Implications of Russia's Caucasus Troubles

Russia's outward and aggressive international posturing in Eastern Europe and the Caucasus may be calming a bit... at least for a bit.

A two-bomb terrorist attack hit Moscow's subways a week ago, killing over 30, and injuring well over a hundred more. The attack was sophisticated in its timing and its execution, catching Russian security services completely off-guard; they could only clean up after the disaster.

Other attacks hit Dagestan, a restive region in Russia where a large chunk of the population wants independence.

Before I continue, I will say that I'm not 100% sure of the culprits--many signs point to separatists in the Caucasus, but a few rumors and reports indicate that Russian intelligence services may have been involved. A human rights lawyer/writer claimed that, after the attack, a man stepped out of the shadows, yelled, "you're supposed to be dead!" and hit her upon the head, before fleeing. That said, this may simply be a furious opposition writer taking an opportunity to blame the state for human rights abuses. Anyway, I digress.

Assuming this was a terrorist act, a few questions obviously arise:
1) Why now, in particular?
2) Did they have outside help?

The first question may be an exercise left to the reader(perhaps you've read some news I haven't). The separatist regions are intermittently active, but their actions usually prompt a relatively brutal Russian response--in this case, Medvedev has said that Russian authorities need to show "more cruelty" in the Russian Caucasus regions in order to root out and break these terrorists. The Russian response is furious and, indeed, it is uniting the Russian people behind the state (in a time when popular opinion was starting to go against Putin and Medvedev). These attacks are unlikely to seriously further any bid for independence, but many militant groups are often prone to high-risk operations in hopes of creating a "quagmire"-style situation that ultimately weakens the central state's control over the area (even if there is not a formal relinquishing). Russia had left much of its separatist republics alone for some time in the 1990s, but it must be obvious to the Caucasus separatists that this is not the Russia of the 1990s. I therefore see dubious benefit to the separatists coming from this attack.

The second question runs the risk of turning us into 9/11-style conspiracy theorists. At the end of the day, militants might not need much in the way of help to make these well-timed attacks. Months of planning, combined with easily-accessed arms and bomb-making materials from a number of central Asian former Soviet states, further coupled with a rather profound lack of communications infrastructure (great for internal spying and policing) would give them the time and freedom they potentially needed to pull the attack off.

That said, it would not be at all shocking if they got help. If they did get help, the question is, from whom did they get help? Do Russian security services have an interest (especially in the light of declining popularity for United Russia) to try to boost poll numbers, unite the populous, or potentially win themselves more internal security powers? Do outside powers (like the CIA, the Georgians, or some sort of threatened Eastern Europeans) have an interest in forcing Russia's eyes inwards, in order to free up "space" to perform their own moves close to the Russian periphery? Both ideas seem dubious, but not completely out of the question.

That said, how will Russia react? Is Russia's response to domestic terror going to be an insular one, where public opinion and Kremlin leadership alike decide to put a delay on expanding the sphere of influence? Or is the rise in unity and state popularity (which is almost inevitable, frankly) going to give the Putin/Medvedev duo a freer hand with which to rattle sabres near Russia's periphery?

Ultimately, it depends on how quickly the Russians are to "get over" the tragedy. If they recover quickly, a legacy of higher polling numbers and "unity" will allow the Kremlin to get gutsy. If the pain should last, an outward stance would appear to be an ignoring of the real problems in Russia's periphery, and create a sense of the Kremlin being "out of touch" with the common Russian.

Sadly, I don't think I have an answer on this one.

Obama's Got Some Diplomatic Magic

It's a big week in diplomacy for the United States, particularly in Europe.

NATO and the G20 both met for some big conferences. Obama was at both.

As much as perennial protests hit G20, Obama seems to have wooed Europe's civil governments with his visit. Obama seems to have gotten some accord in the G20--not quite as much action as he was hoping for, but Sarkozy and Merkel are now likely to at least spend a bit less time railing on Obama's economic policies, and more time trying to come to a mutually beneficial solution.

Obama also held a town meeting in France, taking questions of a bunch of French and German folks, and to "listen." Apparently, they loved him.

At NATO, Obama hailed a "new chapter" in US-European relations. In a showing of support for the US, NATO handed over 5000 troops to Afghanistan to beef up security before elections. They're temporary, but it's more help than the US got in a long time, and it's the first showing in years that Afghanistan is a NATO war, not a US war with reluctant taggers-along. Additionally, Obama managed to convince Turkey to allow the Danish Prime Minster Rasmussen to head NATO (Turkey was worried because Rasmussen was involved with the Danish cartoonist's Mohammed-terrorist snafu, and NATO works on full consensus).

