Foggofwar Prediction: Labor Coalition to Narrowly Win Israeli Parliamentary Elections

Israel's next parliamentary elections happen on March 17th, and a major potential foreign policy shift could happen if Netanyahu's Likud party doesn't win.

Looking at stabilizing opinion polls, I predict that a Labor-led coalition will win, carrying somewhere in the region of 57 to 61 seats (of 120). I think the big X-factors will be whether it can/wants to pick up the communist Hadash party (likely) and the Arab Balad party (maybe?). I suspect they would not take on the Islamist UAL party.

It could be a minority government, but it's likely to hold the day nonetheless.

The Labor coalition would likely look like: Labor, Hatnuah, Yesh Atid, Meretz, Kalanu, and Hadash, which together carry 57 seats in current opinion polls. If they picked up Balad, they would hit 60 or 61 seats, enough for a slim majority.

Since UAL, Ta'al, and Balad (together with 9 seats of support) simply wouldn't join Likud due to their anti-Zionist ideologies, the Likud coalition (Likud, Yisrael Beiteinu, Jewish Home, Shas, UTJ, Otzma, and Yachad) looks primed to hold 54 seats.

The trouble for Labor's coalition is that it would be a bit unwieldy, requiring getting general agreement from socialist/labor, communist, liberal, and Arab parties. The good news is that the smaller groups are so unlikely to jump to support Likud that their bargaining power isn't too high in driving policy (unlike the Lib Dems of the UK, which got to play Kingmaker in the 2010 parliamentary elections there).

Labor might take an approach to end or roll back Israeli settlement of the West Bank, and maybe even lift the blockade on the Gaza Strip. It would be an interesting change in foreign policy, indeed.

We'll keep our eye out if the polls look to change.

Why Did Israel & Hamas Go to War?

For better or worse, this post is likely to leave the reader with more questions than answers. I'd love any input/comments that readers have on the matter here (as always).

Before the assassination strike on Hamas' military leader Jabari, Hamas political leadership was making serious noise about a permanent truce with Israel (in fact, Jabari was literally reviewing a draft peace agreement the day he was assassinated and had been part of discussions with Israel and Hamas' political wing about making it happen), and West Bank PM Abbas mentioned he was potentially willing to waive Right of Return for Palestinians as part of a final peace deal with Israel. It seemed, politically, that Israel was largely getting its way.

Then why the assassination? Why the war?

There are potential motivations on both sides for going to war, which we'll outline below. Not clear at all to me which was the primary motivator.

HAMAS:
Hamas is, of course, far from a united organization. In particular, I must be careful in the use of the word "Hamas" when describing behavior from Gazan militants, as not all are necessarily formally associated with Hamas and may not represent Hamas' interests. In this case, Hamas extremists or other militants likely wished to disrupt the peace process, unsatisfied with its provisions and worried that it might go through if the peace process continued unabated. Hundreds of Hamas rockets were the opening salvo in this eight-day war, and so the above explanation is a reasonable one to answer the question, "why did these rockets launch _when they did?_" If the motivation was 100% on the Hamas side, then we would say that Israel simply "took the bait" and was manipulated into war that disrupted a peace process that they would otherwise be in favor of. The assassination of Japbari, in this case, would have been a strategic blunder to an Israel otherwise very interested in peace.

More legitimate wings of Hamas may have also approved of these rockets in order to sabotage the peace process themselves, in order to make sure there was a clear pretense of peace on the Hamas side without risking having to actually stick to it, in order to win the support of the Arab world, in particular Morsi. If this was the intent, it worked--Morsi was able to broker a ceasefire and very clearly backed Hamas in the war, which would be the first time Egypt supported Hamas against Israel since the 1970's.

