Per Predictions, Round III of Ukraine War Begins for Mariupol

With ongoing wars in the Middle East, it's easy to forget the Ukraine conflict.

If you're outside of Ukraine, that is.

Russian-backed separatists violate the Minsk II protocols almost daily, usually through quick attacks that kill civilians or idle Ukrainian soldiers. Sometimes there are dozens of violations in a single day.

Over the weekend, separatists shelled the outskirts of Mariupol, killing a few people and wounding perhaps ten, using Russian-provided artillery. The pickup in activity around Mariupol comes alongside the massing of about 50,000 Russian troops on the Ukrainian border.

It's not particularly surprising: Mariupol is about 45% ethnically Russian and was a site of a number of pro-Russian protests, as well as fighting during the Donbass war. We've been predicting that it was next on the hit list since Minsk II was signed, largely because it would provide a major port city to a pro-Russian separatist state (resembling something like Abkhazia.

It's not yet clear how hot the fighting will get, and when. Russia is heavily dependent on propaganda to keep fervor whipped up among its citizens and foreign supporters. These shellings may be a probe (where plausible deniability is higher than a full attack) or an attempt to cause Ukraine to react heavily enough to "justify" another Russian incursion--a tactic that was used to great effect in the South Ossetia war. Shelling had picked up a few months ago before quieting down, and Ukraine may be simply gritting its teeth and trying to wait it out, rather than allowing itself to be goaded into giving Russia an excuse to return to Ukraine in force.

Why the US is Sending an Armored Brigade to Eastern Europe

Whether an armored brigade is "big" depends on the size of the pond it swims in.

At about 1100 armored vehicles (Abrams tanks, Bradley fighting vehicles, and some mobile artillery), such a brigade could easily overwhelm the conventional militaries of most small countries.

In the Eastern European theatre, an armored brigade is nothing close to large enough to be a game-changer. Russia's military sports about ten thousand pieces of active heavy armored equipment (tanks, fighting vehicles, and mobile artillery), most of which is dedicated to its western front.

Despite the numerical gap, the US is sending such a brigade to Eastern Europe, spread out from the Baltics all the way down to Romania. What we know is that such a brigade won't be a decisive force if Russia were to invade Sweden, the Baltic countries, Romania, or Poland (all of which it's threatened to do over the past few years). Why the effort, then?

Some analysts suggest it is a "symbolic" gesture for wary allies. I think a fifteen-second gut check suggests this hypothesis is weak: Eastern European countries are skeptical of NATO, terrified of Russia, and are smart enough to see past symbolic gestures. And US leadership is smart enough to see all of this.

I think what's really going on is that these vehicles are there to be a "positive deterrent" of sorts. That is, rather than deterring Russia by having overwhelming strength on the battlefield, this brigade deters Russia by promising that if Russia attacks one of these countries, the US will be dragged into the war: these units are mixed in with local units and have the right to defend such territory from invasion--all these countries are NATO allies. If that happened, US assets would be attacked and destroyed, with all the shock and fury on the domestic front that would come with that.

The United States' leadership would have almost no choice in the matter: they would face massive pressure to deploy more forces (probably first from Germany) in order to repel the Russians from whichever ally was attacked. For Russia the subsequent fight would be long and messy at best. If Russia lost, defeat could bankrupt the country, wreck Putin's reputation, and set the Russian military back years. Not to mention that countries like Ukraine and Sweden would likely hop on the express train to NATO and request heavy garrisoning by the US to prevent further Russian attacks.

So what this brigade does is that it embodies lessons from the errors of 2004 and 2014 that allowed Russia to invade and annex parts of Georgia and Ukraine. Russia's success in those conflicts depended on avoiding getting entangled with NATO and on pitting their forces only against the small domestic forces of their target territories, and on moving quickly enough that it won the status quo in the area. Such a strategy has worked so far, but its effectiveness would quickly end once an American battle tank was destroyed on the field. Russia could not have a quick, clean victory that way, and would no longer be able to use Europe's lethargy to its advantage.

Russia's leadership is also smart, and knows this. The US administration is putting American lives at risk, yes, but with the expectation that Putin will understand the consequences of attacking, and thus be far less likely to attack at all. It is a clever way of containing Russia in a world where Western European allies are afraid to get on Russia's bad side: the US uses its cowboy reputation to its advantage here, and deploys its own deterrent.

The final stroke of brilliance here is that it is a force that is too small to be a credible offensive threat to Russia, so Russia not only won't feel territorially threatened, but its leadership will have shaky ground on which to pretend that it feels threatened (and thus justify an arms race).

In a comparatively cheap, gentle stroke, the US has out-positioned Russia in most of Eastern Europe, putting time back on the West's side for sanctions to squeeze Russia into acquiescence. 

Little Wars: Escalation

Even in the past few days, we've seen escalation in the Little Wars.

Russia

As things heat up near Mariupol, Russia is adding command-and-control assets, air defense, and artillery to its border with Ukraine. NATO thinks Russia is readying for a new Ukraine offensive. Russia has rightly calculated that it's going to continue to get away with its offensives; the EU and US will neither provide arms nor guarantee Ukrainian sovereignty, which is about all Russia needs to feel invited to roll in.

Russia is also sending supersonic strategic bombers to Crimea, both establishing their hold over the area and getting some pretty deadly hardware as close as they can to Kyiv, just in case.

It's not that the West isn't responding in some ways. The US and Canada are throwing a bit of money at the problem, and the US is putting money into counter-propaganda in eastern Ukraine, where Russia is currently drumming up support by alleging systematic murder of Russian ethnic people by a fascist Kyiv government.

Iran

US warships are now escorting American-flagged cargo vessels through the Strait of Hormuz to prevent Iran from nabbing any more. This means a heavier, bristling fleet presence in Iran's territorial waters, which ups the ante and is probably designed to establish status quo US presence there, with Iranian aggression as the pretense. We'll see how Iran responds--there's not much they can do directly, but like the capture of the Maersk, they may find another way to be a thorn in the side of the US. Iran's motives for capturing the vessel are still unclear (and the public statements are highly dubious).

