Last Decade Series: The European Union

The EU gained serious traction through the late 2000s as the Lisbon Treaty was ratified and the EU's executive and legislative branches became significantly more powerful bodies than they previously were (as I've mentioned before, they begin to rival the powers of the former Articles of Confederation).

But as we know, a unified European continent is verging on the single greatest threat to the US' security. Obviously, the US is relatively preoccupied in the Middle East, but it is not this preoccupation that has kept the US from pressing on the EU (certainly the US is pressing on China and Russia).

Ultimately, the EU is a mixed blessing for the United States. There are some downsides--with a "united" foreign policy representative, it will be "easier" to stand up to the United States on foreign policy matters as a group with collective bargaining power (think of a trade/labor union). The EU could, as a group, threaten all sorts of nasty stuff as a whole, including pulling out of Afghanistan, or otherwise not supporting a US policy, that each state on its own would not be able to credibly do. But these downsides are mitigated by the very things that caused me to use sneer quotes earlier; the EU is not actually a terribly unified place, and probably won't be for a long time, if ever (in the US, it took over 100 years for states to shed their strong unique identities). Most EU countries have a very strong unique identity that the United States lacked when they came together, and already there is a fair amount of discord within the ranks. Italy is up in arms about an EU Court ruling over crucifixes in its schools. The UK is now majority in favor of full withdrawal from the EU (in order to protect its own sovereignty). With the Tories bound to be elected by March, this may end up happening--and if it does, countries like Poland and the Czech Republic may follow.

In general, a fair chunk of EU countries would rather not give up their sovereignty and independence to the extent that the Lisbon Treaty asks them to do, even for the economic benefits entailed by the Eurozone. But in general, the idea that many countries with such disparate geopolitical interests could get along is tough to imagine. The US has the dual advantage of coasts on its east/west, and relative weakness to its north/south (a number of wars have made that the case). Unity is geopolitically sensible for the US, but the EU has very different needs on its West (where it sees relative security) and its east (where Russia looms and the Balkans remain a hotspot). Western and eastern European geopolitical interests and needs will clash in the future as Russia tests the EU, and it may fall apart as the east forms its own alliance bloc with the US and UK (NATO largely faces the same risk as western Europe decides it would rather not suffer through standing up to the Russians again).

Ultimately, the EU will remain geopolitically fractured and weak. The bureaucracy of getting anything all done in the EU is horrendous, especially so for such a new institution. The EU will remain facing inward, trying to find a hopeless balance that works for everyone, instead of looking outward to challenge the US or even Russia. It will, at least, have a strong internal trade, which will ultimately be good for the US--a richer EU will mean not only more high quality products, but a bigger market to which the US can eventually export.

The EU will be an irritation in America's side for a bit as the US and EU diverge on geopolitical topics ranging from the Middle East to Russia to global warming, but the EU's very structure largely prevents it or any other European power from becoming a major geopolitical threat to the US, something with which the US should ultimately be quite pleased.

Geopolitical Complications at Copenhagen

The problems at the various climate summits are economically quite simple--there is both a tragedy of the commons problem (in the emitting of carbon dioxide) and a freerider problem (in the halting thereof). Even Europe has has largely decided that the moral payoff for "leading the way" in CO2 control is not sufficient to break its back alone, especially if it enables other economies to slurp up the CO2 "availability," as it were, that they create.

This, of course, is why anyone trying to control global CO2 output needs a treaty. But it is not so simple to simply forge a treaty on this and tell everyone to stop producing. Should all countries cut a portion of their CO2? Should we create a baseline CO2/capita standard which countries must meet? What, instead, of a CO2/GDP/capita standard? These different standards can be abstractly debated on their own merits, but each representative at Copenhagen is undoubtedly going to support the one that best suits their own self-interest.

Right now, one of the big hang-ups seems to be the US-Chinese rivalry, which stems far beyond simple fairness, egalitarianism, equity, whatever, into rather unsubtle geopolitical/economic warfare. The Chinese want to walk away with a "promise" to reduce CO2 output by a certain percentage, but do not want any oversight into their own in-house emissions reporting. The US, of course, is unwilling to sign anything that lets the Chinese get away with zero transparency, while the US gets constant comb-overs by the EU to make sure that it is putting in sufficient efforts to curb CO2.

