Showing posts with label President Obama. Show all posts
Showing posts with label President Obama. Show all posts

Monday, March 23, 2015

Foggofwar Says: Let's Make a Deal With Iran

The nuclear deal with Iran is entering the final stages of getting to "in principle" agreement--here's the general outline.

It's not clear whether the US and Iran will make a deal, but the political will is definitely there, and that's the most important part.

Though I have some reservations, I endorse the deal--I think we should make it, if what shows up in June sticks to the general outline that we know now.



In short, it cuts Iran down to a scope of production that would make "break-out" time--the time it takes to build a nuke if they got serious--one year, which is a pretty long time. Even assuming they can ramp up much faster, it gives the US time to do something about it. The door would need to be open to inspectors, which gives at least enough monitoring to know if Iran is sneaking around.

I'm going to tackle what I think are the objections, though let me know if I miss any:

  • "It's only 10 years." A lot changes in 10 years. The idea of permanently keeping a country from having a domestic, peaceful nuclear power program is something that's just not going to fly. The West is hoping that a good deal and thawed relations will bring out the moderates in Iran and make it a place we're not so worried about anymore.
  • "If we drop all sanctions, we lose bargaining power." If Iran holds up its end of the deal, the US doesn't really need further bargaining power on the nuclear issue. It and the rest of the West can always slap the sanctions right back on--that's easier and more immediate than trying to build a weapon or spooling up weapons facilities. Just as the agreement on Iran's capacity limitations expires after 10 years, so does the agreement to have no economic sanctions about the nuclear issue.
  • "What if they break their end of the deal?" If they really break it, the US can still use military force. The biggest concern I had about the deal was that I was worried the US wasn't willing to threaten military force to prevent Iran from getting a nuke. I started considering whether the President was trying to be clever about messaging, as he is doing in relation to ISIS. A Nobel Peace Prize winner does not lower himself by threatening war if he does not get what he wants. Luckily, his hand-picked Director of the CIA can do just that, and has. The President gets to keep focusing on the positive and being the carrot to the CIA's stick. But there is a subtlety even here: when Obama says that the window for a peaceful resolution is temporary, he means it: the Republican letter to Iran, however hamfisted, makes it clear that the winds may change in the US and that the next President might not be quite so accommodating--and might be more willing to throw missiles at the problem.

The best part about a reasonable deal is that it gives legitimacy and political will for military action if it's necessary. Military force is a last resort after diplomacy fails, and if Iran goes ahead and builds nukes under a treaty/agreement not to do so, it becomes easier for everyone to talk about employing military force.

All in all, I think the deal is a good one. And long-term, it could work to bring Iran further into the Western fold.

Tuesday, February 24, 2015

Is the President's Request for Authorization of Force the Right Package? Is the Mosul Announcement Crazy?

(Total reading time: about 10 minutes)

Reader Andrew asked me for my opinion on the efficacy of the Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF) that President Obama requested from Congress earlier in the month.

Part of what prompted the question was an email from Andrew's representative Michael Capuano (D-MA) stating why he was against the authorization as-written. In short, his objections:

  • "Half measures are a recipe for failure and this resolution is a half measure." It doesn't allow US forces to take part in military operations necessary to win
  • The US' record in the Middle East usually includes success on the ground followed by disaster--either quagmire (Afghanistan and Iraq) or post-war collapse without us there (Libya and post-2013 Iraq); there's currently no plan on how to make this work
  • The US is not directly threatened by ISIS; we could play a support role for more directly threatened nations (Turkey, Jordan, Saudi Arabia) that lead the assault, but leading it does not make sense from a national security perspective
Presumably if Jordan/Egypt/Turkey/Saudi Arabia (along probably with the UAE, Kuwait, Bahrain, and Qatar for good measure) led a ground force, they'd be stuck with managing the aftermath--good both because the US doesn't have to get stuck in another quagmire and also because these countries will have a better chance of managing the peace (more cultural affinity and "pulse" of the situation). Spoiler alert: they probably won't.

Before I add my two cents, let's review a very brief summary of the draft sent to Congress.

