Foggofwar Prediction: Labor Coalition to Narrowly Win Israeli Parliamentary Elections

Israel's next parliamentary elections happen on March 17th, and a major potential foreign policy shift could happen if Netanyahu's Likud party doesn't win.

Looking at stabilizing opinion polls, I predict that a Labor-led coalition will win, carrying somewhere in the region of 57 to 61 seats (of 120). I think the big X-factors will be whether it can/wants to pick up the communist Hadash party (likely) and the Arab Balad party (maybe?). I suspect they would not take on the Islamist UAL party.

It could be a minority government, but it's likely to hold the day nonetheless.

The Labor coalition would likely look like: Labor, Hatnuah, Yesh Atid, Meretz, Kalanu, and Hadash, which together carry 57 seats in current opinion polls. If they picked up Balad, they would hit 60 or 61 seats, enough for a slim majority.

Since UAL, Ta'al, and Balad (together with 9 seats of support) simply wouldn't join Likud due to their anti-Zionist ideologies, the Likud coalition (Likud, Yisrael Beiteinu, Jewish Home, Shas, UTJ, Otzma, and Yachad) looks primed to hold 54 seats.

The trouble for Labor's coalition is that it would be a bit unwieldy, requiring getting general agreement from socialist/labor, communist, liberal, and Arab parties. The good news is that the smaller groups are so unlikely to jump to support Likud that their bargaining power isn't too high in driving policy (unlike the Lib Dems of the UK, which got to play Kingmaker in the 2010 parliamentary elections there).

Labor might take an approach to end or roll back Israeli settlement of the West Bank, and maybe even lift the blockade on the Gaza Strip. It would be an interesting change in foreign policy, indeed.

We'll keep our eye out if the polls look to change.

Regime Change Coming to Venezuela?

Long have I thrown my wagers behind a total economic collapse in Venezuela (and a regime change). The short point is this: as the central government over-spends and mis-manages the public sector, it has progressively nationalized more industries (after fabricating reasons to do so) in order to keep the public economy afloat. This has been a downward spiral for the Chavez regime and, unfortunately, for the people of Venezuela.

The current economic crisis includes electricity shortages, food shortages, and gross stagflation (the miserable condition when both unemployment and inflation are high). Chavez' reaction has been tighter money control and market crackdowns, leading to greater economic stagnation.

It's tough to tell what Chavez' popularity is right now. Tight media control in Venezuela has permitted Chavez to blame most economic turmoil on the United States so far, but enough news may be leaking in to suggest otherwise to a large portion of the population.

A parliamentary election is coming in September that could spell the effective end of Chavez. What will be interesting to watch is whether Chavez' regime goes to anti-democratic extremes in order to keep some semblance of legislative power. But either way, if the vote suggests that Chavez has lost popular support in Venezuela, then his ability to drum up anti-American sentiment in other parts of Latin America will be greatly crushed.

Chavez has, for a long time, over-inflated his sense of influence over Latin America, but he's certainly had some. As the economic crisis worsens, whatever influence he had is likely to evaporate.

Tight Race a Test for America's Iraq

Can Iraq be a functional Democracy?

This question rests on the minds of every foreign policymaker in the United States.

So far, so good. Minimal violence marred the election, and over 60% of Iraqis turned out (this is about as good as most Western democracies).

But the big test is still coming. The race is tight. US-picked Nouri al-Maliki is in a tight race with Sunni rival Allawi--and might just lose.

But either way, neither is likely to get a majority in his alliance right away, which means that a long period of coalition-building awaits the budding Iraqi parliament. Such political grinds are typical of most parliamentary systems, but the question will be whether Iraq can handle it.

If I had to guess, I'd guess that Iraq's democracy is unlikely to collapse or even suffer a major crisis. No matter who wins, getting ethnic/religious/political minorities in their coalition will, to some extent, be necessary. Sunnis and Shiites alike will be represented in the ruling coalition of the government--the question is really only "how much?" And frankly, the Sunnis should be used to being a minority representative (but if they are a key player in the coalition, then they have virtual veto power), and the Shiites are unlikely to begin slaughtering Sunnis or Kurds if they cannot hold an election despite a 60% majority--most reports are that losing parties are likely to sit back and reconsider their election strategies.

In fact, a tough and indecisive election while US troops still remain may be an excellent low-pressure opportunity for the Iraqi political system to learn how to deal with gridlock, with toss-up. For it will, indeed, come again, and next time, nobody will be there to help sort out the cards.

But if it should succeed, then the day may be won for the United States in a more significant way than anyone imagined since the naive days of 2003. The embarrassingly premature "Mission Accomplished" banner might possibly be unfurled, correctly this time, 7 years after its original debut.

Ambivalence, Indecision, and Defeat in Afghanistan

Barack Obama is in perhaps what will be the toughest spot of his presidency.

With poll numbers slipping, independents fleeing, his touted healthcare bill staggering, the economy sputtering, and other domestic mayhem, Obama might be hoping right now he could fall back to a solid foreign policy base.

