The Gaza Rockets

So really, the big deal in this seemingly unending conflict between Israel and Hamas, the weapon of choice for igniting the fire of war again and again, is the Qassam Rocket.

You may have been wondering what the deal is with these rockets, because either the Israeli people are actually all invincible from birth, or these rockets are really not that great.

Today, we'll have a closer look at what these rockets actually look like, how they work (or don't work), and why they're being used.

To your right you should see an image of the regular Qassam Rocket. Hamas paramilitary fighters are conveniently located next to each rocket to give you a sense of scale.

There are 3 broad types of Qassam Rockets (QR) varying in length from 2 ft 7 inches - 6 ft 7 inches (Just about the height of a regular doorway).
The body of the QR is a cylinder of regular grade steel, with guide vanes placed at the bottom for guidance. The nosecone and upper section are packed with as much explosives (TNT) as possible. The rocket motor is a solid fuel type using a mixture of sugar and fertilizer for fuel.

Below is a video of the QR in action (catchy music included!). Skip ahead to the 2:00 min mark to see construction process. You can see the rocket motor being installed, the sections being welded together and the solid fuel mixture being cast (that bit where they pour the orange liquid into a mould).
During the video keep an eye out for the corkscrew rocket contrails.



So, we can see that these rockets work because they're so incredibly simple. These rockets operate using the exact same principle as those model rockets you played with as a kid. The only difference is that your rocket probably didn't have an explosive payload. All you need to make these rockets yourself is some stock steel and a welding machine. Fertilizer and sugar can be picked up at your local hardware store and chemist.

But let's face it. These rockets just...suck.

An image of a QR attack on a house in Sderot.
Yup, that is in fact a butane/gas tank surrounded by flammable material, all very much un-exploded.

The Gaza rocket attacks started in 2001. The first Israeli fatality was in March 2007 . That's a pretty poor track record. The reason for this continued poor performance is twofold: 1) Construction techniques. There's only so much targeting you can do with an unguided missile. The most important part is lining up the guide vanes. Remember those corkscrew contrails I was talking about? When you see those, you know the guy who put the rocket together did a botch up job. Corkscrew's means the rocket is wasting energy in spinning around instead of using the energy to go further which means less range. It also means you can't aim the thing worth a damn, because where you point it is not necessarily where it is going to go.
2) It is not meant to inflict large amounts of damage. It's meant to terrorize people, and it is working. The people of Sderot (the primary target for these attacks) must hate those things with a passion.

Summary: The Qassam rockets are extremely easy to manufacture, require very little technical skill to operate and are largely ineffective in terms of physical destructive potential. Poor manufacturing technique further inhibits the ability of this rocket to be a real threat to a militarized nation such as Israel. The rockets are being used to terrorize the populace and to provoke a response out of the enemy government, which can later on be pointed to as further "proof" that the attacking nation is in fact the victim of an overzealous and aggressive neighbour. Underhanded, yet apparently effective, tactics.

Will Israel Succeed in Gaza?

Thus far, it seems that Israeli tactics are proving to be fairly effective.

Here are some reasons for why they might actually succeed in their objectives:

• Minimal Israeli casualties: 7 by the latest count (report here)

• At least some Palestinians are starting to realize that poking the proverbial dragon with a pointy stick, will in fact end badly. Maybe the traditional insurgent/terrorist tactic of 1) Using the civilian population as a meat shield and 2) Blaming destruction of said meat shield on the enemy, has finally started to backfire on Hamas. There might be a trend of falling popularity. There are some vague western media reports in support of the theory but counter examples are just as easy to find (as well as the bizarre...).

• Isreal is pretty damn good at what they do:

When the dust finally settles and reporters are given more freedom to enter the Gaza strip, maybe then we'll have a better idea of where Hamas ranks popularity wise with the Palestinians and whether Israel really did what they wanted to do: stop the rocket attacks.

