Afghan War Intensity Up--A Sign of Hope?

100 ISAF servicemen died in June--the most since the Afghanistan war began. it's a terrible number and a tragedy, absolutely.

But: there is a sign of hope in the increased intensity of the Afghan war.

The Taliban is increasingly on the offensive--bold (and sometimes reckless) attacks against American and Afghani targets are well on the upswing.

What's this mean? Why the change? The easy answer is to say, "they're getting stronger, and want to deal a finishing blow." This is, certainly, what the attacks are meant to imply.

But the story is more complicated.

The question to ask is: what is the Taliban's winning strategy?

The answer, by the way, is to wait out the US. The US will leave eventually. It will not stay there forever. If the Taliban can slowly swell its safe base of operations, it will win, as the US will eventually grow tired and fade away.

Three series of events are happening in parallel:
1) The US is stepping up drone/special operations in Taliban strongholds in Southern Afghanistan (like Helmand).
2) Pakistan is stepping up full-scale military assaults in Taliban strongholds in northern Pakistan (like Swat and Northern Waziristan).
3) The Taliban is stepping up bold offensives against the Pakistani Government, the Afghani Government, and ISAF.

I think you might be able to see where I am going.

Why the boldness, if the Taliban wants to wait for the US to leave?

The obvious guess is that the wait-it-out strategy is not currently viable.

ISAF and Pakistan are working together on an offensive. As we saw in Iraq, offensives cost lives. They hurt, the numbers look bad, and the American public grows quickly impatient.

But, potentially, they work. Certainly, a lack of offensives will fail. Preventing at all turns a stronghold for the enemy is a necessary (though not sufficient) part of COIN. It seems like this costly measure is starting to pay off: bold Taliban attacks on ISAF sites imply that there may be a desperation on the part of the Taliban to pressure NATO out of Afghanistan quickly. If that's the case, then the Taliban thinks that waiting is no longer in its favor.

The alternative hypothesis is that the Taliban is so strong that it's trying to deliver the "final blow." First, this doesn't make particular sense, strategically--the Taliban is traditionally quite terrible against ISAF in straight-up gun battles, as the past month has shown. If the waiting-game is a winning strategy, then there's no reason the Taliban would grow impatient and start putting its fighters at higher risk. It's been fighting a 25-year war for Independence. Its time horizon is much longer than a few months.

Second, the US is already scheduled to start pulling out of Afghanistan--there is no particular need or reason to try to "hurry" them. This is the perfect situation to, if possible, keep the "wait-it-out" strategy going.

If the Taliban is on the offensive, it's because it can't be on the defensive. Its strongholds and safe areas are being threatened and broken up. For sure, we know its lines of communication are being disrupted--making its attacks decreasingly coordinated and effective.

There is hope. There is a whole lot more to do than disrupting the Taliban's footing in the AfPak region to ensure victory in Afghanistan. But it is necessarily the first and most important step in winning the war (creating a stable, functional, credible central government to take its place is another story altogether).

Keep your eyes up in the next few months for Petraeus to continue to apply his modified strategy from Iraq--potentially successfully.

The McChrystal Pinch

McChrystal's comments to Rolling Stone are unacceptable in a General of the Untied States Army. Period.

Now that that's out of the way:

Life is not quite so easy for President Obama as firing McChrystal. One of the hero-geniuses of the US pulling the Iraq War from the brink (just behind Petraeus), McChrystal is an extremely valuable military asset to the US Army, and would be tough to lose.

After his recent successes in Iraq, he has an incredible loyalty in US troops. He's one of a very few people who has Karzai's trust and respect. And, generally speaking, he commands extremely competently.

The risk of canning McChrystal is that the Afghanistan war could, quite really, fall apart at the seams without him. Like Petraeus for Bush, McChrystal may be President Obama's last best hope at winning this war.

The risk of not firing him, of course, is that President Obama would be allowing an insubordination in a General not seen since MacArthur. He would appear weak domestically and abroad. He would set a terrible precedent in the future. McChrystal clearly lacks respect for the current civilian executive branch of the United States--does that make him less effective? Will his subordinates be less effective for knowing it?

But what's more valuable? Which price can the United States afford to pay for McChrystal's comments? President Obama has been stuck with many unenviable decisions in the last year and a half. This may be his toughest.

(For what it's worth, I'm not sure what my recommendation is.)

The Nationalist Spike in Europe

This is more an observation than a strict analysis, but very interesting, nonetheless.