Key Points of the AUMF

  • The AUMF is for 3 years (a year beyond the remainder of the President's term) and has no geographical restrictions
  • It's clear enough that it's specifically ISIS-related that it probably can't be used to go after every terrorist organization out there (I'll leave out commentary on the 2001 "Global War on Terror" AUMF and the question of constitutionality of recent operations)
  • Ground forces can advise local troops, conduct search-and-rescue operations for coalition members captured by ISIS, coordination for airstrikes and allied ground movements (think: helping coordinate airstrikes to soften targets for Kurdish advances), and "special operations" (SEALs and whatnot) to take out ISIS leaders
  • Ground forces cannot participate in "enduring" (this is probably intentionally vague) offensive ground operations...
  • The 3,000 troops in Iraq are exempt from this restriction, meaning they'll probably be participating in the Iraqi spring offensive


It's Actually Pretty Good

After reading Rep. Capuano's letter, I was feeling pretty prone to side with him on opposing the AUMF for similar reasons. I'm generally critical of the President's half-measures to deal with problems like Russia, Syrian chemical weapons usage, and other matters.

But I've changed my mind. I think this is a solid AUMF.

I do think there's a clearer plan in place than Capuano believes, but also that requiring too clear a plan before authorizing force is unreasonable. The President's military advisers need the freedom and flexibility to formulate and adjust a plan over time, and the AUMF gives them the green light to move when they're ready--it does not require that any particular action happen now.

Let's talk a bit about what might happen under the AUMF.

Offensive in Iraq

The plan for Iraq is incredibly clear and pretty sound. We've already seen that airstrike coordination in Kobane was critical in helping the outnumbered and outgunned force turn the tide (and continues to help in the counter-offensive). The 3,000 US troops should be a huge boon--both for morale and effectiveness--if they join the assault on Mosul. And they should. In fact, while it's not been announced, I suspect the wording of the AUMF makes it very clear that this would be the plan.

Mosul has about 2,000 ISIS fighters holding it right now. 25,000 Iraqi and Kurdish Peshmerga forces are going to be thrown at the city, and the big question is whether the Iraqi fighters are going to break and run as soon as ISIS troops sneeze. I believe very much that having US soldiers in the trenches--along with witnessing well-timed airstrikes just before the assault--will keep Iraqi troops confident enough to point their guns in the right direction. House-to-house fighting sucks, and ISIS is going to make it very hard for civilians to flee (making airstrikes tougher). But the Iraqis and Americans can take their time and regroup in safer areas if they get beat up in any parts of the city.

The big question is that since it's been so broadly announced, will ISIS try to shore up defenses in Mosul? Maybe. The President has gotten some funny looks from the news media and some politicians, and even the Iraqi government: "why the heck would you tell the enemy they have 2 months to fortify your primary target?" It seems totally backwards. One generally doesn't tell the enemy the time and location of one's next offensive.

Once again, I think there is some subtlety at play that is lost in the knee-jerk reaction.

One thing that we must keep in mind is that coalition forces have total air dominance. The US is hitting targets in Mosul probably as you're reading this, and probably while you're sleeping, too. So obviously the coalition has a few months to "soften" Mosul.

But what about a flood of reinforcements? Let's take a look at the region around Mosul:

Thanks for being awesome, Wikipedia

Mosul has some space around it where it could draw fighters back from the front line--I don't know how many are there, but they're actively fighting Kurdish troops in the east, so if they turned tail, the Kurds would be able to recover some territory and place heavy guns within striking distance. At a rough guess, I'd say the local villages, if abandoned, could beef up Mosul to about 4,000 troops. Remember that while these guys are zealous-and well-armed, they are not particularly expertly trained and don't have military intelligence to help at all. The intelligence gap was probably a big part of why the US was able to lead the Kurds so effectively to pick off fog-blinded pockets of ISIS resistance in Kobane.

But obviously the concern is that reserves from other places not under pressure (like ar-Raqqah or elsewhere) could send columns of these guys and turn Mosul into a bloodbath. Let's look at Mosul another way to consider this:

Thanks, Google Earth and MS Paint

Around Mosul is a whole bunch of wide open desert, and I can guarantee you that desert has a few drones circling overhead constantly (for those who have seen the movie "Zero Dark Thirty," recall the drones constantly circling over Bin Laden's hideout for a few hundred days), taking a look at those two roads coming in from the west and south in addition to scouting targets for US airstrikes.

