Foggofwar Prediction: Inertia Will Keep the UK In the EU

Just as inertia and fear of disruption kept Scotland from declaring independence from the UK, I think the same inertia will keep the UK in the EU.

Quick context: there's been talk for a while of potentially exiting the EU and Prime Minister David Cameron is pledging to have a 2017 referendum on the question if the Tories win a majority.

But they won't.

Fivethirtyeight predicts a slim Conservative victory over Labor and pretty much no chance of getting an outright majority.

Could they form a coalition with SNP? Maybe, but SNP has made it clear they won't support a referendum unless Ireland and Wales make it clear they're also on board--which they won't be.

Wales is staunchly against withdrawal--most support comes from the English countryside. But even that support for withdrawal has been dropping after a solid four years (2010-2013) of consistent majority.

The window may have passed.

Labour has made it clear that they'd support a referendum if the UK were to lose more sovereignty to the EU, but that's unlikely--the resurgence in nationalism throughout all of Europe is making it unlikely that the Continent will unite any time soon to give the EU more power. Almost everyone seems a bit grumpy with how much power the EU has now, but not enough to seriously consider leaving.

The UK leaving--unlike, say, Greece--could trigger a mass exodus of "satellite" states, from Poland to Portugal. The fact that it won't leave means we're going to see some ongoing stability--but the threat that it might have left will keep the EU from getting more powerful.

So There's a Ceasefire in Ukraine? Probably Not. But Either Way: Putin's Winning Again.

The give-peace-a-chance summit at Minsk went all night, but a peace deal came out.

At least it appears so.

Warning that my complete lack of sympathy for Russia in all this is going to come through, but I want to try to set what-I-think-is the record straight.

The peace deal included the leaders of: Ukraine, France, Germany, Russia. It was signed, quite reluctantly (or at least they put on a show of reluctance) by two rebel leaders.

The Charlotte Observer has a pretty good summary of the peace deal; I'll touch on a few points.

1) All "foreign" fighters are to leave Ukraine.
2) All "foreign" heavy weapons are to be pulled out of Ukraine.
3) Ukraine will grant its eastern provinces partial autonomy--including free trade with Russia.
4) The eastern Ukrainian provinces get to hold referenda on their status. Luckily, this time it'll be run by Kiev with outside observers, rather than the incredible sham that was Crimea.

All of this begs the question: if Russia does not have troops or heavy weapons in Ukraine, how is it supposed to agree to pull them out?

The situation would be a spectacular joke if it weren't the case that Russia is continually getting away with invading another country, killing people, gobbling up territory, and facing no consequences.

There is ample evidence Russia has been there in huge force. NATO keeps releasing satellite photography of Russian heavy weapons, APCs, etc, crossing the border and going deep into Ukraine. Russia has sent a bunch of cargo trucks into Ukraine to pick up as many as 4,000 Russian bodies and bring them home--despite said bodies having never been there. Ukraine keeps capturing Russian regular soldiers, including paratroopers, who keep claiming that they are "lost" in Ukraine and were most definitely not sent there on purpose. Ukraine keeps stumbling across Russian military ID's scattered about its country. Ukrainian rebels keep getting their hands on Russian tanks, rocket launchers, APCs, guns, etc (including the sophisticated SAM that shot down the Malaysian Airlines plane)--we know they're Russian specifically because the Ukrainians don't use these weapons and they can't simply be captured in Ukraine by the rebels..

The Russians' continued denial of involvement in Ukraine has reached a comical absurdity.

Time for More Mayhem

The ceasefire doesn't start until February 15th, and there are likely plans to consolidate more territory into rebel hands before the ceasefire comes into effect, in order to have leverage during the ceasefire implementation. Russia sent about 90 heavy vehicles into Ukraine during the peace talks, and I'll bet they're heading for Debaltseve , which has been surrounded by rebels honing in on Ukrainian government troops and pounded by Russian rockets and artillery that is definitely not there. 

Tactically, it's a Battle of the Bulge-style disaster for Ukraine if it indeed loses Debaltseve before the ceasefire comes into effect.