Busting the Axis

Iran is currently close to Russia in part because Russia does not have sanctions on the country, and Russia wants to keep it that way. 

If the Iranian nuclear deal works, the West will start trading with Iran again, which would be a huge boon for the economy. Frankly, the massive US/EU markets provide a much more appetizing treat for Iran than the sluggish Russian petro-conomy. Iran has more than enough petrochemicals and doesn't want vodka.

So Russia (and China) might actually be trying to "nuke" the deal, as it were. Forbes' Russia-China expert talks about it here (thanks to reader Nathan for pointing me to this).

The US could soften/weaken the alliance between Russia and Iran with the deal, as well as finally have access to Central Asia (also under Russia' indirect control), which would be a huge boost in the Great Game. 

Could the nuclear deal happen? Sure: the US and Russia made all sorts of similar deals throughout the Cold War, even while facing off in places like Korea, Vietnam, and Afghanistan.

Little Wars with Russia and Iran

We'll take a quick break from battle lines to look at the "little wars" going on between US/allies and Russia/Iran. Much like during the Cold War, we're seeing regional military action that threatens regional escalation as outside powers become more involved.

Russia

Shelling from rebels in Ukraine has started back up (using rocket launchers and tanks that are both banned and were-never-there-in-the-first-place), which we predicted after Minsk II: the deal with Russia caused successful withdrawal of Ukrainian troops from key areas--especially Mariupol, which is next on the rebel/Russian list of targets. Unsurprisingly, the shelling is happening in Shyrokyne (along with reported rebel presence and gunfire exchanges), just east of Mariupol.

Ukraine requested EU peacekeepers; they have been refused. But Poland and the US continue to reassure Kyiv that they will provide support. The US recently deployed anti-air batteries to eastern Ukraine and says it will keep sanctions on Russia until it has completely fulfilled Minsk II.

Even more interesting: Finland spotted what might be a Russian submarine off its coast in its territorial waters, and dropped depth charges with the intent of scaring it off. Sweden did the same in October.

This is another sign, along with continued military exercises near Estonia, that Russia is testing Western resolve and may be intending to create a clearer "sphere of influence" at its border areas where Western military powers cannot operate. Finland and Sweden aren't part of NATO and, like Ukraine, don't have that military umbrella (though unlike Ukraine, they are part of the EU and therefore have more standing to request help). Unlike Ukraine, their militaries are formidable and they do not have restive Russian populations, so don't expect an invasion any time soon; but there may be a rising conflict over the Baltic sea as Russia tries to expand its sphere.

Iran

Last week, US carrier Theodore Roosevelt moved to the coast of Yemen in order to turn away Iranian cargo ships likely carrying arms for Houthi rebels. The ships were deterred, meaning the US now has a partial blockade of Yemen and has for all purposes entered the conflict. Roosevelt has moved back to the Persian Gulf, but the point seems to have been made. 

Iran has responded.

For reasons not yet clear, 5 Iranian combat vessels intercepted a US (Marshal Islands) cargo vessel heading into the Strait of Hormuz, demanding it move towards Iran. After the cargo ship refused, Iran fired warning shots across its bow, and then escorted the ship into Iranian waters and boarded it.

The Strait of Hormuz is a free-go zone (it's all Iranian territorial water but is subject to innocent passage law). The ship may have moved closer to the shore than Iran may have liked, but typical protocol is to demand that such a ship leave, not come closer. So it's interesting behavior.

The US has sortied jets and a destroyer to the area to "monitor." 

American forces aren't likely to open fire or create a direct confrontation, but Iran now has 34 crew members held hostage. It may be a muscle-flexing strategy or Iran may be looking for a negotiating chip of some sort in its standoff with the US over Yemen.

It's the most direct conflict the US and Iran have had in the past few years. At the very least, Iran is making clear that it has no intent to be pushed around by the US, but the Obama administration is unlikely to respond to this by capitulating on Iranian arms shipments to Yemen.

Expect a simmering conflict here, as well.

Little Wars

Like in the Cold War, these "little wars" are unlikely to escalate into major superpower conflict--it's something nobody wants and something that's hard to back down from once started. 

The risk is that Iran and Russia are so inundated in comically-absurd propaganda that it might be politically difficult to save face if backing away from conflict, so these escalations must be managed very carefully.

This will be a longer-term trend over the next decade--the US' "war focus" is likely to shift to an ongoing cold war with Iran and Russia as its attention leaves Afghanistan and Iraq. Once ISIS is pushed out of Iraq and negotiations between Kabul and the Taliban are complete, the US will have its hands newly quite full with Russia and Iran.

But that is likely going to be a problem that comes to a head during the next administration.

Ukraine Eyeing NATO Membership -- the Ante is Upped for Putin

In 2010 Ukraine scrapped its plans to join NATO after pro-Russian Yakunovich was elected president.

Even after the Euromaidan protests that sent Yakunovich fleeing from the country, Ukraine's new government announced no plans to join NATO.

But when one is invaded repeatedly by one's large neighbor, sentiments change.

Ukraine's national security council has declared its support for joining NATO within the next 5 years, and parliament officially dropped Ukraine's "non-aligned" status. Ukrainian support for joining has jumped from 17% to over 50%. President Poroshenko is expected to approve the plan.

Russia will be furious. Russian leadership has already declared in 2014 that Finland joining NATO "could start World War 3," and they'll be even less happy about Ukraine.

The move would set up a show-down over Crimea, which Ukraine and NATO will continue to declare as sovereign to Ukraine. It's unlikely to turn into a war, but would almost certainly mean a heavy NATO troop presence in Ukraine, especially near Russia's border, and an attempt to maneuver Russia into withdrawing from Crimea in a game of soft brinksmanship, I wager.

Russia may well make moves to intimidate Ukraine the way it did Georgia in 2008--although it has already marched into Ukraine several times and seems to be having the opposite effect. Most likely, Russia will issue fairly overt military threats contingent upon Ukraine joining NATO, which will either cow Ukraine or increase its urgency for the alliance.