If anyone out there has a good idea of how to sneak in hundreds of troops or dozens of heavy weapons along those highways, I'd love to know (leave thoughts in comments). But I really don't think it's possible.

And here's what I really think is going on; if I'm right, I tip my hat to the administration:

I believe the President is trying to goad ISIS into trying to reinforce Mosul. 

"Wha?"

If a huge column of trucks and heavy weapons starts rolling from more fortified positions, it will have to travel through a lot of desert and be exposed for at least 3 hours (if coming from the closest ISIS town, al-Qamishili).

Thanks, Google Maps.

American or Jordanian fighter-bombers can get where they need to go in about 30 minutes.

If the coalition doesn't totally blow it, Route 1 would become 2015's Highway of Death.
Thanks, Wikipedia

Is ISIS going to fall for it? Maybe. As we talked about in an earlier post on Kobane, ISIS' power comes from legitimacy and a sense of divine inevitability. Taking Mosul made it horrifying and seemingly irresistible. But nobody likes betting on a loser, so their recruiting (and intimidation) strategy depends in part on winning. I'd be surprised if ISIS was really willing to let Mosul go without a big fight. Furthermore, if they were able to defeat the best efforts that Iraq/the US could put up to root them out of Mosul, it would be a massive symbolic (and military) victory that would probably convince the Iraqis that resistance is just totally futile. There is a whole lot at stake, and I'd be mighty surprised if ISIS was willing to commit to a fight they're probably going to lose.

So it could work. It's even possible the Iraqi defense minister is actually in on the plan and is complaining to make ISIS think reinforcing is a good idea. If so, once again: well done.

The other option, of course, is to abandon Mosul if it looks like it's unwinnable and not suffer a humiliating military defeat. If ISIS believes Mosul is doomed, it is unlikely to cling to the city. There's some evidence it might be thinking this way: ISIS is apparently ditching the big base south of Mosul that they have held for 7 months. The announcement about the Mosul offensive may mean that ISIS would want to focus forces for a counter-attack elsewhere that is not under heavy bombardment and scrutiny, to keep the Iraqis off-balance.

Fallujah, Tikrit, and other areas along the Euphrates in Iraq will require significantly more work than Mosul. Think of Mosul as a place the Iraqis can cut their teeth and gain some confidence for the real work ahead in Sunni-dominated regions.

What about Syria?

Syria is a theater that remains somewhat impervious to anything but a massive ground invasion. I'll repeat: the government and rebel forces aren't going to do it until the civil war resolves in some way, which won't happen for years. The Kurds could pick up territory once the Iraqi Peshmerga forces get relief from the Mosul offensive.

We've seen that the Kurds are perfectly willing to occupy territory outside of their primary ethnic strongholds (see the map below--they're currently occupying Kirkuk and northwest Syria) and so may push in northern Syria to create buffer space. 

CIA, via Wikipedia

But the Kurds simply have no interest in moving to the Euphrates, where ISIS is strong and rules with total impunity. I really just don't think anyone at all has a plan to deal with Syria, and the AUMF only sets up the administration to make a move if the Syrian political situation changes or Jordan/Syria/Egypt get fed up with ISIS hanging out next door and decide to go on a major ground offensive. 

It's possible that success in Iraq will be inspiring and that Jordan, which remains incredibly pissed off, and Egypt, similarly pissed off about 21 Copts being similarly brutally murdered, could decide it's just plain time to lend serious military support to Syria on top of the current airstrikes. 

But, frankly, their armies are small and their economies stretched, and they'd only enter Syria if the civil war ends and moderate forces can finally unite against ISIS.

I'll maintain that if ISIS falls in Syria, its ill-advised strategy of trying to bring Jordan and Egypt into the fight will be part of its undoing.

Libya

Libya's divided forces have opened the door for continued ISIS expansion, which now holds 3 towns (2 weeks ago, it was only Derna), having added Sirte and Nofilya. 