Nationalism seemed to die in much of Eastern Europe towards the end of the 20th century as Europe reeled from centuries of war. It seemed unlikely to many that it would return soon. But, of course, geopolitics marches on. Nationalism is back in Europe, and back in a big way. A few examples of interest:

Germany: The Germans have pushed for a leadership role in Europe with the onset of the Greek crisis. Rather than an isolationist nationalism, Germany seeks to exert its will over Southern Europe, lest the debt crisis bleed it dry. The Germans are likely to come out of the debt crisis with a considerable amount of power in Europe--which is the only way they can make the EU work for them. Otherwise, they will consider leaving--the EU will only be a deal the Germans will tolerate so long as it is not one that tears them down.

Hungary, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Bulgaria, Austria: Right-wing (sometimes seriously so) nationalist parties have made huge gains over the past two years. Much of this is in response to the Russian resurgence (where the options are to fight or join). But this resurgence makes for a potentially rivalrous situation in Eastern Europe. Territorial squabbles may arise and prevent Eastern European unity against Russia.

Denmark, Switzerland, France, and Holland: Right-wing and largely anti-Islamic parties have made great gains in Denmark and Holland in their last elections, signaling a reaction against growing Muslim influence in much of Europe due to massive immigration. France has banned burqas, and Switzerland has banned minarets. Anti-Islamism has become a relative European hallmark. Europe is set for a strong showdown with the Islamic world, but one very different from that of the US.

Belgium: Perhaps the most interesting of the nationalist movements, the Flemish movement has made big gains in Belgium, capturing 20% of seats (far more than any other party). Unlike previous separatist movements, this independence party is largely mainstream (rather than right-wing), and hopes to see a gradual dissolution of Belgium into Flanders (a Dutch region) and Wallonia (a French region). Belgium is probably closer to its end than ever before.

The return of Nationalism to Europe will make it a geopolitically interesting continent once again (after two decades of relative calmness, saving the Balkans).

Turkey Moves East

The EU's rejection of Turkey as a member (which was not an outright rejection, but a bureaucratic stagnation to death) has pushed Turkey towards the Arab world, away from the West. The latest evidence is in its decision to lead the Arab Free Trade Zone.

The implications are potentially large. Turkey has the potential to lead the Middle East and, as I spoke of before, unite it.

Turkish ascension to the EU probably made geopolitical sense, from a strictly national power perspective. It's not clear whether anti-Turkish racism in central Europe was the primary driver to keep Turkey out, or whether it was simply a European implosion over issues like the financial crisis.

But either way, the shift in rhetoric and action by Turkey likely suggests a long-term drift away from the West, and towards the Middle East.

Israel's Risk to US Interests

If you're a reader of George Friedman (or other realist geopolitical academics), you'll tend towards the idea that one of the United States' paramount interests is to prevent a single geopolitical entity (or coalition) from amassing enough economic and military power to challenge it (this has been true since about the turn of the 20t century, when the US became the foremost power in the world). This was why World Wars I and II were important to the US (to stop Germany from conquering the continent), and why the Cold War was so critical (to prevent the Soviets from doing the same). Once a force amasses enough military power, it can potentially challenge US trade dominance, or even cross the ocean and challenge the US near its borders.

The US is further interested in preventing unity in the Middle East. If the Middle East united in a form similar to the Ottoman Empire, it might be powerful enough to potentially challenge the US. Not only would it be highly populous, but it would have vast oil resources and central trading position (between Europe & Asia). It would be a great strategic threat to US hegemony.

Israel, whether or not it has the moral upper-hand in the Middle East conflict, is becoming a risk to US interests due to Middle Eastern perceptions of its behavior as of late. For decades, the states of Egypt & Turkey (in particular), as well as Jordan, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia, have recognized Israel and, generally, supported its existence (despite their populations' general distaste for the Israel/Palestine situation).

But the past few months have made these governments' support of Israel a politically risky gambit. Public outrage towards the deadly pre-election Gaza offensive, settlement-building in Jerusalem, and the recent raid on a supply flotilla trying to break the Gaza blockade have further soured perceptions of Israel. Its image as an aggressive, revisionist state is growing somewhat stronger.

The US must play carefully. If it comes out to support Israeli action, it may encourage the Arabs to unite to deter Israel from further action in Gaza, the West Bank, southern Lebanon, or (potentially) Iran. If these states united against Israel, they might start feeling strong enough to oppose the US (rather than begrudgingly embracing it). The United States' interest is in keeping the Middle East divided and internally distracted--not united and outward-looking.

