Why Did Israel & Hamas Go to War?

For better or worse, this post is likely to leave the reader with more questions than answers. I'd love any input/comments that readers have on the matter here (as always).

Before the assassination strike on Hamas' military leader Jabari, Hamas political leadership was making serious noise about a permanent truce with Israel (in fact, Jabari was literally reviewing a draft peace agreement the day he was assassinated and had been part of discussions with Israel and Hamas' political wing about making it happen), and West Bank PM Abbas mentioned he was potentially willing to waive Right of Return for Palestinians as part of a final peace deal with Israel. It seemed, politically, that Israel was largely getting its way.

Then why the assassination? Why the war?

There are potential motivations on both sides for going to war, which we'll outline below. Not clear at all to me which was the primary motivator.

HAMAS:
Hamas is, of course, far from a united organization. In particular, I must be careful in the use of the word "Hamas" when describing behavior from Gazan militants, as not all are necessarily formally associated with Hamas and may not represent Hamas' interests. In this case, Hamas extremists or other militants likely wished to disrupt the peace process, unsatisfied with its provisions and worried that it might go through if the peace process continued unabated. Hundreds of Hamas rockets were the opening salvo in this eight-day war, and so the above explanation is a reasonable one to answer the question, "why did these rockets launch _when they did?_" If the motivation was 100% on the Hamas side, then we would say that Israel simply "took the bait" and was manipulated into war that disrupted a peace process that they would otherwise be in favor of. The assassination of Japbari, in this case, would have been a strategic blunder to an Israel otherwise very interested in peace.

More legitimate wings of Hamas may have also approved of these rockets in order to sabotage the peace process themselves, in order to make sure there was a clear pretense of peace on the Hamas side without risking having to actually stick to it, in order to win the support of the Arab world, in particular Morsi. If this was the intent, it worked--Morsi was able to broker a ceasefire and very clearly backed Hamas in the war, which would be the first time Egypt supported Hamas against Israel since the 1970's.

ISRAEL:
Frankly, the Israeli defense authority is highly sophisticated and I believe it is unlikely they simply made a mistake and, in response to rocket fire, assassinated _in error_ the man most likely to be able to broker a peace deal with Hamas permanently. The reason I am particularly suspicious is that the assassination of Jabari was among Israel's first strikes, rather than simply strikes against Hamas' rocket sites. I believe, like in the case of Hamas, there are some political incentives that made parts of the Israeli government want to disrupt the process as was.

One explanation is simply that Netanyahu could not appear "soft" during negotiations. If Israel calmly/peacefully negotiated peace as rockets hit its civilian cities, it could potentially be seen as "soft" on Hamas and thus in a weak bargaining position. If Israel saw Jabari as trying to play both ends--authorizing strikes against Israel and also trying to push a peace deal--then Israel may have intended to send a message to his successor that "playing both sides" against Israel would not do. Unlike Israeli troops, Hamas rocketeers are generally woefully under-accountable in the international media for their attacks, and if Jabari intended to use this to his advantage, Israel may have felt the need to put a quick lid on it and allow Jabari's successor to restart such negotiations with more caution and restraint.

Israel could have also "read" Hamas' intent--if it was to simply gain an upper hand with the Arab world through credible noises of negotiation, rather than actually push for peace--and wanted to stop this process in its tracks before it lost leverage in the region, though Israel seemed to summarily fail in this.

Israel's current leadership may well not intend for peace with Gaza any time soon. Peace in general may simply be unacceptable to an administration that sees Gaza as an eternal threat for Iranian influence and other forces that may be out for the demise of the Jewish state. Israel may have a quiet policy of no peace with Hamas until Israel's legitimacy as a state is recognized. For various reasons, Israel may see constant war with Hamas (including a blockade of Gaza to minimize the armaments and militants that can enter) as a safer alternative to peace, as counter-intuitive as that may seem. If this is the case, it will continue to sabotage peace efforts until there is a better way to guarantee security in a free Gaza situation, or until a more short-term risk-accepting administration takes the helm.