Seriously, Donate to Wikipedia

The grey (in Benghazi and elsewhere) is Ansar al-Sharia, who is a totally different (but ISIS-friendly) menace not covered by the AUMF. (Syria has similar pockets of these guys, though right now they're not really fighting with the "good guy" rebels, so we're making the same mistake--as with ISIS--of leaving them alone "until" the "good guy" rebels win.)

Jordan and Egypt want the UN to authorize force in Libya to nip ISIS' presence there in the bud. Egypt is already putting down airstrikes, but now that Libya is in ceasefire, it's a prime place for US special forces, trainers, and airstrike coordinators to help the Tobruk government take back Derna.

A Bit of Good News

And just because everyone likes a bit of good news: ISIS has been totally pushed out of the Baghdad environs and is getting pinned up against a river by the Kurds near Kobane. 

New territory from last week in Kobane circled in yellow.

 Still Wikipedia

New territory gained by the Iraqi government over the past 6 weeks circled in red.
I'll let you guess where I got this one

The Iraqi forces are already pushing back pretty steadily, which is a sign that, despite everyone freaking out about readiness, the Iraqis are showing they can put the fight to ISIS and win.

If you got this far, thanks for taking the time. Leave me some comments about what you want to hear about next, either about ISIS or otherwise!

Update! Kurdish Peshmerga Forces Working on Cutting Off Mosul

Reader and generally-smart-guy Shir shared with me this great article and map showing a Kurdish advance on Route 1, which ISIS is using to resupply Mosul. We discussed above the risk of sending big columns down that road, but if the Kurds can hold the area for the next few months, getting military and support resources to Mosul will be a lot harder and more dangerous--they'd be much more open to ambushes from the Kurds and airstrikes from the Americans. It makes the assault on Mosul a much more likely prospect.


The Washington Post and I seem to have some agreement on the general strategy for isolating Mosul from reinforcement in the coming counter-offensive. Exciting stuff. Expect me to be blogging obsessively about it.

Thursday, October 25, 2012

A Breakdown of US Presidential Candidates' Foreign Policies

This will be our second breakdown of presidential foreign policies in as many presidential elections, making the event at this point a bit of a tradition. Our aim is to keep it simple, objective, and to the point.

So what of the candidates' foreign policies? Ultimately, despite attempts to simulate wide gaps, there are few. The president has, over the past four years, moved to a more traditionally conservative foreign policy stance, and Romney has more or less given up trying to find new ways to be even more aggressive on the international stage.

There are a few key differences, but we can mostly summarize their vision for the United States as such:

Obama, channeling Teddy Roosevelt, advocates that we "speak softly and carry a big stick."
Romney, on the other hand, differs mostly on the desire to "speak loudly and carry a bigger stick."

(Bonus points to readers who caught the Looney Tunes reference, though the comparison to Sam is not meant to be derisive of the Romney approach.)

Because they're more interesting, let's highlight the differences first.

Actual Differences:

Rhetoric: This is important to highlight because you may notice some other glaring gaps in the list of differences below. Romney and Obama obviously believe in having very different rhetoric (Romney's of a "strong America" and Obama's of a more "understanding America") behind very similar policy behavior. Romney is likely genuinely concerned that soft rhetoric is going to weaken the United States' credibility of deterrence (critical in the Pax Americana state in which the US tries to keep a lid on major warfare), where Obama believes that the United States will lose its ability to lead if it is not loved.

Both approaches have flaws. Obviously opinion of the United States crashed during the Bush administration of tough-talk, but it has also gone down since Obama took office in 2009, particularly in Muslim countries where the attempts of compassionate rhetoric have been strongest.

Russia: Romney sees Russia as a long-term threat that must be contained, where Obama sees it as a nation that can be bargained with and potentially partnered with. No doubt Russia's influence and military might are growing, and the United States must address Russia (where in the '90s it was largely able to ignore Russia completely). The two questions on the table here are whether Russia is a credible future threat and whether the US should be moving to oppose it and contain it, or whether it should be working with Russia to make it part of the wider "good guy" community. 