It's also not 100% clear that NATO will allow Ukraine's entry in the midst of the crisis. NATO's Article 10 requires unanimous consent from all current members to allow a new one to join. The US is likely hungry for Ukrainian membership, but the core European powers that are currently fairly dependent on Russian oil and gas will be more reluctant.

That said, with Russia's economy reeling, "cutting off" oil and gas would be tantamount to imposing new sanctions on itself--an economic shooting of oneself in the foot. Russia is willing to tolerate much more pain than Germany and France, but it might not be able to afford cutting off the money flow from two of its biggest customers.

What we'll keep an eye on is specifically how Putin tries to flex Russia's military muscle (as its economic muscles weaken) to try to knock Ukraine back off the NATO track.

Russia, Israel, Iran, and the Dark Reality of Diplomacy

All zero-sum international negotiations are shaped by the size of the guns on the table. This is the dark reality of diplomacy: when one is trying to convince someone to give up a critical behavior (stop a nuclear weapons program, stop invading Ukraine), or start a new one (less common on the modern world order), the key unspoken factor underlying the negotiations is the potential use of force.

The United States and other Western powers are in negotiations that they are struggling with:

• Russia continues to hold Crimea, and isn't planning on giving it back
• Iran is developing advanced nuclear capability and years of negotiations have brought a maybe-acceptable proposal (I still haven't done enough work here to analyze it)
• Israel keeps building settlements in the West Bank

At this point, it's unlikely that the US is going to get what it wants in any of these negotiations, due to one simple fact: it lacks the will to exert its power, and therefore has no bargaining power.

In essence, when the US is trying to compel behavioral change, the other partner asks, "what are the consequences if I refuse?" Currently, the answer is "nothing," so there is no reason to agree unless the carrots are really, really big. And the US currently has no stick available, as it is unwilling to go to interstate war. And in this, it brings no guns to the table: they're all left at home.

In Iran, Professor Muravchik suggests that the Iranians are so ideological and bent on empire that sanctions have little impact, and lifting them (to bring material prosperity) just isn't important enough for the Iranians to not also require a "stick" to change the equation. But despite the blundering letter by 47 Republican congresspeople, the US is not willing to strike Iran's nuclear facilities with aircraft. In fact, the President might have said that he'd even shoot down Israeli planes doing the same. Because the US has no appetite for war, Iran can hold out indefinitely--it gets what it wants by doing nothing, and will only be moved if the US offers something somehow better than nuclear weapons--I just struggle to imagine what that would be.

In Russia, the game is similar. I won't speak at too much length here as we mention it in a recent post, but in summary: Putin enjoys over 80% approval (compared to Obama's 47% and US Congress' 8%) domestically despite the West's sanctions and the drop of the ruble. This won't change, even with more sanctions. Until and unless the US or NATO are able to credibly threaten a military response, Russia will continue to take advantage of the relative gap in resistance to establish its status quo rule over Georgia, Ukraine and probably the Baltics.

Despite the US' ongoing frustration with Israel's settlement construction in the West Bank and suspended peace talks with Fatah, threatening to withdraw the over-$3Billion/yr military aid to Israel is simply not on the table, probably due to concerns for Israel's immediate security. It's a different example than Russia and Iran, but another place where the US is unwilling to use a threat of risk to a nation's security in negotiation.

Until this changes, the US will have no bargaining power here or with China, North Korea, the Taliban, Syria's Assad, or any other frustrating group. Whether or not some of these issues are worth military intervention is a question that should be taken on a case-by-case basis. The point of this article is to simply drive home the fact that negotiations with powers like Iran will always end in failure if the military option is totally off the table; it is unwise to expect anything else.

The Baltics as Russia's Next Target -- And Their Loss of Confidence in NATO

Thanks to reader Tom G. for the inspiration on this one.

I continue to be convinced that Putin's Russia has its sights on the Baltics as it looks to expand its "sphere of influence" back to Soviet days (The Economist has its own take on this idea). This isn't for completely arbitrary reasons: as we discussed way back in 2011 in the series (probably my favorite from my rapidly-approaching-400-posts) on the Blocanization of Europe, and again in May 2014, Russia is not doing this for arbitrary reasons.

Its natural security, according to the "realist" International Relations school, depends on its ability to keep its industry, natural resources, and population centers secure, and that means land buffers (as well as other defensive measures like tactical nuclear weapons, air defenses, etc) between NATO and its core.

And note that all this stuff is jammed right up on its western border (below is a map of population density in Russia).

Source

We also discussed why holding Sevastopol was important: to have access to a warm water port that Russia might have lost had Ukraine gone into NATO. Putin made it all-but-clear that this was the motivation for invading Crimea when he said recently that Russia decided to annex the territory when Ukraine ousted President Yakunovych: while the propaganda was about "protecting Russian citizens" (a la the Sudetenland), the reason to focus first on Crimea was about the Sevestapol warm water port, and the risk that the new pro-EU Ukrainian government would wrest it from Russia.

Putin's declaration of a "New Russia" in eastern Ukraine is creepily akin to Hitler's "Lebensraum," particularly because it has the same motivations. Hitler did not want Eastern Europe simply to have more territory: it was about security.

But not all is secure in Russia even if it does settle with Ukraine in the way it wants (and it will, I think). St. Petersburg remains at serious risk from NATO's presence in the Baltics, and pulling the Baltics under Russia's control is arguably even more important than having eastern Ukraine. It's just not on the table yet because Russia is using Ukraine--a non-NATO country--to test NATO's will.

(And we still remember the Georgian invasion and the successful annexation of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, yes?)

But the Baltics are NATO Countries--Could He Really Take Them Over?
Sure. Putin is excellent at messaging, enough so that even today the West is still trying to make the case that Russia has sent troops into Eastern Ukraine (rather than it being so widely believed and obvious that nobody talks about whether it's true anymore). Putin is clever enough to not simply declare war and march in.

Russia has been using "cyber warfare" against Estonia and has stepped up efforts to incite unrest in its 25% Russian population (Latvia also has a 25% Russian population and is similarly worried).

