So There's a Ceasefire in Ukraine? Probably Not. But Either Way: Putin's Winning Again.

The give-peace-a-chance summit at Minsk went all night, but a peace deal came out.

At least it appears so.

Warning that my complete lack of sympathy for Russia in all this is going to come through, but I want to try to set what-I-think-is the record straight.

The peace deal included the leaders of: Ukraine, France, Germany, Russia. It was signed, quite reluctantly (or at least they put on a show of reluctance) by two rebel leaders.

The Charlotte Observer has a pretty good summary of the peace deal; I'll touch on a few points.

1) All "foreign" fighters are to leave Ukraine.
2) All "foreign" heavy weapons are to be pulled out of Ukraine.
3) Ukraine will grant its eastern provinces partial autonomy--including free trade with Russia.
4) The eastern Ukrainian provinces get to hold referenda on their status. Luckily, this time it'll be run by Kiev with outside observers, rather than the incredible sham that was Crimea.

All of this begs the question: if Russia does not have troops or heavy weapons in Ukraine, how is it supposed to agree to pull them out?

The situation would be a spectacular joke if it weren't the case that Russia is continually getting away with invading another country, killing people, gobbling up territory, and facing no consequences.

There is ample evidence Russia has been there in huge force. NATO keeps releasing satellite photography of Russian heavy weapons, APCs, etc, crossing the border and going deep into Ukraine. Russia has sent a bunch of cargo trucks into Ukraine to pick up as many as 4,000 Russian bodies and bring them home--despite said bodies having never been there. Ukraine keeps capturing Russian regular soldiers, including paratroopers, who keep claiming that they are "lost" in Ukraine and were most definitely not sent there on purpose. Ukraine keeps stumbling across Russian military ID's scattered about its country. Ukrainian rebels keep getting their hands on Russian tanks, rocket launchers, APCs, guns, etc (including the sophisticated SAM that shot down the Malaysian Airlines plane)--we know they're Russian specifically because the Ukrainians don't use these weapons and they can't simply be captured in Ukraine by the rebels..

The Russians' continued denial of involvement in Ukraine has reached a comical absurdity.

Time for More Mayhem

The ceasefire doesn't start until February 15th, and there are likely plans to consolidate more territory into rebel hands before the ceasefire comes into effect, in order to have leverage during the ceasefire implementation. Russia sent about 90 heavy vehicles into Ukraine during the peace talks, and I'll bet they're heading for Debaltseve , which has been surrounded by rebels honing in on Ukrainian government troops and pounded by Russian rockets and artillery that is definitely not there. 

Tactically, it's a Battle of the Bulge-style disaster for Ukraine if it indeed loses Debaltseve before the ceasefire comes into effect.

From  the Wall Street Journal

The following constantly-updated map shows that Debaltseve has not yet fallen, but is nearly surrounded completely.

Putin Wins Again

With the Sudetenland Crimea even more securely in hand with  this deal, Putin is going to end up with much of what he wants in Ukraine--and the ceasefire might actually hold if Russia is satisfied (the Chicago Tribune has a great piece on how the deal is set up to give Russia and the rebels lots of excuses to start fighting again if it's in their interest). If Russian support is actually pulled, the rebels will have a more frustrating time beating the Ukrainian army--the fall counter-offensive by Kyiv is what led to a shrinking of rebel-held territory until the Russians brought arms and troops back into the fight.

Of course, not even Putin has full control over the rebels in eastern Ukraine. If the referendum doesn't end up resulting in "annexation by Russia," I suspect the rebels will pick right back up, and Putin is likely to continue not-supporting them until even more concessions are made.

But what else has Putin won? 

1) The autonomy for eastern Ukraine gives Russia a heavy lever to make sure Ukraine does not join NATO. As we discussed before, Ukraine joining NATO would be a major strategic, long-term security threat for Russia, and the invasion of Crimea secured Russia's only warm-water port in Sevastopol.

2) The referenda obviously might result in more territory--and thus more buffer space--for Russia. Interestingly, such buffer space might actually lead to Ukraine as a whole becoming more EU/NATO-leaning (as pro-Russian populations leave the country), but it makes the territorial integrity of Russia generally safer.

3) Russia once again sets the precedent that it can use military force to invade a neighboring country and win its political/strategic goals without consequence.

4) The ceasefire likely won't hold, and Russia will have won concessions from Ukraine for nothing in return. 

Some readers may think that my not-so-subtle reference to Nazi Germany here is overblown or even absurd. The Russians do not share the simply absurd evil of the Nazis, but it's the most recent and well-known example of expansionist powers testing the resolve of European leaders, seeing their will to be wanting, and then making ever-greater moves.