Israel: Short version: Romney sees Israel as an ally that can take action in the Middle East that the US simply is unable to, and can serve as the bastion of force against Iran. Obama sees it as a dangerous ally that can get the US reined into unwanted conflicts. Paraphrasing Bill Clinton on Netanhayu, "he doesn't know who the superpower is." 

Priorities in US Military Spending (and Strategic Approach): Obama's priorities in US military spending have focused on the ability to execute tactical strikes to deal with terrorist threats--more funding for drone strikes and a focus on special forces has been his focus (where Navy and Air Force spending--the big ticket items--has dropped). Romney, though unlikely to decrease this, wants to beef up the size of the US Navy with two extra Aircraft Carrier Groups in order to better position the US strategically against potential threats with more credible "hard" assets like Iran, Russia, and China. These Carrier groups would be used to protect the Strait of Hormuz, Taiwan/Japan/Korea, and the Baltics, as well as generally make sure that the US controls trade sea trade routes throughout the world.

Iraq?: There's a question mark here because it's not clear whether there will be any real change in action or just rhetoric. Romney is frustrated at the lack of the Status of Forces Agreement over the past 4 years and wants to use US troops to keep influence in Iraq and serve as a second force bastion against Iran.

Key Similarities:

While the candidates share a great deal in common, we will highlight the key--and sometimes surprising--similarities between their approaches. 

American Primacy / Exceptionalism: Despite Obama's 2008 rhetoric about the United States being a bit of a bully, his rhetoric has changed to embrace US Exceptionalism and, generally, its role in the world. Romney and Obama differ on how the US should posture itself with rhetoric and "outreach," but generally they both see the US as the force that should be running around keeping a cap on bad stuff. Both believe in "Pax Americana."

Iran: Ultimately both sides see the critical need to stop Iran from developing a nuke and want to oppose Iranian influence at all turns, which is why Obama (for example) is supporting the rebels in Syria. Romney is tougher-worded but not foolish enough to want war with Iran--both will have similar policies there.

War on Terror: Both will continue the new "precision" style War on Terror that was pivoted into around 2007 as the War in Iraq started to wind down. It will be a war of precision strike from drones and special forces as the US continues to support operations by Afghanistan, Kenya, Somalia, Egypt, Iraq, etc to eliminate terrorists locally.

Afghanistan: The War in Afghanistan is unpopular and will come to an end no matter who is president. It is unpopular as well to pull out immediately (fears of a Vietnam-style collapse remain) so the 2014 departure will be stuck to by both presidents.

China: Both will be aggressive with China about trade policy and keep the implicit threat of the Mutual Defense Treaty with Japan on the table in case there is any tricky business in the Senkakus, but neither is going to either back down on Beijing nor try to incite war. 

Author's Notes: Both candidates are going to have statements on their websites different from those above. We encourage you to take a look, and we're also writing with some interpretation and analysis (rather than simple aggregation of what's already written). Our intent is to write what we believe will be actual policy enacted (or attempted) by each candidate, rather than simply what they're declaring.

We can talk at length about why they have strong incentives to say-one-thing-and-do-another--we obviously saw a great deal of this from Obama in the 2008 campaign and how much the presidency has changed its tone since coming to office--ultimately, a state's security interest generally takes over unless something very strange happens, and there's no reason for that to happen here, which is why we'll see so many similarities going forward. 

Friday, May 27, 2011

Quick Update on the V4

Timing is interesting.

The formation of the Visegrad 4 Battle Group seems to have awakened the United States to its own relative distraction from Eastern European allies.

Poland, which has been asking for American "boots on the ground" (if for no other reason than as a symbolic stand that the United States will defend Poland from Russia), finally extracted a pledge from President Obama, who will be visiting Saturday.

The US will be placing aircraft and trainers in a Polish base to beef up the Polish air force. The president has also assured the US commitment to the NATO precept: mutual defense.

The fact that President Obama needed to make this reassurance to an ally that was staunchly secure during the Bush years is a sign that the US has begun to recognize its poor attention to the area. It's also a sign that the V4 is being taken very seriously, and immediately.