But the decision to remove the missile shield in Poland and the Czech Republic is proving more controversial than once thought. His tripartite summit with Abbas and Netanyahu was a flop. Iraq is struggling enough to make headlines, and he has no answers. The Afghanistan election was a disaster, and now, as more American boys die on the field and signs of Taliban dominance increase, Obama is faced with a nasty choice that he didn't want to make yet.

General Stanley McChrystal (head of ISAF and the US Military's lead man on the AfPak region directly under Petraeus' command over the entire Middle East) has publicly called on the president to make a choice: Go big or go home. That is, send more troops, or quit. The current path will only lead to failure. I'm inclined to agree with the General.

The General claims that the current troop count in Afghanistan is simply insufficient--the US is spread too thin and losing. Obama, despite his initial popularity with the US's allies, is finding himself without the clout to request more troops from Australia, England, Germany... certainly not former Soviet Bloc countries (who were so generous to President Bush) after the missile shield debacle (which, to its credit, is supported by the non-partisan and sage-like Secretary of Defense Robert Gates).

The General, who is trusted despite not being particularly well-known, has given Obama a great public challenge in a time when his leadership is being questioned and the risks he is currently running in policy have become much higher and much more unlikely than he was hoping. The domestic roadblocks he's hitting now (which seemed unfathomable after he swept the election) make risks in foreign policy all the more politically difficult.

But politically, the choice that Obama has to make may be a loss either way. Support for more troops in Afghanistan is less than 50%, and if he should send more and casualty rates should continue to increase, and defeat should follow, Afghanistan will become Obama's Vietnam. If he should pull out now, the United States will be overcome with a similar sense of defeat and humility, and the GOP will be able to spend years questioning his wisdom as Commander in Chief.

The risk that President Bush took by appointing Petraeus in Iraq and "doubling down" in a situation where the country wanted to pull out must be appreciated. But Bush, an idealogue, understood that his party was likely to lose the election either way, and was able to act with a strange sense of futile freedom. The risk happened to pay off, and Petraeus' military genius was given the time it needed to shine. But the problem in Iraq, in a strange way, was easier to fix, if not more simple.

In Afghanistan, a corrupt dictator has arose to replace the paladin saviour of the country--and both men go by the name Hamid Karzai. No longer can the US simply back the "legitimate" government against the evil Taliban--the government has begun to lose its legitimacy. Without any legitimacy or moral high-ground in the central government, the US has nothing to fight for, and should leave. But, in a period of domestic political turmoil, admitting defeat would be politically catastrophic.

The election is not over yet. The Independent Election Commission has not yet, in fact, declared any winners in the campaign. UN intervention could lead to a second round of voting, in which Abdullah has a chance of winning, and (hopefully) cleaning house--with Kabul's legitimacy restored, Obama can take McChrystal's advice and double-down, as Bush did in Iraq... and hope that the investment pays off before the 2010 elections, lest the struggling Democrats suffer a slaughter similar to the 1994 turnover. Obama would surely take much of the blame.

If Karzai manages to hold onto power and award the cronies that helped him clutch to it, the game may be over. But this outcome is not assured yet.

For Obama, politically, the right choice certainly seems to be to wait, under the guise of his administration conducting a "strategic review" of the situation. But how long can this wait? How long can he delay before his ambivalence turns into a very loud and public liability? Surely, he is pressing for the IEC to hurry up and make a decision, but the second vote won't happen until late October, should it happen. Strategic ambivalence must wait until then.

But unless Obama has a series of decisive decisions lined up to react to the outcome of the election, he will be stumbling into doom. His foreign policy inexperience is starting to show, as he finds that rhetoric and hope cannot alone drive success in an international anarchy of realist, idealistic, and skeptical foes.

In Afghanistan--the US's deepest foreign policy investment--indecisiveness for too long will spell disaster. The political machinations of reality are coming to a head, and a decision to go all in or cut our losses must soon be made. The decision rests on one man: expect it soon.

And Now For Disaster

Karzai reached 54% of the vote in the preliminary announcement this weekend, though the IEC continues to cite dozens of cases of fraud.

Those tribal leaders that complained earlier? Karzai apparently took 100% of the votes in that district. Oops.

The West is cautiously calling for recounts, and possibly re-votes. The right answer here is to declare that the election was too marred to determine a winner, and have a run-off between the two candidates, though it begs the question: can more oversight be brought into the process? Or will Karzai (and/or his goons) steal this one, too?

If Abdullah leads a protest (and I'm not saying he shouldn't), an Iranian-style situation might arise... except that the Afghan state has extremely limited security powers, and the protesters will have Kalichnikovs. Things are going to get worse before they get better, if they do.

Afghan Election Update

With about half of all votes counted, Karzai has 45.8% of the vote, a slight tick downward from his earlier lead when 35% of votes were counted. This will be a nailbiter.

The IEC chairman said that the 5th or the 6th is the date we should be eyeing for results to come in. Until then, the fraud allegations have caused confidence in the election, domestically and abroad, to plummet. If confidence can't be built back, Karzai (or whomever was involved) may have handed the Taliban their biggest victory of the war. In Kandahar province, tribal leaders are publicly accusing aides to Karzai's brother (the provincial leader of Kandahar) of shutting down polling booths and shipping in ballots from elsewhere, all marked for Karzai (these tribal leaders had decided to endorse Abdullah). Kandahar province is predominantly Pashtun; such an accusation suggests that whatever unrest may come of a Karzai victory (if, as is almost certain, it is believed to be rigged) will lead to unrest in Pashtun regions as well as elsewhere.

