US Strategy in Syria is Just Insane

As I've been writing my other book, I've been taking breaks and reading a lot about Syria and Iraq because I keep hoping we're going to do something different.

We're not.

I'm not going to talk here about why the US might be choosing such a terrible strategy, but simply outline the ways in which it is so terrible in light of surprisingly limited criticism.

(It has helped me to replace "President Obama" with "President Bush" whenever I read articles about Syria to get a sense of how the public would be reacting if it was making stronger connections to the initial Iraq invasion and that goofy Texan everyone loves to hate.)

So let's tell the Syrian story in some context.

The Arab Spring

Early 2011, a whole bunch of countries in the Arab World start protesting their heavy-handed secular governments. These protesters tended to be some combination of:

• Western-looking, clean-shaven, tee-shirt wearing liberals (not "progressives" but "liberal" in the sense of "a liberal democracy") that wanted a liberal democracy of their own
• Oppressed ethno-religious minorities or majorities
• Hard-core Islamists that wanted to replace these very secular regimes with some form of Sharia

(First, I'll leave it as an exercise to the reader to determine which of these groups are most and least likely to form powerful, long-term militias if anarchy begins in the state.)

Western media mostly portrayed the protests of the first group in places like Benghazi, Homs, Cairo. The protests of ethno-religious minorities in places like Bahrain that were put down by Saudi military action got much less attention.

Libya

In 2011, Qaddafi decided to put down the protests before they could become a rebellion, so he began a pacification campaign from Sirte going east towards Benghazi.

The US and some of its EU allies decided to intervene with air support to keep tanks from rolling in and slaughtering Benghazi, which seemed like a nice thing to do.

Scope creep took over, and the West decided that really the only way to keep the people  of Benghazi and elsewhere safe was to provide air support to militias to defeat the Libyan army and overthrow the regime.

That happened quite successfully, and Obama was clever enough to not get on a giant aircraft carrier with a "Mission Accomplished" banner because he is better at managing the media than Bush was, but the US decided we were done.

Immediately after Qaddafi fell, we left, and the militias that had fought against him looted army bases and armories as the army dissolved.

A democracy was formed, but it was plagued by well-armed militias and now-unemployed (and pariah) former army and government personnel. Violence and skirmishes plague the country for 3 years.

(Again, I encourage the reader to replace "Libya" with "Iraq" and "Qaddafi" with "Hussein.")

The story evolves a bit in 2014 as elections are won by Islamists who are pretty terrible, who then immediately get voted out but--oops--decide not to respect the election and use their militias to hold Tripoli. Libya dissolves into a (very slow) civil war between the new Libyan army and the Islamist militias. In the meantime, a whole bunch of different Islamist militias (called the Shura Council) take over half of Benghazi and the Islamic State decide to move in because the place is such a mess that they can get a foothold in there; ISIS takes over Derna and Sirte. And then some other local militias, who are tired of everyone, carve out their own territories. There are now 6 groups fighting each other in Libya. 

(Libya also makes for strange bedfellows: the Tobruk gov't is supported by the US, Russia, UAE, Algeria, Jordan, and Egypt; the Islamist government in Tripoli is supported by Qatar, Sudan, and Turkey.) 

Wikipedia

It's been a stalemate for the past 2 years.

"Fogg, what does this have to do with Syria?"

While one could give the US the excuse of thinking that "the intervention in Syria will totally be different from Iraq because we're not putting boots on the ground and trying to run the show from Washington," the lessons from Libya leave no such excuse, even for so inexperienced a foreign policy team that led the State Department when the US got involved in Syria.

(When I say Libya's civil war is slow, I mean slow. About 5,000 people have died since the beginning of 2014. 

Syria, on the other hand, has led to probably 300,000 deaths, 130,000 captured or missing, 8 million internally displaced people, and 4 million refugees. )

The one thing that the US and Western allies did right in Libya was support the rebels decisively, which at least knocked Qaddafi out of the fight. This has led to far fewer deaths and a much more "soft" civil war. 

Syria

Syrian protests started in 2011 because Assad has ruled with an iron fist as a pretty terrible dude, oppressing the Arab majority, generally putting his cronies in charge, having a Gestapo-like secret police make people disappear, etc. 

Things really blew up when he decided to torture a kid that spraypainted some critical stuff on a wall. Homs quickly got basically taken over by protesters. Assad reacted just like Qaddafi would have, had the US and allies not provided decisive air support: he's been bombing the heck out of rebel strongholds to try to end the rebellion as quickly as possible, and sending in troops with that air support wherever he can.

So what are we doing in Syria? The US has been supporting "moderate rebels" since 2011. But the word "supporting" is an odd one. We are funneling some weapons and supplies to them (which we did in Libya), but we are not bombing Assad. This is probably to keep from open conflict with Russia. 

Just as a reminder, the US and allies like Germany have been steadfast that Assad has to go before any political settlement can be reached. The US considers a totally dysfunctional patchwork of Syrian rebel representatives to be the "government of Syria," which is at least as silly as insisting for 22 years that the Taipei exile government was the "legitimate government of China" and that the Communists were just upstarts that would go away someday. 

Back to Assad. Assad knows that if he "goes," he faces a chopping block, and so do his cronies. The West is too ideologically pure to cut a deal and say, "look, we'll buy you guys a sweet island and grant you immunity." Dictators like Assad face "justice." So the US has pretty explicitly said, "Assad, you have to win this war or you and your family will die."

So there's a lot of motivation for Assad to keep fighting, even as Syria crumbles.

The US' half-hearted supported for Syrian rebels is just enough to keep the fight going. They have enough armaments to keep shooting and not collapse.... at least as long as they're allied with the al-Nursa Front, who is literally al-Qaeda. These guys are the really intense, zealous fighters that are really sticking it to the Syrian regime. Also, just in case we forgot, ISIS was classified as "part of the rebels" early in the war and between 2011 and 2013 we were still arming them. 

Sure, we tried to train some new "moderate" Syrian rebels so that they'd be more powerful, but we managed to train four or five of them before giving up. 

So now we're basically allied with al-Qaeda against Assad, because the "moderate" rebels are really kindof just the hood ornament. 

Imagining Victory

Let's imagine for a moment that we provided air cover and gave the rebels enough support to actually topple Assad. (This is possible if we support the southern front of Rebels with serious air cover, knock out Syrian bases and air power and supply lines, etc.) We could have done this with the "red line" excuse: back in 2013, Obama promised a big thick red line of Assad used chemical weapons. He went ahead and used them about 17 times, and we said, "er, well," and kept up our current strategy.