Finally, Netanyahu may simply want to take advantage of wartime fear for his own election in January. Hamas rockets may have been just the pretense a Machiavellian-style Netanyahu (if that is actually his thinking, which is not clear) would need to have a brief flare-up with Gaza in order to convince swing voters in Israel to vote for Likud rather than Kadima or Labor, keeping Netanyahu in power for another term.

Whatever the reasoning, it is more or less evident at this point that some parts of both Israel and Hamas had interest in disrupting the peace process, and took advantage of this time period to act. To set the record straight, Hamas' rocket attacks on Israel did happen before the assassination of Jabari and seemed unprovoked--this accounting of events is not clear in all texts. But I also believe it is fairly naive to think that Israel's assassination of Jabari specifically (rather than simply a precision strike against Hamas rocket sites, which it also successfully executed) was simply part of a general defensive strategy rather than a very political move.

Such an interpretation would suggest that peace is likely to be elusive in the area for some time to come.

Link: China's Foreign Policy Under Xi

Professor M. Taylor Fravel, a mentor and teacher of mine, has a great post in The Diplomat about what we can (and can't) infer about upcoming foreign policy changes from Xi's rise to lead China.

Just wanted to share.

Short: Morsi's Power Grab

Egyptian President Morsi's recent power grab has been all over the news. To the surprise of some (but not others), Egyptians are protesting fairly vigorously against the power grab and have already clashed with authorities (though the crack-down in the anti-Mubarak revolution has not yet been seen). The opposition is calling Morsi a dictator, and the Army has been surprisingly quiet.

This is Morsi's second such move, this time taking power from the courts--last time, it was from the once-supreme military. I want to just explore a few questions on the grab:

Quick detail--what powers were taken?

Morsi took for himself the power to order (re-)trials of the ex-Mubarak regime, and forced out the country's lead prosecutor, who he thinks failed to properly prosecute. 

More importantly, Morsi declared that he had all powers necessary to protect the revolution, and that Presidential decrees would be immune from challenge by the courts or parliament. Obstensibly these powers are to make sure that the struggling constituent assembly (building the constitution) is able to finish its job, and that the powers would be temporary.

Why the grab?

When Morsi took power, there were four major factions majorly split in power:

1) Muslim Brotherhood, which had won parliamentary elections (his party)

2) Liberal parties, deeply divided and prone to walk-outs

3) The Army, which had power after Mubarak's fall

4) The Judiciary, the last vestige of actual Mubarak loyalists

The Liberal parties are too weak to be a major issue for Morsi, but the Army and Judiciary would prove an eternal foil to Morsi's agenda if it differed from their interests. Morsi--in Bismarckian style--managed to replace the old Army leadership with supporters of the new regime, and they bowed aside as he took most of their political power away. This left the Judiciary.

The prosecution of the Mubarak regime is a massive symbolic issue that likely represents the "end" of the transition out of the Mubarak era. The Judiciary had mostly let the Mubarak regime go, and to Morsi, this was a sign of an arbitrary loyalty to the old regime that could prove fairly dangerous. Morsi, unable to simply replace the judges, made a move to declare power for himself in order to take this third group out of his way.

If this grab proves successful, there will be no major political players in Egypt to stand in Morsi's way, and we'll be able to see him begin to push his own agenda--whatever that is.

How is this like/unlike Mubarak's authoritarian regime?

The biggest difference here is that Morsi actually holds real power in his hands, rather than simply being a puppet of the Army. So those that think Morsi is a copy of Mubarak are likely over-estimating Mubarak's personal powers. But Morsi, lacking the full backing of the Army that Mubarak had (as an Army "puppet") may be more vulnerable, as well. The Army may currently support him, but could act if he starts acting out of line. Morsi risks having "over-reached," and if the Army sees itself as the steward of Egypt's democratic transition, it may consider unseating Morsi and "starting over," though this has its own dangerous consequences.