Wednesday, September 22, 2010

The Struggle Between Two Bad Options in Afghanistan

The Tension of Two Bad Options in Afghanistan

The War in Afghanistan remains in a frustratingly ambiguout state; the US is neither decisively winning, nor losing.

Colin Powell says that he is "not sure" whether the US is winning or not. General Petraeus is fighting a number of "soft" offensives, attempting to take-and-hold Taliban-dominated regions and build an Afghani security presence, rather than attack and decisively defeat the Taliban (which may not even be necessary, if they maintain a large political base).

Of course, success depends in part on Pakistan's ability (and willingness) to contain the Taliban on its side of the border. Islamabad's inability to recover from the floods in the Northwest not only strengthen the Taliban's presence there, but have brought murmuring rumors of a military coup.

Afghanistan remains in a bad, but ambiguous state.

This is one of the more politically difficult situations a leader can be in--the President can be blamed either way given a decision. If the US "doubles down" and commits heavily to Afghanistan, it might become a classic "quagmire," and will smear him (and would be a more costly defeat).

Unfortunately, politics are getting in the way of what might be the right decision (This being Bob Woodward's "Obama's Wars").

Obama's military aides have been pushing for a larger, longer commitment--one of the risks identified is that if the US nails down a withdrawal deadline while the Taliban are strong, then there's no incentive for the Taliban to deal--only to sit back and avoid major conflict until the US departs (along, surely, with the rest of ISAF).

Obama's tenuous political position has brought out some (if accurate) potentially damning quotes about his motivations behind his strategy, including:
"I have two years with the public on this," and
"I can't lose the whole Democratic Party."

Domestic motivations in a war effort are nothing new--indeed, they're often the primary motivator in many war decisions (unfortunately), including staying in Vietnam (where there was no real threat to the United States' national security). Interestingly, it may be domestic politics that will drag the US out of Afghanistan.

The infighting amongst Obama's aides and the power of domestic politics in war strategy will be a boon to the Taliban. This is a classic case of the "war burnout" from which many Democracies suffer.

Tuesday, June 22, 2010

The McChrystal Pinch

McChrystal's comments to Rolling Stone are unacceptable in a General of the Untied States Army. Period.

Now that that's out of the way:

Life is not quite so easy for President Obama as firing McChrystal. One of the hero-geniuses of the US pulling the Iraq War from the brink (just behind Petraeus), McChrystal is an extremely valuable military asset to the US Army, and would be tough to lose.

After his recent successes in Iraq, he has an incredible loyalty in US troops. He's one of a very few people who has Karzai's trust and respect. And, generally speaking, he commands extremely competently.

The risk of canning McChrystal is that the Afghanistan war could, quite really, fall apart at the seams without him. Like Petraeus for Bush, McChrystal may be President Obama's last best hope at winning this war.

The risk of not firing him, of course, is that President Obama would be allowing an insubordination in a General not seen since MacArthur. He would appear weak domestically and abroad. He would set a terrible precedent in the future. McChrystal clearly lacks respect for the current civilian executive branch of the United States--does that make him less effective? Will his subordinates be less effective for knowing it?

But what's more valuable? Which price can the United States afford to pay for McChrystal's comments? President Obama has been stuck with many unenviable decisions in the last year and a half. This may be his toughest.

(For what it's worth, I'm not sure what my recommendation is.)

Wednesday, December 23, 2009

Is Iran's Opposition Growing or Shrinking?

More protests and clashes in Iran this weekend; after a protest-turned-violent over the death of the leading opposition cleric, this weekend's unrest came during a Shiite religious festival (of sorts) in honor of the 7th century martyrdom of Mohammed's grandson.

The protests are certainly getting their fair due of attention in Iran, and wearing on the nerves of the ruling "conservatives," but are they effective? Good question. A progressive opposition movement's exposure usually does, over time, lead to an increase in popularity (like in the United States during Vietnam). And as much as violent crackdowns have a serious human toll, they may be winning sympathy for the opposition movement from any fence-sitters left. In addition, the crackdowns are hardening the young men and women (especially women) in the movement now--over time, the old men of the conservatives will die off, and the progressives will strike themselves a big win, maybe in 2014.