From  the Wall Street Journal

The following constantly-updated map shows that Debaltseve has not yet fallen, but is nearly surrounded completely.

Putin Wins Again

With the Sudetenland Crimea even more securely in hand with  this deal, Putin is going to end up with much of what he wants in Ukraine--and the ceasefire might actually hold if Russia is satisfied (the Chicago Tribune has a great piece on how the deal is set up to give Russia and the rebels lots of excuses to start fighting again if it's in their interest). If Russian support is actually pulled, the rebels will have a more frustrating time beating the Ukrainian army--the fall counter-offensive by Kyiv is what led to a shrinking of rebel-held territory until the Russians brought arms and troops back into the fight.

Of course, not even Putin has full control over the rebels in eastern Ukraine. If the referendum doesn't end up resulting in "annexation by Russia," I suspect the rebels will pick right back up, and Putin is likely to continue not-supporting them until even more concessions are made.

But what else has Putin won? 

1) The autonomy for eastern Ukraine gives Russia a heavy lever to make sure Ukraine does not join NATO. As we discussed before, Ukraine joining NATO would be a major strategic, long-term security threat for Russia, and the invasion of Crimea secured Russia's only warm-water port in Sevastopol.

2) The referenda obviously might result in more territory--and thus more buffer space--for Russia. Interestingly, such buffer space might actually lead to Ukraine as a whole becoming more EU/NATO-leaning (as pro-Russian populations leave the country), but it makes the territorial integrity of Russia generally safer.

3) Russia once again sets the precedent that it can use military force to invade a neighboring country and win its political/strategic goals without consequence.

4) The ceasefire likely won't hold, and Russia will have won concessions from Ukraine for nothing in return. 

Some readers may think that my not-so-subtle reference to Nazi Germany here is overblown or even absurd. The Russians do not share the simply absurd evil of the Nazis, but it's the most recent and well-known example of expansionist powers testing the resolve of European leaders, seeing their will to be wanting, and then making ever-greater moves.

As a "realist" (this is a school of International Relations theory, rather than simply a haughty impression of myself), I believe the greatest risk for peace in a region of states (rather than a region run by militias and ethnosectarian groups, like the Middle East) is a lack of deterrence. The repeated failure to deter military invasions of Russia's neighbors is cause for serious long-term concern.

The US and UK Part from the EU

The US and UK are both planning on sending military aid (weapons) to the Ukrainians if the fighting picks back up. Even if it doesn't, the US is sending training teams to improve Ukraine's military--no doubt these trainers are also likely to be assistant coordinators if/when the war picks back up.

The EU continues to want to avoid getting embroiled in the war, so new friction is emerging between Germany/France and the US/UK, putting NATO unity at risk. Such continued discord is what makes the Visegrad 4 (Poland, Hungary, Czech Republic, Slovakia) so nervous and independent.

India's Military Purchases: A Sign of Relationship Strength

India recently made a significant military purchase from the UK, according to Breaking News:

"BreakingNews>
British official: India agrees to buy 57 Hawk jets worth about $800 million from Britain - AP"

The Hawk serves either as a low-cost combat aircraft or as a trainer.

India often moves back and forth between buying Russian and Western military equipment. That it continues to buy UK equipment is a good sign for Indo-Western relations, despite the tensions in the region caused by the continuing Afghan War.

US & UK Split on Gaza

Cameron took a tough stance against the blockade of Gaza today in a speech calling it a "prison camp."

Not only does it signal more pressure on Israel, but a break from the US. I'm a bit surprised, given that a more Euroskeptic Conservative party should be pushing the US and UK closer together. It's something to keep our eyes on.

Will the Afghan Gamble Pay Off?

The thing that I like about the Surge-like offensive in Afghanistan is that it is likely to produce a more decisive strategic-political path within a few months than a more conservative approach was likely to determine.

There are obviously problems--the biggest is deaths, both the number and the type. After a short two days, there are already 9 coalition deaths, all of which were from roadside attacks or other ambushes, rather than from coalition-led assaults. As I've mentioned before, this is tough on morale. If this rate of death keeps up, the US public is going to seriously reconsider the wisdom and efficacy of leaving troops as sitting ducks in Helmand.