Anyway. Let's say the Syrian regime collapses, and let's say it collapsed before ISIS took over half the country. You've got Kurds in the northeast that want their own country, and then you've got the moderate rebels that number 40,000-50,000, and a bunch of al-Qaeda-and-friends (which includes a lot of groups) that number between 100,000 and 160,000. 

They duke it out. Guess who wins?

Basically, I don't see how the US imagines any outcome of the collapse of the Syrian regime besides al-Qaeda or ISIS or both taking over Syria.

But Forget That, Because Victory Ain't Happenin'

The Syrian regime is very, very different from the Qaddafi government and the Hussein government: it has pretty broad popular support, decisively controls the fertile heartland of Syria, and has the steadfast support of heavy-hitters like Iran, Hezbollah, and Russia (who are willing to put troops on the ground and are willing to bomb the heck out of the rebels, unlike the West). So we're not the only guys parachuting weapons and providing intel: the Syrian government is getting it, too. This is an all-out proxy war, which was not the case in Iraq, Libya, Afghanistan.

So these groups have been tearing each other to pieces. Guess who gets to step in and fight at their convenience wherever these two groups are weak? You guessed it: ISIS. Remember that Obama called ISIS "the JV team" of al-Qaeda and we grossly under-estimated their potential strength (which he later lied about). 

But now ISIS has taken over tons of oil resources and is actually constructing some semblance of a functional state--something that no radical Islamist militia has been able to do since the Taliban emerged out of US support for the mujaheddin back in '89.  Now that they've more or less decided not to mess with the Kurds (who are a very united force thanks to their long history of shared ethnic oppression), they get to pick their battles and operate with a great deal of impunity.

The Syrian regime and the Rebels are too concerned fighting each other to be able to oppose ISIS with any serious fervor. Each hopes it's going to win and can then turn its attention against ISIS with united support from the international community. The Kurds aren't going to come in and save Syria--they have no interest in shedding their blood for that. 

(Wikipedia. Note the green "rebels" are the loose alliance of the "moderate" and Islamist rebels.)

The US and allies are bombing ISIS, yes, but ISIS is highly resilient. Remember when we bombed the Viet Cong and North Vietnam for 13 years and the North Vietnamese totally just gave up? Me neither.

So This is Officially Pretty Insane

The depth of delusion at the highest levels of the US government--and the utter refusal to learn and adapt--is frustrating and frankly mind-boggling. 

To summarize:

• The US is half-heartedly supporting rebel troops just enough to extend a war, but definitely not win it, which gives ISIS plenty of room to grow
• Oh right, we also armed ISIS for a few years
• The US is currently allied with al-Qaeda and a bunch of other Islamist groups and that totally won't be just like the Mujaheddin in Afghanistan 
• If the US decided to whole-heartedly take down the Syrian regime, al-Qaeda-and-friends would almost certainly smother the fractured moderate rebels and take over the country

All scenarios here lead to utter disaster, for decades.

The only way one can support the Syrian rebels and even hope for them to come out on top is to commit Iraq-level troops and support for probably just as long and just as bloody a conflict. And even then, you might just end up with the same kind of corrupt, fractured government that you have in Afghanistan and Iraq. 

But what we're doing right now is just terrible.

Enter Russia

Before I get started, readers should know by now that I'm generally extremely critical of Russia's foreign policy and territory-grabbing, to the point where I sometimes have to re-write posts to keep my frustration to a minimum.

At the UN, basically looking right through to the US Ambassador towards the White House, Putin says, "Do you now realize what you've done?"

For once, I've got to hand it to the guy. 

Russia has actually decided to end the war. It's putting troops in Syria and providing air cover to help Assad's troops carve back territory from rebels and ISIS alike. Russia's aim is to keep Assad in power, yes, but ending the war decisively will bring the nightmare of Syria to an end. 

Russia is actually the best opportunity the US has to get out of this. I know I said I wouldn't speculate on why we insist on such a stupid Syrian policy, but I think some of it is an attempt to "be consistent" and generally save face: we're not going to suddenly start supporting our named "bad guy" in the fight. And we've already backed down once on a line we drew in the sand (chemical weapons). We're probably resistant to coming out and admitting we're wrong.

But we're wrong, and it's killing lots of people.

Russia has proposed a political solution: the rebels ally with Assad to take out ISIS, and in 2 years after everything has settled a bit (which is pretty ambitious), you have elections. If the Syrian people want Assad, he stays, even if he's awful.

"Erik, are you saying we should change policy and prop up Assad?" Absolutely. We should have done it years ago, before each army was beat to snot, but while the best time to plant a tree is 20 years ago, the 2nd best time is now.

The way out is to work together with Russia and Iran, withdraw our support for the Syrian rebels, and tell them they get no more weapons or air cover unless they stop fighting Assad and turn all their guns on ISIS, full-stop. Any group that doesn't becomes our enemy.

It would be embarrassing to admit. But diplomacy is weird: everyone can know we're doing something stupid, but we somehow save face by not admitting it.

But what we're doing in Syria is immoral. 300,000 people have died, the country is a giant pile of rubble, 12 million people have left their homes (only 1/3 of which have made it to the tent-camps of other countries). The moral move in Syria is to end the war. The only way to do that--excepting an Iraq-style commitment that risks direct conflict with Russia--is to support Assad. Full-stop. 

This is Way, Way Worse than Iraq

Hopefully you have been reading this with my instruction to draw parallels to Bush and Iraq.

Syria's worse. Way worse. It has led to the deaths of maybe half of Iraq's 600,000 (and led to the deaths of more than 3x Afghanistan's 100,000) body count, but Iraq also has twice the population of Syria--so in much less time, as much of the country has been killed. Far more have lost their homes.

And unlike Iraq, there is absolutely no end in sight, and the destruction of Syria has been far more thorough than the destruction if Iraq. Iraq has cities, and an economy. Its GDP per capita (PPP) is about $15,000 per year and has been growing every year since the Hussein regime fell. Syria's GDP per capita (PPP) has dropped to maybe $2,000 after having lost more than 60% of its economic output (without the war, it would probably be about $7.000). Its HDI is hard to measure, but basically imagine that everyone in Aleppo, Homs, Hama, Derna, Idlib, Palmyra, etc, is living in bombed-out concrete husks without access to basic supplies, and 10% of the population is stuck under ISIS. 

