Sunday, June 13, 2010

The Nationalist Spike in Europe

This is more an observation than a strict analysis, but very interesting, nonetheless.

Nationalism seemed to die in much of Eastern Europe towards the end of the 20th century as Europe reeled from centuries of war. It seemed unlikely to many that it would return soon. But, of course, geopolitics marches on. Nationalism is back in Europe, and back in a big way. A few examples of interest:

Germany: The Germans have pushed for a leadership role in Europe with the onset of the Greek crisis. Rather than an isolationist nationalism, Germany seeks to exert its will over Southern Europe, lest the debt crisis bleed it dry. The Germans are likely to come out of the debt crisis with a considerable amount of power in Europe--which is the only way they can make the EU work for them. Otherwise, they will consider leaving--the EU will only be a deal the Germans will tolerate so long as it is not one that tears them down.

Hungary, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Bulgaria, Austria: Right-wing (sometimes seriously so) nationalist parties have made huge gains over the past two years. Much of this is in response to the Russian resurgence (where the options are to fight or join). But this resurgence makes for a potentially rivalrous situation in Eastern Europe. Territorial squabbles may arise and prevent Eastern European unity against Russia.

Denmark, Switzerland, France, and Holland: Right-wing and largely anti-Islamic parties have made great gains in Denmark and Holland in their last elections, signaling a reaction against growing Muslim influence in much of Europe due to massive immigration. France has banned burqas, and Switzerland has banned minarets. Anti-Islamism has become a relative European hallmark. Europe is set for a strong showdown with the Islamic world, but one very different from that of the US.

Belgium: Perhaps the most interesting of the nationalist movements, the Flemish movement has made big gains in Belgium, capturing 20% of seats (far more than any other party). Unlike previous separatist movements, this independence party is largely mainstream (rather than right-wing), and hopes to see a gradual dissolution of Belgium into Flanders (a Dutch region) and Wallonia (a French region). Belgium is probably closer to its end than ever before.

The return of Nationalism to Europe will make it a geopolitically interesting continent once again (after two decades of relative calmness, saving the Balkans).

Thursday, June 10, 2010

Turkey Moves East

The EU's rejection of Turkey as a member (which was not an outright rejection, but a bureaucratic stagnation to death) has pushed Turkey towards the Arab world, away from the West. The latest evidence is in its decision to lead the Arab Free Trade Zone.

The implications are potentially large. Turkey has the potential to lead the Middle East and, as I spoke of before, unite it.

Turkish ascension to the EU probably made geopolitical sense, from a strictly national power perspective. It's not clear whether anti-Turkish racism in central Europe was the primary driver to keep Turkey out, or whether it was simply a European implosion over issues like the financial crisis.

But either way, the shift in rhetoric and action by Turkey likely suggests a long-term drift away from the West, and towards the Middle East.

Sunday, June 6, 2010

Israel's Risk to US Interests


If you're a reader of George Friedman (or other realist geopolitical academics), you'll tend towards the idea that one of the United States' paramount interests is to prevent a single geopolitical entity (or coalition) from amassing enough economic and military power to challenge it (this has been true since about the turn of the 20t century, when the US became the foremost power in the world). This was why World Wars I and II were important to the US (to stop Germany from conquering the continent), and why the Cold War was so critical (to prevent the Soviets from doing the same). Once a force amasses enough military power, it can potentially challenge US trade dominance, or even cross the ocean and challenge the US near its borders.

The US is further interested in preventing unity in the Middle East. If the Middle East united in a form similar to the Ottoman Empire, it might be powerful enough to potentially challenge the US. Not only would it be highly populous, but it would have vast oil resources and central trading position (between Europe & Asia). It would be a great strategic threat to US hegemony.

Israel, whether or not it has the moral upper-hand in the Middle East conflict, is becoming a risk to US interests due to Middle Eastern perceptions of its behavior as of late. For decades, the states of Egypt & Turkey (in particular), as well as Jordan, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia, have recognized Israel and, generally, supported its existence (despite their populations' general distaste for the Israel/Palestine situation).

But the past few months have made these governments' support of Israel a politically risky gambit. Public outrage towards the deadly pre-election Gaza offensive, settlement-building in Jerusalem, and the recent raid on a supply flotilla trying to break the Gaza blockade have further soured perceptions of Israel. Its image as an aggressive, revisionist state is growing somewhat stronger.

The US must play carefully. If it comes out to support Israeli action, it may encourage the Arabs to unite to deter Israel from further action in Gaza, the West Bank, southern Lebanon, or (potentially) Iran. If these states united against Israel, they might start feeling strong enough to oppose the US (rather than begrudgingly embracing it). The United States' interest is in keeping the Middle East divided and internally distracted--not united and outward-looking.

If the Israeli government does not change the tenor of its policies, it may begin to become a liability to the US. The US, in response, would try to distance itself publicly, while placing pressure on Israel to move towards peace negotiations.