As a "realist" (this is a school of International Relations theory, rather than simply a haughty impression of myself), I believe the greatest risk for peace in a region of states (rather than a region run by militias and ethnosectarian groups, like the Middle East) is a lack of deterrence. The repeated failure to deter military invasions of Russia's neighbors is cause for serious long-term concern.

The US and UK Part from the EU

The US and UK are both planning on sending military aid (weapons) to the Ukrainians if the fighting picks back up. Even if it doesn't, the US is sending training teams to improve Ukraine's military--no doubt these trainers are also likely to be assistant coordinators if/when the war picks back up.

The EU continues to want to avoid getting embroiled in the war, so new friction is emerging between Germany/France and the US/UK, putting NATO unity at risk. Such continued discord is what makes the Visegrad 4 (Poland, Hungary, Czech Republic, Slovakia) so nervous and independent.

Hollande's 75% Tax Isn't Dead--Not Even Sick

More laissez-faire readers are likely to be pretty excited skimming the headlines and learning that the 75% tax on the wealthiest Frenchmen has been struck down by the Constitutional Committee.

Having read this myself, I paused: "how does a constitution possibly bar some arbitrarily high tax rate?" The only reasonable possibility of this in my mind would be if the Committee made a pretty long stretch of one's liberty from unreasonable seizure.

Reading more deeply revealed that the Committee repealed the law due to what are ultimately minor structural details (targeting individuals rather than households, primarily), and Hollande has already declared that a re-structured law will come right back in 2013 with full force.

The first observation here is that the headlines of some very reputable news organizations are simply deceptive in their oversimplification--the casual reader would clearly interpret the headlines below to say that the law is dead. It's very much not--it's in fact going to be quite fine.

What this means for France is that its flow of super-rich citizens to London and Bern won't end any time soon. French national debt is nearing 90% of its GDP (which compares to a staggering 110% for the US) and climbing quickly--obviously losing this income stream will hurt, though France is likely to generate more income from increases on those who stay than it loses by those who leave. Geopolitically this tax wash may not be massively significant, but French unemployment is at 10.7% and--unlike the US, UK, or Germany--has been climbing for 19 months in a row.  France's biggest risk is that it loses those well-suited to launch or fund new companies or projects that will push its economy forward and hire its labor force. French labor & consumer laws aren't exactly business-friendly, but the fact that starting companies is difficult in France makes it even more critical to have individuals that can muster lots of money/resources at once.

And, just for chuckles, Monty Python brings us a timely analogy for the tax law.

Implications of the Current Situation in Libya

Short summary of recent events in Libya:

* Rebel and Gaddafi forces face east/west stalemate
* Gaddafi's forces organize and rally, pushing Rebels to Benghazi
* At some point, SAS (and probably CIA) inserted into Libya
* UN approves no-fly zone and "all necessary measures" to protect civilians
* Gaddafi declares ceasefire, declares willingness to talk to opposition, meanwhile moving forces into Benghazi
* Anti-Rebel operations continue in Benghazi (in efforts to "last-minute" end the Rebel forces)
* French strikes begin on land targets (tanks, etc)
* US/UK strikes begin on anti-air, fuel, airport, communication/command sites
* Arab League condemns ground attacks

"All necessary measures" is likely a deliberately vague clause, allowing the West to justify (at least to itself) nearly any military action, while abiding by its post-Iraq rule-following sensibilities.

Of course, the protection of civilians is a political mask over the true intent: regime change in Libya. As much as the Rebels are a bit of an unknown factor (and some of them are clearly Islamist), the West is quite tired of Gaddafi.

The implications are numerous and highly variable.

West-Middle East Relations
The West certainly hopes that its pro-Rebel action will endear it to the new anti-establishment movements and regimes that seem to be sweeping the Middle East. The West gets to claim "we helped without occupying!" when the new governments of the Middle East start making serious decisions. The fact that the Rebels asked consistently for Western help is a good sign that the PR has the potential to be good.

That said, the Arab league is condemning the ground strikes, saying that the West has already gone past its mandate of protecting civilians. Indeed, the "protecting civilians" focus of the UN resolution may be a political crutch to real action. The Arab League, moving towards a popular/ democratic rhetoric, is worried that the air strikes will lead to non-insignificant civilian casualties; these governments thus do not want to be perceived as supporting more Western action in the Middle East that seems to damage Arab/Muslim people.