The Syrian war's human toll--and long-term consequences--make Iraq pale in comparison. And it's the way it is because of US policy since 2011.

The Controversy over Syrian Refugees is Comically Depressing

The outrage over some in the US not wanting to take 10,000 Syrian refugees is not wrong, but it's completely misplaced. The idea that our moral duty here is primarily to 10,000 people currently in Turkish or German or Greek camps, and not to the 17,000,000 Syrians we're subjecting to a protracted, nightmarish war so the current administration can try to save face, is absurd.

Why the same Americans that protested Iraq aren't in the streets now protesting Syria is beyond me, but my current guess is that the guys in charge are wearing the Blue Team jersey rather than the Red Team jersey.

Screed over.

Dark and Bright Spots on the Middle Eastern War Maps

Over the past few weeks, ISIS has made a major comeback in Iraq and has gained significant ground in all the non-Kurdish parts of Syria. They're expanding territory in eastern Libya amid the renewed civil war there, and hold almost all of eastern Yemen. It's looking bad. The American/Jordanian-led air campaigns are just not enough to keep them bottled up.

In Anbar (Iraq) and northern Syria, there are a few bright spots that are worth highlighting.

Iraq

Ramadi fell to ISIS a few weeks back, despite a significant numerical advantage on the part of Iraqi forces. US command says the Iraqi forces lost their will to fight, which is surprising, given the number of attacks they'd repelled in the previous weeks. 

Iraq is responding by sending in the Shiite militias, though right now it seems that they're working on surrounding Fallujah rather than Ramadi, which suggests that ISIS forces had been dispatched from Fallujah to take and hold Ramadi, leaving Fallujah open to attack. Shiite militias in Sunni-dominated Anbar will doubtless be a major problem, but Iraq is stuck choosing between bad options if its regular forces turn tail when attacked.

Syria

In all non-Kurdish territory, ISIS keeps pushing south and west. They've taken Palmyra and are now holding positions near both Damascus and Daraa. I'm thinking that the best hope to end the war is that ISIS threatens Damascus and other major population centers like Daraa and Homs so much that the rebels and gov't form a deal to deal with them.

The one bright spot is that the Kurds have gone on a major offensive. They finally crossed the river in the northeast to reclaim hundreds of villages that ISIS held, and they're moving fast. They've alleviated pressure on Qamishli and are surrounding Hasakah from the west. From Kobane, they're moving east towards Tall Abyad, albeit more slowly--this crossing is an important supply line from Turkey for ISIS and they'll fight for it. But the Kurds are looking poised to link up in the north. I also anticipate they'll keep moving south from Qamishli to surround Hasakah from the east... but they'll probably stop there and hold, as liberating al-Raqqah (ISIS' capital) is not on their agenda. They're looking out for their own.

Yemen

In Yemen, the government forces are so pressed by Houthi forces in the west that their eastern backyard has been almost entirely taken over by ISIS. There's little in the way of good news there, and the stalemate--like in Syria and Libya--just means more room for ISIS to maneuver. Saudi Arabia and Syria are more concerned with the Houthis than ISIS right now, so ISIS gets to roam free.

Libya

Similarly, stalemate here means ISIS gets room to play. The Tobruk government just can't bottle ISIS up in the east, and they're taking control of population centers. Ansar al-Sharia, an ISIS ally for the moment, holds parts of Benghazi. It looks like the government offensive towards Tripoli has stalled out completely. What's odd about this conflict is just how little fighting is actually happening. Looking at the Wikipedia article gives a sense of how oddly quiet the past few months have been, and how few casualties there are. I'm not sure why it's slowed down, particularly in the east (although gov't forces are still fighting in Benghazi).

Finally, a bit of good news. An ISIS member took a selfie at a big Syrian ISIS HQ, posted it with a location to the Internet, and that gave the US the intel necessary to bomb the HQ, destroying it completely. 

Tides Reversing in Middle Eastern Wars

Looking at maps is my way of procrastinating, so I get to find the seemingly little changes going on week-to-week in the Middle Eastern conflicts in Libya, Iraq, Syria, and Yemen.

Go check our most recent post on these wars that show progress by US-supported forces.

For clarification, the US supports:

• In Libya: the Tobruk government (red)
• In Syria: the "moderate" rebels (green)
• In Iraq: the government & allies (red)
• In Yemen: government forces (red)

Here's the update:

Libya

Libya Dawn (Tripoli government) has broken the siege of Tripoli and is pushing back. The Tobruk government's attack is floundering.

If we look to the south, we see some angry Tuaregs (who I imagine as pretty hardened mountain-fighters) have managed to capture a large swath of Libya for themselves and are challenging Tobruk's power there. I'm not sure what their goal is: maybe power-sharing, maybe independence.

Other unaffiliated local groups in Bani Walid and Tawergha have taken control from Libya Dawn--I believe they're actually old Gaddafi loyalists who are uninterested in either group. 

In general, we're seeing the fighting between Tripoli and Tobruk, meaning doors are left wide open in their own backyards for smaller groups to start some form of self-rule/splintering, which is going to be a recurring theme.

Iraq

The attempt to surround Ramadi is failing right now, and I'm not sure what the heck the Iraqi forces are doing with themselves--they should be able to outnumber and overwhelm Ramadi, but it may be the case that without Shiite militias, they're going to continue to struggle. In the past weeks, they had taken some of this territory and pushed deeper into Ramadi, along with repelling ISIS counter-attacks. But the once-imminent surrounding of Ramadi has been held up at best. Let's see if Iraqi forces reinforce further to finish off the fight. 

If Ramadi is taken, Iraqi forces would be able to comfortably cut off Fallujah for a protracted siege.

Syria

"Moderate" rebel advances in the south along the border with Israel have been pushed back. Slogging north that way would have given the rebels plausible access to Damascus that wouldn't involve taking Daraa--if they fail here, they'll be quite bottled up.

Another option for the rebel forces appears to be trying to link up between Inkhil and Tubna to cut off Daraa and besiege the city, but their forces seem to be committed to the north and in Umam Walad.

Yemen

The Houthis have made a major counter-assault in Ma'rib and Tai'zz, taking back Tai'zz and surrounding Ma'rib. They've also pushed back in Ataq and halted the southern coastal advance by government forces. It's looking increasingly bleak for government forces.

We're seeing, of course, that forces committed to red/green battle lines are allowing ISIS to make advances in ignored areas, so they've managed to pop up in the middle there, which will prove hugely frustrating (in addition to just terrible for the people of Yemen).