But will they run out of steam by then? Or even if they do win, will it be too late for the US to close the Iranian nuclear pandora's box, as it were?

Thinking about this has gotten me to try to get into the head of the President, and figure out what he's doing. He's shown a great deal of restraint with Iran, which a lot of folks oppose. But think about this: should we authorize a strike to take down the Iranian nuclear program, we'd be giving Ahmedinejad and his crew the most incredible propaganda that they could hope for to harden their position. A strike would further radicalize the Iranians, make them more Western-phobic, and even undermine the legitimacy of the opposition movement (Ahmedinejad would have some credence to his accusations of Western influence and manipulation in Iran). No, a strike might be disastrous.

But just how much is the US staying out of Iranian affairs? Surely, opportunities for subtle propaganda influence are not simply being ignored. Even something as simple as Voice of America, a shameless, open alternative network to the Iranian state-run media, is having an effect.

The Iranians are not nearly as good at information control as the Chinese, and the United States is probably taking advantage of that fact as much as Iran's own opposition movement is. This, of course, is a guess. No overt cooperation will happen with the opposition movement, both to protect its legitimacy and to protect its integrity: no Iranian wants to be an American stooge, and the Green Movement won't allow itself to be a puppet.

But the incredible restraint shown by the Obama administration towards the Iranian regime may indicate some intelligence that we don't have. Will there be an internal overthrow of the regime? I think it's unlikely (the population is divided and poorly armed), but if popularity for the opposition movement in 2014 is strong enough, truly sweeping reform could be on the way. And I might be wrong about the level of armament of the population--the Basij militiamen are technically civilians, and are allowed to keep weapons in their homes. Surely, there are guns floating around Tehran in numbers. And the opposition movement is surely making efforts to show that the Ahmedinijad/Khaimeni regime has violated Shiite Islamic law. Under Shiite law, the population has not only a right, but a duty to overthrow regimes that are antithetical to the tenets of Islam. Certainly the motivation and legitimacy for armed revolt are there. If the means are there, too, then the Obama administration's stance makes perfect sense--stay out of Iranian internal politics as much as possible, and let the opposition's support grow slowly over time, until it is ready.

But then again, when was the last time an armed revolt took down a modern, well-armed government? It's been a while.

Monday, June 8, 2009

Obama, Lebanon, the EU, and the American Turnaround

Perhaps I am a bit optimistic in the power of Diplomacy. As a number of readers have pointed out to me, Mr. Obama has not changed a whole lot of US Foreign Policy. Pick a foreign policy situation, and Bush/McCain would have probably done whatever Obama's doing now (save perhaps Guantanamo, which is questionably foreign policy, and questionably changing at all). Obama's "humble" Diplomacy has many in the GOP grumbling, but it's really a great way to get everyone to like you without actually having to do any work.

Anyway. A few elections have come and gone, with some pretty pro-American results. Not every election puts most of its weight behind an American referendum, but US & Allied policy has been a pretty hot topic as of late. The EU elected pro-market, pro-US centre-right parties to its parliament despite rough economics and formerly-shaky US-EU relations. More importantly, Lebanon's pro-Western coalition held on despite a concerted and blistering push by a pro-Iranian (Hezbollah-led) coalition to get a majority in parliament. Many analysts are venturing that President Obama's speech on Islam may have made a difference, and indeed it may have. And, as soon as the speech was over, many political leaders said that they wanted action beyond the words, but in any democracy, words can go a long way in a voting population.

Mr. Obama's speech to the Muslim world was timed in particular to be right before the Lebanese and Iranian elections--two of the most important elections in the Middle East in the next few years. Even Iran's opposition may have gotten a bit of a boost (albeit perhaps futile) from Obama's speech.

Ultimately, it is easier to find a way to get along with an adverasary than to fight them. Particularly, when the adversary is the US and its Allies, finding some common ground and a leader that will reach out to them often reduces difficulty on your own part. Such was the basis of the "thaw" in the US-Soviet Cold War. Such may be the basis of a changing attitude toward the US in the Middle East in in the EU--if the US appears more willing to talk and work together, then the EU and Middle East will gladly accept the stance and jump at the opportunity.