In Ukraine, Russia has used non-uniformed troops (the famous "little green men") in both Crimea and eastern Ukraine, and has focused on arming annexationist rebels to keep a shroud of plausible deniability. Its efforts in both Ukraine and Georgia have been nothing short of brilliant.

But even if it did invade directly: Estonia and Latvia are tiny, and Russia could overwhelm them in hours. It's already frequently conducting military exercises on the border, any of which could turn into an invasion--Israel famously used this tactic in the six-day war. And if it does invade and deploy extensive anti-air defenses, NATO would have to commit to a bloody, protracted campaign to defeat Russia militarily in order to get them to back off. And much like Germany in 1939, Russia has good reason to believe that just won't happen. So after it wraps up Ukraine, it might just go ahead with the Baltics, after the heat has died down and the Americans have become too distracted in the Middle East to mount a credible response.

Hold On: Why Do You Keep Comparing Putin to Hitler?
Putin is obviously not a madman hellbent on committing genocide upon an entire race of people, so don't take it the wrong way.

But Putin is interested in taking over swaths of Europe, and for similar reasons as the Germans. It's worth noting that Germany had gone to war with its neighbors many times before WW2 in its short history as a unified nation, for always the same reasons: security. Putin's "testing the West" behavior is similar to Hitler's in the 1930's, and the propaganda of "protecting ethnic peoples" is similar. The West's response is note quite as weak as in Munich, but Russia is willing to deal with sanctions, and support for Putin remains over 80% even as the economy takes a major hit. His absolutely brilliant propaganda campaign is galvanizing the Russian people for an ongoing war with the West. Sanctions aren't a deterrent, and won't be: pretending they will be is probably naive.

Back to Business: Aren't NATO Countries Obligated to Act?
They're obligated to act, but as the Economist points out, Article V leaves ambiguity in the type of action member states are obligated to take. It doesn't require that NATO countries use military force, which is important. Russia has held off so far invading NATO countries, but it's running out of buffer-states to build without going to NATO countries like the Baltics for that security it craves.

The Baltics and the Visegrad 4 are both taking matters into their own hands as their confidence in NATO wanes. The V4 formed their own battle group, independent of NATO command. The Baltics are stepping up defense spending as Russia flies daily "exercises" near their borders. They're losing confidence in NATO's willingness to defend them. Sadly, the Baltics are not going to be able to resist Russia's invasion, but they may be depending on the V4 to act when NATO doesn't: Joe Biden actually went to Poland to keep Poland from leading the V4 against Russia when it invaded Crimea.

Germany wanted to station troops in the Baltics as a response. This would put NATO lives on the line, meaning that Russian attacks would risk killing NATO military personnel--increasing the impetus to go to war for NATO--essentially a form of deterrent. This was shut down in Brussels.

So What's Going to Happen?

The question, as usual, is ultimately about deterrence: does Russia believe the US and NATO will get alarmed enough to shed blood over Russia's next military move? Ultimately: did Putin see oh-so-much wormlike behavior in Minsk? If so, deterrence has failed.

On another note, the Blogger search feature is actually quite impressive. If you want to do a deeper-dive on any serious topic like Russia, Iraq, Afghanistan, ISIS, etc, I've pretty-enthusiastically tagged everything I've written, so a simple topic search will get you some rich and historical stuff. 

Short: Debalsteve Falls

It seems Putin is not happy with the ceasefire.

Debaltseve fell yesterday (take a look at the live map here) as rebels pushed ahead with completing their takeover of the town, using all the heavy equipment that was supposed to be pulling out days ago. Ukrainian government troops broke out of the encirclement rather than be captured--the retreating column was picked apart by tank and rocket fire.

Debaltseve is critical to an independent Luhansk and Donetsk because it's a major rail depot between the two capital cities. I think this is why Russia raced in heavy weapons to support the encirclement and capture of the town. There's some patchy evidence that Russia and the rebels may have doubled down around Debaltseve during the ceasefire, moving troops from other towns in the belief that Ukraine would not counter-attack.

In a way, well done.

Expect Mariupol to be next on the hit list.

So There's a Ceasefire in Ukraine? Probably Not. But Either Way: Putin's Winning Again.

The give-peace-a-chance summit at Minsk went all night, but a peace deal came out.

At least it appears so.

Warning that my complete lack of sympathy for Russia in all this is going to come through, but I want to try to set what-I-think-is the record straight.

The peace deal included the leaders of: Ukraine, France, Germany, Russia. It was signed, quite reluctantly (or at least they put on a show of reluctance) by two rebel leaders.

The Charlotte Observer has a pretty good summary of the peace deal; I'll touch on a few points.

1) All "foreign" fighters are to leave Ukraine.
2) All "foreign" heavy weapons are to be pulled out of Ukraine.
3) Ukraine will grant its eastern provinces partial autonomy--including free trade with Russia.
4) The eastern Ukrainian provinces get to hold referenda on their status. Luckily, this time it'll be run by Kiev with outside observers, rather than the incredible sham that was Crimea.

All of this begs the question: if Russia does not have troops or heavy weapons in Ukraine, how is it supposed to agree to pull them out?

The situation would be a spectacular joke if it weren't the case that Russia is continually getting away with invading another country, killing people, gobbling up territory, and facing no consequences.

There is ample evidence Russia has been there in huge force. NATO keeps releasing satellite photography of Russian heavy weapons, APCs, etc, crossing the border and going deep into Ukraine. Russia has sent a bunch of cargo trucks into Ukraine to pick up as many as 4,000 Russian bodies and bring them home--despite said bodies having never been there. Ukraine keeps capturing Russian regular soldiers, including paratroopers, who keep claiming that they are "lost" in Ukraine and were most definitely not sent there on purpose. Ukraine keeps stumbling across Russian military ID's scattered about its country. Ukrainian rebels keep getting their hands on Russian tanks, rocket launchers, APCs, guns, etc (including the sophisticated SAM that shot down the Malaysian Airlines plane)--we know they're Russian specifically because the Ukrainians don't use these weapons and they can't simply be captured in Ukraine by the rebels..

The Russians' continued denial of involvement in Ukraine has reached a comical absurdity.