The US and Russia seem to be thawing a bit, which is bringing a sigh of relief to NATO. Apparently Medvedev and Obama are "comrades" now, after Obama showed up and said that Russia has "legitimate" interest in, and grievances with, NATO. Comrade Obama's clearly trying to soothe Russian frustration and try to integrate them into the European community, in hopes that they can be a part of the norm-centered Western order, rather than resorting to realpolitik. Medvedev responded with remarks that the Russians had no intentions of trying to bust NATO, and that they look forward to continuing to work together in regional security. In a sign of new cooperation, Comrades Obama and Medvedev agreed to push for extensive bilateral nuclear disarmament. If it can be pulled off, it will be a great trust-building measure, that will make the next 8 years (where Medvedev and Obama will both likely be still working together) possibly go a bit smoother. Such disarmament will save taxpayers a good few bucks, though I'm somewhat worried about Obama's hope to "rid the world of nuclear arms." I'm much more comfortable with the Russians and Americans being able to leverage nukes on rogue states than not. More importantly, having a second-strike capability is critical to keeping countries like Iran and North Korea from doing anything too drastic if they get themselves extensive arsenals. Comrade Obama may have even defused the Eastern European missile shield snafu by pledging to work together with Russia to create a missile shield to protect Russia and Europe from missiles coming from elsewhere (probably Iran, North Korea). I see no particular reason why the NATO-side of the system couldn't also shoot down potential Russian missiles.

Finally, thumbs up seem to be coming from Afghanistan and Pakistan on Obama's new strategy for Operation Enduring Freedom. In response to an earlier post of mine: it's possible that Obama and/or the media were portraying an overly-simplistic version of the strategy. In particular, if the Afghan government approves of the strategy, then it's not one that's going to leave the Taliban in charge, which means that most of the problems I cited are naught, which is frankly great news. Maybe he'll pull it off. Pakistan's even starting a symbolically and strategically very important joint operation with the US to hunt and kill Taliban leader Baitullah Meshud, who is apparently likely to become serious trouble in the near future. If such joint operations can slowly be increased, then NATO and the Pakistani army may be able to surround and squeeze the Pashtuni region and levy sufficient pressure on the Taliban to get them to the negotiating table.

It seems everyone across the pond is gaga for Obama. Maybe we can just all get along. But over the next few months, I'll at least be scrutinizing the president for real policy results.

Obama's Very Quiet Olive Branch to Moscow

Obama recently sent a letter to Moscow. Presidents do this quite often. As far as I know, we even have a red phone to Moscow in the Oval Office today.

But this letter is a special one. And it was supposed to be a very quiet one. Somehow, through journalistic voodoo and heka magic, the New York Times happened across the contents. It looks, for the moment, that Mr. Obama was quietly implying that the US would halt and undo its missile defense placements in Europe in exchange for Russia making sure that Iran would not be able to build ballistic missiles.

The implications are interesting. First, about the leak--it is unclear whether the letter was supposed to be leaked or not. Intentional leaks are common, in order to let the state throw its hands up and say, "we didn't mean to publicize this," and so further questions are not pressured. This may be an intentional leak--it may be an attempt to show Eastern Europe, Russia, et al, that the missile shield is not intended as an anti-Russian initiative (even though it is). This potentially gives Obama some political traction for continuing the project, should it seem necessary.

But it also makes the shield a bargaining chip with Russia. Obama says, "we know you don't like it, but hey, it's for Iran, so if you can just make that problem go away, we won't need it anymore, and we'll stop spending money on it." It means that, if the Russians choose to (and indeed, are able to) deal with the Iranians, then Obama is willing to reprioritize on defense. The likelihood that the Russians are actually going to engage in ballistic missile brinksmanship bargaining is low... but it is not so low for the Iranians. Furthermore, the EU is actually collectively strong enough to stand up to the Russians if they are willing to get their hands dirty, where Israel is less able to do so (even if much more willing).

So Obama knows that today, one needs to sidle up to the Russians, and pressure the Iranians. Obviously, this is tough to do. Medvedev, when questioned about the leak, mostly shrugged at the situation and said that "nothing concrete" was in the letter. He knows that he is in a relatively good relative bargaining position, and is not ready to yet show his hand.