And again, this goes beyond fairness, or effectiveness. Could the world at large reduce CO2 production to whatever reasonable levels it sets for itself without the Chinese getting on board until some years from now? Certainly. China may be a big contributor to world CO2 emissions, but it is not yet so big to single-handedly destroy any attempts to put caps on world emissions (where the US is certainly that big, as is the EU). This is, as usual, about long-term and arcane calculations about the relative power of the two perceived titans of world politics, the US and the People's Republic of China.

My own opinions about where the US should be aiming its sights aside (hint: Russia and Iran), the US sees a great threat to its pacific hegemony in the Chinese, and the Chinese probably see a great opportunity in this treaty, if it should come out the right way. Further, the Chinese have an advantage--for years, the Chinese have denied any aspirations of being a "world leader" or any of that claptrap. While they are concerned about their reputation in order to open trade and assuade the military fears of their neighbors, the Chinese lack the desire to be loved, admired, and followed that the US became addicted to in the Second World War (and not for entirely sentimental reasons. The relative love affair that the Western World has had for the US over the past sixty years has allowed the US to make bold moves in its own geopolitical favor and receive backing in legitimacy, money, manpower, military base placement, etc. It's been a very powerful tool, and it's far from lost, all the Bush-era apocalyptic soothsayers' opinions to the contrary. But I digress). The Chinese can legitimately look Copenhagen dead in the eye and say, "we don't care if you approve of our economic or environmental practices," as long as such disapproval
does not grow so large as to threaten boycott (which would certainly be difficult to legitimately threaten, although it would damage the Chinese and Southeast Asian economies far, far more than the economies of the US or EU, under-read cocktail-sipping fatalists' opinions to the contrary. But I digress). It's not an enviable position for the United States.

For the United States has a reputation to uphold, and it may be in a position where it is making a value judgment about that geopolitically powerful reputation and its geopoltically powerful manufacturing industry (which is still the largest and most formiddable in the world, a fact that would be more widely known if we were not so obsessed with predicting our own demise. But I digress). Should the US walk away and say, "no deal without China breaking its back as much as we do," its European allies will grow increasingly impatient and disillusioned about American exceptionalism, altruism, leadership ability, what have you. But should the US say, "the Chinese be damned, we're going to do the right thing," then it will quite disproportionately and quite significantly load a disadvantage onto its own manufacturing industry, its war machine, its economy in general--and ultimately its ability to project power into the pacific.

Manufacturing is a CO2-heavy process, even when it's not a coal-fired steel plant (of which we have precious few these days). You'd probably have nightmares over how much CO2 went into the air to make that brand new Prius you're so proud of buying (and re-buying after a mere 3 years to get the "higher effiency" model, in a misguided attempt to save the earth. But I digress). Military manufacturing is much, much worse. Military manufacturing puts a much higher emphasis on performance over price, to the point that it hits some seriously diminishing returns (to whit, the military often picks some very odd opportunities to say "only the best for our boys!" and "we need to save money," but I digress). And, until renewable technology really picks up, manufacturing price is often fairly well-correlated to CO2 usage to make it (of course, in the case of military hardware, the CO2/price ratio is higher than for most goods).

The short of it is this: A major carbon tax or cap-and-trade will be a disaster for the US military's already- enormous budget, in a country whose debt is already so horrifyingly large that both parties are balking at spending more (and the Greek debt crisis is hopefully teaching a lesson about the limits of the power of borrowing. But perhaps not. I digress). Additionally, the US will simply flat-out lose more manufacturing to China if it should impose limits on its CO2 production and China doesn't. While the US will make sure to subsidize its arms manufacturers, many other industry's won't be so lucky. The US would have to (until renewable technologies mature) be incredibly picky about just which manufacturing sectors are "Critical to national security," or it would annihilate its economy just to keep them all afloat.