Israel's Confidence is High

Israel is starting to hint that they have full intent to take down Hamas with this war in Gaza (though this has been pretty obvious for a few days now). Their confidence that they can do so is surprisingly high, as well--Israeli officials are calling Hamas "crippled" in a few ways: its physical governance infrastructure is ruined (parliament building, police buildings, etc), its leadership is dead or in hiding (having abandoned its population), and its popularity is going to drop.

Though the popularity of Hamas is currently rather high, the Israelis think it will go down significantly in the next few weeks as Palestinians wonder whether a militant anti-Israel stance is one that is going to serve them well in the future. In particular, if Hamas is unable to provide governance, order, medical supplies, etc after the war ends, then their support will erode. Pre-war, Fatah already had an edge in Gaza polls. When the Palestinians have elections, probably in April 2009, Fatah will probably have quite the edge, even in Gaza. And if it does, and if Kadima can hold on in Israel, then the whole situation in Palestine looks a lot different. Israel will probably do what it can to enforce Fatah's right to govern in Gaza Strip, and help clean the strip up before working on serious two-state talks.

Such confidence is strange, coming from an Israel that lost a 2006 war in Lebanon due to overconfidence and poorly-defined campaign goals. Israel had been showing serious conservatism in its war goals early on: the air campaign was aimed at reducing rocket attacks, not even eliminating them. While Israel is not saying that they have changed their goals to the toppling of Hamas, they are certainly saying that it's likely that they will, and that they're quite happy for it. This means one of two things:

1) Israel's government did not learn a lesson from its tough defeat, even though I was able to graft that lesson from my seat in Cambridge, or,

2) Israel is actually well and truly crushing Hamas' governance and combat capabilities.

Occam's Razor says it's probably the latter.

Despite confidence, Israel remains conservative. They have not given in to goading and luring on the part of Hamas to enter Gaza City or other urban areas for street fighting. They have kept their total military casualties to one, suffered on the first night of entry. Israel's targets have been picked with deliberate caution, as well: Palestinian medical authorities have reported only 16 children dead, despite a strong incentive to over-report. Hamas has claimed that half of the over-500 killed in Gaza are civilians, but there is a strong incentive to over-report here, as well: Hamas loses face by reporting its own fighters killed, and gains support by claiming that Israel has killed civilians. Given how informally one can join the Hamas paramilitary, it will be impossible for these figures to ever be confirmed beyond academic estimates.

So things seem to be going well for Israel so far. They have a lot of work to do, and in particular, Israel must keep up strong diplomacy with Jordan, Egypt, and Lebanon, in order to keep its free military reign in Gaza. But such support should have wavered days ago if it was going to. Israel appears to have a serious shot at crippling Hamas for good and, despite the cries of many protesters to the contrary, contribute to long-term peace in the Middle East.

Analysing Israel's Gaza Tactics

After a day of war, Israel stand at one dead and about 40 wounded. They say they have killed "dozens" of Hamas militants, but they are struggling with their opposition using civilians as human shields in the fighting.

Let me first digress by expressing my own personal sympathies for Israel's difficult position. After returning full control of the Gaza strip to Palestine, Hamas used a civil war to wrest power, and has been using it as a safe haven to accumulate rockets from Iran and other sources to launch into Israel constantly, even during a six-month ceasefire in which Israel was relatively disciplined. Israel provided the majority of Gaza's fuel, food, electricity, and medical aid at no cost--despite access to the Mediterranean and Egypt, Gaza's Hamas leadership has held Gaza's economy back--gross mismanagement and excessive, corrupt government bureaucracy have made sure that Gaza's market has not spun up at all. Hamas hands out aid received by Israel, and takes credit--keeping its popularity high among its many poor and jobless. Hamas seems to take very little flak from its own people for storing weapons in Mosques and orphanages, or by using civilian human shields as they fight Israelis. The Arab world is starting to flare up in protest, and otherwise-moderate Arab governments have to condemn Israel's invasion to halt rocket fire--after relatively patient and persistent warnings to stop, offers to negotiate, and months of restraint--as a "war crime." Luckily for the Israelis, Egypt continues to stand by them (to what extent they can), and the Arab League is unable to spin up the momentum to actually meet over the crisis. The US will block any UN resolutions to officially condemn Israel in any way. Even US Senate Majority Leader, Harry Reid, has said that a ceasefire is impossible until Hamas offers to halt rocket fire. So even if this war lasts for a few weeks, the US will not be switching teams on a dime.

