Regime Change Coming to Venezuela?

Long have I thrown my wagers behind a total economic collapse in Venezuela (and a regime change). The short point is this: as the central government over-spends and mis-manages the public sector, it has progressively nationalized more industries (after fabricating reasons to do so) in order to keep the public economy afloat. This has been a downward spiral for the Chavez regime and, unfortunately, for the people of Venezuela.

The current economic crisis includes electricity shortages, food shortages, and gross stagflation (the miserable condition when both unemployment and inflation are high). Chavez' reaction has been tighter money control and market crackdowns, leading to greater economic stagnation.

It's tough to tell what Chavez' popularity is right now. Tight media control in Venezuela has permitted Chavez to blame most economic turmoil on the United States so far, but enough news may be leaking in to suggest otherwise to a large portion of the population.

A parliamentary election is coming in September that could spell the effective end of Chavez. What will be interesting to watch is whether Chavez' regime goes to anti-democratic extremes in order to keep some semblance of legislative power. But either way, if the vote suggests that Chavez has lost popular support in Venezuela, then his ability to drum up anti-American sentiment in other parts of Latin America will be greatly crushed.

Chavez has, for a long time, over-inflated his sense of influence over Latin America, but he's certainly had some. As the economic crisis worsens, whatever influence he had is likely to evaporate.

Summit of the Americas Shows the Value of Charisma

Obama's courting the hemisphere; "re-engaging," he calls it. Sometimes, I'm not entirely sure why we care whether Venezuela or Ecuador likes us, but the people of the United States want the world to love them. And if that's what they want, it's what Obama is delivering.

Obama made some pretty small concessions to Cuba recently. In essence, he's allowed direct relatives of people in Cuba to visit their relatives in Cuba without limit, and to send remittances without limit. The policy is shrewd--it keeps Cubans from immediately enjoying a vast cheapening of goods (cell phones are a serious luxury) that might bolster the Castro regime. The concessions stay in the theme of giving families the ability to support each other--and that's hard to argue with. But the concessions are a sign that more may be on the way, if Cuba is able to act. What the US wants out of Cuba is increased liberty, democracy, human rights, etc. I think the idea of taking down the Castro regime with economic sanctions has long gone out the window--hanging onto that goal is foolish. And with the Cold War long gone, the Castro regime no longer remains a threat in any way to the security of the United States or its allies. But we, as the Good Guys, would prefer if we could lever our economic and political power to bring greater freedom and human rights to the peoples of Cuba, and that's a fine thing.

Raul Castro has responded in his own way, by saying that he'd be willing to meet with Obama to discuss "everything." It's a fine first step. Sadly, putting sanctions back up after taking them down is politically costly, and it's tough to ensure that Castro will follow through with any promises towards democratization, human rights, or liberty.

At the Summit, Obama was met with a standing ovation by other world leaders. Even Chavez didn't say a single bad thing about Obama--Chavez specifically limited his criticisms of the United States to the past. Obama's mere presence has derailed a lot of criticism of the US, even though policy hasn't changed much. Part of it's the change in rhetoric--Obama has brought a lot of that. Some of it is progress on the Cuba front. But Obama talks pretty, apparently listens well, and is the kind of guy that you hope likes you after he meets you (the concept of not liking him after meeting him boggles most people outside the US).

In diplomacy, these traits can go surprisingly far. Bush was often aloof, and was apparently not a great listener--he'd show up with a policy and advocate for it, and was apparently not very good at pretending there was a dialogue. He didn't charm people. Obama does. And that fact alone may make the job of the United States a whole lot easier over the next 8 years.

But the standing ovation for Obama shows that world opinion is fickle. A simple changing of personalities in the White House can change responses in the streets from protests to parties. Has the US given up most of the world's grievances? Nope (but it has given up a few things, like stopped outsourcing interrogation to Eastern Europe). Iraq policy is essentially going how Mr. Bush would have planned it. Afghanistan policy is changing, but it's a re-trenching, not a pulling-out. The US is still backing Israel and pursuing a two-state solution. It's still in favor of expanding NATO, and of keeping tough sanctions on Iran and on North Korea, and even on Cuba. Obama's being careful not to give much away (beyond "first hit's free" tasters of policy change that whet the tongue for negotiation).