The two questions as to the PR outcome will be the # of civilian casualties and the outcome of the campaign. More casualties will be tolerated in the short-term if Gaddafi's brutal regime is removed and replaced by something more friendly, but only if the front-line action is driven by the Rebels themselves. The West will need to keep some of its guns in check in order to avoid looking less like humanitarians and more like imperialists.

Commitment
Part of the major risk is scope creep, though it depends on the country.

The United States has already committed to take a back seat after the Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses (SEAD) campaign ends, allowing countries like France and Italy to take over enforcing the no-fly zone and preventing ground forces from entering Benghazi en masse.

That said, the risk is creating a stalemate, in which a withdrawal of air forces will allow Gaddafi to succeed, but an endless no-fly zone campaign might quickly frustrate both domestic European opinion and Middle East opinion.

To break that stalemate and seriously cripple Gaddafi's forces (thus giving the rebels the advantage) will require action beyond the original mandate, though this can often be done with enough discretion that only minor objections will be thrown up.

The West's goal here may be to make sure a friendly country, probably Egypt, is committed to supporting the rebels and making sure they can be rearmed, fed, and regrouped during the air campaign, such that they can make a sustained push west towards Tripoli when the initial SEAD campaign ends; Western forces are likely to be able to provide key intelligence to help the Rebels find isolated pro-Gaddafi units and overtake them quickly and decisively, which would further arm the rebels with artillery and armor.

Military Outcome
Likely military outcomes here are either a stalemate or a rebel victory. Gaddafi will struggle to get the forces he needs into Benghazi (and struggle to control them well enough to effectively occupy key population centers).

As a default, military units are now hiding in heavily populated areas, though if they're otherwise paralyzed, it may give Rebel forces there an opportunity to harass the units into a state of unpreparedness for a more sustained Rebel counter-attack.

While a Rebel victory is possible, it's also unlikely. The Rebels lack military leadership, and (unlike Yemen or Egypt) have not had major elements of the armed forces defect and turn their guns against the leadership. Until that happens, the Rebels would have to completely knock out the sizable Libyan army in order to claim victory over Tripoli.


Political Outcomes
If the stalemate persists, the Rebels are likely to keep their alternative government in the east, and a de facto split of Libya would occur. The Benghazi government could garner international support; especially from Egypt (which would want influence over the large oil reserves in that area).

but whether the Rebels win or not, the big question of its political makeup remains a major concern for the West. Clearly, the Rebels are anti-despotic, but what else? Libya had a brutal campaign against extremist Islam for some time--how strong are these influences in the Rebel group? Do the Rebels desire a secular state? Will it be Western-friendly? These are all questions left unanswered, and will largely determine the amount of sustained Western support for the government.

Western Cohesion and Trans-Atlantic Relations
Perhaps most interesting is that the biggest benefit the West is likely to get is its own internal sense of dignity and goodwill. With US-led operations in the last 10 years going militarily poorly and morally questionably, there have been a lot of bad feelings and aimlessness among the West, even with respect to itself. The West's strategic direction is confused and frustrated (especially as Russia seems to be running circles around NATO's internal conflicts). If Libya goes well, the West can achieve a "feel-good" victory like it had in the early 1990s, and a renewed confidence in its ability to be an effective and relatively-welcomed police force.

Western military cohesion will not be that of the early 1990s, but it may improve. Specifically, the US will have an opportunity to act in an effective support role, both improving relations with Europe (by allowing Europe to lead the operation that's most relevant to its immediate periphery), and setting up a system in which the US can limit its engagement. The US has far and away the best logistical/transport capacity and control, as well as the best battlefield intelligence. These two factors make it a perfect candidate to support other Western nations' campaigns against less impressive forces, and the US can benefit significantly by setting up alliances in which it maintains that role.

France Shows Interest in Fostering Brazil

Given the holidays, this post will be a bit short.

Sarkozy is Maintaining his reputation as a hyperdiplomatic machine by reaching out to Brazil while his ties with Syria wait and cool for the next few elections to roll through in the US, Israel, Iraq, and PA--maybe in Iran, too. Sarkozy makes France one of the first major powers to seriously acknowledge Brazil's ascendancy. Such treatment, if it became a norm, would give Brazil great power-level influence.

In this diplomatic blitz, Sarkozy has done two things. First, he has signed an arms deal to sell $12billion of goods, including 50 EC725's (Multi-Mission aircraft) and 5 conventional submarines. Why they really need the submarines is unclear, except perhaps for domestic industrial development. The deal is diplomatically significant for 2 reasons: 1) neither the US nor Russia were picked, implying that the Brazilians would like to stay neutral in this Cold War that seems to be brewing; 2) The French benefit by making themselves stand out on the Continent--these kinds of deals, should they stack up, will ratchet up the perception of France's world power--and perceptions matter.