But ultimately, the missile shield in Eastern Europe is something that the Russians are willing to do a lot to get rid of. In a somewhat ironic way, Mr. Obama can thank Mr. Bush for leaving the incomplete missile shield behind so that he, in the nicest way possible, can use it as a lever to pry Moscow.

Winning The Second Cold War Before It Starts

Oh, the Russians. Becoming more and more terrifying, no? Moscow's domestic and international politics alike are worrying the West, and for good reason.

The Duma (Russian parliament) has backed a 6-year presidential term, almost certainly leading to a 12-year Medvedev presidency--and thus an even greater extension of Putin's power. Apparently, the bill means that Putin will be eligible to run for President again in 2012 or 2018, whenever Medvedev decides he's done... giving Putin yet another 6-12 years afterwards. He'll have ruled longer than any post-revolution leader of Russia.

And Russia's leadership is not ruling with a bunnies-and-kitties fist. Russia's habit of intimidating dissenting reporters (usually by sending the mob) has been ratcheted up by Moscow's declaration that it would close the murder trial of Politkovskaya to the public. The Kremlin is signaling that it would rather appear opaque and shadowy than let whatever terrible truth is afoot here get out. Justice for future murders is unlikely.

Internationally, he presidents of Poland and Georgia had to duck from fire at a South Ossetian checkpoint over the weekend, and the Russians are waving it off as a setup by the Poles. How the Poles might have put agents into South Ossetia to fire on their own president is unclear.

Russia's launching itself towards new superpowerdom, and quickly. It is sending a naval fleet to South America to deal with Brazil, Venezuela, and Cuba--almost certainly to boast that it can steamroll the Monroe doctrine at its pleasure, and to put pro-Russian sentiment into the back yard of the US. It's threatening to set up offensive ballistic missiles against its former satellite countries that won't cow to its will. It's trying to force Finnish paper industries to move to Russia with crippling timber tariffs. The invasion of Georgia was a clear signal to NATO to back off. Russia has threatened to cut off gas supplies to France and Germany if NATO accepts the Ukraine.

With Putin and Medvedev likely in power for approximately forever (in government terms, looking three or four administrations away is such--Could Gerald Ford plan for Bill Clinton's tenure?), they're likely to only turn the heat up as Russia's GNP and military continue to grow. Western governments likely want to (and if they don't, should want to) launch preventative measures to keep Russia from becoming big enough to actually do damage to Western interests. I have some simple (but not easy) suggestions on how to relegate Russia to being a tinpot regional power, able to terrorize only the people of the Central Asian Stans (which we Westerners don't care much about anyway):

1) Show NATO Has Guts.NATO was formed for one reason: to contain Russia. In the 1990s, Russia's internal collapse meant NATO found itself bored and poking around in the civil wars of small Balkan and African countries. In 2001, it came to bat for its largest benefactor, the US. NATO has grown aggressively throughout the 1990's and 2000's. It has shown strength, unity, and cooperation. It should make sure not to splinter, and see what it can to do supports members in most dire need of help: the Czech Republic, Poland, Turkey.

2) Subsume Georgia and the Ukraine.The Russians clearly meant to terrify NATO by smashing Georgia up so thoroughly--they hoped to make Georgia such a liability that NATO would reject it as an ally. But if NATO is going to contain Russia, it should invest in taking the blow now to keep a knife close to Russia's underbelly. But the Ukraine is even more important. The Ukraine is the Russian heartland, and provides Russia with massive supplies of grain. In addition, Sevastopol is Russia's only deep warm water port, which it rents from the Ukraine. Losing its lease would mean a deep retraction of the Russian navy, particularly in the winter. Seasonal power projection is barely better than no power projection, and Russia would lose great influence in the Eastern Mediterranean and elsewhere. If the Ukraine and Georgia enter NATO, Russia's last two European allies will be the paltry Serbia and Belarus--staunch, but ineffectual. Russia will be pushed out of Europe forever. If it goes on to develop Central Asia to give itself a sphere of influence, than all the better.

3) Come to bat for Germany and France. If Ukraine and Georgia are admitted to NATO, then Germany and France are likely to lose access to Russian oil and gas. But luckily, oil and gas are necessarily fungible, unless Russia chooses to hoard that gas and lose all the revenue, rather than sell it... but this is unlikely. Let's assume they sell it to the Chinese, instead. That means the Chinese demand less Middle Eastern hydrocarbon, and the price goes down. The Americans and British can buy up these cheaper Middle Eastern resources, and then re-sell them to the French. Now, will it all be as cheap as normal? Clearly not. But everyone can take some hit in prices to support French and German stands against Russian resource blackmail, and it will have to be temporary if the Russians don't want to lose lots of money over their own inefficiency (currently, they make the most possible money by selling to Europe). It will be temporarily costly to test Russian resolve, but the long-term savings in not having to deal with Russian weight-throwing are immense.