Time for More Mayhem

The ceasefire doesn't start until February 15th, and there are likely plans to consolidate more territory into rebel hands before the ceasefire comes into effect, in order to have leverage during the ceasefire implementation. Russia sent about 90 heavy vehicles into Ukraine during the peace talks, and I'll bet they're heading for Debaltseve , which has been surrounded by rebels honing in on Ukrainian government troops and pounded by Russian rockets and artillery that is definitely not there. 

Tactically, it's a Battle of the Bulge-style disaster for Ukraine if it indeed loses Debaltseve before the ceasefire comes into effect.

From  the Wall Street Journal

The following constantly-updated map shows that Debaltseve has not yet fallen, but is nearly surrounded completely.

Putin Wins Again

With the Sudetenland Crimea even more securely in hand with  this deal, Putin is going to end up with much of what he wants in Ukraine--and the ceasefire might actually hold if Russia is satisfied (the Chicago Tribune has a great piece on how the deal is set up to give Russia and the rebels lots of excuses to start fighting again if it's in their interest). If Russian support is actually pulled, the rebels will have a more frustrating time beating the Ukrainian army--the fall counter-offensive by Kyiv is what led to a shrinking of rebel-held territory until the Russians brought arms and troops back into the fight.

Of course, not even Putin has full control over the rebels in eastern Ukraine. If the referendum doesn't end up resulting in "annexation by Russia," I suspect the rebels will pick right back up, and Putin is likely to continue not-supporting them until even more concessions are made.

But what else has Putin won? 

1) The autonomy for eastern Ukraine gives Russia a heavy lever to make sure Ukraine does not join NATO. As we discussed before, Ukraine joining NATO would be a major strategic, long-term security threat for Russia, and the invasion of Crimea secured Russia's only warm-water port in Sevastopol.

2) The referenda obviously might result in more territory--and thus more buffer space--for Russia. Interestingly, such buffer space might actually lead to Ukraine as a whole becoming more EU/NATO-leaning (as pro-Russian populations leave the country), but it makes the territorial integrity of Russia generally safer.

3) Russia once again sets the precedent that it can use military force to invade a neighboring country and win its political/strategic goals without consequence.

4) The ceasefire likely won't hold, and Russia will have won concessions from Ukraine for nothing in return. 

Some readers may think that my not-so-subtle reference to Nazi Germany here is overblown or even absurd. The Russians do not share the simply absurd evil of the Nazis, but it's the most recent and well-known example of expansionist powers testing the resolve of European leaders, seeing their will to be wanting, and then making ever-greater moves.

As a "realist" (this is a school of International Relations theory, rather than simply a haughty impression of myself), I believe the greatest risk for peace in a region of states (rather than a region run by militias and ethnosectarian groups, like the Middle East) is a lack of deterrence. The repeated failure to deter military invasions of Russia's neighbors is cause for serious long-term concern.

The US and UK Part from the EU

The US and UK are both planning on sending military aid (weapons) to the Ukrainians if the fighting picks back up. Even if it doesn't, the US is sending training teams to improve Ukraine's military--no doubt these trainers are also likely to be assistant coordinators if/when the war picks back up.

The EU continues to want to avoid getting embroiled in the war, so new friction is emerging between Germany/France and the US/UK, putting NATO unity at risk. Such continued discord is what makes the Visegrad 4 (Poland, Hungary, Czech Republic, Slovakia) so nervous and independent.

No, the Ruble Falling Doesn't Mean Russia is Hosed

A friend recently shared an article with me about the ruble dropping (partly in response to sanctions) and asked me what I thought about it.

Go read it first, it's quick. I'm not going to summarize.

Read it yet? No, really, go do it.

Alright, good. Below is a modification of my original response, which I just wanted to share with everyone.

First, I think "2 guys got arrested" --> "Russia's economy is eating itself" is a grossly over-inflated and completely un-supported assertion here. Putin is on top because he does a great job specifically pitting his oligarchs against each other and reminding them that he can snap his fingers and crush them at any time... while keeping them rich. So the government still doing that is not surprising.

The oligarchs aren't in charge of the justice system (Putin wouldn't trust that) so I don't see how the arrests relate at all to oligarchical bickering. 

The ruble dropping isn't great, but it does mean that you can buy more bread (domestically made) for each barrel of oil you sell, so Russia's gas/oil imports will be buffeted here against the drop in the general price of oil/gas. 

Dropping one's currency is also a way to pivot an economy towards internal manufacturing, which may also be a deliberate move by Putin's administration to become less foreign-dependent, and it may be a sign of an economic strategy rather than just a political one. 

So yes, Russia is "digging in," and no doubt, it's getting ready to survive long-haul sanctions. But that doesn't mean the Russian economy is going to collapse. Putin is a smart guy. If he's planning to lose trade with the West, the first thing one wants to do is create as much domestic manufacturing as possible, and the ruble dropping is step one to doing that (because imports get expensive, exports get profitable, so local manufacturing is stimulated). The pain of the ruble dropping will pass as entrepreneurs seize on the opportunity to build new industries that take advantage of new domestic cost advantages. Russia's got the metal to make a lot of what it imports, excepting the luxuries that wealthy Russians love so much (but we don't need to worry about them). 

They'll be fine. The only way to really choke off the Russians is to cut oil/gas imports dramatically, and the Europeans aren't ready to feel the sting of that, themselves.