The Brits are already getting ready to leave. Public opinion in the UK is dismal--over half of Brits think that the war is unwinnable and that troops should be withdrawn right away. The increasingly-popular Tories are having trouble resisting the political temptation to pull for withdrawal.

The offensive is clearly a gamble; the Brits need results either to improve public opinion or to simply see themselves as accomplishing as much as possible before an increasingly-inevitable pullout. But the loss of the Brits would be an incredible blow to the already-stretched thin Americans, and a boon for the Taliban. It is difficult to imagine the war being won if the UK were to disappear in the near future.

The other tough part about the offensive is the difficulty in which one observes tangible results. The Taliban denied NATO the satisfaction of sticking around and fighting. Now, training and development dominate US/UK strategy, along with the occasional hunting mission--but the Taliban remain elusive. And when the US/UK inevitably leave Helmand (some time after the elections), they will certainly emerge from their hiding places to reclaim their place--the question is whether the US/UK will have created a sufficiently impressive security environment that they can resist collapse and dissolution under insurgent pressure (the Taliban are unlikely to give the US/UK the easy option of engaging Afghan forces directly in a conventional, protracted battle, lest the US send air cavalry right back in).

Whether this security training is sufficient is a nearly unanswerable question from my deskchair in Cambridge, but it is the crux of the gamble. The US must train hard, fast, and well, create buy-in from the populace (such that the Taliban does not have an extensive network of safehouses, informants, etc, upon their return), and keep enough reserve troops on-hand for long enough to provide pinpoint support to any brash assaults from the Taliban--at the same time, the military must protect itself and prevent casualties from spiraling, lest necessity take over and lead to their premature withdrawal. It is a daunting task.

If the US/UK can "win" in Helmand, I expect they are likely to use it to improve the bargaining position of the Afghani government with any Taliban. Currently, the Taliban refuse to come to the bargaining table until all foreign troops have left, but the US/UK/Afghan governments fear (with good reason) that a unilateral withdrawal at this point would lead to another Taliban takeover of the country. Withdrawal, therefore, is only an option as much as a loss of objectives is.

Anxiety Over Helmand Offensive

The Marines stormed into Helmand with force, speed, fury. Offensives are really the Marines' game, and the ride into Helmand was no different. Had anyone been there to fight them, it would have been quite the horror show.

But. There was nobody there to fight them. The Taliban apparently did the smart thing and disappeared when the Americans showed up, rather than stick around to try to repel them. In fact, the Taliban have fared quite poorly for the past 8 years when they have taken Americans toe-to-toe. But this is asymmetric warfare, and as long as the Taliban shows patience, they have a shot.

I wondered whether the Taliban would be wise enough to disappear, rather than fight, after their disastrous stand at Swat. These Afghan Taliban are more hardened than their Pakistani brethren, though I figured much of that hardness would have trickled south by now. More likely, these Taliban are under wiser command that heard of and learned from the Swat disaster.

After disappearing, the Taliban have picked (apparently quite well) opportunities to attack both the Americans and the British. 8 Brits have died in the past two weeks, and the British will to keep fighting is seriously starting to falter. The Taliban may be concentrating on them specifically to try to kick them out of the fight, eliminating the second-largest troop presence in Afghanistan. But the primary casualties from the last few weeks have been from bombs and traps--not head-to-head fighting. It's terrible for troop morale, and it means little is getting done. The offensive should be offense--otherwise, it's just high exposure.

There is good reason to be anxious over the Helmand offensive--so far, it looks like a failure. Are the bulk of the Taliban hiding in Pakistan? In the mountains? It is apparently somewhat unclear. Unless the US and UK can find them and hit them hard, this offensive is going to be a failure.

Thoughts on the Helmand Offensive

It's getting... some news. Not too much.

But it's the biggest military offensive in Afghanistan since the invasion in 2001, and the stakes are high. The outcome is important. The implications will be enormous.