In the near future, look either for a major shift in Israeli policy towards Gaza and Jerusalem, or a gradual (but noticeable) distancing of relations between the US and Israel, as the US tries to prevent a unity coalition from arising in the Middle East.

Tuesday, May 25, 2010

Untangling the Korean Peninsula Conflict


Mystery shrouds the current Korean Peninsula conflict about as much as it shrouds the North Korean government itself. A few readers have asked me, "what the heck is going on up there? Why the heck did North Korea attack South Korea?" Good question! It had me thinking & reading for a bit.

Why did the North Koreans sink the Cheoan?

There's no clear answer for this. The government officially denies doing it (which is not surprising), but it seems a relatively irrational thing to do. To understand the most likely possibility, one must understand the politics of North Korea. At least a bit.

Like most dictatorships, North Korea's government is propped up by elites (in this case, primarily military elites). And, like all governments, they faction. Long story short, Kim is old & frail, he's picked a potentially weak successor, and an opposition faction is likely trying to make a play for power. If South Korea had retaliated, chaos would ensue (North Korea would be caught unprepared for a war), and an opposition faction would have a much stronger opportunity to seize power from Kim (and likely quickly declare an end to the war by being a new regime).



As such, the coup likely failed. Whether there has been a purge is probably going to be unclear, but North Korea's lack of followup to the attack (and lack of military readiness at the time of the attack) both indicate that it was not an order from the top, but rather an order from much lower on the chain of command--likely meaning some attempt at insubordination.

What the heck are the Chinese doing in response?

Another good question! China's response seems to be arbitrarily contradictory. By inviting Kim to Beijing (and leaning towards "no" on international reprimand in the UN Security Council), China is taking a major international hit... in particular with South Korea and the United States, two of its biggest trading partners. China seems to be encouraging North Korean aggression.

But after a conference with China, Secretary of State Clinton came out speaking surprisingly rosy about China. Why?

Again, we must think of Chinese politics. In a Korean Peninsula war, what does China have to lose? It cannot and will not send troops or supplies to assist North Korea, and with the help of Japan and the United States, South Korea would rout the North Korean army (though Seoul would likely take serious damage in the meantime). China would be stuck with a collapsed North Korea, and an angry (and rather economically devastated) South Korea. The collapsed North Korea would send millions of starving, brainwashed refugees into northern China--a disaster that China is not prepared to face.

China's greatest concern in Korea is stability. It cannot afford a collapsed regime. This explains its stance--first, by inviting Kim to Beijing, China makes it clear to any opposition that Beijing will back Kim's faction, and help it keep power. Beijing was also likely able to get reassurances from Kim that he will purge the aggressive opposition, and also refrain from further provocations of South Korea... at least for the time being. China must also restrain from doing too much to anger Kim, lest Kim feel isolated and threatened. By befriending Kim, China gives Kim some security, allowing Kim to refrain from any foolish lashings out. Secretary Clinton understands this position, and thus was able to express confidence that China would effectively help prevent war in the Koreas.

What will happen from here?
South Korea cut off trade with North Korea, and North Korea followed by severing all diplomatic and communication ties with South Korea, and put its army on full readiness. South Korea further retaliated by opening up propaganda messaging into North Korea, and participating in anti-submarine drills with the United States. The Sunshine Policy is over.

For now, the conflict will drive South Korea (to some extent) away from China and towards the US/Japan. South Korea will seek stability in US strength. China will show North Korea that it is ready to defend North Korea from internal threats, but will not support it in a war against South Korea--North Korea's only rational recourse would be peace.

North Korea will desperately attempt to retain face by growing increasingly perturbed over accusations that it carried out the attack. It will accuse the South Koreans of setting up the attack themselves to provoke a war (sounds far fetched as an accusation, but many Americans think the same of the 9/11 attacks).

As far as war, I think it is unlikely. Neither country has a serious interest in it. Sino-American relations will not be particularly strained by this, but China will see any actions against North Korea as being a favor to the US (stacked on top of any favors that China does for the US with respect to Iran).

The Peninsula's best hope of a reemergence of peace might, unfortunately, be the death of Kim and a new regime leader.

Wednesday, April 14, 2010

Emerging Results of US-Russian Negotiations

With Russia's 65th Victory Day parade in full swing (and a grande one it is), and Gazprom looming over Ukraine's very independence, it may be hard to think that the US and the Russians are putting together a working relationship. But on the issue of nuclear weapons, the two states may have actually achieved a deeper understanding.

Of course, the two states will continue to be rivals as far as spheres of influence--of this there is no doubt. But, ultimately, there is common ground on the issue of nuclear proliferation, and the two states are taking advantage of this.