For the sake of beating ISIS, decisiveness--one way or another--is key in these civil wars. The continuing ambiguity is going to give them space to grow.

Quick Update on Libya, Iraq, Syria, Yemen

There's been moderate but notable movement in the past few weeks across war fronts in Libya, Iraq, Syria, and Yemen; I'll highlight them below.


Libya:
After having been initially repelled, army troops (loyal to the elected government) have moved to encircle Tripoli with support from Zintan militias. They've also moved into Ras Lanuf and Bin Jawad from the east, taking those towns back from ISIS.

Iraq:

Government reinforcements have almost surrounded Ramadi, and will counter-siege the ISIS troops in the city. If they take it, expect the government to attempt to similarly encircle Fallujah, just to the east.

Northern Syria:
Kurdish troops are making very slow progress across the Nar al Khabur river into a densely-populated area of Kurdish villages under the control of ISIS. They're battling desperately to take these villages back after finding mass graves in the area.

Southern Syria:
Free Syrian Army troops are making agonizingly slow progress against Syrian government troops in the south, around Daraa. They've recently taken the Nassib crossing and reinforced the Quintera crossing. Closing off Daraa has been attempted and repelled a few times, but would give the FSA access to the highway going north towards Damascus, their final target. They may attempt to circle in from the west, near Quinteria, to link up with pockets of troops to the southwest of Damascus.

Yemen:
The Saudi coalition's air campaign has reversed the Houthi tide, and government troops are making some gains. They're barely holding on to Aden, and are trying to relieve pressure by taking surrounding areas to the west, northwest, and north of the city. They've also moved west from Madrib and are attempting to use Saudi air support to seriously threaten Sana'a.

And, because it will make everyone's day: ISIS and the Taliban have declared jihad against each other.


Sources: All images from Wikipedia:

• ISIS War
• Yemeni Civil War
• Libyan Civil War

Infographic: Major Conflicts in the Middle East

I decided to try my hand at an infographic to get everyone caught up in all the major mayhem in the Middle East currently going on.

If everyone likes it, more will come to try to give the big picture on some individual conflicts.

Enjoy! (Click here for bigger version of the infographic)

Middle East War Update: Libyan Civil War Back On; Saudis Attack Yemen

Libya:

The key bit of news for Libya is that as of March 20^th, the Libyan civil war is back on in full swing, and Tobruk government forces are quickly moving to surround Tripoli. They seem to have caught Libya Dawn—who has been focused on fighting ISIS—off guard.

A Quick Reminder of the Players:

·         Tobruk Government: the newly-elected parliament (House of Representatives) and Presidential Council. Backed by the army. Generally considered the legitimate government due to having won the most recent elections.

·         Libya Dawn: the greater Islamist umbrella siding with the “New General National Council,” which was the General National Council until they were defeated in elections and refused to step down. Also called just the “Islamist Government” due to being an alliance of Islamists from the Muslim Brotherhood to Ansar al-Sharia (and the electorally-defeated New GNC is highly Islamist).

More in my recent post on Libya, here.

Quick 2015 Timeline:

·         January 16^th:  Libya Dawn and Tobruk Government ceasefire. Unity Government talks launched.

Jan 21 Map Post-Ceasefire. From Wikipedia. Red = Tobruk Gov't; Green = Libya Dawn; Grey/Black = ISIS.

·         Interregnum period: lots of fighting with ISIS.

·         Feburary 20^th: Tobruk Government’s House of Representatives votes to cut off talks with Libya Dawn  / New GNC.

March 20^th Map: Greatest Extent of ISIS Control

·         March 20^th: Tobruk government re-launches hostilities against Libya Dawn to take Tripoli

·         March 23^rd: Tripoli attacked under siege

March 22^nd Map With Tobruk Gov’t Assault. Note ISIS Positions Contracting. Note white = Ansar al-Sharia.

The fact that Tobruk Government forces were so quick to make progress to surround Tripoli suggests they were able to conceal the size and position of their forces.

(This is often why military groups are wary of ceasefires, by the way: they give the other side breathing room to regroup, resupply, and reposition. It’s why Ukraine was so bloody upset after Minsk I.)

Despite being beaten back in the past 2 months, ISIS is likely to make a comeback as Libya Dawn and Tobruk focus on each other.

Yemen:

With Iran-backed Shiite Houthis pressing down on Aden (the last major stronghold of elected-government forces), on March 25th Saudi Arabia decided to (at the behest of Yemen’s President) launch a military operation to push the Houthis back and restore the government. They’re claiming currently that they have a 10-country Arab (probably all Sunni-controlled) coalition, and they have amassed heavy weapons and troops along the border, just north of the Houthi’s strongest presence.

The Saudis have launched airstrikes to get things started, likely as they organize for a ground assault with the rest of the coalition. Egypt is sending ships to the area right now for support.

What finally spurred the Saudi intervention was the very rapid advance of Houthi forces towards Aden over the past 4 days--if Aden falls and the President is captured, the government comes very close to being booted out of the war entirely:

 March 22nd. Red = Gov't forces. Green = Houthis. Yellow = South Yemen Separatists. Grey = ISIS/Al-Qaeda.

March 26th

Yemen is the hottest spot right now for the ongoing Sunni-Shiite regional war and the Iranian/Arab regional war, which have very high overlap. Syria’s civil war is the secondary battleground, though outside nations are not committed to invading directly and are wary enough of the strength of ISIS that they are taking a break of sorts. In Iraq, all parties seem so dedicated to beating ISIS that the hottest parts of the Sunni-Shiite fighting have been put aside almost entirely.

Iran will probably not respond militarily here other than to try to beef up Houthi forces; at this point neither the Gulf States nor Iran want all-out war--expect their conflict to continue as a series of proxy wars.

Short: Why is Libya Important to the Islamic State?

Reader Nathan asked if I would make a Libya post and then, helpfully, gave me some truly awesome source information. Thanks, Nathan!

The big question here is: why ISIS is putting so much effort into expanding into Libya when it's losing ground in Iraq and having mixed success in Syria? (To elaborate a bit: ISIS does need to put recruiting, training, and physical resources into Libya, and foreign Jihadis going to Libya aren't going to Iraq/Syria to reinforce there, so it's definitely an investment.)

The article starts with a translation of an ISIS strategy document, which outlines to ISIS and fellow Islamic extremist groups the motivations for going to Libya.