And, of course, for every manufacturing plant the US loses, it's one China gains. China's ability to compete, in particular, in high-precision manufacturing would increase significantly--a prospect that US security advisors (for better or for worse) shudder to think about (the US still has rather obnoxious export limits on high-precision manufacturing equipment to China, as well as other "dual-use technology" that the US and EU currently specialise in making. But I digress). This manufacturing would, of course, make China's economic position more powerful in the Pacific, and enable its indigenous military hardware industry (which has been crawling obediently towards independence from Russian supply).

Increased tax revenues, increased manufacturing capacity, and increased trade partnerships in the Pacific would greatly increase China's geopolitical and military position in the region, where the opposite would apply to the US. This is one of the big reasons the US is so very obsessive about making sure the Treaty (that it's actually considering signing) is "fair" in the sense that it hurts the US and China equally.

I doubt, though, that the US is going to get its wish in that particular field until Chinese GDP growth starts to peter out. And if it can handle its looming demographic crisis, China is unlikely to see GDP grwoth slow for some years to come.

The Lisbon Treaty

The Lisbon Treaty in the EU finally cleared one of its biggest hurdles today--that set up by the voters of Ireland.

Requiring unanimous approval of the member states of the EU, the Lisbon Treaty was signed by heads of state of all 27 member nations in 2007, and was expected to be in force at the beginning of this year. For all but Ireland, national parliaments rubber-stamped the treaty through (though the Czech and Polish executives had refused to sign the treaty until the Irish passed it--not sure what they've done yet). With the Irish vote done, the treaty is likely only some red tape away from coming into effect.

The Treaty would strengthen the breadth of powers and autonomy of the EU parliament and executive, create tighter central integration, and a whole bunch of other stuff. In reality, it's very similar to the "EU Constitution" which was so summarily rejected by the more nationalist nations of France and Holland before being abandoned entirely. While the Treaty of Lisbon's passing does not actually make Europe one big happy sovereign nation, it does make it pretty darn powerful (they'll even have a single Foreign Minister to represent the "united" EU opinion on foreign policy). It's the kind of treaty that makes an old-school realist sit down and wonder what sovereignty really means.

If the EU holds together and chugs forward, I anticipate some level of "de facto" sovereignty will emerge, even if it is not formalised in the lifetimes of anyone around today. Many of my European friends (with very strong nationalism) would surely want to cut my tongue out for saying such a thing, but I will indeed note that state pride/nationalism in the US was incredibly powerful until after the civil war (if you've seen any of those civil war movies, you see the Confederates holding up state flags and screaming things like "FOR VIRGINIA!"). In fact, while the States of the US did not have formal sovereignty in the Westphalia sense as soon as the Constitution was signed (they essentially retained their sovereignty under the Articles of Confederation by... oh, just go look it up if you don't know), the de-facto erosion of state-level power, autonomy, and semi-sovereignty is obvious in American history. Every time some issue emerges that is pressing enough to worry some majority of the country, the voting public cedes another notch of power to the federal government (though I will remain mum on whether this is or isn't a good idea).

My point is that the creation of a centralized confederation for all of Europe is similar enough to the confederation of the American states that I think a somewhat similar process of growth of central power is relatively inevitable unless the formalized central system is reversed, and quickly (which is highly unlikely).

I believe, though, that the situation is more likely to be reversible than in the US, and I believe that Russia has the potential to cause it. Like George Friedman (by the way: go read The Next 100 Years), I believe that the nations of Europe have such a vast discrepancy of fears and misgiving's about Russia's potential behavior and future that its expansion and aggression is more likely to drive a wedge between European countries rather than unite them. If Western Europe does indeed abandon the East in order to keep the oil and gas flowing, then NATO will become defunct, as will any faint illusion of collective defense in Europe under the umbrella of the EU. And then, expect some action.

But until that hypothetical arises, expect the EU to be a rather happy-go-lucky place for a while. Maybe (just maybe) it will become a more assertive and significant player in world affairs, after a 50-year post-world war II hiatus.