What does the future hold?

In this case, there is little that can be done without a major showdown. Either the political rustlings will quell into simmering and grumbling, or else the Army, courts, or people will make enough of an opposition that Morsi will likely back down.

Morsi is new to power and may risk being reckless out of a sense of impatience for political change. This seeming recklessness may pay off for his regime--if his opposition remains in disarrary, then his new powers may simply become the status quo. 

For the Egyptian people, they may inherit an "elected dictator" kind of democracy, in which the individual they elect to the Presidency is the only real political authority in the nation. This would make presidential elections into high-stakes showdowns. This, of course, assumes that Morsi is more interested in the democratic process than his own power--if not, he'll use his newfound powers to limit opposition capacity to run against him, and he'll just become the next Middle Eastern autocrat.

A Breakdown of US Presidential Candidates' Foreign Policies

This will be our second breakdown of presidential foreign policies in as many presidential elections, making the event at this point a bit of a tradition. Our aim is to keep it simple, objective, and to the point.

So what of the candidates' foreign policies? Ultimately, despite attempts to simulate wide gaps, there are few. The president has, over the past four years, moved to a more traditionally conservative foreign policy stance, and Romney has more or less given up trying to find new ways to be even more aggressive on the international stage.

There are a few key differences, but we can mostly summarize their vision for the United States as such:

Obama, channeling Teddy Roosevelt, advocates that we "speak softly and carry a big stick."

Romney, on the other hand, differs mostly on the desire to "speak loudly and carry a bigger stick."

(Bonus points to readers who caught the Looney Tunes reference, though the comparison to Sam is not meant to be derisive of the Romney approach.)

Because they're more interesting, let's highlight the differences first.

Actual Differences:

Rhetoric: This is important to highlight because you may notice some other glaring gaps in the list of differences below. Romney and Obama obviously believe in having very different rhetoric (Romney's of a "strong America" and Obama's of a more "understanding America") behind very similar policy behavior. Romney is likely genuinely concerned that soft rhetoric is going to weaken the United States' credibility of deterrence (critical in the Pax Americana state in which the US tries to keep a lid on major warfare), where Obama believes that the United States will lose its ability to lead if it is not loved.

Both approaches have flaws. Obviously opinion of the United States crashed during the Bush administration of tough-talk, but it has also gone down since Obama took office in 2009, particularly in Muslim countries where the attempts of compassionate rhetoric have been strongest.

Russia: Romney sees Russia as a long-term threat that must be contained, where Obama sees it as a nation that can be bargained with and potentially partnered with. No doubt Russia's influence and military might are growing, and the United States must address Russia (where in the '90s it was largely able to ignore Russia completely). The two questions on the table here are whether Russia is a credible future threat and whether the US should be moving to oppose it and contain it, or whether it should be working with Russia to make it part of the wider "good guy" community. 

Israel: Short version: Romney sees Israel as an ally that can take action in the Middle East that the US simply is unable to, and can serve as the bastion of force against Iran. Obama sees it as a dangerous ally that can get the US reined into unwanted conflicts. Paraphrasing Bill Clinton on Netanhayu, "he doesn't know who the superpower is." 

Priorities in US Military Spending (and Strategic Approach): Obama's priorities in US military spending have focused on the ability to execute tactical strikes to deal with terrorist threats--more funding for drone strikes and a focus on special forces has been his focus (where Navy and Air Force spending--the big ticket items--has dropped). Romney, though unlikely to decrease this, wants to beef up the size of the US Navy with two extra Aircraft Carrier Groups in order to better position the US strategically against potential threats with more credible "hard" assets like Iran, Russia, and China. These Carrier groups would be used to protect the Strait of Hormuz, Taiwan/Japan/Korea, and the Baltics, as well as generally make sure that the US controls trade sea trade routes throughout the world.