I'll briefly sum up the main points below, but the key takeaway is that ISIS isn't looking to Libya primarily or urgently for attacks in Italy. Despite its apocalyptic machinations, ISIS' first priority is to actually establish the Caliphate: to them, that includes a very ambitious plan that is way bigger than the previous Caliphate of the dark/middle ages.

Adding to this of course are the gains that the Ottomans made in the 1200s-1400s that included areas in India, the rest of Turkey, the known Muslim areas in northern Africa, and some of the Balkans. IS wants all of this stuff and, for whatever reason, all of India. Why IS would want to rule India is not yet clear to me.

via The Daily Mail

The summary of the strategic document, in short:

• The Islamic State really does want to cover all of the Muslim World
• Libya is a window of opportunity: the strength of militants, rise of Jihadi groups, and government division mean that IS can establish a foothold there
• It's under less pressure than Iraq and is a pretty free operating space for regional operations (where IS is on the defensive in Iraq and still under lots of bombing/Kurdish pressure in Syria)
• It has access to nearby states that IS wants to spread to, many of which have potential allies (particularly Niger, Mail, and Algeria)
• It has access to battle-hardened recruits in Libya, Algeria, and Sudan [added after post]
• Indeed it does have access to Southern Europe--there are human trafficking operations that could more easily move militants to Italy and elsewhere for expanded terror operations--probably "some 20 militants shooting up Rome for a few hours" kind of mayhem

Battle Lines in Libya Reflect a Similar Fight as in 2011

About a week ago I promised a post on the current Libyan civil war.

I've done my research and started out a bit perplexed. But the battle lines now seem to make sense.

As an intro, it's worth noting that the current situation is at a ceasefire between the Tripoli government and the probably-more-legitimate Tobruk government, with talks on a unity government apparently happening. This is particularly good news because--as has been pretty common in Middle Eastern civil wars of late--the chaos has allowed ISIS and its other radical allies to gain a footing.

Much like can be said of Syria: only after the civil war ends can any real action happen against ISIS.

I won't give a summary of the 2014 civil war, as Wikipedia (as usual) actually does a fairly admirable job. But I will give a brief summary of the combatants, as it gets really complicated.

In 2011, there was the Qadaffi regime versus the rebels, made up of the Transitional National Council (TNC) that later became the General National Council (GNC), Libya Dawn (an Islamist group), and many other militias.

In 2014, the pro-Islamist GNC was defeated handily in elections, but did not step down. They call themselves the "New GNC" and operate out of Tripoli. They are allied with Libya Dawn and other Islamist groups. The recently-elected representatives call themselves the House of Representatives and operate out of Tobruk. I am calling them the "new regime" at times. They're allied with the regular armed forces of Libya.

Whew: okay.

I became particularly interested in what was going on when I noticed that the battle lines in 2014 are surprisingly similar to those from 2011:

Early 2011: Qaddafi forces in green, rebels in red

Late 2014: Islamist/New GNC forces in green, ISIS and allied forces in grey/white, House of Reps in red

The biggest exception to the consistency here is Misrata, which was anti-Qaddafi and pro-New GNC now. Don't worry too much about the towns to the south--they're sparsely populated and their militias aren't large enough to control their own fate. Benghazi is an important note, too: it is split between Islamist forces somewhat-allied with the New GNC and the forces allied with the House of Representatives.

So, the big question: why do the battle lines end up so similarly? 

Let's note first that various tribes, Islamists, and other groups all formed militias during the 2011 civil war--rather than necessarily joining up with one army or the other, the way we're accustomed to in reading US or other civil war history. These militias continued to run around and cause major problems in 2011-2014 and the government was unable to put them down.

But back to the question: why the similar lineup?

One thing we note is that it's not clearly ethnosectarian the way it has been in Iraq. Almost everyone is Sunni Muslim, and we can see that the battle lines cut right through the Arab population (but that the non-Arab ethnic groups have generally been part of the "red" side of both wars):

Some of the answer lies in Qaddafi's stance on Islam: he had Sharia law governing Libya (mostly). More "moderate" Islamists were prone to support him, even though he rooted out extremists--not for moral reasons, but because their views of pan-Islamic empire undermined his regime. These rooted-out radical Islamists were part of the opposition and--like at the beginning of the Syrian civil war--were begrudgingly welcomed by the secular opposition.

These more "moderate Islamists" became frustrated at the new government's very Western-style approach to government: secular and liberal. Their militias stuck around as an ideological opposition and wanted the return of Sharia. These "moderate Islamists" now found themselves much more aligned with radical Islamists, and dug in their heels when their 2013 re-enaction of Sharia law came under threat by the looming backlash in the polls.

It's also the case that pro-Qaddafi forces, like Baath forces from Iraq, felt marginalized in the new regime, so they kept their militias and allied with the Islamists in 2014 in seeking the new regime's overthrow.

That's why, I think, you see the anti-Tobruk forces concentrated in the same pocket as in the 2011 war, and also why you see some exceptions: the group that shifted from anti-Qaddafi to pro-GNC has been the coalition of most hardline extremists (including the now-influential Libya Dawn). Under Qaddafi they were hunted and oppressed, and under the new regime they suffered the same. But the allied Islamist/New GNC group shows promise for being closer to what the Islamists want for Libya, so they have joined up. Since these extreme Islamists have significant presence in both Misrata and Benghazi, those cities are the ones that don't clearly line up in the way they did in 2011.

Sadly, Libya follows a long line of examples where Middle Eastern dictators and strongmen fell, and broken states emerged in their wake.

Libya Mop Up: What's Taking the NTC So Long?

A few readers have asked, "Why is the NTC taking so long to capture Bani Walid and Sirte?"



Great question, and (luckily) simple answer.

Sun Tzu mentioned that you always want to give an enemy the ability to retreat. If not, they'll fight to the last man, taking many of you with them.

In past battles, Gaddafi forces have had the ability to retreat, and chose it, rather than be overwhelmed and destroyed, in the hopes of being able to reorganize and counter-attack.

All of Gaddafi's remaining forces are in these two cities, and they have nowhere to retreat to. They will need to be completely destroyed (surrendering counts) in order for the NTC to take these cities, which will be expensive and painful.

But ultimately, it is inevitable. The Gaddafi forces in Sirte have no supply lines and will fall to a siege. But, knowing this, they are likely to try to launch a counter-attack against NTC forces rather than be starved out. It's unclear whether NTC forces have significant reserves to deal with a counter-attack. Some rumors fly that they're stretched thin and are low on ammunition, but it's a game they're going to win in the long-term.

The problem is that people hate waiting.