So Israel is now elbow-deep in this problem--what have they actually done? According to relatively scattered reports, Israel has already cut to the Mediterranean and has surrounded Gaza City and other urban centers, as far south as Netzarim, but the Israeli Army has been disciplined enough to avoid entering any major urban areas, where the Hamas militants likely have a great advantage (with huge numbers of civilians that the Israelis have to worry about, potential booby traps, and other "home turf" advantages like knowledge of the terrain, friendly homes, etc). A map I put together below should make it a bit more clear where the Israelis have gone.

Approximate Israeli Movement and Positions (Click for Larger)

Their staging ground was Sderot, on the northeast corner of Gaza. From there, Israel broke in during the night and cut power to most of the northern half of the strip, taking advantage of night fighting technology to strike their initial blow (and most of their advances in the last day). The Israelis are likely to continue using night to press their primary assaults in search of rockets, launch pads, and Hamas leadership. Note that with Gaza City surrounded (and certainly extremely strict policies for anyone escaping), Hamas leadership isn't going anywhere soon (for the Israelis control Gaza waters, as well). Special forces have an opportunity to use what intelligence that Mossad has gathered to take them down in the capital city if they weren't smart enough to get out early.

At this point, Israel looks like it is going to focus on a search-and-destroy mission in the north, and then perhaps move south to mop up militants that got out--it is unlikely to spread its 3 brigades so thin as to take the entire strip at once. Israel also has troops ready in Jerusalem and near Lebanon in case West Bank Palestinians or Lebanese Hezbollah militants try anything tricky to help out their brothers-in-arms.

So the easy part is over, with few casualties for the Israelis, but the hard part--search-and-destroy--is just beginning. The success of the rest of this mission will depend on Israeli tactical intelligence abilities more than brilliant ground war operational capabilities. Israeli unit tactical training will face a test, as well.

But this mission really has more substance than simply finding rockets, or even toppling Hamas leadership. After failing to meet its objectives in Summer 2006 in Lebanon--namely, preventing rockets from hitting Israel in the north--Israel is hoping to regain its deterrent capabilities with neighboring militant groups. Israel is unlikely to face a regular war with its neighbors in the near future--their willingness to negotiate has a lot to do with Israel's ability to bloody them up if they choose to fight. So far, Hezbollah has chosen to sit this one out (so far), and read (though I've lost the link) that there are rumors floating about Hamas heading to Egypt to talk potential ceasefire options. So maybe it's working.

Gaza Land War Begins

Israel is now holding nothing back against Gaza--its tanks and infantry have entered the strip with the public intent of capturing Hamas rocket launching sites (and likely very large weapons caches nearby) and dismantling them. The Israelis are also likely sending in large numbers of special operations forces to try and take down as much Hamas leadership-in-hiding as possible.

There's little to say yet on the operation, except that it shows a real commitment for Israel to pay the necessary political costs to take down Hamas in a way that would allow Fatah to take control of Gaza if/when it wins elections that Abbas is calling. Strangely, it may be this very war that enables the Israelis and the Palestinians to make peace. A reminder is due that Hamas does not recognize Israel's right to exist--it is only interested in driving Israel out of the area, and that it took over Gaza strip in a civil war in 2006 after losing elections to Fatah--their continued presence has been a tough roadblock for the Israelis, and it seems the Israelis feel they finally have the political capital with their neighbors to finish Hamas off. And despite all the criticism coming Israel's way, it looks like they're right. But now the fate of this operation depends on the military's ability to achieve its objectives without "mission creep" or a quagmire.