Things are looking bad. I can't help but worry that ISAF has created a monster. US and EU envoys are considering their response to the election results. The IEC, it appears, has the power to declare the election broken and force a run-off, which the US and EU appear to hope to persuade, should the numbers work out for Karzai.

But whether things will go better the second time is a bleak question. It appears now that Karzai is much more interested in maintaining his position than his legitimacy, and such an incentive (for a man with as much power as he has) is dangerous.

"Too Close to Call"

Well, my predictions from yesterday are looking to be quite wrong.

Early results, released today as announced, put the two leading candidates in what is nearly a dead tie; Karzai has 41% and Abdullah 39%. Only 10% of the votes have been counted, and it's unclear which 10% (it's almost certainly not random). Special Envoy Holbrooke said that it's way too early to call whether this election will go to a run-off, and he's right.

It begs the question: what the heck was Karzai's finance minister thinking? It seems difficult to think that he is right in his assessment of the vote count (and that the Independent Election Commission is reporting some tiny, skewed subsection of the vote despite knowing more). If he's wrong, does he know it? Does he have some flawed source? The announcement continues to trouble me.

More updates as we hear them.

A Dirty Win for Karzai?

Partial election results are not due to be released by the Independent Election Commission (IEC) until Tuesday, but a very late Monday announcement by Finance Minister Zakhilwal claimed that Karzai has won the election with a whopping 68% of the vote. If this is actually true, it might appear to be such an enormous number as to guarantee the consent of the Afghan people despite all the intimidation and corruption.

But I fear this election is not going to end cleanly or easily no matter what happens. There are 3 likely scenarios: outright Karzai victory, outright Abdullah victory, and toss up leading to a runoff. I talked about the consequences of an Abdullah win or a run-off in my last post.

But the Finance Minister, while out of line, is likely correct about the official vote count (he is otherwise very much sticking his neck out for seemingly little gain). But while Afghan polling was neither extensive nor accurate, it certainly seemed like this would be a much closer vote as of two weeks ago. And, further, low turnout in the southern Pashtun regions (due to Taliban intimidation) was likely to hurt Karzai, not help him. A 24% increase in polling for Karzai over that two week period seems highly unlikely.

And all of this, of course, is starting to look frighteningly like the Iranian elections. Abdullah, whose reformist slant and underdog attitude are reminiscent of Mousavi, is claiming "widespread fraud" in the vote, in the form of inflated counting, ballot-stuffing, and intimidation; he claims further that such extensive fraud may well change the election outcome, implying that there would have at least been a runoff had the vote been fair.

The announcement by the Finance Minister comes a few hours after the UN Special Envoy to Afghanistan supported claims of irregularities and urged that dozens of complaints be dealt with, as they are potentially outcome-changing. The announcement might be an attempt to instill decisive victory in the minds of the Afghani population to steal the initiative from a potentially messy review or recount process.

At this point, the legitimacy of the election may be beyond saving. Abdullah cannot be faulted for claiming fraud if the allegations are true (and they likely are), but a lack of legitimacy is likely to damage the government and can potentially lead to violence. It is difficult to undo the damage of most fraud without a second vote of some sort, and such a thing is not only highly uncommon, but is logistically a nightmare; further, it's unclear a second vote would be any better. For ISAF, it's time to dig in and prepare for unrest. Whether some semblance of trust and confidence can be imparted into the Karzai government when it (almost certainly) receives a victory announcement tomorrow is unclear and grim. And without the confidence and trust of the Afghani people, the central government is going to be unable to stick.

The Afghani Election So Far

The Afghan elections did not meet the catastrophic failure of total disruption and violence that many officials feared. That hurdle, at least, was cleared, and most people are carefully avoiding entertaining the idea that most of the Taliban (remember they are not always a united front) did not care too much about the elections. That is not to say that there was not violence; there were rockets, there were roadblocks, there were mortars. But they were sporadic and isolated--had the Taliban been bent on preventing the elections from happening, much more noise would have been made.

But that's only one hurdle. Turnout was apparently significantly lower than the last election, especially in the south, probably due largely to Taliban intimidation tactics. This southern area is dominated by Pashtuns, where Karzai seeks much of his support to beat Abdullah. Whether this disparity in turnout will affect the election, and whether it will call legitimacy into question, is unclear.

Other problems include complaints of ballot-stuffing or other issues of corruption. Karzai's power over Afghani bureaucracy is massive, and has led to a great deal of corruption and graft in normal government functions, and is almost certainly going to leak into the election, even if Karzai himself does not intend to cheat.

Beyond that, the Independent Election Commission (IEC) has to deal with inflated versions of normal election problems, like hanging chads.

But the votes are indeed being counted. Both Abdullah and Karzai have claimed victory, but the IEC has said that it's too early to tell. A Voice of America survey of three polling districts in Kabul put Karzai ahead in 2 of them, and Abdullah ahead in one, and neither with a majority. Ghani and Bashardost were in 3rd and 4th--Bashardost was unable to leap past fourth place even in his own district of Kabul.