Eastern Ukraine in Full-Scale Civil War

Just a few snippets:

Literally hundreds of pro-Russian insurgents keep attacking bases and border posts:
http://www.usnews.com/news/world/articles/2014/06/02/ukraine-says-insurgents-attack-border-guards

Insurgents from Russia are using occupied border posts to pour through and reinforce eastern Ukrainians. Of course Russia is not really doing anything to prevent this:
http://www.cbsnews.com/news/russian-fighters-killed-along-with-insurgents-in-eastern-ukraine/

Ukrainian troops are battling insurgents for control over dozens of locations, like border posts, government buildings, and a big airport:
http://www.thewire.com/global/2014/05/hours-after-ukrainian-elections-pro-russian-separatists-seize-airport/371579/

The insurgents are well-armed: having taken some armories and (embarrassingly) APCs, they're doing more than your typical AK-47 wielding civilian. They were even able to shoot down a Ukrainian helicopter:
http://www.thewire.com/global/2014/05/ukrainian-helicopter-shot-down-by-rebels-leaving-14-dead/371789/

The military has the advantage in training and equipment, and killed 300 (probably) insurgents as they close in on Slaviansk. That's a crazy-big number for the kind of war this is:
http://time.com/2821792/ukraine-russia-slaviansk/

Putin of course making matters worse by jacking up prices on Ukrainian gas and cutting off supplies from Crimea. Ukraine refuses to pay the extra fee (but is paying at the old rate), generally considering this extortion. Now, of course, Russia is planning to cut off supplies entirely:
http://www.thewire.com/global/2014/05/putin-speech-ukraine-spief-2014/371491/

NATO's response for the moment is to fund/train Ukrainian forces, increase exercises in Russia's regional waters (Black and Baltic seas), and step up spending on its own military (particularly in Poland, which is probably due for a war with Russia within the next 20 years):
http://www.kyivpost.com/content/ukraine/nato-to-support-ukrainian-army-report-350521.html
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/news_110609.htm

The Ukraine Battleground, from Russia's Perspective

So some of my readers decided they wanted to hold me to a higher standard and wrenched my arm into giving the Russian perspective on the battle for Ukraine. This I shall do.

As usual, it's a story and (as usual) a tragedy of realist international politics and the security spiral. I shall tell this story today, trying to keep my biases aside.

The first and most important element of the story comes after the fall of the Soviet Union. I start here because it was a turning point: the former Soviet Union could have stuck with Russia, become neutral somehow, or leaned towards NATO in some way.

We'll talk about why the third option was essentially unavoidable, and explore how it looked from Russia's perspective.

The map below shows the eastward expansion of NATO. Note in particular everything after 1990: a whopping 12 countries were added to NATO's portfolio, doubling its Cold War number to 24. In 2004, NATO expanded enough to completely check any Russian sea action in Europe, and put troops on the borders of its closest allies (Belarus and Moldova).

Obviously from the Russian perspective, this is at-best terrifying. After defeat, one's former enemies surround Russia bit by bit--not slowing down as the memory of the Cold War started to ease, but accelerating and even bordering the country, attempting to choke it off forever.

From NATO's perspective, it was bringing into its protective (and purely defensive) umbrella eager members, whose memory of Soviet oppression was harsh and still fresh, desperate to ensure that the Russians could never come back for them, for the Russians were never kept down for long.

From the perspective of realist international relations: central and eastern Europe are a long, flat plain with essentially no protective boundaries to create natural, safe borders between countries (look at Switzerland--have they been to war any time recently?). Ultimately, these countries are vulnerable to land attack by more powerful countries at all times--end of story. It is critical for them to be under the protection of one alliance or another. Even the Warsaw Pact provided some stability for them from the possibility of more invasion, as much as it was pushed onto their shoulders.

Because these countries are not naturally protected, they were going to join an alliance of some sort. Choosing NATO was not surprising, given their history.

But for Russia, this encroachment--whether or not one understood the natural forces driving it--meant danger and a tightening of a noose.

In 2008, NATO declared that it would be working to incorporate Ukraine and Georgia into the alliance, and that was the last straw. Georgia has access to the Caucasus mountains, and Ukraine sticks like a knife into the underbelly of Russia (and also includes major gas and grain fields, crucial to support Russia in case of a breakdown of trade with NATO). It was just too dangerous, and appeared so aggressive that there was a plausible story that Bush, Blair, Sarkozy, and co. were looking to strike a killing blow. It's even possible that they were.

Russia's 2008 invasion of Georgia was meant to remind Georgia that Russia was still in charge of the area, and it would not tolerate more encirclement (imagine if Mexico became a Russian ally and would start hosting Russian troops and missile batteries).

Recently in Ukraine, the West was obviously very in support of the protesters and the change they would bring. The EU is very interested in bringing Ukraine into its fold (despite the many changes Ukraine must make to get there), and Russia looked quite fearfully at the very real possibility of losing its Sevastopol warm water port (more on that in this earlier post).

It felt it had to act, European objections be damned. So act it did. It was the forces of international security at work, as always: Russia faced a nearly existential threat if it lost its Sevastopol lease.

For Russia, as with most countries, imperialism is not motivated mostly by greed, but by a desire to strengthen, consolidate, or defend its security position. It may seem ridiculous to younger generations that Europe might descend into a land war, but peace in Europe has been a strange break from 1600 years of truly endless carnage, bloodshed, and border-shifting. To pretend that nobody should be worried about such things as the warm water port--or, for my own case, the precedent set of allowing European countries to invade each other and annex territory--enough to go to war for it, is ultimately myopic.

While I will not claim that the Russians have any moral ground for their invasion, it is always worth considering everyone's perspective: for Russia, it is safety and defense, preparing itself to never again allow the invasions of the first and second World Wars to occur. But I want to emphasize that just because we understand the motivations of countries running around annexing each other, doesn't make it any morally less terrible nor less dangerous.

Russia Mistakenly Reveals Real Crimean Election Results -- Big Surprise, It Was All a Sham

Thank you to Forbes et all for catching this one quickly.

I'll allow myself to remain in my heated, biased state (that I otherwise try to avoid on this blog) on this issue, as I continue to believe the risk to peace in Europe is high.

Russia's official results on the Crimean election:

• 97% in favor of annexation
• 82% turnout

What the Human Rights Council (of Russia) accidentally posted:

• 50% in favor of annexation
• 30% turnout

Russia couldn't even get 50% of folks to vote for annexation when it had guns pointed at them.

The weird thing about diplomacy: everyone paying attention knew it was a sham, but the sham election grants some strange, thin, but real veneer of legitimacy. Now that it's gone, something could change--if the EU and US have the spine to do something about it. 