Israel Chooses a Gaza Strategy

Israel's former ambiguity in its Gaza strategy is gone, and has given way to a much more decisive strategy of total crippling of Hamas' offensive capabilities. Israel is attacking leadership, communications, security, weapons storage/manufacturing, and deployment sites in an effort to turn Hamas into an ineffectual flag-waving organization, rather than a militant wing with any bargaining power.

Figure 1: Gaza Strip With Urban Densities (Click for Larger Image)

The turn to decisiveness is good for Israel, who appeared to be waffling earlier over what to do. Poking at Gaza and bloodying/infuriating its civilian population without achieving any real political goals would have been not only wasteful, but counterproductive--they would have increased Hamas' will without seriously hampering its capabilities. Now, the Israelis have figured that they have already paid the political cost of the airstrikes, both in Gaza and internationally, and they might as well finish the job to their satisfaction. It will mean many more dead Gazans. It will mean billions in relief. It is a questionable decision overall, but one that appears rational once one accepts the given decision to begin serious airstrikes.

The commitment to cripple Hamas doesn't necessarily mean it will happen, despite Israel's impressive military. In the past, like the 1982 and 2006 wars in Lebanon, the Israelis have struggled to do serious damage to non-state actors. Israel's regular military, despite the state's security needs, remains largely outfitted to promptly dispatch Arab regular armies. But to be fair, nobody on earth has yet figured out how to properly deal with non-state actors, as the US in the last 7 years has demonstrated. Hamas remains resilient and confident. It is an organization that feeds politically on suffering, terror, mayhem, and death. Its support among its base is likely to harden. What makes life tougher for the Israelis is the constant decision between tactical advantage and strategic caution--Hamas has no qualms with hiding arms in Mosques, hiding terrorists in orphanages and hospitals. Israel must choose between letting them hide out, or killing children, killing the sick, killing religious observers. They seem to be going for the latter.

Figure 2: Arms Smuggling and Rocket Sites in Gaza

Israel may be preparing to invade Gaza. Reservists have been called, troops and tanks are lining up by the Gazan border, and foreign nationals are being escorted out of the country. The move may be an effort to pull Hamas security to the border and push civilians away, making it easier to more exclusively target militants, but it may be a legitimate preparation. A ground war is likely to become a mess--unless the Israelis have learned from the Summer 2006 Lebanon war, but chances are (sadly) that they haven't. The most productive thing that Israel can do in a ground war is conduct a series of raids to take down every single Hamas leader whose name registers on the Israeli radar that they can. The only way to truly get Hamas to fall apart will be to rob it so completely of leadership that it kills itself in an internal power struggle. The Mossad may have the intel the Israeli army needs to do that. It's tough to say.

For what it's worth, Israel's friends are sticking by their side. Israel's earlier diplomatic maneuvering is paying off. Egypt is keeping its border crossing closed except for inspected humanitarian relief trucks going into Gaza and inspected emergency transport trucks going out. Egypt has drawn a lot of criticism for this, from the UN and Iran, and from protesters just about everywhere, but it's sticking to its guns. The Lebanese government has come out against criticisms of Egypt, The Syrians have vowed to continue peace negotiations with Israel, and Jordan is keeping quiet despite a 50% Palestinian population. Such reactions are absolutely remarkable, and should mostly guarantee Israel a free hand in the Gaza operation. It remains likely that Livni has convinces Israel's neighbors that Hamas must go.

So with its free hand, Israel continues to pound Gaza, targeting as many Hamas critical points as they can. Hamas remains bold, but nothing Israel can do will change Hamas' rhetoric. Keep an eye out for a Gazan land war, and for more Hamas leaders to turn up dead. Israel may have a unique opportunity to eject this thorn in its side once and for all.