The whole thing smells a bit sweetly of a General Petraeus plot. Large surge of troops, offensive against the seriously bad guys, and long-term boots on the ground to provide security and institutional organization where there is a vacuum. Petraeus trained the US army in doubling as a low-level government, and those skills will be critical in winning the long-term security of the province. Hearts-and-minds.

It is very hard, to say the least, to tell how the offensive is going. Bad guys are dying, good guys are dying. The folks in Helmand aren't sure whether they're more angered by the presence of the Taliban or the presence of foreign troops.

But if US marines and UK army troops are able to achieve victory (loosely defined as restoring peace and security to the region), then a number of benefits follow:

1) Helmand and Kandahar will be more secure areas in which the US can operate and prevent Taliban from pouring across the border during the Waziristan operation in Pakistan. This is critical. If Helmand and Kandahar remain in Taliban hands, then even a successful assault in Waziristan will be worth little to the long-term war against the Taliban. On the other hand, if the US and UK can hold the area and patrol the border, then they will pinch the largest concentration of Taliban in the entire Afpak region, and have a good shot at delivering the first crushing blow in a very long time. But these Taliban are wiser, tougher, and smarter than their brethren out in Swat, and will not go down so easily.

2) Voting in the area will be secure. Giving the Pashtun majority the ability to vote in full (where currently the only secure voting areas are in northern, non-Pashtun areas) will legitimize the election and potentially prevent post-election violence.

3) The ISAF will strike a significant psychological blow to the Taliban--and bolster the confidence of anti-Taliban citizens in Afghanistan, much like the Pakistani assault in Swat did. The ISAF needs to regain the momentum of this war; the Taliban can out-wait foreigners rather indefinitely if it is not soundly beaten.

Losing, of course, means that the momentum is very squarely in the hands of the Taliban. But, frankly, the US and UK are unlikely to simply give up this fight--they will stick around and make life rather difficult for the Taliban for a long time. Total defeat seems unlikely, and they should at least be able to operate with enough presence to support the Waziristan assault in Pakistan (at which point the US should have an easier time "mopping up" Helmand and Kandahar, as the Taliban will have no safe zones). It may be messy and long, but I believe the US is likely to turn a victory here.

But if it doesn't, serious questions will be asked about whether it is worth it to stick around much longer.

Iraq: One Fewer Worry for President Obama

The Status of Forces Agreement (SoFA) has passed Iraqi parliament, with 75% of parliament approving. This sounds like a pretty darn big number, but it's about as low a number as the US can politically get away with--a substantial majority against the bill would give a lot of legitimacy to continued anti-American resistance, continued factionalization, etc.

Iraq's fate is sealed; Petraeus and Gates (locked in for the next while at least) should be able to handle the situation quite well. And with this agreement (which must be finalized by the 3-person Iraqi Presidential Council--it will), Obama has no Iraq policy left to make. He need only say, "stick to the plan, Mr. Gates," and the troops will come home in a timeline he can appreciate. It should be a weight off the new president's shoulders.

But with Russian challenges, Somali pirates, Afghanistan falling apart, and now a major, in-progress anti-US/UK terror attack in India, Mr. Obama needs all the relief he can get.

And now, Turkey.

The War for the Soul of the Middle East

Gunbattles have broken out in Beirut over the past few days; pro-government Sunni and pro-Hezbollah Shiite militants and partisans have come to clash, and just today, Hezbollah fighters routed pro-Government forces and took over the capital, Beirut. Lebanon is spiraling into full-fledged civil war, with Hezbollah at the advantage, and Syria or Israel may try to intervene.

Sadr City has been through a slow, draining fight for weeks as US troops have been executing an Iraqi government crackdown on militants; despite former claims of peace and cooperation, Shiite Cleric Al-Sadr is refusing to lay down arms, and his troops have laced Sadr City with guards and roadside bombs.

Iran is blaming the United States and the United Kingdom for a bomb that exploded in a Mosque that killed 14 last month. Iran has further claimed that it refuses to negotiate in its right to nuclear power, regardless of the G5 offer for a deal.

Al-Qaeda has made a chilling comeback in Afghanistan, operating from a squishy home base in the northwest of a defiant and weak Pakistan.