Iraq?: There's a question mark here because it's not clear whether there will be any real change in action or just rhetoric. Romney is frustrated at the lack of the Status of Forces Agreement over the past 4 years and wants to use US troops to keep influence in Iraq and serve as a second force bastion against Iran.

Key Similarities:

While the candidates share a great deal in common, we will highlight the key--and sometimes surprising--similarities between their approaches. 

American Primacy / Exceptionalism: Despite Obama's 2008 rhetoric about the United States being a bit of a bully, his rhetoric has changed to embrace US Exceptionalism and, generally, its role in the world. Romney and Obama differ on how the US should posture itself with rhetoric and "outreach," but generally they both see the US as the force that should be running around keeping a cap on bad stuff. Both believe in "Pax Americana."

Iran: Ultimately both sides see the critical need to stop Iran from developing a nuke and want to oppose Iranian influence at all turns, which is why Obama (for example) is supporting the rebels in Syria. Romney is tougher-worded but not foolish enough to want war with Iran--both will have similar policies there.

War on Terror: Both will continue the new "precision" style War on Terror that was pivoted into around 2007 as the War in Iraq started to wind down. It will be a war of precision strike from drones and special forces as the US continues to support operations by Afghanistan, Kenya, Somalia, Egypt, Iraq, etc to eliminate terrorists locally.

Afghanistan: The War in Afghanistan is unpopular and will come to an end no matter who is president. It is unpopular as well to pull out immediately (fears of a Vietnam-style collapse remain) so the 2014 departure will be stuck to by both presidents.

China: Both will be aggressive with China about trade policy and keep the implicit threat of the Mutual Defense Treaty with Japan on the table in case there is any tricky business in the Senkakus, but neither is going to either back down on Beijing nor try to incite war. 

Author's Notes: Both candidates are going to have statements on their websites different from those above. We encourage you to take a look, and we're also writing with some interpretation and analysis (rather than simple aggregation of what's already written). Our intent is to write what we believe will be actual policy enacted (or attempted) by each candidate, rather than simply what they're declaring.

We can talk at length about why they have strong incentives to say-one-thing-and-do-another--we obviously saw a great deal of this from Obama in the 2008 campaign and how much the presidency has changed its tone since coming to office--ultimately, a state's security interest generally takes over unless something very strange happens, and there's no reason for that to happen here, which is why we'll see so many similarities going forward. 

Senkaku Islands Dispute as a Distraction for the Chinese Public

You've probably heard about major protests, warship movements, and maybe even talk of war over a few islands between China and Japan. These are called the Senkakus (by the Japanese--"Daiyou" by the Chinese, but we're going to stick with Senkaku for simplicity and the fact that you'll hear "Senkaku" on the news. Dear Chinese readers--please note that I am not taking a side on this conflict by using the word "Senkaku."), and they're a small chain of almost entirely uninhabited rocks with very little strategic value (unlike the Spratlys, which may have all sorts of oil / gas underneath and have East Asian countries in an ongoing dispute, as well).

I wanted to take a quick moment to share my own pet theories on the conflict. First, some background:

The Senkakus were occupied by the United States after WWII until 1970, at which point they were transferred to Japan. Of course, much of Japanese territory at the end of WWII did not necessarily belong to Japan  beforehand, but most of it went right back.

The complicated part about the Senkakus is that they were uninhabited islands, so there was no really obvious indicator as to who they belonged to. If you look back over history, both Japan and China have, at different times, had official maps/documents that both claimed them as sovereign and also marked them as belonging to the other country. So both sides have fairly questionable claims on them (I won't get into the details on this because they are boring and not helpful here), but nobody else has any claim at all, so they're up in the air between the two countries. Since the 70's, there has been some tension between the two countries as to who should have them, but the Japanese have "administered" the islands for the past forty years and have occassionally

But the recent flare-up makes little sense without context. Suddenly, it seems, the Chinese have become particularly aggressive about Japan's control of the islands. Some of this is likely provoked by the Japanese government purchasing the islands to solidify its claim, but the reaction is blown somewhat out of proportion. What we're seeing in China is massive protests that have led to huge damage in Japanese buildings / businesses in China (and leading to the Japanese shutting down factories in China for protection), Chinese activists heading to the Senkakus to plant flags, Chinese government vessels and even Chinese warships going to the area.