A Complicated Libya Transition

As Gaddafi's regime ends (as now it is a mop-up exercise), "the world" must begin thinking hard about how to help Libya transition over to a functional, democratic government--and what the effect on the region will be.



The short version:
-The rebels are deeply divided about the direction they want to take post-Gaddafi.
-Gaddafi still has supporters in Sirte and other parts of Western Libya that will fear reprisals and marginalization. The rebels will struggle to bring them into the regime.
-It's unclear how much of the civil service infrastructure will be left; that is, will the civil servants that made the cogs turn pre-war keep working?

This is a great opportunity for the West to learn from its mistakes in Afghanistan and Iraq to make the transition to a new regime smoother. Mistakes not to repeat:
-Marginalizing the "old guard." They must have a reasonable place in the new regime, or they'll resist it.
-Don't declare victory too soon.
-Take a more hands-off approach: the National Transitional Council (NTC) will lose credibility if it looks like a puppet.

We'll see what the West can do. Luckily, the folks in Benghazi currently love the US to bits, so Obama has an opportunity to lead this transition well, and win back some legitimacy for the United States as a world leader.

Quick Libya Update

I know I owe everybody an update that discusses the Baltics--I promise, it's actually more interesting than you probably think it is.

It's worth a quick Libya update. For those of you rooting for the Rebels, they seem to have finally broken the stalemate.

Trained reinforcements from Benghazi and increased coordination with NATO are part of how the rebel forces have broken out from the safety of the mountain ranged and dared, successfully, the open desert. The presses from the east, while unsuccessful so far, have also taxed Gaddafi's forces and allowed the western front to be relieved, at least to some extent.

They are stretched thin, attacking multiple cities at once. But in doing so, they take advantage of the full force of NATO behind them, which is now hitting most of Gaddafi's troops in the west at once (see Wikipedia image below).


If the rebels manage to take and hold Gharyan and (most importantly) Al Zawiya, they will have successfully cut off Tripoli from any incoming supplies, including electricity, food, weapons, money. Many of Gaddafi's troops are mercenaries, and are likely to quit if the supplies and money run out.

Gaddaffi's loyalists will certainly launch a powerful, Alamo-style counter-attack, but can be hit by NATO airstrikes on the way out of Tripoli. But if the counter-attack is unsuccessful, the war will, for the most part, be over. Gaddafi lacks the command & control to coordinate effective offensives, and cannot make the long pushes that the rebels are making. He has been unable to exhaust NATO's patience (which is turning to excitement as the rebels advance), which was the only strategy he had to ultimately win back the entire country.

In the next few days, we'll see if we've entered the end game in the Libyan situation or not.

Keeing Up with the War in Libya

A few readers have asked me about how to best keep up with the War in Libya. I can say, without shame, that the best source I've seen so far (as far as getting the facts) has been Wikipedia. Check it out.

Checking In on Middle East Unrest Predictions

Never let it be said that Foggofwar doesn't hold itself accountable to its predictions. Let's go back and see how we did. For now, we won't cover everything--only the interesting ones.

Libya: Certainly the most interesting case, Libya would give Foggofwar the excuse of "intervention by the world's most powerful military alliance." Ironically, we may not even need this prediction: Protests have still not reached Tripoli, and the Rebel/NATO alliance seems to be showing a serious inability to mount an assault across the long stretch of desert, and thus won't overthrow the Gaddafi regime: the West will lose interest before Gaddafi loses will or military capability. As Predicted.

Morocco and Jordan: Protests here have died down largely due to reforms enacted by the governments that have given protesters what they wanted. As Predicted.

Syria: Protests continue to rock the country, despite (or because of) Abbas' crackdowns. Abbas has the ability to keep a lid on the populous through serious security and political liberty reforms, which he may want to do in order to court the West, anyway. But Abbas has infuriated his country and squandered a strong, loyal security establishment. Increased Risk.

Yemen: Rumors fly that the Yemenese president is working with Saudi and US allies to transition out of government... and out of the country. It's been a surprisingly long, sustained fight, but it looks like this current regime is on its way out. As Predicted.

Bahrain: Bahrain has fallen out of the news sphere as of late, as the active unrest has stopped. Interestingly, the sustained crackdown continues, trying to marginalize the supporters of the protests. The regime is safe--for now. But the Shiite majority of the country has been alienated completely. Long-term, the regime will continue to face risk. As Predicted.

Briefly speaking, no other country has surprised us yet in the magnitude of risk or, more importantly, in regime change. Overall, we've done pretty well so far.

But we're happy to be proven wrong if things change.

Implications of the Current Situation in Libya

Short summary of recent events in Libya:

* Rebel and Gaddafi forces face east/west stalemate
* Gaddafi's forces organize and rally, pushing Rebels to Benghazi
* At some point, SAS (and probably CIA) inserted into Libya
* UN approves no-fly zone and "all necessary measures" to protect civilians
* Gaddafi declares ceasefire, declares willingness to talk to opposition, meanwhile moving forces into Benghazi
* Anti-Rebel operations continue in Benghazi (in efforts to "last-minute" end the Rebel forces)
* French strikes begin on land targets (tanks, etc)
* US/UK strikes begin on anti-air, fuel, airport, communication/command sites
* Arab League condemns ground attacks

"All necessary measures" is likely a deliberately vague clause, allowing the West to justify (at least to itself) nearly any military action, while abiding by its post-Iraq rule-following sensibilities.

Of course, the protection of civilians is a political mask over the true intent: regime change in Libya. As much as the Rebels are a bit of an unknown factor (and some of them are clearly Islamist), the West is quite tired of Gaddafi.

The implications are numerous and highly variable.

West-Middle East Relations
The West certainly hopes that its pro-Rebel action will endear it to the new anti-establishment movements and regimes that seem to be sweeping the Middle East. The West gets to claim "we helped without occupying!" when the new governments of the Middle East start making serious decisions. The fact that the Rebels asked consistently for Western help is a good sign that the PR has the potential to be good.

That said, the Arab league is condemning the ground strikes, saying that the West has already gone past its mandate of protecting civilians. Indeed, the "protecting civilians" focus of the UN resolution may be a political crutch to real action. The Arab League, moving towards a popular/ democratic rhetoric, is worried that the air strikes will lead to non-insignificant civilian casualties; these governments thus do not want to be perceived as supporting more Western action in the Middle East that seems to damage Arab/Muslim people.