ISRAEL:
Frankly, the Israeli defense authority is highly sophisticated and I believe it is unlikely they simply made a mistake and, in response to rocket fire, assassinated _in error_ the man most likely to be able to broker a peace deal with Hamas permanently. The reason I am particularly suspicious is that the assassination of Jabari was among Israel's first strikes, rather than simply strikes against Hamas' rocket sites. I believe, like in the case of Hamas, there are some political incentives that made parts of the Israeli government want to disrupt the process as was.

One explanation is simply that Netanyahu could not appear "soft" during negotiations. If Israel calmly/peacefully negotiated peace as rockets hit its civilian cities, it could potentially be seen as "soft" on Hamas and thus in a weak bargaining position. If Israel saw Jabari as trying to play both ends--authorizing strikes against Israel and also trying to push a peace deal--then Israel may have intended to send a message to his successor that "playing both sides" against Israel would not do. Unlike Israeli troops, Hamas rocketeers are generally woefully under-accountable in the international media for their attacks, and if Jabari intended to use this to his advantage, Israel may have felt the need to put a quick lid on it and allow Jabari's successor to restart such negotiations with more caution and restraint.

Israel could have also "read" Hamas' intent--if it was to simply gain an upper hand with the Arab world through credible noises of negotiation, rather than actually push for peace--and wanted to stop this process in its tracks before it lost leverage in the region, though Israel seemed to summarily fail in this.

Israel's current leadership may well not intend for peace with Gaza any time soon. Peace in general may simply be unacceptable to an administration that sees Gaza as an eternal threat for Iranian influence and other forces that may be out for the demise of the Jewish state. Israel may have a quiet policy of no peace with Hamas until Israel's legitimacy as a state is recognized. For various reasons, Israel may see constant war with Hamas (including a blockade of Gaza to minimize the armaments and militants that can enter) as a safer alternative to peace, as counter-intuitive as that may seem. If this is the case, it will continue to sabotage peace efforts until there is a better way to guarantee security in a free Gaza situation, or until a more short-term risk-accepting administration takes the helm.

Finally, Netanyahu may simply want to take advantage of wartime fear for his own election in January. Hamas rockets may have been just the pretense a Machiavellian-style Netanyahu (if that is actually his thinking, which is not clear) would need to have a brief flare-up with Gaza in order to convince swing voters in Israel to vote for Likud rather than Kadima or Labor, keeping Netanyahu in power for another term.

Whatever the reasoning, it is more or less evident at this point that some parts of both Israel and Hamas had interest in disrupting the peace process, and took advantage of this time period to act. To set the record straight, Hamas' rocket attacks on Israel did happen before the assassination of Jabari and seemed unprovoked--this accounting of events is not clear in all texts. But I also believe it is fairly naive to think that Israel's assassination of Jabari specifically (rather than simply a precision strike against Hamas rocket sites, which it also successfully executed) was simply part of a general defensive strategy rather than a very political move.

Such an interpretation would suggest that peace is likely to be elusive in the area for some time to come.

Israeli Timing Holds True

While Mr. Obama was busy moving his family and belongings to Pennsylvania Avenue, Israel abruptly and unilaterally declared a ceasefire in Gaza. The Gazans (undeniably more than simply Hamas), a few hours later, declared one as well. The ceasefire is holding, somewhat surprisingly. Hamas has decided that they don't want to risk another invasion (yet), and no rockets are flying. Even a day without rockets is a huge symbolic victory for Israel.

Israel's unilateral ceasefire makes two points. The first is that the Israelis do not want a lingering war when Mr. Obama takes office. Such a decision is strategically calculated to prevent Mr. Obama from having to deal with an Israeli war (under the pressure of his allies to stop the Israelis) on day one; certainly, Israel wants to be as friendly with the new American president as possible. The second point is that the Israelis do not want to be bound by the terms of an internationally-brokered peace deal: they want to be able to move into Gaza unbound if the rocket fire continues.

But for now, signs point to Hamas being beaten up enough that it has no intentions of provoking the Israelis yet. It is likely waiting to see if it can rebuild and rearm itself over the next few years of quiet to be ready to weather another Israeli storm.