Second, Sarkozy has made calls for Brazil to become a "world leader" and the sixth Permanent Security Council member. This kind of recognition has been seldom bestowed onto a middle-power--to Japan, briefly, without much seriousness. Not to India or Germany. But such a recognition would likely cause Eurasian powers to begin to think about looking to Brazil as the gateway to the entire South American continent. With the Monroe Doctrine whittled away by American negligence of the region, it lies open and waiting for influence or leadership. Interestingly the French are trying to hoist Brazil up to the level of France's continental neighbors, rather than looking to Brazil as an opportunity to project power throughout the region.

Brazil as a recognized regional leader will almost certainly be seen as positive to all parties. The Brazilians are friendly with the US, but skeptical (though this will change a bit with the Obama administration, almost certainly). The Brazilians are avoiding the temptations of the Russians (that the Venezuelans, Ecuadorians, and Bolivians are warming to) to join what appears to be a Russian-orchestrated anti-American proto-alliance (including such upstanding states as Iran and Belarus). The Brazilians are taking the Middle Way, much like the French are: warm to the Americans, cordial to the Russians, willing to talk to everyone. Such leadership would bring stabilization, great-power representation, and an inlet for economic investment to South America, and probably go a long way in combating the strange tendencies towards national socialism and tinpot dictators like Chavez. When South America becomes Brazil's backyard--rather than America's--it'll be a very different place.

Winning The Second Cold War Before It Starts

Oh, the Russians. Becoming more and more terrifying, no? Moscow's domestic and international politics alike are worrying the West, and for good reason.

The Duma (Russian parliament) has backed a 6-year presidential term, almost certainly leading to a 12-year Medvedev presidency--and thus an even greater extension of Putin's power. Apparently, the bill means that Putin will be eligible to run for President again in 2012 or 2018, whenever Medvedev decides he's done... giving Putin yet another 6-12 years afterwards. He'll have ruled longer than any post-revolution leader of Russia.

And Russia's leadership is not ruling with a bunnies-and-kitties fist. Russia's habit of intimidating dissenting reporters (usually by sending the mob) has been ratcheted up by Moscow's declaration that it would close the murder trial of Politkovskaya to the public. The Kremlin is signaling that it would rather appear opaque and shadowy than let whatever terrible truth is afoot here get out. Justice for future murders is unlikely.

Internationally, he presidents of Poland and Georgia had to duck from fire at a South Ossetian checkpoint over the weekend, and the Russians are waving it off as a setup by the Poles. How the Poles might have put agents into South Ossetia to fire on their own president is unclear.

Russia's launching itself towards new superpowerdom, and quickly. It is sending a naval fleet to South America to deal with Brazil, Venezuela, and Cuba--almost certainly to boast that it can steamroll the Monroe doctrine at its pleasure, and to put pro-Russian sentiment into the back yard of the US. It's threatening to set up offensive ballistic missiles against its former satellite countries that won't cow to its will. It's trying to force Finnish paper industries to move to Russia with crippling timber tariffs. The invasion of Georgia was a clear signal to NATO to back off. Russia has threatened to cut off gas supplies to France and Germany if NATO accepts the Ukraine.

With Putin and Medvedev likely in power for approximately forever (in government terms, looking three or four administrations away is such--Could Gerald Ford plan for Bill Clinton's tenure?), they're likely to only turn the heat up as Russia's GNP and military continue to grow. Western governments likely want to (and if they don't, should want to) launch preventative measures to keep Russia from becoming big enough to actually do damage to Western interests. I have some simple (but not easy) suggestions on how to relegate Russia to being a tinpot regional power, able to terrorize only the people of the Central Asian Stans (which we Westerners don't care much about anyway):

1) Show NATO Has Guts.NATO was formed for one reason: to contain Russia. In the 1990s, Russia's internal collapse meant NATO found itself bored and poking around in the civil wars of small Balkan and African countries. In 2001, it came to bat for its largest benefactor, the US. NATO has grown aggressively throughout the 1990's and 2000's. It has shown strength, unity, and cooperation. It should make sure not to splinter, and see what it can to do supports members in most dire need of help: the Czech Republic, Poland, Turkey.