What this means is that Obama, if he is going to actually make the collective lives of the United States easier in the foreign policy realm, must use his charm and charisma to seek policy changes in other countries that are permanent (difficult to reverse), beneficial (directly making our lives cheaper/more prosperous/safer, etc), and tying (increasing "interdependence" in the world such that opposing powerhouse economies like the US leaves you behind). He must also make sure not to ignore traditional US allies, like Japan, South Korea, Israel, Britain, Poland, Australia. But he seems to be standing by them where they need it, so far. And he may have correctly identified that they need far less maintenance as allies than they have recently had. With essentially scarce diplomatic resources, Obama must balance between wooing and maintaining. But frankly, I think he's off to a good start. Let's see what he can do with it.

The Irish Vote, European Hedging, and Continued American Hegemony

The Irish "No" vote on the Lisbon Treaty has led to serious resignation among the power leadership of Europe--in particular, the French, who are slated to take over the presidency next, show little excitement or hurry for trying to recussitate the treaty, or any other pseudo-constitution.

At it happens, many countries have had very large "no" minorities in their approval votes, and the odds that one of these would not turn into a small majority (the "no" vote in Ireland was 54%) was pretty low. Many countries, particularly smaller ones, do not want to give up such a large chunk of their sovereignty--they like the free trade pact, but not being bossed around by France, Germany, and the UK. Europe must find a new path.

But the behavior of the power players in Europe shows that they have been aware of the possibility of this result for some time, and have been hedging their bets. A pseudo-state EU would create an entity as economically strong as the Untied States, though probably not yet as militarily or politically so. Either way, Europe would be able to stand up to America's ability to unilaterally act. But even as hopes for the EU peaked, Germany, France, and the UK drifted towards the United States. Merkel, Sarkozy, and Brown have all maintained and emphasized friendly ties with the US despite disagreements over the War on Terror and War in Iraq. Such behavior shows that they have been making clear attempts to avoid alienating the United States--a mere irritation if the EU became a single foreign policy bloc with the power to pressure the US, but a disaster if it failed. Given that failure, pro-US hedging on the part of these great powers has paid off.

But that hedging leaves momentum, and a direction. The collapse of the Lisbon Treaty might otherwise leave the foreign policies of many European countries adrift, and their geopolitical positions unsure. But now these countries are turning back to the institutions left behind after the cold war--US bases in Germany, the UK-US "Special Relationship," and NATO--all provide a US-led network to fall back on in a potential crisis of decision. The French are triumphantly returning to full NATO membership, the first time since 1967, and upgrading their military; further, Sarkozy has essentially mirrored Bush's foreign policy since Sarkozy entered office. The British are hanging tough in Iraq despite domestic pressure to withdraw, and Bush and Brown are making clear that they have no disagreements over future Iraq policy. Merkel and Bush have collaborated in drafting UN resolutions against Iran on its nuclear program, and Merkel has made moves to improve ties with Israel, perhaps the US' closest ally.

Without a strong EU, the looming spectre of Russia will further push Europe towards America's umbrella. The Russians are starting to exhibit a disturbing pattern of natural gas extortion, threatening its dependents (one at a time) to cut off supplies should they swing too far out of the Russian line. The Germand and French both admitted that they vetoed Ukraine's entrance into NATO, fearing such an occurence, and would accept Ukraine later when they had established greater energy independence. Eastern European states, save the Ukraine and Belarus, continue to cling to the NATO alliance as a protection from Russia, and more small Russian neighbors, like Georgia, hope to join.

This reliance on the United States for foreign policy leadership is largely unchanged since the early 1990's. The EU looked like it was going to be the force that brought Europe out of the US umbrella once and for all, but EU hopes for a strong foreign policy seem to have been dashed. Without another grand idea or direction, and a Russia that is not only growing quickly economically and militarily, but also asserting itself with increasing aggression, European heavy hitters are likely to stay in line behind the United States for a long time to come.

China's rise and East Asia's willingness to accomodate it is likely to mean an eventual end to US dominance of East and Central Asia. India remains friendly to the US, but fiercely independent. The Middle East mostly continues to tolerate the US, but is looking forward to its exit from the region. Africa is almost certain to never become a sphere of US influence, given the West's constant neglect, and China's neocolonial opportunism. South America remains closer to the US than any other region, but most states in South America have a rather poor opinion of the US, save Columbia; further, Brazil's potential economic explosion with oil finds off its coast may give most Latin American countries a new direction to look. Mexico and Canada will certainly always respect the US' hegemony over North America, but there is little that can be done with that power, and even less that the US cares about.

Ultimately, and perhaps surprisingly, Europe may become the last bastion of US hegemony. Should it ever unionize, build its military, and assert itself in foreign policy, the US would be reduced to an oversized regional power in the next century.