The Irish Vote, European Hedging, and Continued American Hegemony

The Irish "No" vote on the Lisbon Treaty has led to serious resignation among the power leadership of Europe--in particular, the French, who are slated to take over the presidency next, show little excitement or hurry for trying to recussitate the treaty, or any other pseudo-constitution.

At it happens, many countries have had very large "no" minorities in their approval votes, and the odds that one of these would not turn into a small majority (the "no" vote in Ireland was 54%) was pretty low. Many countries, particularly smaller ones, do not want to give up such a large chunk of their sovereignty--they like the free trade pact, but not being bossed around by France, Germany, and the UK. Europe must find a new path.

But the behavior of the power players in Europe shows that they have been aware of the possibility of this result for some time, and have been hedging their bets. A pseudo-state EU would create an entity as economically strong as the Untied States, though probably not yet as militarily or politically so. Either way, Europe would be able to stand up to America's ability to unilaterally act. But even as hopes for the EU peaked, Germany, France, and the UK drifted towards the United States. Merkel, Sarkozy, and Brown have all maintained and emphasized friendly ties with the US despite disagreements over the War on Terror and War in Iraq. Such behavior shows that they have been making clear attempts to avoid alienating the United States--a mere irritation if the EU became a single foreign policy bloc with the power to pressure the US, but a disaster if it failed. Given that failure, pro-US hedging on the part of these great powers has paid off.

But that hedging leaves momentum, and a direction. The collapse of the Lisbon Treaty might otherwise leave the foreign policies of many European countries adrift, and their geopolitical positions unsure. But now these countries are turning back to the institutions left behind after the cold war--US bases in Germany, the UK-US "Special Relationship," and NATO--all provide a US-led network to fall back on in a potential crisis of decision. The French are triumphantly returning to full NATO membership, the first time since 1967, and upgrading their military; further, Sarkozy has essentially mirrored Bush's foreign policy since Sarkozy entered office. The British are hanging tough in Iraq despite domestic pressure to withdraw, and Bush and Brown are making clear that they have no disagreements over future Iraq policy. Merkel and Bush have collaborated in drafting UN resolutions against Iran on its nuclear program, and Merkel has made moves to improve ties with Israel, perhaps the US' closest ally.

Without a strong EU, the looming spectre of Russia will further push Europe towards America's umbrella. The Russians are starting to exhibit a disturbing pattern of natural gas extortion, threatening its dependents (one at a time) to cut off supplies should they swing too far out of the Russian line. The Germand and French both admitted that they vetoed Ukraine's entrance into NATO, fearing such an occurence, and would accept Ukraine later when they had established greater energy independence. Eastern European states, save the Ukraine and Belarus, continue to cling to the NATO alliance as a protection from Russia, and more small Russian neighbors, like Georgia, hope to join.

This reliance on the United States for foreign policy leadership is largely unchanged since the early 1990's. The EU looked like it was going to be the force that brought Europe out of the US umbrella once and for all, but EU hopes for a strong foreign policy seem to have been dashed. Without another grand idea or direction, and a Russia that is not only growing quickly economically and militarily, but also asserting itself with increasing aggression, European heavy hitters are likely to stay in line behind the United States for a long time to come.

China's rise and East Asia's willingness to accomodate it is likely to mean an eventual end to US dominance of East and Central Asia. India remains friendly to the US, but fiercely independent. The Middle East mostly continues to tolerate the US, but is looking forward to its exit from the region. Africa is almost certain to never become a sphere of US influence, given the West's constant neglect, and China's neocolonial opportunism. South America remains closer to the US than any other region, but most states in South America have a rather poor opinion of the US, save Columbia; further, Brazil's potential economic explosion with oil finds off its coast may give most Latin American countries a new direction to look. Mexico and Canada will certainly always respect the US' hegemony over North America, but there is little that can be done with that power, and even less that the US cares about.

Ultimately, and perhaps surprisingly, Europe may become the last bastion of US hegemony. Should it ever unionize, build its military, and assert itself in foreign policy, the US would be reduced to an oversized regional power in the next century.