Calculated Madness

The New York Times has a fine article about the "calculated madness" of the Israeli attack, and its analogy in the Hamas circle. But I'm not going to re-hash that.

I intend to consider the validity of Israel's conclusions on its war. Israel took down a lot of Hamas infrastructure--and because Hamas is so ubiquitous in Gaza (it is pretty much everything), Israel took down many houses, schools, Mosques, etc. As far as I can tell, nothing hit wasn't either A) a legitimate Hamas target, or B) a complete mistake, but in war, intent is a very small part of the story.

Israel believes that it has taught them a lesson, as the Chinese are fond of saying in their wars. It strolled in, delivered a beating, and left. It wasn't going to destroy all of the rocket sites. It wasn't going to take down Hamas, and alas, it certainly didn't. This war was meant to show Hamas and its supporters that throwing rockets at Israel wasn't worth the risk of massive retaliation. Did that work? Indeed, can that work?

Israel's hope is that the sup;porters of Hamas, while angry at Israel, will question the wisdom of voting for Hamas. This is somewhat likely, but they may also be purple-blooded. After the Sept. 11 attacks in the US, Americans did not question their foreign policy, except perhaps in concluding that they were being too shy, too meek, too peaceful, and too generous (in conflict with pretty much the rest of the world). While the analogy between the 9/11 attacks and the Israeli war is pretty weak, it makes a strong point: can beating on people make them more calm and peaceful? The Blitz of London, the 9/11 attacks, the bombings of North Korea, the Rape of Nanking, they all say otherwise. But they were all primarily anti-civilian attacks. Can Israel make a clearer message by having almost exclusively attacked Hamas-related targets?

Perhaps. Israel has to make two messages clear: 1) Hamas got Gaza into this mess by refusing to stop launching rockets, and 2) that the Israelis were genuinely trying to avoid civilian casualties. The second will not make Gazans less angry at the Israelis for their friends and family dying from shell fire, but it will allow point #1 to have more salience. And that is the important part--if Gazans can say, "Hamas' irresponsibility is why the Israelis attacked" (whether or not it was deserved, etc), then they will back down.

A good example of this is Europe. Russia has recently been, for lack of a better term, insufferable and hyperaggressive. They have gone after Ukraine (with gas) and Georgia (with tanks) for minor provocations. But even though the Russian response was far out of line (and resembling that of a child's temper tantrum), the European Union has questioned the wisdom of continuing to agitate the Russians--particularly, it has questioned a continued policy of trying to subsume Georgia and Ukraine into NATO. Indeed, while Russia's actions have been largely unjust (particularly in Georgia), Europe has taken the posture that Russia is an entity whose disposition and behavior are both A) unlikely to change soon through any measures, and B) rational, even if unfair and disproportionate. And so the Europeans have acted just as the Russians have. So might the Gazans, if the Israelis can impart the same sense of causal linkage between the rockets and Israel's attack (as Russia did between Georgia's shelling of South Ossetia and its own assault). If that link can become salient and vivid for Gazans, then they will either pressure Hamas to change into a more reserved military entity, or they will vote them out. Either, to some extent, is a victory for Israel. But now that the 3-week assault is over, the propaganda war will only intensify.

The Gaza Rockets

So really, the big deal in this seemingly unending conflict between Israel and Hamas, the weapon of choice for igniting the fire of war again and again, is the Qassam Rocket.

You may have been wondering what the deal is with these rockets, because either the Israeli people are actually all invincible from birth, or these rockets are really not that great.

Today, we'll have a closer look at what these rockets actually look like, how they work (or don't work), and why they're being used.

To your right you should see an image of the regular Qassam Rocket. Hamas paramilitary fighters are conveniently located next to each rocket to give you a sense of scale.