The common ground is such: Neither state wants nuclear arms to fall into the wrong hands. At the end of the day, it is much better for both Russia & the US that there are a limited number of nuclear-armed states. This both gives the Nuclear Club a strong bargaining upper-hand with other nations, and reduces the risk of arms ending up in the hands of (undeterrable) terrorist groups. Both states furthermore have sufficient retaliatory capacity that few minor changes (like # of warheads) can significantly impact.

Where are we seeing this cooperation play out? A number of recent events, not yet explicitly linked together by either state's spokespeople, suggest a wider cooperation afoot:

1) SMART. The renewed nuclear treaty really allows both countries to get rid of their older, obsolete arms easily. Fewer, more advanced arms allow both countries to save a bit on maintenance costs, but more importantly, help both countries keep track of their weapons (remember the 2007 incident a few years where a US [CORRECTION:]B-52 mistakenly flew with weapons? Russia is not the only state for whom it is difficult to keep track of them all). Beyond that, it's symbolic, but it shows both states are willing to put time into cooperating on the issue, even with many other competitive games underway.

2) Pressure on Iran. Russia and China look to be in favor of some limited forms of sanctions against Iran (not including, for example, a gasoline ban). While the sanctions themselves are unlikely to be crippling, Iran's loss of Russia & China's support on the issue would be. Iran is China's second-largest oil supplier--China's willingness to risk relations with Iran in order to keep it in line on the nuclear issue would be significant. But, ultimately, Russia & China don't want a nuclear-armed Iran, either. Russia would enjoy Iran's continued existence as a nuisance to the United States, but no more than that. Iran's possession of nuclear weapons would make it a threat to Russia and China's interests--not necessarily a nuclear strike (hitting either Russia or China would be suicidal); but it would grow increasingly daring and audacious in its region. China and Russia would certainly prefer to dominate the areas to the east and north of Iran themselves.

But if the US has won over the Russian and Chinese hands towards pressuring Iran to dismantle its nuclear program, the odds of its failure increase dramatically (namely, Ahmedinejad is likely to lose sufficient domestic support to press it forward if Iran loses its key allies over the issue). It may be the only option the US has to stop the program that doesn't include war.

3) BMD. We see also Bulgarian and Czech involvement in the American BMD (Ballistic Missile Defense) system. The Czechs have confirmed their own plans to place radar and missile systems within their borders; Bulgaria has made its intentions clear that they desire to be a part of the system as well. Such moves come amid the United States backing off pressure in Ukraine (where it has all but conceded the loss of Ukrainian autonomy in the near-term) and failing to counter Russian sympathy diplomacy in Poland. Some of this is the United States being, frankly, outmaneuvered by a truly brilliant Russian foreign policy.

But some of it appears to be a very quite understanding of spheres & values. The Russians are distinctly not making a fuss over the Bulgarian and Czech missile defense systems, where Polish plans for the very same thing were met with military officials murmuring of nuclear war (and not facing reprimand afterward). Russia & the United States may, for now, be deciding that they have more pressing issues to tackle than each other (as much as I may personally disagree with said policy).

The suggestion to be made is that an understanding of sorts may have emerged. Perhaps it is part of a larger deal, where the two sides have found room to concede on issues of less import to secure cooperation on issues of greater import. The opposition opinion is that Obama is being distracted by nuclear arms negotiations when there are more important areas to burn his time and political capital. But at the end of the day, the United States is simply not in a position to counter Russian expansion into Ukraine, Georgia, and certainly not Central Asia. Furthermore, the balance of interest is far in Russia's side--if Russia loses any of these 3 regions (especially Ukraine), it is in danger of being permanently marginalized. These areas aren't areas where the US is ready to fight and win--this unfortunate reality may be what's driving America's current deal-making (rather than conflict-making) strategy with Russia.

Monday, April 12, 2010

Venezuela's Energy Market May Be Chavez's Downfall

Wouldn't it be just great?

Venezuela is up for state-level elections in a few months, and things are not good in the energy sector (now adding to consistent woes in the food sector).

According to STRATFOR:

While the Venezuelan government continues to stress sabotage as the cause of the electricity crisis, government figures on the water level at the Guri dam are not consistent with the reported lack of rainfall at the reservoir.

The government has reached the point of blaming active saboteurs for its energy woes--whether this is simply propaganda or a personal delusion of Chavez is unclear, but the question at hand is this: how tightly does the government control information?

Somewhat-recent protests at the shutting down of an opposition television station suggest disgruntlement with the current information strategy of the Venezuelans (somewhere between the feelings of the citizenry of Iran and China on the issue). Such disgruntlement may mean some transparency exists over the actual mismanagement of Venezuela's electricity sector, which could mean that crackdowns and accusations of sabotage might only be making Chavez's life more difficult in the long run.

The election will tell. Unfortunately, even a resounding defeat for Chavez in the local elections is unlikely to lead to regime change in Venezuela or a loosening of Russian influence in South America.