The two questions as to the PR outcome will be the # of civilian casualties and the outcome of the campaign. More casualties will be tolerated in the short-term if Gaddafi's brutal regime is removed and replaced by something more friendly, but only if the front-line action is driven by the Rebels themselves. The West will need to keep some of its guns in check in order to avoid looking less like humanitarians and more like imperialists.

Commitment
Part of the major risk is scope creep, though it depends on the country.

The United States has already committed to take a back seat after the Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses (SEAD) campaign ends, allowing countries like France and Italy to take over enforcing the no-fly zone and preventing ground forces from entering Benghazi en masse.

That said, the risk is creating a stalemate, in which a withdrawal of air forces will allow Gaddafi to succeed, but an endless no-fly zone campaign might quickly frustrate both domestic European opinion and Middle East opinion.

To break that stalemate and seriously cripple Gaddafi's forces (thus giving the rebels the advantage) will require action beyond the original mandate, though this can often be done with enough discretion that only minor objections will be thrown up.

The West's goal here may be to make sure a friendly country, probably Egypt, is committed to supporting the rebels and making sure they can be rearmed, fed, and regrouped during the air campaign, such that they can make a sustained push west towards Tripoli when the initial SEAD campaign ends; Western forces are likely to be able to provide key intelligence to help the Rebels find isolated pro-Gaddafi units and overtake them quickly and decisively, which would further arm the rebels with artillery and armor.

Military Outcome
Likely military outcomes here are either a stalemate or a rebel victory. Gaddafi will struggle to get the forces he needs into Benghazi (and struggle to control them well enough to effectively occupy key population centers).

As a default, military units are now hiding in heavily populated areas, though if they're otherwise paralyzed, it may give Rebel forces there an opportunity to harass the units into a state of unpreparedness for a more sustained Rebel counter-attack.

While a Rebel victory is possible, it's also unlikely. The Rebels lack military leadership, and (unlike Yemen or Egypt) have not had major elements of the armed forces defect and turn their guns against the leadership. Until that happens, the Rebels would have to completely knock out the sizable Libyan army in order to claim victory over Tripoli.


Political Outcomes
If the stalemate persists, the Rebels are likely to keep their alternative government in the east, and a de facto split of Libya would occur. The Benghazi government could garner international support; especially from Egypt (which would want influence over the large oil reserves in that area).

but whether the Rebels win or not, the big question of its political makeup remains a major concern for the West. Clearly, the Rebels are anti-despotic, but what else? Libya had a brutal campaign against extremist Islam for some time--how strong are these influences in the Rebel group? Do the Rebels desire a secular state? Will it be Western-friendly? These are all questions left unanswered, and will largely determine the amount of sustained Western support for the government.

Western Cohesion and Trans-Atlantic Relations
Perhaps most interesting is that the biggest benefit the West is likely to get is its own internal sense of dignity and goodwill. With US-led operations in the last 10 years going militarily poorly and morally questionably, there have been a lot of bad feelings and aimlessness among the West, even with respect to itself. The West's strategic direction is confused and frustrated (especially as Russia seems to be running circles around NATO's internal conflicts). If Libya goes well, the West can achieve a "feel-good" victory like it had in the early 1990s, and a renewed confidence in its ability to be an effective and relatively-welcomed police force.

Western military cohesion will not be that of the early 1990s, but it may improve. Specifically, the US will have an opportunity to act in an effective support role, both improving relations with Europe (by allowing Europe to lead the operation that's most relevant to its immediate periphery), and setting up a system in which the US can limit its engagement. The US has far and away the best logistical/transport capacity and control, as well as the best battlefield intelligence. These two factors make it a perfect candidate to support other Western nations' campaigns against less impressive forces, and the US can benefit significantly by setting up alliances in which it maintains that role.

Middle East Protests and Regime Security as of Feb 18

As we continue to cover the Middle East crisis, I wanted to give an update as to my current understanding of regime security throughout the Middle East in light of the current protests that seem to be spreading throughout the entire region.

We've discussed briefly some of the reasons behind the protests, and these geopolitical forces will generally apply to countries besides Tunisia and Egypt.

Below, I've summarized the countries of the greater Middle East* and taken my best shot at assessing the risk to the regime based on the current level of protests and the greater structural factors behind the unrest in the country. In addition, I've color-coded the countries by risk on a map here. I'm happy to release the map into the public domain (this means you can use it as you wish, though I do appreciate credit).

The low attention span summary is that despite the protests, very few Middle Eastern countries face significant risk of regime change. Yemen is likely to see a change in government, and Algeria and Bahrain face an unclear future, but other regimes are relatively secure.



Secure Regimes, Few or No Protests:
-Saudi Arabia: I mention Saudi Arabia due to a surprising lack of unrest. As extremist violence has grown in the country, house Saud has struggled to balance its need for stability with calls for reform, but so far it has managed its oil wealth well enough (and dealt with extremism with a sufficiently fair and progressive hand) that it seems to have warded off too many fundamental causes of instability.
-Iraq: Sporadic protests have erupted in the north and the south of the country, but not in Baghdad. Ironically, the weakness of the current government (and the factious parliamentary system of the country) means that there exists neither a scapegoat (to protest against) nor a hero (to replace him).
-Turkey
-Israel
-Lebanon
-Qatar
-United Arab Emirates
-Oman
-Kuwait

Secure Regimes with Significant Protests:
-Iran: Mousavi and Kharoubi have once again emerged as leaders of the opposition movement, which is forming "green"-style rallies across Iran. Tehran's geopolitical stability is even higher than it was in 2009,

-Jordan: Jordan has often faced demographic instability (due largely to many Palestinian refugees living within its borders), but has generally handled it with some amount of grace. The king has won approval from the opposition by sacking his prime minister and cabinet, and appointing new leaders under a long-term economic and political reformist plan.

-Libya: It's tough to say just how large the protesters in Libya are; Kadafi's media control is significant. Certainly, there are protesters calling for Kadafi's removal in cities across Libya, but Tripoli seems relatively quiet compared to many other Middle Eastern capitals, and the "Day of Anger" seems to have flopped (due in part to security force intimidation). Libya is both willing to crack down hard on protesters and relatively economically secure, making overthrow unlikely.

-Syria: I am wary to group Syria into the same category as Iran and Libya, but the Syrian government has made a few concessions to a relatively small and wary group of protesters, and has also taken moves to suppress the protests that show at least some nervousness in the regime.