4) Accelerate the Mediterranean Solar Plan. Sarkozy's MedU plan to stick a bunch of thermal solar plants in North Africa to replace oil and gas dependency for power-generation has a few excellent effects for Europe in the long-term. The first is a reduction in carbon dioxide emissions, which will help them sleep at night. The second will be a less volatile source of electricity, which will keep shocks from busting up the economy. The third benefit will be relief from dependence on Russian gas and oil. Imports are fine, unless you're importing from someone who's willing to jump from a cliff just to take you down with him. Putin may be ready to do that. In the long-term, the more the Europeans reduce their dependence on Russian gas and oil, the more irrelevant the Russians will become. France's high-speed construction of nuclear power plants is a great example of these efforts--even if nuclear power is currently more expensive than the gas and oil. The French and German power grids are integrated, and if the Russians do turn the gas off, a combination of solar in North Africa, wind in Germany, and nuclear in France should soon be able to sop up enough of the slack to keep the economy from faltering as the Americans and Brits scramble to deliver the necessary hydrocarbons.

If the Russians lose Ukraine and Georgia, and also (in the long-term) lose their hydrocarbon monopoly in Europe, they will become irrelevant very quickly, unless they actually want to initiate a full-scale war with NATO. But the Russians are smarter than they used to be, and weren't foolish enough to launch such a war in the 20th century, when they owned half of Europe. If NATO claims the Ukraine and Georgia, its conquering of the Russian empire will be complete, and in the long-term, Russia will be relegated to its own icy home.

The Devil Went Down to Georgia

You all have a pretty good idea what's going on at this point, so I will keep the summary brief:

Georgia has two provinces that have declared independence in the 1990's--South Ossetia and Abkhazia--and Russia jumped to recognize that independence (and probably wants to subsume them if they actually achieve physical indepdenence). A quick fight between Georgia and Russia left Russian "peacekeeping" troops in both breakaway regions, and a great deal of autonomy (Wikipedia considers them "de facto independent," much like Taiwan).

In the meantime, Bush's aggressive expansion of NATO hit a roadblock with the Ukraine and Georgia, because the Russians threatened to cut off French and German gas and oil supplies. Instead, the Ukraine and Georgia were offered promises of membership that were set to become action plans in December. Such an expansion would cut the Russians off from Europe for as long as the West pleased. December 2008 slowly began to creep upon a Russia whose behavior has been increasingly assertive and aggressive. Surely, plans were in the works.

Then things got complicated. Georgia's president Saakashvili has had strong but dwindling support since his 2004 victory with 96% of the vote--in 2008, he won 53% (the second place candidate won onlt 27%). He has had rather contradictory goals of improving relations with Russia, winning back control over South Ossetia and Sbkhazia, and entering NATO. He is one of President Bush's most loyal international allies.

Now: Five days ago. It should be noted that there are no independent foreign media in Georgia at all, so reports can only be taken on face. Five days ago, Georgian troops stormed into South Ossetia, claiming shelling by South Ossetian forces. This would be a claim of an unlikely and suicidal half-attempt at conflict, unless one presupposes that the Russians might have invited the South Ossetians to make such a move.

Afterwards, Georgian troops rolled in, hoping to use the incident (which may not have even happened) to reassert military control over South Ossetia. The region is connected to Russia primarily by a single tunnel, which the Georgians probably considered bombing, but they likely worried about provoking a formal Russian response.

Russian Cossacks, who are recognized as a pseudo-official security force in the Caucases by the Russian government (who often makes dubious agreements with shady characters like mobs and Chechneans to keep order in a vast Federation that it largely cannot centrally control), began flowing into Georgia through that tunnel on busses. They came (of course) from the region of North Ossetia, who shares ethnic and cultural ties with the South Ossetians, and somehow stuck with the Russian Federation during the confused and frantic early 1990's breaking-up of the USSR. The Russians did little to stop them, and we mostly thought that the Russian government was happy to let "volunteers" do its dirty work.