Let me be clear here: these islands are of zero import. They are about 7km total area, devoid of natural resources, and uninhabited. On their own, it seems absurd to be upset about them. To be fair, China is obsessed with not giving any ground on its territorial claims (consistency is very important for China to have precedent in case they have major territorial disputes over places like Taiwan, Xinjiang, Tibet), but territorial claims here through the 70's have been inconsistent and China loses little by making a more strategic decision about whether to pursue or renounce the islands.
For China, the issue is almost certainly one of distraction. If we look at China internally (and China's only real focus is internal, as it has ever been), we see two things going on: first, there are economic issues bubbling up. Second, there is a power struggle in the Communist Party.

Economic issues are sufficiently obvious that they're somewhat out in the open. Even the People's Daily, a state-sanctioned paper, is writing articles about how the economy needs to change (though certainly the Party is already planning on this if it's being written about). China's wealth gap continues to grow, even as hundreds of millions are brought out of poverty, and the wealth gap is always a painful, risky thing. Inflation was high and growth slow during the past few years, and a lot of fear of a "hard landing" is still out there. Wall Street Journal says the "hard landing" has been avoided, but that doesn't mean the population is convinced of it yet. To be clear: the Communist Party's grip on power depends almost entirely on its ability to continue to drive unprecedented growth in the country, and a Japanese-style "lost decade" would be crippling to its power. It's also clear to the populace that massive corruption within the party and it's "friends" is unfair to them and potentially bad for the economy as a whole, so it will mean that the population can find ways to blame the party for their own troubles.

Second, you may have seen lots of news about Bo Xilai and the murder trials going on around him. Bo was the predicted heir apparent in China and the sudden, public scandal is clearly the result of a power struggle within the party that he lost, setting up rival factions to potentially take power at the next Congress. The use of the murder trial and other very personal charges is an attempt to take the spotlight away from the Party itself, but there is still the risk that the Party is seen as divided and weak. During this power struggle, until the dust settles, all factions in the Party have a strong incentive to make sure the public doesn't pay too much attention.

Thus, there's a lot of reason right now for a distraction to happen, and the Japanese provided just the excuse. Let me emphasize something: mass protests do not happen in China without government consent--at least not without a massive crackdown. The fact that these protests went on so long and caused so much damage before police intervention means that they were sanctioned and encouraged by the Chinese government. The government is making very sure to stoke anger about the Senkaku islands to bolster nationalism and keep frustration focused on Japan, rather than internal issues in China.

This, at least, is my own pet theory. As it turns out, we're seeing the Chinese government start to back down a bit on its rhetoric and get the protests a bit under control. This may be due in part to the US response (reaffirmation of the US-Japan Defense Treaty but non-involvement in supporting territorial claims), or the observed risk of massively damaging trade relations with Japan, which is a major source of exports for China. But as domestic politics in China settle (after the next Congress, probably), I predict we'll stop hearing about the Senkakus altogether for some time.

Blog Link: Smoke Filled Room's Take on Turkey's Kurdish Strategy

I found particularly fascinating here the insight on how Turkey is working together with the Kurdish government of Iraqi Kurdistan to try to gain influence over bordering Kurdish regions, particularly in Syria--in hopes that it will be able to better deal with the ongoing Kurdish crisis in its own south.

http://thesmokefilledroomblog.com/2012/09/03/biting-off-more-than-you-can-chew-turkey-syria-and-the-pkk/

Smoke Filled Room does not think, though, that this is necessarily the best idea.