If the Israeli government does not change the tenor of its policies, it may begin to become a liability to the US. The US, in response, would try to distance itself publicly, while placing pressure on Israel to move towards peace negotiations.

In the near future, look either for a major shift in Israeli policy towards Gaza and Jerusalem, or a gradual (but noticeable) distancing of relations between the US and Israel, as the US tries to prevent a unity coalition from arising in the Middle East.

Untangling the Korean Peninsula Conflict

Mystery shrouds the current Korean Peninsula conflict about as much as it shrouds the North Korean government itself. A few readers have asked me, "what the heck is going on up there? Why the heck did North Korea attack South Korea?" Good question! It had me thinking & reading for a bit.

Why did the North Koreans sink the Cheoan?

There's no clear answer for this. The government officially denies doing it (which is not surprising), but it seems a relatively irrational thing to do. To understand the most likely possibility, one must understand the politics of North Korea. At least a bit.

Like most dictatorships, North Korea's government is propped up by elites (in this case, primarily military elites). And, like all governments, they faction. Long story short, Kim is old & frail, he's picked a potentially weak successor, and an opposition faction is likely trying to make a play for power. If South Korea had retaliated, chaos would ensue (North Korea would be caught unprepared for a war), and an opposition faction would have a much stronger opportunity to seize power from Kim (and likely quickly declare an end to the war by being a new regime).



As such, the coup likely failed. Whether there has been a purge is probably going to be unclear, but North Korea's lack of followup to the attack (and lack of military readiness at the time of the attack) both indicate that it was not an order from the top, but rather an order from much lower on the chain of command--likely meaning some attempt at insubordination.

What the heck are the Chinese doing in response?

Another good question! China's response seems to be arbitrarily contradictory. By inviting Kim to Beijing (and leaning towards "no" on international reprimand in the UN Security Council), China is taking a major international hit... in particular with South Korea and the United States, two of its biggest trading partners. China seems to be encouraging North Korean aggression.

But after a conference with China, Secretary of State Clinton came out speaking surprisingly rosy about China. Why?

Again, we must think of Chinese politics. In a Korean Peninsula war, what does China have to lose? It cannot and will not send troops or supplies to assist North Korea, and with the help of Japan and the United States, South Korea would rout the North Korean army (though Seoul would likely take serious damage in the meantime). China would be stuck with a collapsed North Korea, and an angry (and rather economically devastated) South Korea. The collapsed North Korea would send millions of starving, brainwashed refugees into northern China--a disaster that China is not prepared to face.

China's greatest concern in Korea is stability. It cannot afford a collapsed regime. This explains its stance--first, by inviting Kim to Beijing, China makes it clear to any opposition that Beijing will back Kim's faction, and help it keep power. Beijing was also likely able to get reassurances from Kim that he will purge the aggressive opposition, and also refrain from further provocations of South Korea... at least for the time being. China must also restrain from doing too much to anger Kim, lest Kim feel isolated and threatened. By befriending Kim, China gives Kim some security, allowing Kim to refrain from any foolish lashings out. Secretary Clinton understands this position, and thus was able to express confidence that China would effectively help prevent war in the Koreas.

What will happen from here?
South Korea cut off trade with North Korea, and North Korea followed by severing all diplomatic and communication ties with South Korea, and put its army on full readiness. South Korea further retaliated by opening up propaganda messaging into North Korea, and participating in anti-submarine drills with the United States. The Sunshine Policy is over.

For now, the conflict will drive South Korea (to some extent) away from China and towards the US/Japan. South Korea will seek stability in US strength. China will show North Korea that it is ready to defend North Korea from internal threats, but will not support it in a war against South Korea--North Korea's only rational recourse would be peace.

North Korea will desperately attempt to retain face by growing increasingly perturbed over accusations that it carried out the attack. It will accuse the South Koreans of setting up the attack themselves to provoke a war (sounds far fetched as an accusation, but many Americans think the same of the 9/11 attacks).

As far as war, I think it is unlikely. Neither country has a serious interest in it. Sino-American relations will not be particularly strained by this, but China will see any actions against North Korea as being a favor to the US (stacked on top of any favors that China does for the US with respect to Iran).

The Peninsula's best hope of a reemergence of peace might, unfortunately, be the death of Kim and a new regime leader.