Such speeches and diplomatic blitzes may prove very useful to the US, and are likely to prevent the "marginalization" of US power so quickly predicted by US and foreign pundits alike. Mr. Obama is taking a page from Sarkozy's diplomatic book, and may already be turning key results in favor of the US' long-term foreign policy goals.

Monday, May 11, 2009

Flushing the Taliban Out?

This will be a short blog post. I'm getting word from Al Jazeera that the Pakistani army is "flushing out" Taliban from main Swat cities, and that the Taliban are now "on the run." Apparently about 700 Taliban have been killed in Swat in the last 4 days, which is about 1/6 to 1/7 the 4000-5000 militants in the area.

But with most of these Taliban on the run, the Army may not actually be successfully accomplishing goals that lead to the long-term security of the AfPak (as it's called) region. There are benefits to routing and disorganizing an enemy force--they are less effective in future combat, they cannot launch offensives, and indeed, you take the territory. But the entire point of an insurgency is to run when the heavy weapons come, and to slowly seep and sneak back into an area being held by the government, and use terror/hit-and-run tactics to grind them down. Like Vietnam and Iraq, causing the enemy to turn tail and run is only a short-term victory. They will find refuge elsewhere (there is a great deal of space in northwest Pakistan and southeast Afghanistan in which they can take refuge) and come back to fight another day. Unfortunately, in the case of hardline militants, the only ways to achieve victory are to A) convince them not to fight (which is unlikely with a single flushing) or B) kill them all. Killing some large portion of them with a grinding and bloody operation would have certainly gotten the job done to a large extent, but it would have cost large numbers of civilian and army lives. But by not paying the price now, the Army may have to pay a greater price later in the form of a coordinated vengeance attack.

There is an alternative explanation, that I am quietly hoping that Pakistani tacticians have elected. If the Pakistani Army was not willing to deal with massive casualties in door-to-door fighting (which is understandable), then urban warfare would not be an option. There is a second option that would require more finesse and fewer casualties--though the finesse part may be tough to muster. If the Pakistani Army can effectively rout the militants and channel them (by cutting off alternative escape routes) into some relatively obvious hiding spot, then the Taliban will have lost their defensive advantage: they will be on relatively unfamiliar ground, they will be disorganized, they will have lost much of their weaponry, and they will no longer be "dug in" to an urban area, well-placed for brutal urban combat. If they enter an unfamiliar mountain range, then not only do they have less preparation and ammunition, but they also (more importantly) are no longer shielded by civilians to endless bombing and artillery. The Pakistani army can spare lives and throw metal instead at the problem, and simply surround the mountain region to catch and capture or destroy any escaping militants. Such a tactic could create Taliban casualty rates that would spiral towards 100%.

It's unclear whether that's the Pakistani Army's tactic of choice. If it was, they wouldn't be advertising it. If it's not, then they may instead try a very thorough hearts-and-minds counterinsurgency campaign in the city to win the loyalty of the population and keep the Taliban from coming back. Unfortunately, most civilians from Swat urban centers are in refugee camps that are undersupplied at best. The Army will struggle to win their loyalty to an extent that exceeded their loyalty pre-invasion.

Alternatively again, the Pakistani Army might intend to simply use a series of cheap "flushing" maneuvers on the Taliban until they retreat, in a disorganized way, into Afghani space, at which point better-trained NATO troops might be able to eliminate them. At such a juncture, the Pakistani Army would be able to close in on Taliban bases and safe zones, and eliminate the free operating area that the Taliban had in Pakistan. And frankly, this may be the only way that NATO got the Pakistani Army to agree to the operation--if NATO was willing to do the actual hard work in fighting the Taliban to the death, then the Pakistani Army would return the favor by ensuring (as best as they could) that the Taliban have no safe zones in Pakistan. While it would result in higher NATO casualties early, it would mean a significant strategic victory, and quite possibly a full turnaround in the war in the area.

If this is the case, I tip my hat to President Obama and Secretary of State Clinton for excellent strategic diplomacy. But I may be being optimistic.