Karzai will fare better in the south, and Abdullah better in the north. Karzai's primary disadvantage will be the low Pashtun turnout, but he makes up for this by a number of deals cut with warlords and other local leaders in the north. It should be a close race, and I think a runoff is likely.

Unfortunately, a runoff will be a logistical nightmare of the same magnitude as this election. The Taliban will be able to pose a similar threat, the US will probably have to spend another $250 million on it. If Karzai or Abdullah win outright, there will at least be a sigh of relief that the mess is over for a few years. That said, an outright Kazrai win would likely lead to a number of calls of corruption, irregularity, etc, and hinder reconciliatory efforts across the country.

Should a runoff occur, the two big bargainers will be Bashardost and Ghani, whose support should be able to deliver key slices of vote. I predict that they'd be more likely to support Abdullah, who shares their anti-corruption message, but Karzai is a great negotiator with a lot of power, and could sway them to his side. Should Karzai lose, his supporting warlords will have also lost, and will have little in the way of loyalty to the new government. Whether Karzai can or will convince them to get in line will be worth keeping an eye on.

More updates as we get them.

(P.S.: Congratulations and thanks in particular to the US and UK troops that have, for the past two months, helped prepare southern Afghanistan for an at least semi-functional voting experience. The impact on the local population is likely to be critical.)

All Doors Closed in Tehran

Yesterday, Khamenei announced that the regime would support election results against "any cost;" today, the Guardian Council announced that the partial recount re-affirmed Ahmedinejad's victory, despite admitted irregularities that included 50 cities in Iran having more votes than registered voters, and 3 million "mystery votes."

The leadership has, obviously, eliminated all political options for overturning the results of the election. Protests continued today, but they were apparently quite violently broken up by Basij and riot police that outnumbered the protesters approximately 2 to 1.

At this point, continuing protesters have no realistic chance at achieving an outcome close to what they want, but many will certainly want to continue to defame and illegitimize the regime in the long-term, both domestically and internationally. The toughest part of such a strategy is that the only weapon a protester can use to fight the regime is, ultimately, his or her own body.

Team Mousavi Prepares for Martyrdom

After being told that death was the punishment for further disruption, Mousavi and thousands of protesters came back for more, clashing with riot police and the Basij. There are sporadic reports of capsicum (pepper spray) being dumped from helicopters to break up the crowd, reports of gunfire, and numbers of violent clashes that have apparently left hundreds of riot police injured. Busses, cars, motorcycles, mosques, and the Ahmedinejad supporters' Headquarters have all been set on fire. The Shrine of Khomeini has been bombed by a suicide bomber,

Sporadic clashes continue, though the police seem to have managed to break up much of it without actually killing protesters--excellent execution on their part.

But it is highly unclear that the regime has ended the protests, or seriously slowed them down. @BreakingNews on Twitter had the following:

"BULLETIN -- IRANIAN OPPOSITION LEADER MOUSAVI SAYS HE IS "READY FOR MARTYRDOM" AND WILL CONTINUE HIS PATH."

There is almost certainly a hardcore group of protesters ready to follow him to the end (see last post). They will continue to make life incredibly difficult for the regime until they are rounded up.

The Very Dangerous Tehran Game

The situation as it currently stands was obviously not inevitable. Mousavi could have decided not to risk his family's life in challenging the election; the Guardian Council could have decided that rigging the election was not worth the (probably) minor policy changes that would occur under Mousavi (this is assuming Mousavi would be winning on his own, which is still worth debating, despite obvious rigging). But rig they did, and caught they got.

In the past day I've talked to some folks smarter than myself (most notably my friend Clint), and our conversations revealed some tremendous insight.

There was one major mistake along the way that could have been avoided completely, and it has put all parties in the situation in difficult corners: Ayatollah Khameini, rather than waiting the traditional (and possibly legal?) 3 days to announce the winner of the election, the Supreme Leader chose a mere hour after the election to announce the "divine victory" of Ahmedinejad. Why? If we assume that the election was rigged, and that the Supreme Leader was involved, then he has a very strong incentive (and probably a bit of worry) to make the elections seem as legitimate as possible. So when Mousavi declared victory (claiming, even that he had a leak from the election commission), Khameini did everything he could to try and crush from the outset any momentum Mousavi may have gained, in an attempt to stop what's happening now from ever happening.

This was an error for two reasons. First, it was so very odd that it could not be seen as anything but calculated. Never before has the Ayatollah called an election before 3 days have passed, and calling it in a mere hour is obviously a strategic move. Such suggests that something is amiss (in this case, it bolstered the already-significant evidence that the election was rigged from the top). But more importantly, it put the Supreme Leader firmly in the Ahmedinejad camp, giving him very little room to maneuver, and very few good exits if things didn't go smoothly.

And then they didn't go smoothly. Now, Mousavi and his gang of youngsters are standing up and demanding the vote be annulled. Obviously if Khameini annulled the vote after praising it, he would have serious legitimacy problems himself. His leadership would be questioned, his impartiality would be laughed at. So he has compromised a bit--he is supporting a "recount," but insists that any serious challenges to the regime will be met by the Republican Guard. The recount is a 12-day total event, which is strategic as well: it is just long enough that he hopes to sap the protesters of some energy and momentum, and short enough that it does not make sense to stage a full-time sit-in in Freedom Square (ala Tiananmen).