-Morocco: Morocco's liberalization efforts since the 1970's (including free trade agreements with the US and EU) have led to significant economic transformation in time. But Morocco's economic fates have worsened since 2008, and this stagnation hurts particularly in a country with nearly 20% youth unemployment and high illiteracy rates. Protests have sprung up, but the regime enjoys relatively wide popular support, and the success of a relatively capitalist approach in the last few decades make alternative economic models (and their standard-bearers) less attractive.

Regimes With Protests, at Risk:
-Sudan: After the Southern Sudanese secession referendum, it seemed tempting to believe that al-Bashir might consolidate power over a now-majority Arab country. Interestingly, Southern Sudan was one of the out-groups that was helping al-Bashir hold together a fragile coalition of Arab Nationalists and Islamists. Now, both Islamists and non-Arab opposition groups are emboldened and trying to push their agenda. To hold power in the short-term, al-Bashir is likely going to have to move closer to an Islamist group he's been trying to distance, which will likely pit him against the 45% non-Arab groups of his country, leading to a prolonged struggle for the future of Sudan.

-Algeria: Food price spikes have exacerbated the unemployment in Algeria, and trade unions have joined protests demanding change. Ultimately, the number of protesters has been kept small, due in large part to security force repression. But long before the Tunisian "Jasmine Revolution," president Bouteflika has faced an increasingly strong rivalry from the Directorate of Intelligence and Security (DRS) for power. The protests give the DRS, which grew powerful during the civil war against Islamist fundamentalists, an opportunity to side with "the people" and attempt a regime change similar to the military-stewarded removal of Mubarak in Egypt.

-Bahrain: Bahrain has one fundamental threat to its regime stability: demographics. Like pre-2003 Iraq, Bahrain is a majority-Shia country ruled by a Sunni dynasty. Unlike Iraq, it is an economic powerhouse with relatively low poverty rates and has been driving moderate reform since 1999. The current Shia community is demanding an end to alleged discrimination against the Shia population in both politics and employment. The situation may have remained low-risk, but Bahrain has become a battleground between Saudi Arabia and Iran, much like Iraq was during its sectarian civil war. Iran sees this as an opportunity to potentially create an ally in the region. Bahrain has reacted surprisingly desperately, violently driving protesters out of Pearl Square, killing 3 and injuring hundreds. Bahrain may have to depend on sustained security repression to keep the Pearl Square incident from leading to a backlash of even more protests.

-West Bank Abbas is highly embattled, though this is due less with the current crisis (and the socioeconomic or demographic causes behind it), and more with the Wikileaks-prompted revelation that he planned to cede significant Palestinian territory to Israel in return for state recognition. The current wave of protest has increased pressure, but has little impact on the long-term endgame of how that will play out for the current Fatah regime.

Regime Change Likely:
-Yemen: Massive protests in Yemen, supported by both an impoverished majority and a radical religious fringe, are likely to take down president Saleh. Massive unemployment, illiteracy, and general poverty (made worse by poor government economic policy) make Yemen a prime target for regime change. Saleh's promise of neither running for re-election nor passing the presidency to his son has done nothing to quell the unrest.

Regime Change Partially Occurring:
-Egypt: The military is working hard to make sure the next regime is friendly (and under the military's control), without looking like it's turning a "revolution" into a coup. Expect the new boss to be similar to the old boss, but more savvy about unemployment and monetary policy.

-Tunisia: Massive protests across Tunisia were led by the 30%-unemployed youth against a regulatory system that left them with no prospects for employment or advancement, and are largely credited as being the "spark" that has set off the current Middle East crisis. President Ben Ali resigned and fled the country, with the Speaker of the Parliament taking his place in an "interim" role. The Tunisian protests continue (in a reduced state, though many of the protesters have no work to which to return), and will likely not abate completely until a compelling plan to meet their demands is formed by the transitional government.

*Note that Afghanistan and Pakistan are left out of this analysis--the current crisis has little to do with the significant regime risk both countries face.

The Wane of the Axis of Evil

Bush's controversial foreign policy may yield a curious victory when (or soon after) he leaves: the end of the Axis of Evil, both its official members and its often-called "junior" members.

The official list, if you have forgotten: Iran, Iraq, North Korea
The "Juniors": Libya, Syria

Iraq: Thanks to the so-far 5+ year war, regime change has certainly taken Iraq off the list, although it remains a different sort of problem.

North Korea: Thanks to effective carrot/stick diplomacy in six-party talks, North Korea has finally taken the first steps to denuclearizing, and may even return kidnapped Japanese to their homes. Kim Jong Il is still rather evil, but has come far enough from the 1987 terror attacks on Korean Air Flight 858 that "axis" no longer applies. Kim may have been convinced that cooperation is the best way for his country to move foward. Now that the US is taking it off the terror support list and lifting economic sanctions, it falls off the Axis.

Iran: Not off yet, but working on it. The Iranians and Americans are working on setting up diplomatic posts in each others' countires (a step down from Embassies, but not far). They have been talking quite a bit before this, but this move shows that the US is willing to hold out carrots to Iran as well as wave sticks over its nuclear program and operations within Iraq. The New Yorker is accusing the Bush administration of "preparing the battlefield" for war with Iran, but such accusations have come for years, and only diplomatic action has resulted. Iran is certainly not off the list, but is farther from the brink than before. Diplomatic pressure has worked, and Stratfor predicts they will cut a deal on their nuclear program with the next president, refusing to give Bush diplomatic credit (like between Carter and Raegan in the Embassy hostage crisis).

The little guys:

Libya: Libya has become a model of the deterrence strategy. The US showed that it meant business about dealing with WMD fears using regime change as a strategy, and the Libyan government responded by opening its operations to inspectors, and revealing a great deal of information about the Iranian, Pakistani, and North Korean programs. Libya and North Korea have been shown that past actions will be forgiven, as long as rogue nations are willing to start playing by Great Power rules.

Syria: Not yet absolved, but on its way. The US is using its presence in Turkey and Israel to influence negotiations between Israel and Syria quietly--Syria could not politically afford to admit the US is getting involved. But if Syria makes a peace deal with Israel--which will likely include a distancing from Iran and an undercutting of support for Hezbollah--it will surrender almost all issues with which the West contends. Israel is offering the Golan Heights--an important Syrian cultural site captured for strategic reasons when most of the Arab world simultaneously invaded Israel--as well as trade, and encouragement of Western powers to drop trade sanctions, in return.

Each of these five states has shown progress away from rogue behavior--Iran least. Bush has shown that his tough-guy diplomacy may fulfill many of its goals, though it has had high diplomatic, monetary, and human costs.