Ukraine Foreign Minister Says Ukraine Will Fight if Russia Invades East

http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/europe/russia-ukraine-bars-pilots-from-leaving-aircraft/2014/03/26/cf44ee34-b4b6-11e3-bab2-b9602293021d_story.html

With Precedent Set, the Door's Wide Open for Putin in Ukraine. What will Ukraine and the V4 Do?

So, first thing's first: I was pretty wrong. Definitely no shooting war over Crimea.

With that said, the US, Canada, and NATO are all saying Russia looks pretty poised to invade the rest of Ukraine (either to take more of Ukraine or get to Moldova), so stay tuned! There may yet be a shooting war. (The ethnic Russians live in those really red bits and would be the likely target in Ukraine.)



Ukraine up and pulled its troops out of Crimea after Russian troops smashed into the bases. In what is ultimately a complete and unlikely miracle, nobody was shot during this entire process (save for some stray sniper rifle fire from who-knows-whom.) At least the dolphins don't look like they're going to surrender.

Why surrender so quickly?

Simple: it's pretty obvious that Ukraine lacks support. The EU and US just had no interest at all in risking a war with Russia, so they weren't going to come to the aid of the Ukrainian military (which would have lost on its own). Biden may have visited Poland specifically to tell them "no-go" on getting involved in Ukraine (they seemed otherwise chomping at the bit to get in there with the Visegrad 4, which I kept believing would happen).

The US is not considering putting Ukraine under the defensive umbrella of NATO.

The biggest sign of non-support for Ukraine comes from the pretty weak sanctions against Russia. So far, it's only against individuals (travel bans, asset freezes, etc). The US and EU are considering further sanctions if Russia invades the rest of Ukraine, which basically gives Putin a hearty thumbs-up to invade the rest of Ukraine. (The Daily Show actually nails it for once, explaining that "Putin Doesn't Give a S--t.")

(So I'll have to note here that my bias in this matter is pretty obvious. I think undeterred territorial-expansion invasions in Europe are a dangerous thing and set a very bad precedent for the stability of Europe in the future.)

So  let's assume a second invasion of Ukraine is pretty likely at this point. It's not clear whether or not Ukraine is going to fight a losing war for the rest of its eastern territories. Certainly Tymoshenko--most influential leader in Ukraine right now--is ready to "wipe out" the Russians and take up arms. Highly controversial statement, but it may get her swept into power quickly if Russia invades again.

Ukraine is clearly not going to get military support if it doesn't fight. I think in Crimea it was ready to see if it could get the support it needed. Russia moved quickly and jammed through the sham-referendum, and the West balked at helping. By the time Ukraine knew what help it could get, it was just too late.

If Russia invades again, Ukraine knows it can't wait for help.If it starts fighting and its people start dying--rather than doing nothing--it is much  more likely to provoke a military response from a friendly nation. It seems somewhat Machiavellian to throw one's army into a fight one knows it will lose (on the hopes that help will come), but the pro-Western part of Ukraine very much sees itself as the Czech / Poland to Putin's Nazi Germany right now. The idea of rolling over is fairly horrifying to many.

Sadly, I just can't predict what's going to happen. They absolutely can't depend on the EU, US, or NATO--they've been quite thoroughly hung out to dry by all of them.

Once again, I turn to the Visegrad 4, the sleeping tiger in all of this (and the only ones that seem to be kicking up any serious dirt about Russia's invasion of Ukraine). It may be the very weakness of the US/EU/NATO response that kicks them into gear. The V4 was formed quite explicitly out of a lack of confidence in the rest of NATO to protect them from Russia, so they're a bit of a rogue element within NATO. To them, Russia is a very real and credible threat, and so the US/EU/NATO responding weakly is going to shake V4 confidence in that leadership. They'll be, in turn, less likely to listen to any warnings about getting involved.

So I'm still going to predict that, if Russia invades eastern Ukraine, and Ukraine fights, Poland and the V4 are going to get themselves in the fight. They won't invade Russia, but they're poised right on the western border of Ukraine and would be ready to send their battle group in to hold the line.



Once that happens, Russia will have a bit of a tough choice: either take them head on or try to avoid a fight and hold on to whatever territory it has. Normally, I'd assume that neither side wants to be seen as an aggressor, but Russia might just not care that much and try to give them enough of a bloody nose to boot them out before NATO can decide whether to back up the V4 and try to win back some shadow of a hint of relevancy in Eastern Europe.

But I'm not going to predict how that fight will go.

The big takeaway here is that the US, EU, and NATO are very quickly losing relevance in Eastern Europe, and that's where the action is. Ukraine is on its own unless the V4 jumps in. If they do, NATO as a real power in Europe is probably doomed.

So it's a pretty big deal.

The Shooting War May be Starting... Stay Tuned

2 Ukrainian servicemen killed in Crimea by snipers. Not yet confirmed it's Russians.

http://rt.com/news/crimea-shooting-military-center-646/

But the Russians will have to push the Ukrainians out of Crimea if they're going to legitimize themselves, and I think a hot war is coming.

Crimean Referendum In Tow, Russia Still Possibly Stuck

The tough part about this referendum is that, under other circumstances, it might make sense.

It might even be the right thing for Crimea to be part of Russia rather than Ukraine, in some sort of idealized world.



That said, it probably also would "make sense" for lots of lines to be re-drawn to group together people that most want to be grouped together. But the process for doing that must be both delicate and consistent--lest the door be opened for the kind of mayhem that Russia is causing at this very moment.

So the reason it's tricky is that, with a population so excited about joining Russia, the West's liberal tendencies make them loathe to deny them that autonomy. But the circumstances under which it occurred force the West, even against some of its own values, to reject the referendum flat-out.

(Those of you paying attention will note that I owe you a beer: the referendum did not get 70-80% to join Russia, but got 93%--a whopping number that is so obviously padded that it's clear that Putin is more interested in showing off unwavering support/unity in the area than in having the legitimacy that comes with an election that is fully free and fair. The Tatars alone, if votes were counted freely and fairly, would have brought that number down.)

With Ukraine and NATO not recognizing the referendum, any violence by Russian troops to enforce the annexation (see my last post about the need to do so) will cross a hitherto-uncrossed line. It's one thing for Western leaders to stand by dumbfounded by a bloodless coup--it's another if the Russians start murdering Ukrainian troops in their bases.