And many friends of mine have likened this situation to that of Tiananmen, but there are a few differences. First, it's short (Tiananmen was a month in coming before the major crackdown). Second, the youngsters/reformers have not yet taken control of the city (whereas China had lost all control of Beijing by the time the tanks had to smash in). Third, new technology (and limited control by the Iranians over it) has allowed for constantly-shifting information and communication sources, proxies, etc, that are evading government attempts to shut it down. Finally, the protesters are actually making an ultimately much smaller, much more legitimate, and much more conceivable demand: instead of asking for Democracy from scratch, they are simply asking that the vote be counted honestly--and Mousavi is (or at least was) not a major challenger to the legitimacy of the Religious regime (though Khameini may have forced him into that camp, and Mousavi has taken advantage of it: rather than appealing to Khameini, he appealed to the more religiously academic Guardian Council, who were the first to note the irregularities). But most importantly, the kids of Tehran are very different from the kids of China. While the Chinese regime was built on a rebellion, Confucian culture had, for thousands of years, emphasized the importance of the relationship between leader and subordinate. It is ingrained in Chinese culture, even today--the Cultural Revolution was a very strange departure from that, and it was one that the Chinese very firmly put behind them as soon as it was over. Rebellion was a bit strange and foreign to many of the Tiananmen youngsters, and when they got shot at, they scattered.

But it will not be so easy for the Iranian regime. Already, the volunteer Basij (a pro-government milita) stormed the university that many protesters were camped in, smashing, looting, and beating. Basij has shot and killed 8 protesters, and wounded 28 more. There have been street clashes with rocks, batons, fire. The protesters have already set fire to a Revolutionary Guard building that the Basij worked out of. These are unlikely the makings of a successful violent revolution, but it is clear that the protesters are not afraid of violent conflict.

And so we look to Iran's history for the explanation of such an embrace. Shia Islam was built, thousands of years ago, on rebellion. It was a proclaimation that the Sunni Caliphate was illegitimate, and that disobedience of evil leadership was a virtue. The Shiites were (in the past) the primary terrorists/assassins of Islam, and the Iranian Revolution was a predictable (rather than strange) consequence of the CIA-installed Shah. Since then, Iran has proudly indoctrinated its children with this rebellious spirit--it's why Iran's domestic politics allow its foreign policy to be so rogue and confrontational in nature. In the war against Iraq, millions of youngsters donned red bandanas and literally ran across open desert, unarmed, at machine gun emplacements and tanks, howling like banshees, climbing over their dead brethren, in order to either join the Martyrs or rip the Iraqis apart with their own hands. They suffered immense casualties, but their will never broke. This is the legacy that these kids inherit. And now, Iran's most dangerous weapon to any outsider has now been turned, in part, on the regime. These kids will accept conflict, violence, and casualties, and they are not afraid to inflict them. Trying to break up the millions of Tehran protesters will be a whole heck of a lot harder than breaking up Tiananmen. And it will turn a huge chunk of the country (even tentative supporters of Ahmedinejad) against the regime for a very long time, should it happen. It would seal that the regime rules by force, terror, and authoritarianism, rather than by the will of its people. Such an outcome would be disastrous, even if the protesters went home.

So Khameini must find some way to end this. If he does not, he is doomed. But he is in a very difficult position, and that makes him incredibly dangerous: he cannot simply call Mousavi the winner. He would undermine his own authority and anger a different very large chunk of the population in a similar way. The recount still has the potential to lead to another vote--either that, or it will simply erode Ahmedinejad's lead and declare him the winner anyway. Both moves are difficult. But I do not believe that telling the protesters, "recount done, Ahmedinejad won, go home," is likely to work. Any exit now is going to be bad for the regime, but perhaps, the least bad way is to rig the "recount" such that there is a second vote, and let Mousavi squeak by with a victory.

If Khameini is foolish (and he rarely is), he will seek some exit where he takes almost no political flak. This would make him the most dangerous of all, as he would do something neither I nor my friends have yet predicted. But tomorrow, millions (likely) will assemble in Freedom Square, once again defying Khameini's decree, to mourn the dead protesters with Mousavi leading the entire gang. While foreign journalists are not prestent, Twitter and Facebook still are, and their ever-watching eye will make this public. Mousavi is putting the regime in a difficult place: let him stand up defiantly and do as he pleases, or brutally force him out and kill dozens, hundreds, or even thousands of Iran's finest youngsters? Both options are terrible. Tomorrow will be a dangerous day, and Mousavi knows this. Many of his supporters know this.

Even if they manage to kill Mousavi, there are others. Kharoubi is an excellent second choice for the reformers, and even more liberal than Mousavi. He could take the helm, with a newfound fury from the reformers.

But Khameini is clever, despite his recent mistakes. And the Guardian Council's support of the recount means he is under a lot of pressure to not simply try and crush this defiance. I am not sure what he will do in the long term. Tomorrow, he is likely to send the police to try to keep the protesters off-balance, but is unlikely to authorize deadly force. Unfortunately, this is likely to have little effect. All we can do from here is watch and hope, and see what he will do.