In happier news, Syria and Israel have admitted to secret peace talks, possibly being mediated by Turkey--Israel may be returning the Golan heights, in hopes of Syria supporting Israel's right to exist with only slightly altered borders.

But conflict in the Middle East is growing ever-more complex. Relations are highly polarized along ethno-sectarian lines, along political-religious lines; the struggle between factions along skew axes for the future of the Middle East may mean conflict long beyond--and largely irrelevant to--large-scale US presence in the region.



Below, a religious distribution of the Middle East:



One of the primary axes on which rival factions in the Middle East see each other is religious; largely, whether they are Sunni or Shiite. Within Iraq, most of the carnage between 2005 and 2007 was caused by religious-sectarian warfare, in Lebanon, Shiites are rallying behind Hezbollah forces while the Sunnis continue to back the government. Iran's interest in Iraq lies largely in ensuring Shiite dominance in the country after the United States leaves--and perhaps finding a new ally.

But the factioning is certainly more complex than religious. There are ethnic divides--largely between Arabs and Kurds or Turks and Kurds in the region--but these disputes are surprisingly straight-forward. Religious extremist terrorists certainly make up one unified faction across the Middle East; but Iranian-American power politics complicates matters significantly.

Iranian Faction: Made up of Iran, Syria, Hezbollah, many Shiite militias in Iraq, (in part) Oman, and (in part) Hamas. Strangely enough, Syria is a vast-majority Sunni country, and Hamas is almost entirely a Sunni party, but both have aligned with Iran due to power politics and security interests. Iranian weapons--including guided missiles--are prominent in the Hezbollah arsenal that it is unleashing upon government forces; Iran's continued funding of Shiite factions in both Lebanon and Iraq has the US administration convinced Iran will go to expensive and violent ends to keep pro-Western governments out of the region, and raise as many pro-Iranian ones as possible. I am inclined to agree. It should be noted that this faction makes up the vast majority of anti-Israeli forces, and Iran could try to coordinate disruption of Israel by Hezbollah and Hamas simultaneously.

US Faction: Made up of the United States, Israel, pro-government Lebanese and Iraqi forces (including the Kurds and Awakened Sunnis), (in part) Turkey, (in part) Saudi Arabia, (in part) Jordan, (in part) Kuwait, pro-government Afghani forces. While the US lacks combat partners in the Middle East, many of its Arab friends are willing to both host US forces for protracted warfare, and have recently boycotted the Arab League convention in Syria due to its interventions in neighboring countries. The United States continues to hope that its presence can not only stabilize the region, but create a preponderance of Western-leaning states to counter Iran's power and pressure Iran regionally into behaving (namely, disarming its nuclear arsenal and cutting off its terror funding). The US faction looked like it was making great gains in late 2007, but 2008 has been a series of setbacks, ending most recently with the collapse of Lebanese stability and rule of law.

Religious Extremists: Mostly Al-Qaeda and associated factions. While their presence is waning in Iraq, it remains strong in northwest Pakistan, and their ability to operate in Afghanistan is frustrating US efforts to create a stable state. Their goals are clear: total US withdrawal from the region, collapse of pro-Western governments in place of Sharia ones, the destruction of Israel, and the death of one Westerner for every Muslim killed (ever, really) by a Westerner, from the crusades to the Iraq War. While they may have silent approval to disrupt Iraq from Iran, no current Middle Eastern government wants Al-Qaeda style militants within their borders, regardless of what power faction they are on.

Al-Qaeda is unlikely to win this struggle, but it will make life extremely difficult for both factions. It may even unite rival groups to some degree (as it has the religious factions within Iraq) if for no other reason than to attack Al-Qaeda. But US opportunities to flex its muscles in Iraq are on a short timescale--after the 2008 elections, pressure to withdraw troops is likely to reach a breaking point. If the United States withdraws without creating a Middle East that can individually resist Iranian intervention, Iran is likely to make great gains. The United States leadership is likely to sacrifice political success (in the form of low death tolls) for progress in routing Shiite militias (as it has done for the past few weeks), in the hopes that it will not face new political pressure to withdraw until the end of the year, and that destruction of these militias will leave Iran much more impotent in Iraq.