There are 3 broad types of Qassam Rockets (QR) varying in length from 2 ft 7 inches - 6 ft 7 inches (Just about the height of a regular doorway).
The body of the QR is a cylinder of regular grade steel, with guide vanes placed at the bottom for guidance. The nosecone and upper section are packed with as much explosives (TNT) as possible. The rocket motor is a solid fuel type using a mixture of sugar and fertilizer for fuel.

Below is a video of the QR in action (catchy music included!). Skip ahead to the 2:00 min mark to see construction process. You can see the rocket motor being installed, the sections being welded together and the solid fuel mixture being cast (that bit where they pour the orange liquid into a mould).
During the video keep an eye out for the corkscrew rocket contrails.



So, we can see that these rockets work because they're so incredibly simple. These rockets operate using the exact same principle as those model rockets you played with as a kid. The only difference is that your rocket probably didn't have an explosive payload. All you need to make these rockets yourself is some stock steel and a welding machine. Fertilizer and sugar can be picked up at your local hardware store and chemist.

But let's face it. These rockets just...suck.

An image of a QR attack on a house in Sderot.
Yup, that is in fact a butane/gas tank surrounded by flammable material, all very much un-exploded.

The Gaza rocket attacks started in 2001. The first Israeli fatality was in March 2007 . That's a pretty poor track record. The reason for this continued poor performance is twofold: 1) Construction techniques. There's only so much targeting you can do with an unguided missile. The most important part is lining up the guide vanes. Remember those corkscrew contrails I was talking about? When you see those, you know the guy who put the rocket together did a botch up job. Corkscrew's means the rocket is wasting energy in spinning around instead of using the energy to go further which means less range. It also means you can't aim the thing worth a damn, because where you point it is not necessarily where it is going to go.
2) It is not meant to inflict large amounts of damage. It's meant to terrorize people, and it is working. The people of Sderot (the primary target for these attacks) must hate those things with a passion.

Summary: The Qassam rockets are extremely easy to manufacture, require very little technical skill to operate and are largely ineffective in terms of physical destructive potential. Poor manufacturing technique further inhibits the ability of this rocket to be a real threat to a militarized nation such as Israel. The rockets are being used to terrorize the populace and to provoke a response out of the enemy government, which can later on be pointed to as further "proof" that the attacking nation is in fact the victim of an overzealous and aggressive neighbour. Underhanded, yet apparently effective, tactics.

Will Israel Succeed in Gaza?

Thus far, it seems that Israeli tactics are proving to be fairly effective.

Here are some reasons for why they might actually succeed in their objectives:

• Minimal Israeli casualties: 7 by the latest count (report here)

• At least some Palestinians are starting to realize that poking the proverbial dragon with a pointy stick, will in fact end badly. Maybe the traditional insurgent/terrorist tactic of 1) Using the civilian population as a meat shield and 2) Blaming destruction of said meat shield on the enemy, has finally started to backfire on Hamas. There might be a trend of falling popularity. There are some vague western media reports in support of the theory but counter examples are just as easy to find (as well as the bizarre...).

• Isreal is pretty damn good at what they do:

When the dust finally settles and reporters are given more freedom to enter the Gaza strip, maybe then we'll have a better idea of where Hamas ranks popularity wise with the Palestinians and whether Israel really did what they wanted to do: stop the rocket attacks.

Gaza Land War Begins

Israel is now holding nothing back against Gaza--its tanks and infantry have entered the strip with the public intent of capturing Hamas rocket launching sites (and likely very large weapons caches nearby) and dismantling them. The Israelis are also likely sending in large numbers of special operations forces to try and take down as much Hamas leadership-in-hiding as possible.

