum for his very brinksman-style policies on Israel, the West, the US, and nuclear "power." It looks like things are not going to go his way.
First, religious conservatives in Iran don't really like him. They're relatively insular, and more concerned with Islam and the Shia Ummah than with regional power-grabbing and conflict. He's faced pressure from the unelected religious leadership to tone down and look inward. International sanctions have hurt him with these groups.
Parliament has started targeting his allies. A cabinet member was dismissed for having faked his educational credentials, by large margin in parliament.
Finally, and perhaps most importantly: Ahmadinejad has depended in large part on the fact that the US is seen as an enemy, as unreasonable, as controlled by war-corporations. Whether merited or not, the election of Obama has changed the perspective of many Iranians about the US attitude, its democracy, etc. This is in large part due to the fact that Obama's black--if a black man can win, then the democracy must be real. The results are undermining years of messages by Tehran state media, trying to reinforce beliefs of US corruption, capitalism-evil, white dominance, etc etc. Tehran's anti-Westerners are going to struggle in the next election as people catch onto the fact that state media has been lying.
From the LA Times: "“Let me tell you that now I believe in American democracy,” [a man in Tehran] said excitedly. “Honestly, I did not think that Obama would be president. I thought that the invisible hands of the big trusts and cartels would not allow a black man to be president of the United States.”" Iranians tuned into Voice of America to hear Persian translations of Mr. Obama's victory speech.
Even Obama's reaching-out to Tehran might undermine Ahmadinejad. If the US appears to be open-minded and diplomatic in the Middle East, moderate, pro-West parties will begin to look more attractive (because warming up to the West will have fewer cons than previously thought).
All this means that Ahmadinejad has a tough 8 months in front of him. Expect a moderate alternative to start looking popular in the next few months in Iran.
First, religious conservatives in Iran don't really like him. They're relatively insular, and more concerned with Islam and the Shia Ummah than with regional power-grabbing and conflict. He's faced pressure from the unelected religious leadership to tone down and look inward. International sanctions have hurt him with these groups.
Parliament has started targeting his allies. A cabinet member was dismissed for having faked his educational credentials, by large margin in parliament.
Finally, and perhaps most importantly: Ahmadinejad has depended in large part on the fact that the US is seen as an enemy, as unreasonable, as controlled by war-corporations. Whether merited or not, the election of Obama has changed the perspective of many Iranians about the US attitude, its democracy, etc. This is in large part due to the fact that Obama's black--if a black man can win, then the democracy must be real. The results are undermining years of messages by Tehran state media, trying to reinforce beliefs of US corruption, capitalism-evil, white dominance, etc etc. Tehran's anti-Westerners are going to struggle in the next election as people catch onto the fact that state media has been lying.
From the LA Times: "“Let me tell you that now I believe in American democracy,” [a man in Tehran] said excitedly. “Honestly, I did not think that Obama would be president. I thought that the invisible hands of the big trusts and cartels would not allow a black man to be president of the United States.”" Iranians tuned into Voice of America to hear Persian translations of Mr. Obama's victory speech.
Even Obama's reaching-out to Tehran might undermine Ahmadinejad. If the US appears to be open-minded and diplomatic in the Middle East, moderate, pro-West parties will begin to look more attractive (because warming up to the West will have fewer cons than previously thought).
All this means that Ahmadinejad has a tough 8 months in front of him. Expect a moderate alternative to start looking popular in the next few months in Iran.
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