Israel may take Hezbollah's hostile takeover of Beirut as an opportunity to settle a score that many analysts have predicted has been years in the making--since the Summer 2006 war. If Hezbollah becomes the government-by-coup of Lebanon, then Israel gains the legitimacy it needs to attack the country as a whole if Hezbollah forces attack its citizens. If it declares war on the government of Lebanon, it is not as likely to try and "hold back" as it did last time, but unleash the full fury of its forces for the first time since the 1970's.

For now, the war for the soul of the Middle East remains in stalemate.

No More Surrender Jokes, Guys

The French are tough again, and it's official. President Nicholas Sarkozy made a speech today fundamentally shifting French foreign strategy back to cooperative internationalism (a strategy very similar to Mr. Gordon Brown, and also US Candidates Hillary Clinton and John McCain), and toughening France's stance in Iran.

France has, for decades, avoided full NATO integration (since its withdrawal from NATO joint command in 1996), and has shouldered a disproportionately low burden in NATO operations. But Sarkozy has declared that France will become a full member once more, and has started re-integration talks with the Secretary General. As a full member of NATO, France will carry a higher military burden, which Sarkozy is willing to accept; he has offered to increase France's troop presence in Afghanistan.

Sarkozy has furthermore pledged to reduce France's nuclear warhead stock to 300; not that he is not willing to use them. Standing in front of France's newest nuclear attack sub, he said "All those who threaten to attack our vital interests expose themselves to a severe riposte by France.” He is getting tough, and not just in rhetoric.

France is taking a tougher anti-Iran stance, and is pushing for more sanctions against Iran to stop what France believes is a continued nuclear weapons program. In this stance, as well as full-frontal diplomacy in visits to the United States and the United Kingdom, Sarkozy is possibly pushing France to join the United States and United Kingdom's special foreign policy relationship. As the US and UK have been in near lock-step on foreign policy for decades--and particularly after 9/11/2001--Sarkozy may attempt to turn the Big Two into a Big Three.

Finally, Sarkozy's public mullings over boycotting the Chinese Olympic Opening Ceremony is a nearly unilateral attempt at pressuring the Chinese into changing their Tibet policy, as Bush and Brown play "good cop" and encourage dialogue between Hu Jintao and the Dalai Lama.

Ultimately, Sarkozy has thawed the somewhat frosty relationships France has had with the US and UK by showing not only a willingness to work with their leadership, but a toughness on the Middle East and China that the US and UK are likely to appreciate. If he can continue this blitz of policy and diplomacy, French surrender jokes and "Freedom Fries" are likely to be snippets of the past.

Iran Moves In for the Kill

Since the Islamic revolution of 1979, Iran has hated the United States. The end of the revolution wrought what was indeed a bad day for American flags in Tehran, as the American-backed government was fully overthrown. Iran's history from then is interesting, with their only significant war coming from the invasion of Hussein's Iraq in 1980. The war lasted 8 years, and Hussein's army inflicted 500,000+ casualties and USD 350 Billion in damage to the Iranians, in large part with mustard and nerve gas. The Iranians emerged from this war quite bitter, having felt teamed up against by just about everyone in the world. Iraq received weapons and support from many countries-- the highest number of weapons coming from France, China, and the Soviet Union. Even the United States provided political support and some helicopters (proving once and for all that the defeat of Iran seemed to be the only thing the Americans and Soviets could agree upon). Coming out of the war broken, but sovereign, the Iranians were rather pissed-- and bent on beefing up their military capabilities.

These days, the Iranians don't spend much on their own military, but still boast 550,000 troops, including the elite al-Quds. They have American F-14 Tomcats (provided before the revolution), as well as a large stock of Russian-provided weapons, and short-range ballistic missiles. But as the Iran-Iraq war showed us, Iran's home-field advantage would make it extremely difficult to invade. American forces' technological superiority would give them an advantage, but they're tied up with Iran's neighbors. And it's this tie-up that has given Iran the opportunity it needs to do something about being so angry at everyone all the time.

