The Good Cop/Bad Cop Game in the Middle East

There is a pattern to policies in the Middle East going on, and it is beginning to look like the work of not competing polities struggling for power, but a quiet agreement and cooperation that looks primed to make peace in the Middle East look like a vague possibility for the the first time in a long time. I believe that Bush, Sarkozy, and Brown are playing a Good Cop/Bad Cop game with respect to Iran and all important regional players involved, that might just get things to go their way.

We should note that Iran's most significant lever of power is through its support of regional terrorist/political organizations: In Iraq, Al-Sadr and Shiite militias. In Lebanon, Hezbollah. In Palestine, Hamas. Iran's primary polity ally in the region continues to be Syria, which still exercizes great influence over Lebanon. Iran does have long-range missiles, but Israel is their only possible target, and Israel is bristling with anti-missile interceptor technology. Iran can't afford to start an air-war with Israel--the combined Israeli-US air forces are not accessible to Iran by land or sea, and would be able to retaliate--with terrifying effects--mostly unadultered. If Iran was actually going to fire its missiles at Israel, it might have to be prepared to try to invade Iraq.

But Iran's primary lever of power has taken serious blows lately. In Iraq, Al-Sadr and other Shiite groups are at peace with the central government after months of raids and negotiations. Iran is trying to rein them in, because it is seeing it is unlikely to win the victory it wants in Iraq, so it is likely taking the victory it can get--a democratic, but Shiite-dominated state. The US and Iran are likely to open diplomatic posts in each others' countries, but mostly as signs of goodwill in their Iraq negotiations. Iraq, believe it or not, is mostly in cleanup-mode at this point.

Syria is primed to jump Iran's ship--its inclusin into Club Med, peace talks with Israel, and ambassadorial relationship with Lebanon means it is suddenly reaching in a very pro-West manner, after decades of jihadist rhetoric and isolation, not to mention support of anti-Israeli terror groups and former invasions of Israel. It looks like all of this is about to change. And that means...

Hezbollah will lose one of its primary benefactors. Syria's lack of cooperation will even make it difficult for Iran to support the southern-Lebanese terror group, and Syrian support for the current Lebanese government will likely decrease the popularity of Hezbollah as a political force.

Syria's recognition of Israel, and peace with it, will strike another blow to the legitimacy of the Hamas terror front's fight for a Palestinian state that replaces the entire Israeli one. The more that the Middle East lines up behind Abbas and the two-state strategy, the more hopeless Hamas' political goals will become, and they will be relegated to the realm of extremists in the minds of fellow Muslim Arabs, causing them to lose cash and political support.

All this means that Iran will have very little to threaten Western interests with, if it all works out. A weak Hamas, Hezbollah, and Iraq Shiite movement will mean it can't threaten to shake up Israel, Lebanon, or Iraq at a moment's notice. Without that power, Western and pro-Western states will raise eyebrows when Iran uses brinksmanship instead of cooperation as its means of convincing other states to do what it wants. This is certainly the "good" scenario of the current situation, but how did we get here?

Bad Cop: Of course, George Bush, doing what he does best, has put a lot of fear into a lot of folks that might otherwise feel comfortable. For example: although war with Iran has now become more clearly a psychological tactic to cause the Iranians to lose confidence in their president, this years-long psywar has fooled even the American media into worrying that US troops were about to leap into Iran (even though the military deployment in Iraq and carrier deployment around the world showed no evidence of that ever being the case). Conservatives and moderates in Iran, alike, have started to get very worried bout their president's brinksmanship with an American president known for making quick decisions and sending military forces against good advice. Even now, Israeli planes are flying over the mediterranean and over Iraq, making clear that they are practicing for a strike on Iran. Bush is leading calls for sanctions against Iran in the UN. Bush's hard line against anything resembling terror has lost him respect, but has made those that support terror think twice.

Good Cop: Nicholas Sarkozy, great French diplomat, president of the EU. His elaborate diplomatic blitz early in his career patched up relations with the US, UK, and Germany in a very short period of time. Even the Russians are a bit warm to him, even if the Chinese aren't. He is now courting the Syrians--who are probably the biggest remaining key to the entire situation in Israel/Lebanon/Palestine--in a truly fantastic, Romanesque way. He has invited them to Club Med, given his support to peace talks with Israel, and even held the Syrian president as a guest of honor at Bastille Day, depsite the fact that this raised a few eyebrows in his own country. Syria is responding well to Sarkozy's courting, and if Syria acts well, the dominoes may begin to fall.

Where does Brown fit into all this? By giving his goodwill. The UK's massive military and political power could be put to use here, but they are mostly being kept in check. The UK doesn't want to play bad cop, and can't afford to play good cop due to having so many troops in Iraq. Brown likely gave his permission for Club Med, and is likely exercizing his political strengh to silence people like Merkel, who are most likely to object. The Big Three are working in concert, as they had the potential to as soon as the French and British elections had happened, and each his doing his own part.

Sarkozy's carrots to Bush's sticks are making cooperation a very tempting alternative. One can imagine Assad's eyes light up during his visit to France on Bastille Day, when Sarkozy told him "This is what the cool kids get."