There's little to say yet on the operation, except that it shows a real commitment for Israel to pay the necessary political costs to take down Hamas in a way that would allow Fatah to take control of Gaza if/when it wins elections that Abbas is calling. Strangely, it may be this very war that enables the Israelis and the Palestinians to make peace. A reminder is due that Hamas does not recognize Israel's right to exist--it is only interested in driving Israel out of the area, and that it took over Gaza strip in a civil war in 2006 after losing elections to Fatah--their continued presence has been a tough roadblock for the Israelis, and it seems the Israelis feel they finally have the political capital with their neighbors to finish Hamas off. And despite all the criticism coming Israel's way, it looks like they're right. But now the fate of this operation depends on the military's ability to achieve its objectives without "mission creep" or a quagmire.

On the Gaza Air Raid

Israel hit Gaza--hard--for the second straight day today in an air raid. Short of decisive, the attacks are looking ugly, pulling Israel into a mess that they may not be willing to deal with. But diplomatic pressure remains low.

300 Gazans are dead--Hamas reports 180 of their own and the rest civilians, the Israelis, of course, claim more. 700 are wounded. Hospitals are flooded. The place is a mess. Okay, now what?

If the Israelis were trying to strike a crippling blow to Hamas, and keep them from operating, then fine. It might be worth the PR problems that are being generated, and it might be worth the resentment of their Palestinian neighbors. Any raid like this has huge political costs. But Livni has openly declared that there won't be a ground invasion, and this will not be the crippling blow to Hamas. Then what is it? What's the benefit?

This campaign looks like a deterrence/punishment operation, from its nature. It's an attempt to tell Hamas, "hurt us a little, and we'll hurt you a lot." Hamas and Israel don't recognize each other as legitimate, and Hamas isn't participating in talks with Fatah, Israel, or even an Egyptian mediator. There's little talking that can be done to Hamas.

But this mayhem may not be what Israel wants. Mayhem should be an unfortunate byproduct of a bigger operation--eliminating Hamas' rocket capabilities, or decapitating the leadership. But neither of those are happening. Israel probably won't seriously hamper Hamas' ability to throw rockets into Israel, and it's certainly unlikely to break Hamas' will--martyrdom is encouraged and sought-after among Hamas' members, and civilian deaths are an infuriating motivator in any bombing campaign (think of the London Blitz).

So Israel seems to be failing to really make a blow to Hamas' capability or will with this air raid. There is a possibility that this raid is actually a signal to Fatah and its leader, Abbas, that Israel's grievances must be taken seriously by the PA if the PA is going to be able to govern itself. Fair enough. If anyone is getting the signal that Gaza needs to be put under control, it's Mr. Abbas.

What this assault won't do is strike a blow to Hamas' popularity--if anything, its base is likely to be energized. If Israel hoped to convince Hamas supporters that their party's irresponsible behavior was the cause of the attack, they've failed.

But, Israel's options remain open. They're really not taking much in the way of diplomatic fire--the UN, EU, and Arab states are calling for "restraint" and an end of hostilities--but there's very little condemnation coming out of the region, the EU, or the UN. Obviously, the US is expressing its hope for a peaceful resolution, but has openly told the Palestinians that they had it coming.

Abbas has sent an official condemnation, but that was to be expected. Arabs throughout the region are protesting in the streets, burning Israeli flags and whatnot, but their governments are not responding strongly. International politics is trumping domestic politics in the region. It's a sign that the Israelis--particularly their Foreign Minister Livni--have prepared the diplomatic battlefield. It means that they've got options in the bag, and it means that they have, over time, earned the acceptance of their regional community. But unless they can start thinking about a new approach, and focus on what their political goals in this operation might be, the diplomatic maneuvering might all be for naught.

Hamas' Neighbors Conspiring to Take it Down

Six days into the end of the ceasefire, rocket attacks from Gaza into Israel have gone up significantly--and not as a response in particular to any Israeli behavior. While the rockets are still not killing Israelis, they are making life for anyone nearby nearly unbearable.

These rocket attacks may have sealed Hamas' fate. Hope that Hamas can be groomed into a legitimate political party are falling apart, for even its neighbors. There is a lot of talk by relevant parties that seems to indicate that Hamas will soon be facing its doom. Even more significant, however, is who isn't talking.