Not only is Iran angry about the United States' existence, but it is one of the few countries left in the world still trying to drive Israel into the sea (or, as it's written by President Ahmadinejad, "wipe Israel from the map." There's lots of good angry stuff at intelligence.org: http://www.intelligence.org.il/eng/sib/4_04/as_iran.htm). With the United States in Afghanistan and Iraq, (with alliances of sorts in Pakistan, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia) Iran has been feeling a bit surrounded. Not only that, but the fundamentalist theocratic government has had an opportunity to quell a lot of old unrest by uniting its people against the Zionists and the Great Satan. Iran's reaction to the United States and Israel cramping its style has not been to cow, but to flex its muscles. And Iran's government is starting to realize it can really do whatever it wants.



On the list of Iran's diabolical plans for the Middle East:

1) Develop a nuclear weapons program. They're not fooling anyone. The wildly disparate UN Security Council continually agrees that Iran's "peaceful" nuclear power program covers a clandestine weapons program. It doesn't help that Iran's also developing "peaceful" medium range, nuclear-capable ballistic missiles. Having nuclear weapons would give Iran a leg up in its efforts in achieving objective number two...

2) Wipe Israel off the map. Nothing too new, but angrier than ever. President Ahmadinejad seems to have brought a whole new level to Iran's anti-Israeli hate. No real clashes yet... unless you count the unprovoked capture of soldiers and then rocket-bombing of civilians last summer by Iranian-trained, -funded, and -backed Hezbollah militants in southern Lebanon. But the consensus seems to be to blame Israel for that war anyway. Iran may not have driven Israel off the map with that effort, but Hezbollah emerged stronger than ever, and the Iranian government wouldn't be crazy to think that Israel lacks a great deal of political support these days, which might very well mean that Israel would think twice about a pre-emptive attack against a mobilizing Iranian army. Iran's strange alliance with Sunni-dominated Syria remains strong, perhaps only due to shared anti-Israeli sentiment. More strangely, this alliance hasn't been hampered by objective the third...

3) Win the war in Iraq and establish Shi'ite dominance in the region. Remember, Iran is a hard-line theocracy, and Sunni Muslims, while not as bad as Americans or Jews, still find a place on the hit list. Iran has clearly been funding the stronger Shi'ite militias in Iraq, hoping that they will triumph in the war and finally make Iraq a strong Iranian ally. The US invasion of Iraq has proved an opportunity for Iran to bring the only other large Shi'ite dominated country into its axis. If Iran can secure Iraq, it becomes a highly formidable force, and in time, could become an uncontested regional force. The US military and intelligence have found Iranian soldiers in Iraq, as well as evidence of their elite al-Quds infiltrating Baghdad and other hot spots.

And Iran hasn't stopped there. Until recently, they have kept to subversion and proxy fighting against the west. But now, they've taken another big step, and gotten aggressive. The capture and holding of 15 British troops has brought Iran into the war for real, as much as nobody really wants to admit it. This crisis puts Iran in a hugely advantageous position-- The Iranians understand that Britain values the lives of these 15 soldiers, and they now act as a powerful negotiating tool for the Iranians to get what they want. Britain, and the coalition in general, have been put in a very tough position.

Iran will continue its bold moves to take power in the region. It won't dismantle its nuclear program. It won't stop funding Hezbollah. It won't stop interfering in Iraq, and it won't give back British troops until it gets something very valuable in return. Iran feels emboldened, and invincible. This is mostly because no single group or alliance has both the will and the capability to invade. With the United States and Britain tied up in Afghanistan and Iraq, and their will for war depleting rapidly, Iran's two greatest enemies are all but out of the military picture. The next-largest militaries, France and Germany, surely won't consider invasion as a means for fixing Iran's behavior. Ever-confident that it can make move after move to shape the region as it wants, Iran knows that as long as none of its actions are too extreme, nobody will muster the will to do anything about it. This drip-by-drip escalation was mastered by Germany in the 1930's, and Iran may manage to stay far enough under the radar to see long-term success in its hopes for both an active nuclear weapons program and hegemonic dominance over the region.

But only if we decide to continue not to do anything about it.