I leave you with some of the more compelling pictures of the conflict so far.

Protesters in Tehran.

Fire-barricades to Ward Off Police.

Recent demonstration in Freedom Square.

Ahmedinejad with Basij Commanders.

Protesters Outside of Iran (As Evidenced by Lack of Headscarves)

A Woman with "Man = Woman" in Farsi on her Hands.

The 2-Million Strong Rally

A Riot Police Officer Confronts a Protester (Peacefully).

Revolutionary Guard Compound Ablaze.

A Man Shot or Beaten by Basij or Police.

Riot Police Chase and Beat a Protester.

The Recount

The Guardian Council announced today that they would be recounting "Contested" districts, but that Iranian constitutional law does not allow them to annul the vote. This is entirely possibly true, and I really have little enough interest in studying Iranian Constitutional Law to figure this out. Either way, it won't be annulled, which leaves a few options from here.

1) Recount supports status quo. If the Guardian Council wants Ahmedinejad to win, and only really cares about dampening the blow of stealing the election, then they will close the gap a bit, admit some mistakes, but let him squeak by. This, I think, is the most likely outcome.

2) Recount leads to re-vote. If the recount puts Ahmedinejad under 50% and nobody over 50%, then he and Mousavi will face off in a re-vote. The Guardian Council here would have to be either seriously dedicated to honesty or seriously terrified of unrest to go this path. It is possible this will happen if they recount (by which I mean, "accurately report in") enough districts, especially urban areas.

3) Recount leads to Mousavi victory. This is pretty unlikely. One of Mousavi's big complaints was that his districts had problems of intimidation, extortion, and woeful under-balloting--the Guardian Council is ignoring all of these problems by ordering a recount, and not an annulment. Such an outcome would also be pretty obviously admitting massive fraud, rather than just a bunch of mistakes/irregularities, and the Guardian Council would very much like to avoid that. Even if they decide Mousavi should win, they're going to send it to another vote to do that.

If option 1 is chosen, the options for the Mousavi crowd are acquiescence or revolution--the latter being particularly tough given the brutal, fanatical, and gun-toting nature of the Revolutionary Guard (and the "progressive" curtailment of citizens owning weapons in Iran). But they can make enough trouble to seriously cripple the administration in the eyes of the West and even much of the Arab world, but they're going to need to do a lot of dying to do so.

If option 2 is chosen, there is some hope, but Iran continues to block phone service, pro-Mousavi websites, etc, and continues to jail reformist politicians. Organization will be difficult, but it can be guaranteed that anyone that stayed home in the last vote will come out this time as part of the Green Revolution. This is the option where the Guardian Council gets to gain (rather than burn) some popularity by appearing to save the country from some corrupt lower bureaucrats, or something similar.

But, now all one can do is sit back and wait. The US' decision not to publicly denounce the election may be working in their favor--Iran is making a big fuss over the EU having done it, and if there's anything that can kick up Ahmedinejad support, it's the US or Israel appearing to try and interfere with Iranian politics. I give the Clinton/Obama crowd a lot of credit for that level of discretion and wisdom.

I'm Officially Calling it Fraud

A surprisingly good Time article outlines why one should be "suspicious" of Iran's election.

A few of the major reasons:
1) Consistent results across districts. This is highly unlikely actually true, given that Mousavi polled much better in cities (with what little polling there was), and Ahmedinejad better in rural areas. The demographics and voter issues are very different. Consistency across districts likely means someone pulled some numbers out of the air and threw them down.
2) Ahmedinejad won in every major city. Also unlikely. Some cities are particularly wealthy, young, educated, and were all but painted green the week before the election.
3) Ahmedinejad beat Mousavi in his own home town. This is just absurd. Mousavi was almost certainly most popular in his own district, and it is simply unbelievable that he could not win it.
4) Karoubi got less than 1% of the vote. This would suggest that many of Karoubi's personal campaign volunteers bailed on him at the polls.

The fact that Ahmedinejad beat Mousavi by approximately the same margin in every district, city or rural, and in Mousavi's home town are so statistically improbable that those that care about empirics cannot accept it. This election was rigged; I am officially calling it fraud.

Frankly, this is bad election rigging. Ahmedinejad had a serious popularity base, and as a friend said, "he could have gotten over 50% of the vote if the Ministry had bothered to count the votes." And, frankly, it is surprising that these results are so poorly rigged. As another friend said, "I could do better than this with the 2005 results and a python shell."

But with such blatantly rigged results, why is the US not standing up and calling it rigged? Perhaps Obama/Clinton fear that overt attacks on the election could harden the shell of the conservatives in power of the Guardian Council, or otherwise provide firepower/motivation against a new election. The EU is being more overt about it, perhaps because they are not as hot a topic as the US, or perhaps because they tend to follow a bit of a more friendly-idealistic foreign policy. Who knows.