2) Subsume Georgia and the Ukraine.The Russians clearly meant to terrify NATO by smashing Georgia up so thoroughly--they hoped to make Georgia such a liability that NATO would reject it as an ally. But if NATO is going to contain Russia, it should invest in taking the blow now to keep a knife close to Russia's underbelly. But the Ukraine is even more important. The Ukraine is the Russian heartland, and provides Russia with massive supplies of grain. In addition, Sevastopol is Russia's only deep warm water port, which it rents from the Ukraine. Losing its lease would mean a deep retraction of the Russian navy, particularly in the winter. Seasonal power projection is barely better than no power projection, and Russia would lose great influence in the Eastern Mediterranean and elsewhere. If the Ukraine and Georgia enter NATO, Russia's last two European allies will be the paltry Serbia and Belarus--staunch, but ineffectual. Russia will be pushed out of Europe forever. If it goes on to develop Central Asia to give itself a sphere of influence, than all the better.

3) Come to bat for Germany and France. If Ukraine and Georgia are admitted to NATO, then Germany and France are likely to lose access to Russian oil and gas. But luckily, oil and gas are necessarily fungible, unless Russia chooses to hoard that gas and lose all the revenue, rather than sell it... but this is unlikely. Let's assume they sell it to the Chinese, instead. That means the Chinese demand less Middle Eastern hydrocarbon, and the price goes down. The Americans and British can buy up these cheaper Middle Eastern resources, and then re-sell them to the French. Now, will it all be as cheap as normal? Clearly not. But everyone can take some hit in prices to support French and German stands against Russian resource blackmail, and it will have to be temporary if the Russians don't want to lose lots of money over their own inefficiency (currently, they make the most possible money by selling to Europe). It will be temporarily costly to test Russian resolve, but the long-term savings in not having to deal with Russian weight-throwing are immense.

4) Accelerate the Mediterranean Solar Plan. Sarkozy's MedU plan to stick a bunch of thermal solar plants in North Africa to replace oil and gas dependency for power-generation has a few excellent effects for Europe in the long-term. The first is a reduction in carbon dioxide emissions, which will help them sleep at night. The second will be a less volatile source of electricity, which will keep shocks from busting up the economy. The third benefit will be relief from dependence on Russian gas and oil. Imports are fine, unless you're importing from someone who's willing to jump from a cliff just to take you down with him. Putin may be ready to do that. In the long-term, the more the Europeans reduce their dependence on Russian gas and oil, the more irrelevant the Russians will become. France's high-speed construction of nuclear power plants is a great example of these efforts--even if nuclear power is currently more expensive than the gas and oil. The French and German power grids are integrated, and if the Russians do turn the gas off, a combination of solar in North Africa, wind in Germany, and nuclear in France should soon be able to sop up enough of the slack to keep the economy from faltering as the Americans and Brits scramble to deliver the necessary hydrocarbons.

If the Russians lose Ukraine and Georgia, and also (in the long-term) lose their hydrocarbon monopoly in Europe, they will become irrelevant very quickly, unless they actually want to initiate a full-scale war with NATO. But the Russians are smarter than they used to be, and weren't foolish enough to launch such a war in the 20th century, when they owned half of Europe. If NATO claims the Ukraine and Georgia, its conquering of the Russian empire will be complete, and in the long-term, Russia will be relegated to its own icy home.

Sarkozy Comes to Obama's Rescue

Nicholas Sarkozy, Diplomatic Rock Star, has made an appearance to reduce Mr. Obama's list of foreign policy challenges by at least one--to great effect.

Hours after McCain conceded the American Presidential election to Obama, Russian President Medvedev announced that Russia, in response to US anti-missile shields in Poland , would be building offensive missile capabilities right outside of Poland.

Allow me to first digress into how silly this is as a foreign policy scheme. "If you install anti-missile technology in Poland, we will install offensive missiles next to Poland!" seems unnecessarily bellicose. Of course Russia can overwhelm almost any missile shield with sheer volume--which means it's rather unlikely the missile shield was meant to defend against Russia, rather than Iran. But anyway.

Sarkozy led an EU-Russia meeting that caused the Russians to agree to back off of the claims--giving Obama some much-needed pressure relief. The Russians are asking Mr. Obama to attend an EU-Russia security meeting in the summer, but it may be a largely face-saving measure on their part--the longer that these missile shields are the norm, the tougher it will be for the Russians to overturn their existence (even though they are not yet installed).

Sarkozy's meeting and convincing has helped Obama avoid an early bout of brinksmanship, in which he would have to act in a way that might either be perceived as aggressive on one hand or weak on the other. This double-bind was probably the intent of Mr. Medvedev, who would benefit from either. Mr. Sarkozy has bought Mr. Obama some much-needed time to make a consistent foreign policy materialize before he faces any serious great power challenges. The Americans owe the French some thanks on this one.