There's actually more of a standoff than one might think. Russia is working very hard to create an air of inevitability, to declare "Mission Accomplished" loudly enough that everyone will start to believe them. But the government of Ukraine is fervently anti-Russian and the western part of the country is sufficiently terrified of more Russian domination that they're ready to fight.

I don't quite see how this is going to go down without bloodshed--Russia just isn't going to walk away, and it's likely the Ukrainians are getting some quiet promises of military support if (violently) attacked, particularly from the V4. Russian troops (about 60k, according to Kyiv) are amassing on the eastern border of Ukraine, which suggests Russia knows it's going to have to try to beat Ukraine into accepting the annexation.

The West is holding its breath, but it has the upper hand in a conflict as long as it has the will. A lot is at stake here--namely, the principle of Deterrence in Europe, which has hitherto been enforced since 1939 and has probably been the biggest reason Europe has seen relative peace in the last 70 years. 

Crimean Endgame Unclear--Russia May be Stuck, And Will Likely Lose

So Russia has obviously gone "all-in" with Crimea--the only way to really walk out with face intact is to walk out with Crimea in pocket. Sadly, Putin hasn't given himself a reasonable out without it.

But can that really happen at all?

The Crimean Referendum being rushed through looks like it may seal the deal. But that's far from obvious.

Only 58% of Crimea is Russian. This is a lot, but it's unlikely 100% are going to vote for annexation--Russia's an unattractive enough state that some ethnic Russians may opt to stay. A lot of them are from families shipped to the area by force during the Soviet Union's era, which means not everyone is going to be a die-hard.

But let's be honest: the referendum is going to show Annexation is favored, and by a lot. Russia has no problem rigging even its own elections, and will rig the heck out of these. It'll wipe its hands when it's over, with some 70-80% "favoring annexation" (anyone that wants to bet a beer that it'll fall out of that range, let me know), and look to the West and say, "see? Everyone wants to be here, so leave it be."

The most dangerous thing about Russia is (excuse my language) that the leadership may believe its own bullshit. It may not understand just how absurd its behavior seems to the West.

The West, and Kyiv, are going to look at the referendum with rolled eyes. Ukraine, particularly, is not going to pack up its bags and abandon its bases in Crimea. So after the referendum, there's going to be a standoff. And here's where the dangerous part starts.

Russia will likely put an ultimatum on Ukrainian troops to leave its "legal, sovereign territory," and threaten to open fire to drive them out and "defend" its homeland. But nobody outside of Russia is going to buy the moral/righteous argument (though they're likely to buy that yes, Russia will open fire). So when Russia does open fire, it will likely feel it has a moral high-ground, but nobody else will.

The West has been pretty weak on this matter until recently, but once Russia opens fire on the Ukrainian bases (and it will have to, in order to legitimately claim that it has territorial sovereignty over Crimea), that's going to change. Poland and the V4 are going to fight back, and drag US air power in with them. Kyiv, which has a not-at-all-laughable military, is going to hit the Russians in Crimea full-force.

It'll get messy, and Russia is honestly likely to lose. This isn't Georgia. Russia can only really deploy its southern forces to Ukraine, and those southern forces won't match up against Ukraine + the V4 (though the V4 would bring the Western forces in). Ukrainian and V4 troops are more professional and have (especially in the V4) superior tech, more plans, and similar numbers of troops.

I think the only way Russia wins this is if it somehow convinces the Ukrainian forces to pack up and leave Crimea, but I just don't see that happening at all. Otherwise, it's going to have a war on its hands that it can't win. And again, that's the dangerous part: Russia will feel its actions are entirely legitimate, that it is in the right and everyone else is aggressive/expansionist against it, and therefore may not break quickly/easily.

But I don't think it can win.

Ukraine Might have Won the War Without Firing a Shot

So I might have been dead wrong about my shooting war prediction. Hopefully so.

The Russian military's ultimatum (surrender or die) to the Ukrainian military bases came and went without a peep (other than various bases very loudly singing the Ukrainian national anthem at the Russians) and, importantly, without the Russians acting. The Ukrainians called their bluff, and in such situations, having one's bluff called is pretty crippling to one's ability to further intimidate.

The Ukrainians actually claim to have intercepted a call with Putin somewhat furious at a field commander for not having provoked the Ukrainians into firing at them. It's clear Russia wants a shooting war and that their ambitions at the moment are beyond sitting on their hands in Crimea, but so far the Ukrainians aren't giving it to them--and probably won't.

Russia might just be stuck. Putin's quick-mover advantage is quickly eroding and now he looks--more importantly than looking like an aggressor--like he doesn't have a plan. If the Russians don't have a strong enough pretext with moving forward on the "shooting" part of this adventure, they may just have to withdraw.

On another note--a little bit more research suggests that Visegrad 4 military along with Ukraine would make Russia's life very hard if it was engaged--it would be far from a "rollover" kind of war, given in particular that Russia's military is mostly conscripts and the V4 is more professional. 

My Prediction: War in Crimea Within 48 Hours

It sounds like Russia is actually issuing ultimatums to the bases (that they have surrounded and put under siege, by the way) that if they don't surrender, war will begin. Russian troops are digging trenches on the northern coast of Crimea and the fleet is being mobilized to control the seas, giving the Ukrainians only a tiny bottleneck to move through.



I predict that's just what's going to happen. Ukraine won't give up without a fight.


It's not a war Ukraine's going to win. They'll get beat pretty badly and Russia will use this as an excuse to march into the rest of the country. Already, a truly North-Korean-style propaganda blitz is happening within Russia now to drum up domestic support for the war.

The big question will be what the V4 does, but I think they'll get involved. Poland is mobilizing and Russia is actually readying its northern defenses (around St. Petersburg). I think both sides are getting ready to go at it.

The West is responding as weakly as Putin hoped and predicted. The EU is refusing to join the US in imposing sanctions--Russia has too much oil/gas leverage. The US is not threatening a military response, and it's frankly the only kind of response that would give Putin pause.