Israel is sending strict warnings, and making it clear that they are preparing a massive offensive into Gaza. The operation would be aimed at toppling Hamas, and they might just have the support they need for it.

Egypt invited Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni to Cairo for talks over the issue. Egypt is urging restraint, but this is likely a mere diplomatic and political gesture. The place of the meeting has significance--Egypt usually only meets with Israelis in an out-of-town resort, but bringing Livni into Cairo is a gesture of respect and endorsement that Egypt rarely grants. It is an off-the-record way of saying, "we are on your side now."

But there's more. Al-Quds al-Arabi, a newspaper out of London, has reported that Egypt would not object to a strike by Israel to take down Hamas. This is big news. This is about as close to a full war endorsement as one can get from Arab neighbors--a light endorsement usually comes in the form of an Embassy-level protest, even if just to save face. But the Egyptians have said out loud that they're going to keep their noses out. And they'll probably keep enforcing the blockade.

The Egyptians have probably become tired of trying to be impartial mediators with Hamas after years of being snubbed and enabling bad behavior. In October, when Egypt tried to host reconciliation meetings between Hamas and Fatah, Hamas boycotted. Egypt kept suggesting to Hamas that they continue the Israeli truce and go to Cairo for peace talks, but Hamas refused. Hamas' rocket attack escalation has come against Egyptian warnings. Egypt realizes that anything short of an endorsement for war is a form of political capital for Hamas that it can use to pay for the flight of more rockets into Israel. Egypt doesn't want to be a part of it anymore.

Before now, domestic pressure kept the otherwise-moderate Egyptian government at least partially on Hamas' side. It is likely Hamas' loss of grace--rather than serious changes in the politics between Cairo and the Muslim Brotherhood--that has pushed Egypt to Israel's side. But it's there, and that's bad news for Hamas.

Abbas has taken the opportunity to declare his support of unity and democracy by vowing not to pursue a civil war to beat Hamas. Abbas gets to play good cop as more-established powers put the pressure on Hamas for him. But there's a lot to gain for him here. His popularity is on the rise, and world opinion turning against Hamas for irresponsibility and militarism, moderates in the Palestinian Authority are likely to shy away from Hamas as well. Abbas is preparing the battlefield for snap elections and a booming victory by Fatah that he will be able to hold onto for years. If Fatah can start to consolidate its political power, then an anti-Hamas operation will become much more viable an option for other world leaders.

But just as significant are those that are not talking. Iran and Syria have said little or nothing on the matter. They have not warned Israel, nor had words with Egypt over its pro-Israeli behavior. Whether this is a result of talks with Bush, Brown, and Sarkozy, or whether it's simply due to Hamas' PR gaffes of the last few years, is unclear. But by not talking, they too are giving as much of a green light to Israel as possible. The UN will complain if the Israelis invade, as will Russia; but if the regional actors here keep behaving like they are now, they will prepare the region for peace.

If Hamas' domestic popularity tumbles, then their ability to wage a messy and bloody insurgency against Israel will be limited--people will give them less funding, fewer troops, fewer places to stay. Palestinians will betray their positions to the Israelis. The war will go well, and the militant machine that keeps Hamas in place will start to weaken. Until this happens, elections will be meaningless--Hamas has already shown that its respect for democracy and peace are long trumped by its ideology and thirst for power (see: the PA civil war). But if they can be crippled, then Fatah's elections can bring a new mandate for the region to work together to clear any Hamas resistance to the new PA order. Some control over Gaza may become possible, in time. It will require patience.

As importantly, Egypt's blessing of Israel will make it an excellent supporter of the Israeli-Fatah peace talks, especially if the Syrians choose to continue to participate after election cycles are over. Israel, should it choose to pursue the two-state option, will have regional support and mediation that should make life a lot easier.