Intrigue and Betrayal at Damascus

The London Times has reported that the Syrian government had approved the US raid within its borders that it is now protesting--but it's a bit more complicated than that.

The Syrians allegedly gave the OK for US commandos to quietly pop in, kidnap a big al-Qaeda leader operating in Syria (that the Syrians sure as heck don't want there), leave, and interrogate him. Clearly, things didn't go to plan, and a number of Syrians died. Now there are pictures of crying family members all over Middle Eastern news.

What can the Damascus government do? They're already taking a fair amount of heat from the more conservative elements of their state for their Westernization efforts--but they've been smart. Their Westernization has been towards less-antagonizing powers like France, and their joining the MedU has allowed them to work with Israel and the European Union under the guise of economic construction. Syria's ties to the West are important mostly because the US is in Iraq--which Syria isn't terribly thrilled about, anyway.

So the operation got botched, and crying Syrian women are on the news--the Syrians, of course, are going to deny that they let such a terrible thing happen. And sure, they didn't really approve the US coming in and shooting people up, that wasn't part of the deal at all. So the Syrians have protested heavily. They've closed the US embassy--at least for now. Quietly, they are probably saying, "Sorry, there is nothing else we can do."

But they're also withdrawing troops from the Iraqi border--which is going to make the border more porous. Early in the war, Syria was quite happy to have a porous Iraqi border--their jihadists and extremists all left to fight and die in Iraq, which was quite fine with them (remember, they're a secular Ba'athist regime). But during the Surge and the Sunni Awakening, Western Iraq became less friendly to al-Qaeda and company--so they all started going back to Syria, so they would have a safe haven from which to conduct operations. Damascus had to finally get troops on the border to prevent arms and men from going out, so that the incentive for bad guys to hang out in Syria would be lower.

Now that the Syrian people are up in arms against the US, the Syrian jihadists are likely to be freshly motivated to go hit the US in Iraq as retribution--so under the guise of diplomatic outrage, the Syrians are quietly letting their jihadists in once more, and they're likely to re-seal the border in a week or two, to make sure that the bad guys don't try to come back after they find that Western Iraq is, once again, not a terribly friendly place to be for terrorists.

The US, obviously, feels somewhat betrayed. Sure, they botched the operation, but to be called out for being "aggressive" or violating Syrian sovereignty, is just untrue. A frustrated Washington is facing an Iraqi parliament using this incident as a new bargaining chip in sapping more concessions from the US in the extended US-Iraqi security pact. There will certainly be some sort of pact by December--moderate Iraqis and Americans know that neither side can tolerate the pact not happening, but many factions in Iraqi parliament are much more willing to play brinksmanship with the pact and get concessions for their particular party/sectarian group--all they need is just enough diplomatic legitimacy to do it, and the Syrian raid incident has given it to them; the US military will ultimately bear the brunt of this foul-up.

But the Syrians did make one mistake. If it's clear to US allies that Damascus gave the go-ahead for the raid, then US allies that Syria depends on are likely to make Assad's life difficult. For example: The UK quickly canceled a joint conference in London with the Syrian government after the raid--a confusing move at the time, but one likely meant to show Syria that London is not as quick to sell out Washington as Damascus may be. More importantly in the long-term, the ascent of Sarkozy in France has turned Paris into a strong Washington ally (and Bush ally, even). As head of the Mediterranean Union, and the key to Syria's entry into the Western fold, Sarkozy's voice has a lot of sway in Damascus.

Nothing terribly decisive is likely to happen until Bush is out of office, and puzzle pieces can't really fall into place until the Israeli election happens, either. But the decision in Damascus to sell out the US to keep itself from facing heat domestically is likely to have unforseen diplomatic consequences, for both the US and the Syrians, independently of each other. All in all, it was probably a bad decision. The Syrians could have claimed that there was a miscommunication, and that the US had mistakenly come over the border. Clearly, Damascus can't admit that it gave the US the go-ahead to enter Syrian territory, but to put the maximum possible blame on the US was not necessary to save face. If Damascus wants to Westernize, it needs to be able to take a stand with the friends it wants to make, and not sell them out at first convenience. Friends don't always get along, and the US in particular is a friend with liabilities in the region. But it comes with the territory--one has to take it or leave it.

Succumbing to European Pressure, Russia Stops Bullying Georgia, Resumes Killing Own Citizens

Russia began its withdrawals from Georgia a few days ahead of each deadline, according to the Sarkozy-brokered ceasefire deal, and has tried to go to the negotiating table with Georgia. They haven't made it to the same negotiating room yet--but that's okay, they tried. Russia has seen how bad PR can really hurt its export-heavy economy, and has pushed its PR pretty hard to try and return to appearing relatively innocuous.