But the clearly-rigged nature of this election gives more credibility to the allegedly-leaked results (although Ahmedinejad getting third seems unlikely, too, given how much noise his own supporters made). Unfortunately, the Council will struggle to be able to say, "oh, wow, hey, we found the real results!" and just publish them--it would be an admitting of systematic, centralized fraud and fakery. More likely, if they capitulate, they will find a few folks in the Interior Ministry they don't like, sack/imprison/kill them, and say that there were "sufficient irregularities" to require a second election, push it through, and only then give Mousavi the win. But, we can certainly hope for that.

Iran's Ever-Complex Election Aftermath

Iran's post-election situation seemed rather bleak for the pro-reformers (and for the West) after the election commission announced Ahmedinejad's landslide victory. But I am getting some conflicting reports on the situation, so bear with me, but I will try to summarize and analyze as best as I can.

After the election, Mousavi and Ahmedinejad both claimed victory. The state media then announced that Ahmedinejad had achieved a pretty stunning 62% of the vote, which is a number that really nobody in the West can seriously claim is or is not a good estimate of his actual support. Mousavi called foul, claiming that members of the election commission told him that he had a serious lead (around 58%) when the polls closed (which he claims had led to his claiming victory). After crying foul, Mousavi's supporters took to the streets, in defiance of Khameini's decree, and began protesting (which, of course, turned intio rioting with busses burning, shops breaking, etc). Obviously, there have been lots of clashes between protesters and police. Sometimes, protesters were broken up--sometimes, the police ran. Lots of people have been beaten up, arrested, probably killed.

Iran arrested Mousavi and put him under house arrest at some point, though he is clearly out now. Other reformists were also arrested, as was the Supreme Leader's daughter, who has at least sympathized with Mousavi's cause. I'm not sure what her status is, currently.

Iran cut off cell phone service to Tehran, and packed it with police. It has also tried to shut down all pro-Mousavi websites, but its Internet censorship team is not anything on part with China's, and they are largely failing to keep the ever-morphing mass of information from jumping around between different websites, twitter accounts, and whatnot. People are staying informed, and organized.

Some allegedly-leaked information from the Interior Ministry shows Ahmedinejad in third place after the election (even after apparent ballot-rigging, extortion and intimidation, etc). The numbers:

Mousavi (Independent Reformer): 19.1 Million (45.8%)
Kharoubi (Etemad-e-Melli): 13.4 Million (32.1%)
Ahmedinejad (Abadgaran): 5.7 Million (13.7%)
Rezai (Independent Conservative): 3.5 Million (8.4%)

If these numbers are true, they have incredible implications. First, the run-off vote would be between two reformers (with Mousavi the clear favorite), basically sealing a big victory (and relief) for the West in Iran. Second, Ahmedinejad's policies are so woefully unpopular that he would have the worst incumbent turnout in any presidential election I can even conceive of. Third, and finally: massive, systemic, planned fraud from the very top was designed to make sure this election went one way. If these numbers are true, then Khameini deeply feared the results, and with good reason. Such overwhelming (almost 80%) support for reformist candidates would put great pressure on him, and great support behind the President. He does indeed answer to a series of religious elites in Iran, and many of them actually care about Iran and its people (who knew!).

And the pressure from the electorate to void these results is starting to trickle into such elite circles. A group of influential Ayatollahs have called for the election results to be nullified, and the election to be re-taken in order to win the confidence of the Iranian people. I have heard scattered reports that there are election commission officials calling for a re-vote with better controls of irregularities. The West is finally coming out and making calls for investigations, although cautiously.

Today, Mousavi (somehow getting out of house arrest?) appeared in Tehran in front of (what an Iranian police officer said was) 1.5-2 million supporters, in defiance of the Supreme Leader and under explicit threat of deadly force. He has whipped Tehran into a fervor, and is trying to keep the energy up in order to keep the pressure on the leadership high. He has the momentum, and he knows it.

At this point, the Supreme Leader needs to seriously worry about losing control of Tehran and having to resort to an incredible massacre with the Revolutionary Guard. In order to try to assuage anger, he is actually calling for investigations into the "irregularities" cited by Mousavi.

This could be one of two things: first, he could actually be balking to pressure, and plans to call a new vote (it is unlikely he will flat-out declare Mousavi the winner). Second, and perhaps more likely, he will probably stretch out the investigation in the hopes that the energy of Tehranians will fizzle, and then declare that despite some irregularities, Ahmedinejad still won. The second path is dangerous--these youngsters are largely on summer vacation, and they don't actually have normal lives to return to in the next two months. Mousavi has almost nothing to lose, as he'll surely be thrown in jail of Ahmedinejad walks out of this with the win. That said, all these kids can threaten to do is give Iran an ever-increasing public relations scandal, and undermine Ahmedinejad's authority abroad. But will he care? Will the Supreme Leader? That is a question with bleaker possibilities.

But, frankly, there is hope. Mousavi and his band of youngsters have not only shaken up Iranian politics, they have changed the face of Iran to the West forever. Even if Ahmedinejad emerges with the presidency, the West shall always look to Iran's people with great sympathy, as their fight for liberty tugs our heartstrings. They share many of our values. They remind us of the best of ourselves. That, alone, may change the West's relationship with Iran--or at least its policy towards it. But, further, there is a chance that the Supreme Leader will decide that the safe route is a route of lower risk--one that does not involve such obvious lies and deception, but one that bends to the will of Iran's citizens, and allows Mousavi the chance to do what he can. Iran's religious leadership has weathered reformers before, and while Mousavi promises to be quite effective, it will weather them again: Khameini has very little to lose by sweeping in and playing hero to the Iranian people by using his hand to call a new vote and hand Mousavi the victory. In fact, he may decide that this moment in his legacy is one where he does, indeed, want to play the hero, rather than the villain.