Finally, Livni seems to be showing she's got the right stuff to be Prime Minister--and she's using the opportunity to steal the spotlight from Netanyahu. This will be critical in Israel's upcoming elections--if she can use her power as Foreign Minister to keep the region on Israel's side even during an attack on Gaza Strip, then she will at lest carry an image of a great diplomat and representative of Israel. More importantly, this fight is a big test as to whether or not her two-state system can work, or whether it should be abandoned for Netanyahu's one-state system. But with Fatah and Egypt giving tacit support to Israeli operations in Hamas, Syria and Iran's non-involvement, and the continually increasing likelihood that Hamas' days as a major player in the region are coming to a close, moderate Israelis are likely to favor the two-state system, Livni's ascendancy to PM, and continued peace talks.

Gaza War to Reignite

As the truce winds down, Hamas faced two options: rev the war back up, or bide their time. Long-term, time is in their favor--Arab Muslims are outbreeding Jews by quite a bit (although they're still quite the minority). But it's very long-term. So Hamas is going with option 1.

First: rocket attacks have increased significantly. Because Hamas has no credible control over the people of Gaza, the only reputation blow it takes is for letting these rockets go is on its administrative and security abilities--a reputation it doesn't really care about anyway. But Hamas allows doubt to loom over whether it's orchestrating the attacks or not. The rockets are making living near Gaza nigh-untenable for Israelis, even though none have died. But that's the point: it's terror.

Second: Hamas has generally agreed that the cease-fire will end. They claim they will only "respond to Israeli aggression," but the cease-fire gives Israel a lot of leeway to really hammer down on the West Bank for rockets flying into Israel--if Hamas doesn't want large-scale war, it had better hope that it does have control over such rocketeers. The lack of a cease-fire will lift any veil that Hamas is actually trying to keep rockets under control--and Israel has shown that it's unlikely to cow to international pressure. Hamas probably knows it, too.

Israel probably has a plan to make a surgical strike into Hamas if they provoke it. Israel had offered to extend the truce--it was Hamas that declined, even after Israel released a few hundred Palestinian prisoners. Along with the rockets, Hamas is pretty clearly asking for it. Expect the Israelis to have something very precise in their sleeves to unleash on the Hamas leadership if they start acting up after the truce ends. Especially with Livni's declaration that Hamas has to go by force, don't expect Israel to play nice with Hamas, regardless of whether Kadima or Likud takes the polls in January.

Implications of a Poll in Palestine

A poll was published today that described relative support for Palestinian Authority parties, Hamas and Fatah. Overall, Fatah would take 42% and Hamas 28%; in the Gaza Strip, Fatah leads 46%-32%.

The implications of this are extremely interesting for Persian Gulf and American governments. Here's why:

A few years ago, Hamas and Fatah fought a brief civil war in both the Gaza strip and West Bank. In Gaza, an aid-dependent territory, Hamas had strong local roots and a reputation for setting up schools and donation centers. They were popular, and in Gaza, they drove Fatah out. But Fatah was the elected government, and won in the West Bank, where trade and diplomacy happen through Israel and Jordan. Each section became a more homogenous, polarized region.



Israeli policy in Gaza looked for a while like it would drive Gazans to the lunatic fringe. Hamas reacted with massive propaganda efforts to Israel's attacks, blockades, etc. In a region so devoid of contact to the outside world, it seemed like such propaganda would work. But somehow, it hasn't. Gazans currently prefer Fatah--a party removed from Gaza's streets and consorting with Israel, Hamas' enemy. The implications of this are strong: Despite losing the civil war and appearing to sell out the Gaza strip, Fatah has won their loyalty. Throughout all of the Palestinian Authority, Hamas is being rejected by fairly impressive margins.

If Fatah can substantially win the upcoming January elections, then its moderate politics will reign supreme. If it can consolidate its power over Gaza, then it can begin to enforce moderate policies and suppress Hamas' anti-Israeli terror behavior. If and only if it can suppress this behavior will its 2-state policy have a chance. Israel cannot give up some control of the PA until it knows that it will not be a hotbed for terror--it cannot take it back as easily as it can simply hold on.