But, of course, Russian citizens started dying. This is due in part to the fact that the Russians have slowly been infiltrating both regions with Russian citizens and "peacekeepers" (no doubt to Russify the regions) that have been hit by shelling and bombing, and also that the poorly-armed Cossacks picked fights with Georgian tanks and airplanes. At this point, Abkhazia started fighting the Georgians as well, in hopes of helping the Ossetians deliver its army a rough defeat that would seal their de facto independence indefinitely. The Georgians struggled, but it looked as if they might even prevail, and reunite their country.

The Russians are probably looking at this problem much like the Americans would view an attack on Taiwan. While the US does not address Taiwan as an independent state, it would not quietly let the Chinese invade--just as the Russians' feathers were quite ruffled by Georgian action in Ossetia. The difference is thus: The Russian army is much, much larger than the Georgian army. And with American forces tied up in the Middle East, Western retaliatory action was unlikely. So the Russians struck, and hard.

Georgia has suffered a rout; it is barely worth speaking of orders of battle or troop numbers, the Georgians just weren't up to the fight. Russian troops have hung around the Caucaus for some time, waiting for an opportunity like this. Russian troops have not only completely occupied both breakaway regions (much to the delight of a majority of their residents), but also pushed into unambiguously Georgian territory, as far south as Gori. Bush made sharp criticisms of the Russians (though did not mention Putin), the UN called for an immediate end to fighting, and Sarkozy quickly flew to Moscow, hoping to use an increasingly legendary diplomatic charm to help Russia weigh its options.

But no threats of action have come out, except faint hints at booting Russia from the G-8 (which Mr. McCain was planning on doing anyway). Much talk abounds of the diplomatic and military weakness of the US because of Iraq, but the US would not have been able to do much besides declare war against the Russians anyway. Right now, Georgia is simply not worth it, and the Russians knew that.

Russia ordered a halt after conquering about half of the country, but is still quite willing to shoot Georgians that resist their occupation, and has made no plans to pull out. They are in negotiations with Sarkozy and the EU at the moment.

Now, this all is very interesting. Some questions arise:
1) Who started it, and why?
2) What will NATO's immediate response be?
3) What is the fate of the Georgian territories?
4) What does this mean for NATO expnasionism?
5) Will Russia's relationship with the West change in the long-term?

I will do what I can with these questions. Other questions about how this will affect US domestic politics and the November election arise, but the intuitive answer is that not much will happen--there is an unambiguously correct side for each candidate to take. I might make a later post about this anyway.

1) It remains unclear who started it, given that both sides have a fair amount of interest in starting it, given a few preconditions. The Georgians would have been happy to exploit or even fabricate Ossetian violence to reclaim the region, but only if they thought the Russians would not get involved. Is there any reason to think so? Putin's presence in Beijing might have made them think the Russians would have been impotent to respond, and they may have predicted a rapid victory. But besides that, nothing about Russian behavior shows obvious weakness or preoccupation. Why would the Georgians would not wait until they were NATO members--or at least had an expected membership date? Trying to assault Ossedia now, without a clear sign of Russian restraint, would seem foolish.

On the other hand, the Russians have a lot to lose from waiting. NATO's expansion is creeping too close for comfort. The last thing the Russians want is a second front from NATO in their south, or (perhaps more importantly) total NATO control of the Black Sea, which would be made possible by Ukranian and Georgian inclusion. If the Russians want to head off such inclusions, they have many options, and have already employed some; they may now be looking to scare the West into leaving their sphere alone--why now? Note that NATO is one of the most terrifying military alliances in the world because of a single clause in the Charter: Article 5, which states that an attack on one country would be considered an attack on all (this was used only once, in the Sept. 11th attacks on the US). But they may also be looking to lock in control over Ossedia and Abkhazia--Russia is currently a fledging-enough regional power that small influence gains are worth it. But it is rather clear from a brief topological survey that inclusion of these territories (or separation of them from Georgia) would give Russia much physical security--Russia's border with Georgia is a solid line of Caucasus mountians. The most likely explanation is that the Russians indeed encouraged a South Ossetian incident such that they might test Georgia's and NATO's resolve to fight. The result has been a great blow to Western influence in the South Caucasus region, and a new sign of US weakness in a "Cold War Lite."

I will note that the possibility remains that there was no subversive action--that a few Ossedians simply got upset at some small incident and started firing artillery, and the whole mess spiralled out of control. But it's unlikely.