Post-Election Tension in Iran

Ahmadinejad apparently got 62% of the vote, giving him the win outright. Frankly, I wouldn't be surprised if that was nearly true. But Mousavi is calling foul, alleging vote-rigging, intimidation, etc. The US has yet to make an announcement on the issue.

In response, Mousavi supporters have taken to the streets in Tehran. Buses are being burned, shops broken, etc. Tehran needs to avoid a total crackdown, but the Revolutionary Guard has promised to deal decisively with the problem. Additionally, cell phone services are currently suspended in the Tehran area, and websites related to Mousavi have been blocked.

The chance that this will turn into a full-fledged revolution is quite low, and without such a push, the protests are unlikely to go far. They may damage the regime internationally--or at least with the West--if their fury can provoke Western nations into condemning the outcome. But such condemnations are likely to drive Iran's policymakers deeper into partisanship.

Initial Results Out

According to Twitter's @BreakingNews, preliminary official results give Ahmadinejad a whopping 70% of the vote (to Mousavi's 28%). Tough to believe, but either the people or the dictatorial religious leadership of Iran wanted to make sure he won, and it doesn't really matter which group made that decision.

I was really looking forward to not having to remember how to write "Ahmadinejad."

And So Quickly It Gets Complicated

Now both sides are claiming victory. We're going to wait for numbers here at Foggofwar.

Followup: Canadian Parliament Suspended

It was even easier than I thought. Despite being Liberal-recommended, Governor General Jean agreed to suspend Canadian parliament today. The no-confidence vote, which Harper was expected to lose, will not happen--at least in the near future.

When parliament reconvenes in late January, both sides will have had a fair amount of time to make their point to voters. If Harper is able to get Canadian citizens on his side, then the opposition coalition will dare not bring the no-confidence vote--for then, Harper could call snap elections and potentially win a majority of seats. But if the Canadian people have in fact grown tired of the Conservatives only 2 months after giving them a near-majority power, then the no-confidence vote may go ahead, forcing Harper to bow out into opposition status.

But given how quickly the opposition coalition tried to push through the no-confidence vote, they are unlikely to benefit from 2 more months of jockeying and thinking among the Canadian populous. It will be hard to keep people excited for a change in government when nothing is getting done. And with the Governor General on his side, Harper can claim that the State will benefit from a continued Conservative government with more legitimacy.

The Canadian Political Crisis

After a second-straight gain in elections, the Conservative Party of Canada 143 of 308 seats--nearly a majority, and things looked good for Stephen Harper and his party.

Being good Conservatives, they decided that the fiscal crisis would probably be hurt by a too-hasty hemorrhaging of taxpayer loonies all over the economy, so they took a wait-and-see approach.

But the Liberals, New Democrats, and Bloc Quebequois aren't happy about this--so unhappy, in fact, that they've signed a deal to topple Harper's Conservatives and drop a 30 billion dollar package of their own. To actually oust the government, they would need to win a vote of no-confidence, which would need 155 votes (out of 308). But the Conservatives' 143 seats are unlikely to vote for the motion, meaning that the Conservatives would only have to convince 12 out of the remaining 165 representatives in house not to shake up the government. I don't know the propensity of Canadian reps to toe the party line, but this would be a doozie for the opposition almost anywhere.

But Harper's not taking any chances. Instead of letting the vote of no confidence go forward, he's asked the Governor General to suspend parliament until late January--when the Conservatives will present their budget for a vote. The move, if he can pull it off, would be quite brilliant. The whole justification of the opposition coalition's hostile takeover is a desire to put through a quick stimulus package--but if the Conservative budget in January is politically sound (and it likely will be, if they have the next 8 weeks to think about it), there will be little that an opposition coalition could accomplish beyond it. The original purpose of the coalition would be lost, as long as the budget looks good.

As angry as they'd be about having parliament suspended during the economic crisis, they'd have to find a new political reason to topple the Conservatives--they might hold a vote of no confidence on the grounds of irresponsibility; on the grounds that Harper wanted to suspend Parliament during tough times--but the opposition coalition can't blame Harper without more deeply (though unintendedly) blaming Governor General Jean, who was recommended by the last Liberal government and appointed at the pleasure of the Queen, and is not part of any political party. The members of House would be spitting on some pretty big wigs, and almost certainly are unwilling to do that.

So, if Harper can pull off the suspension, he'll take the wind out of the opposition's sails, and likely hold onto the government for the forseeable future. If not, he may have to face a no-confidence vote or test the wind to see if he'd fare well in a snap election, marking one of the shortest election periods in Canadian history. If he does call snap elections, he'll have to blame the opposition parties for putting politics before country, which he's already trying to do. If he wins a majority out of the snap elections (unlikely), then his government is in good shape for a fair many years.