But the other implications are perhaps more interesting, in Israel. If the moderate Fatah party can take control of all of the Palestinian Authority, then Israeli perceptions about the PA may change. If the Israelis see hope in 2-state negotiations, if they see that such negotiations may lead to long-term peace and prosperity rather than increased terrorism and demands by radical Islamist leadership, then Israelis may be more tempted to vote Kadima and continue negotiations rather than throw their hands up and oust the government for the Likud opposition.

If Fatah and Kadima can get a new mandate and a stronger political hold over their respective territories, then the 2-state negotiations are likely to have a lot more hope in the next few years--particularly if such moderates in power allow the Israeli-Syrian peace talks to resolve. The machinations for Middle East negotiations have been shaken up significantly by the last years' actions, but they may not have fallen apart.

Why is Gaza Broken?

My first warning on this post is I really have no idea what the answer is. But there are a few points worth noting, that bring up a few questions.

1) The Hamas Coup. Still acting like a terror cell as much as a political party, Hamas' violent purging of Fatah in the Gaza Strip (as soon as it had a big enough advantage in firepower) has shown complete disregard for the creation of a stable independent state... but this is not surprising. The party officially still insists on the dissolution of Israel before peace is possible. How do you fix a region run like this? Not sure.



2) Geography. Making a country that is split by its greatest security threat (Gaza Strip and West Bank split by Israel) seems stupid, and it is. Germany hated Poland long before 1939 because of the Danzig Corridor, and an independent Palestine would have serious trouble maintaining administration, security, and trade unless Israel was willing to allow free flow, through Israel, between the two regions. Unfortunately, because of 50 years of constant terror and military threats from the Palestinian regions, such free flow is almost certainly politically infeasible (and probably not actually a great idea).

3) The Security Dilemma. Neither side (Israel or Palestine) is willing to promise peace without security assurances, and neither side can give these assurances, largely because of Hamas and other terror organizations. Israel could try to be the "grown-up," given its military strength, give Palestine its political and security concessions, wait for peace, and then get its own concessions later, but while Olmert and Abbas might be willing to work with this plan, non-state actors in Palestine (particularly Hamas-type fanatics) are impossible for the Palestinian state to effectively control, and they would likely continue to use terror to increase their political gains, as they have done in the past. Therefore, Abbas cannot possibly make security promises to Israel, and therefore, Israel cannot (in its own interest) let Palestine yet have a free state. Again, I do not know how to fix this dilemma.

4) The Arab States' lack of help. Well, some are helping. Egypt is trying, but Gazan refugees are starting to pour into Egypt, and the Egyptian PM is literally threatening to break legs. Egypt's cooperation with the Israeli blockade is somewhat rare. Iran's Hezobllah militants in Lebanon seem to be vying for another war with Israel, and Syria has refused to help make peace in the Palestine issue until gives back the Golan Heights--a mountain range through which Syria invaded Israel multiple times.

5) Israel's Inconsistency. Israel has been inconsistent about its responses against terror attacks by Gazan militants. Israel forced its settlers from Gaza (which was, in general, the right thing to do) amid uncharacteristically high terror attacks, which may have made Hamas think such terror attacks would win political victories... even now, Israel's military responses range from lackluster to extreme, and Palestinian civilians cannot be clear on what kind of behavior will bring them peace and prosperity. Palestine is much like a colony of Israel, and Israel will have to take care of the Palestinian people or let them be free... doing neither will only create more resentment.

But we are certainly stuck. Israel and Palestine both need promises of security before political progress can be made, and this makes one think "UN Intervention," but that's unlikely to happen anytime soon (and we see it failed rather miserably in the 2006 Israeli-Lebanon war).

I would love comments from readers on creative peace-making ideas.