But the Russian government is yet to learn that attacking its own people might not be great for Public Relations, either. Years after the James Bond-esque Litvinenko ordeal, as well as mysterious bullet holes in the heads of anti-government writers, the Kremlin is being accused of attempted murder once again.

French police are launching an investigation after finding toxic pellets in Karinna Moskalenko's car. Moskalenko is investigating the murder of Anna Politkovskaya, an anti-Kremlin activist (one that ended up with a bunch of holes in her head).

Should all these accusations pan out, then the Russian government is getting desperate. It's not only killing anti-government activists, but also anyone investigating the killings of these activists. Putin probably doesn't have control of the courts--else the Kremlin would unlikely continue its murder streak. But again, this is speculation.

Putin climbed the ranks of the KGB before becoming Moscow's head-of-everything, and his strongest allies are certainly in the security business. It's very little surprise that, when armed with one of the biggest hammers in Eurasia, every problem looks like a nail. Expect the hammer to keep falling.

Syria is Preparing for a Major Shift

Syria accepted a visit by French President Sarkozy this weekend, and started making noise about major policy shifts that are likely to set the balance of the Middle East well in favor of the West.

First, they accepted a visit by Sarkozy at all. Sarkozy, of course, has been on a foreign policy blitz since he took over for Chirac. Counter to all his economic impotence, he has deeply improved ties with the US, UK, and Germany, re-entered NATO as a full member, taken his own tough stance against Russia and Iran in a way that Europeans have been highly averse to for a very long time. He has proposed a Mediterranean Union, one in which France would likely lead states like Morocco, Algeria, Italy, Turkey, Greece, and other middle-sized states. Syria is a small-but-critical piece of making a great deal of French geopolitical re-positioning possible. For the Syrians to accept them shows an opening-up to their former colonial overlords, despite years of almost-jihadist rhetoric coming from the government.

Second, they are upgrading to full diplomatic relations with Lebanon, for the first time since they declared independence. Such a move, even if it does include Hezbollah as a political party, likely shows an intent to work together with the anti-Syrian majority that ousted the Syrians in multiple bloody steps, ending in 2005. Such cooperation would make it difficult for Hezbollah to make gains from its minority position, and also much harder to acquire weapons. The Syrians are investing in the success and stability of the Lebanese government, and are thus helping to assure it. A willingness to deal with the ruling party in Syria means that Hezbollah will no longer be their only option, and so they are likely to put their limited eggs in multiple baskets.

Finally, the Syrians are seriously looking to continue peace talks with Israel--as soon as the US election is done. This not only shows us how important the US is in such things, but also that it is weighing the timing of the decision seriously, even if it is not clear exactly how. Would McCain scare them into siding with the West? Or would Obama convince them that a friendlier, more regionally hands-off US presidency makes the next 8 years a better time to experiment with pro-Western stances? Or is it as simple as they state--they want either candidate that is not George Bush to work with? I simply don't know. But the sign that they are waiting for the US election shows serious policy consideration on the issue--it is not a matter of whim, but of real conditions. The Syrians want this peace deal. They just need the conditions to be right.

And so they are planning something big. Peace with Israel would mean an Israel secure from any land invasion except by Hezbollah insurgents from Lebanon--and combined with good relations with Lebanon, peace with Israel would lead to a Syria much less excited about supporting unpredictable Shiite insurgent groups that are likely to both destabilize Lebanon and anger Israel. This would also necessitate a moving-away from an Iran that would feel abandoned by its ally. No doubt, the Iranians are likely screaming at Syrian policymakers to reconsider, which may be why they are waiting until the US election. The move would leave Iran relatively isolated by--if not an enemy of--the Middle East, much in the same way that Japan is the black sheep of East Asia. The Syrian abandonment is likely going to give the next US president bargaining power with Iran to come to a deal in Iraq favorable to the US. Iran knows that Iraq will be a Shiite-dominated country, the only question is how much. They may be willing ot hedge their bets on Iraq and ensure a friendly neighbor rather than use brinksmanship to create an idealistic ally, at risk of alienating their last chance in the region.