2) When I first heard about this five days ago, I said "NATO should really have an emergency session over this," and indeed they have. The meeting didn't do much, but they took a stand that they really needed to: they called for a return to status quo ante (that is, Russian and Georgian troops both out of the region), condemned Russia but not Georgia, and affirmed support for Georgia's attempts to assert its recognized sovereignty over the region. NATO, far from abandoning Georgia for potentially foolish action, has stood by it (making this look perhaps like a World War I spiral scenario, which may be part of the reason the Russians were so quick to accept a cease-fire).

3) The fate of the Georgian territories is highly unclear. Even if the Russians pull back, the Georgian military has probably taken a beating, and is scared stiff. It will not be able to physically assert its authority over its breakaway provinces again. That said, if the Georgians do join NATO, the Russians will know that another stunt like this would risk a declaration of war, which they won't be able to afford if Bush manages to install anti-missile batteries in Eastern Europe. Ossetia and Abkhazia are just not worth that kind of risk. The fate of these regions depends largely on the next few weeks of diplomatic talk, and Russia's concern with trying to save its image. But its reputation is already tarnished and the West is already irritated--pulling back completely and leaving the mess alone would mean accepting diplomatic sunk costs to a foolish move that the Russians may feel they have bought too deeply into.

4) NATO expansionism is unlikely to alter its course, unless it is to speed up. The members of NATO said that their considerations of Georgia as a member have not changed. The Georgian ambassador to NATO chided them slightly by saying that this was a consequence of cowing to Russia's threats in April over a fast-track plan for membership, and Bush has suggested that NATO take a stronger stance on its acceptance of Georgia as a response to the Russian incursion, but it's likely that Georgia is likely to go through the same long and (now excruciating) process that most countries do, as is the Ukraine. Far from frightened by the Russians, NATO might be emboldened by this action into agreeing with more aggressive factions (like Bush and Sarkozy) into seeing Russia as a reemerging threat that needs to be aggressively contained.

5) The West has been using a "hedge" strategy with Russia for some time, Bush included. Warm words, joint military exercizes, and a crucial oil trade have kept relations on both sides friendly. The West has hoped to "socialize" Russia, much like they feel they have begun to "socailize" the Chinese (and, luckily for them, the Olympics are a good sign in this direction). But Russia has grown aggressive in the past few years, and Putin's iron grip over the country (which is quite happy to be so gripped) has not faltered--this trend is not going to reverse on its own. The West is likely to start to become worried enough about the Russians that a Hedge strategy will give way to full-blown containment. Unlike the Chinese, the Russians can be largely contained with trade restrictions and alliance expansion. But after such a quick turnaround from Soviet Union to Soviet Putin, the West may be scratching their heads in exasperation, wondering how they might teach the Russians to just get along.

On another interesting note, I cannot seem to find anything by the Chinese on the incident, who are probably quite grateful that they have the Olympics as an excuse to ignore completely an incident where they might otherwise be asked ot take sides between their greatest economic trading partner and their greatest military partner.

As a closing note: The situation is changing by the hour, some of this may already be out of date. But I will try to keep updated.

Putin's Dictator Status is Secure

With Medvedev attaining 70% of the Russian vote, the Russian system (and mostly even the people) has given Putin a full mandate to act as dictator. As Prime Minister of a parliament with more than 2 out of 3 seats occupied by his party (United Russia), he can pass any legislature that he chooses. And Medvedev, Putin's long-time Protoge, at the helm of the Presidency, Putin is likely to have full executive support for his plans. At this point, there remain approximately zero political institutions that can challenge him, barring any strange Russian Constitutional Law precedents that I am (admittedly grossly) unaware of.

Medvedev has, of course, been called a "puppet" of Putin, and it may well be true. He has openly offered to step down after 4 years and allow Putin to resume another potentially 8-year-term in 2012, pushing Putin's reign to 20 years. At this point, Putin represents Russia's future, and he has great leeway. Despite clear rigging in the Parliamentary election (Chechnya allegedly voted, at 99% turnout, for United Russia by a margin of more than 90% over any other party) and highly suspicious deaths of anti-Kremlin forces, he remains extremely popular, due largely to Russia's economic growth and Putin's tough stance to the West. He is Time's Person of the Year for a reason.

Twelve more years of Putin means the US is going to just have to get used to him. Is a new Cold War coming? Unlikely. Putin is tough, but he respects other tough statesmen, and is willing to work with them. The EU still towers over Russia both economically and militarily, and, as we addressed earlier, more and more Russian satellite countries are flocking to NATO. But now, it is time to be ready for Putin's Russia. And for most of us in the US, including me, step one is figuring out what that even means.