Cranking Up the Heat on Iran

No, this isn't deja vu. We just keep doing it. I'll keep this short:

Israel launched well over 100 fighters over the Mediterranean in what it openly publicized as a dress rehearsal for a possible strike on Iranian nuclear facilities. Iran claimed that it was just psychological warfare, and probably is (as Stratfor notes, one does not publicize surprise attacks just before performing them), but this nonetheless means that Israel is happy to show a militarily aggressive posture towards Iran. Further, the Israelis noted that a nuclear "threshold" in Iran is likely to be crossed in late 2008 rather than 2009, as earlier predicted. We're not sure exactly what that threshold is, but the Israelis seem to have an idea that Iran is tumbling towards a nuclear weapons capability of some sort by the end of the year.

This all comes amid evidence found on a Swiss computer that the former A.Q. Khan weapons ring (that brought the Bomb to Pakistan and missiles to other countries) dealt with advanced missile-mounted nuclear technology (the blueprints appeared on the Swiss computer, though it's not clear how).

In addition, the EU has approved new sanctions against Iran, freezing bank accounts. France and Germany in particular have hardened their rhetoric against Iran.

And again, the US has called Iran out for shipping weapons to Iraq and training Shiite insurgent groups. The US is even publicizing a case of two of its own; two men that allegedly helped the Iranians acquire weapons.

It seems that a grand coalition of Western powers is in a quiet, unofficial agreement that Iran is a meance and must be dealt with. Bust most of the leaders of these countries have at least been aware of it for years. A clear media campaign is being waged by most of them--from military exercises to news stories to high-level meetings (and a strangely warm reception of Israel by a usually-cool EU). The UN is not a military option for the West--the Russians would clearly veto any military action in Iran. But the West seems to be preparing for something... and it is possible that they are not preparing for anything, but only trying to make it so clear that they are preparing for something that the Iranian government would crack. In the last parliamentary elections in Iran, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's party lost seats not only to the few moderate candidates that were able to run, but also to the more religiously conservative party (that aligns with the Supreme Council). Clearly, much of Iran worries over the brinksmanship being played by Ahmadinejad's executive... including the Supreme Council. If the West can emphasize this and try to worry the Council over imminent action, then it's possible a wedge might be successfully lodged into the Iranian government that Ahmadinejad's power to act will be dramatically reduced.

That, or the West is really sitting down and deciding that an airstrike needs to be launched against Iran. This seems so unwise that it is unlikely, but Iran's continued support of Hezbollah, Hamas, Al-Sadr, and its defiance of UN nuclear restrictions and sanctions shows a country that is risk-accepting, dangerous, and revisionist, with plans for domination of the region (through Iraq, Palestine, Syria, and Lebanon). Most schools of International Relations (particularly the realist varieties) would agree that defiant states exhibiting such behavior, especially as they grow in size and strength, are the most dangerous.

No More Surrender Jokes, Guys

The French are tough again, and it's official. President Nicholas Sarkozy made a speech today fundamentally shifting French foreign strategy back to cooperative internationalism (a strategy very similar to Mr. Gordon Brown, and also US Candidates Hillary Clinton and John McCain), and toughening France's stance in Iran.

France has, for decades, avoided full NATO integration (since its withdrawal from NATO joint command in 1996), and has shouldered a disproportionately low burden in NATO operations. But Sarkozy has declared that France will become a full member once more, and has started re-integration talks with the Secretary General. As a full member of NATO, France will carry a higher military burden, which Sarkozy is willing to accept; he has offered to increase France's troop presence in Afghanistan.

Sarkozy has furthermore pledged to reduce France's nuclear warhead stock to 300; not that he is not willing to use them. Standing in front of France's newest nuclear attack sub, he said "All those who threaten to attack our vital interests expose themselves to a severe riposte by France.” He is getting tough, and not just in rhetoric.

France is taking a tougher anti-Iran stance, and is pushing for more sanctions against Iran to stop what France believes is a continued nuclear weapons program. In this stance, as well as full-frontal diplomacy in visits to the United States and the United Kingdom, Sarkozy is possibly pushing France to join the United States and United Kingdom's special foreign policy relationship. As the US and UK have been in near lock-step on foreign policy for decades--and particularly after 9/11/2001--Sarkozy may attempt to turn the Big Two into a Big Three.

Finally, Sarkozy's public mullings over boycotting the Chinese Olympic Opening Ceremony is a nearly unilateral attempt at pressuring the Chinese into changing their Tibet policy, as Bush and Brown play "good cop" and encourage dialogue between Hu Jintao and the Dalai Lama.

Ultimately, Sarkozy has thawed the somewhat frosty relationships France has had with the US and UK by showing not only a willingness to work with their leadership, but a toughness on the Middle East and China that the US and UK are likely to appreciate. If he can continue this blitz of policy and diplomacy, French surrender jokes and "Freedom Fries" are likely to be snippets of the past.