Al-Sadr Joins The Forces of Order

As you probably know, forces of the Al-Sadr militia, the Mahdi Army, got into a tussle with Iraqi Security Forces in Basra and Sadr City last week. Days of fighting have left over 100 dead, and a bad taste in the mouths of the residents of these areas. The Iraqi Security Forces showed prowess and achieved a military victory over the Mahdi Army forces, but it was Al-Sadr that ended the fighting with offers of peace and cooperation, painting himself as peace-maker and patriot.

The reason for his decision is complicated. Stratfor believes Iran has been a large factor in Al-Sadr's decision, and that there may be a greater pact for joint progress on Iraqi Security. Bush called this fight a "defining moment" for the future of Iraqi Security, but the ultimate conclusion may have been a defining moment in a way that he could have never guessed--and may mean an end to the adversarial positioning that the US and Iran have been going through for years.

After six days of fighting, Al-Sadr called his forces to leave the streets. He refused to give up arms, as the Iraqi government demanded, but kept vehemently to the cease-fire he called 9 months ago, and has claimed “Anyone carrying a weapon and targeting government institutions will not be one of us.” He has not only pledged not to fight, but to work together with the Iraqi government: "We have decided to withdraw from the streets of Basra and all other provinces... [and to] cooperate with the government to achieve security.” This is a long stretch from his previous anti-government sentiment, vowing to fight them for their cooperation with American imperialists.

Stratfor believes the renewed calls of cooperation and peace come in part due to Iranian pressure on Al-Sadr. Al-Sadr and the Iranian government likely depend each other for mutual security; Iran is looking for a Shiite-dominated Iraq that will never pose a security risk to it again (given the terror of the Iran-Iraq war of the late 1980's), and Al-Sadr needs outside support to secure his base in Iraq.

But the agreement seems very pro-American, and we must consider why each party seems to be agreeing:

Iran: President Ahmadinejad visited Iraq last month, proclaiming friendliness and cooperation between both governments. Certainly, Ahmadinejad had security on his mind; Iran wants neither an adversarial Iraq nor a refugee or terror problem. How much military meddling Iran is doing to hedge its bets is unclear, but Stratfor believes there may have been a secret US-Iran meeting in Baghdad to talk security concessions--Iran may have given a commitment to helping stabilize the Iraqi government for US concessions in both ceasing action against rival Shiite factions (which have remained fractured for years) and making military and UN resolution moves against the Iranians. Why now? Victory by Ahmadinejad's allies may be pressing his hand to act and achieve regional victory quickly. Finally, Iran may now be a committed advocate of Iraqi security; a dark ally that the US desperately needs as its era of troop presences draws to a close.

Mahdi Army: Al-Sadr's military defeats pressed his hand, in part; there was a danger of a strangle on his power base by the Iraqi Security Forces. But there are two other issues that made this choice easy for Al-Sadr. First, as an ally of the Iraqi government and people, Al-Sadr will enjoy support from the government and its security forces, on top of virtual immunity for his gathering of military and political forces. He may even be winning popular support for seemingly sacrificing his own power to achieve Iraqi unity. His power struggle with other Shiite factions in the south remains broiling, and as an ally of the government and people, he may be tapped as the Shiite leader that will unite the sect. But second, the Iranians may well have levied heavy pressure on Al-Sadr to make him step down for good and put aside his pride in favor of a long-term strategy.

Iraqi Government and Washington: The Iraqi government needs stability as it tries to create political unity and reconciliation. With the Al-Sadr militia on its side, it should be able to quell the anger of the restive southern Shiite regions, and Al-Sadr's Mahdi Army will become an asset, rather than a liability--this way, Iraqi Security Forces should be able to concentrate the bulk of their effort on pursuing Al-Qaeda and securing Baghdad. This advancement will become critical as US forces draw down both this summer and next winter (in particular if a Democrat wins the US election).

This new deal seems like one, long-term, that can help everyone involved. Furthermore, it ties in the security interests of the Mahdi Army, the Iraqi Government, and the Iranian leadership. I am a raging optimist, but this readjustment by the Mahdi Army and Iranian government is an excellent sign for the future security of Iraq.

Al-Sadr Has a Hitchcock-Like Flair for Suspense

Cleric Moqtada Al-Sadr (that handsome gentleman pictured below) has extended his ceasefire in a most last-minute way today. With the previous ceasefire with US and Iraqi forces (set six months ago) due to expire Sunday, the Cleric was making very few noises as to whether or not he would continue it further. US Analysts were baffled as to whether he would continue the ceasefire or not... in large part due to the fact that nobody is quite sure what Al-Sadr wants. But extend it he did, and there are lessons to be drawn from today's news.





Al-Sadr seems to have first declared a ceasefire because the Mahdi Army (his personal militant group) was in trouble. They had started fighting with other Shiite groups, and got pretty beat up in the process, back in July. He hoped to reorganize, regroup, and bring a newfound discipline to the army before deciding what to do next.

At the time, it seemed that he wasn't prepared to start working together with American or pro-American elements in Iraq. His rhetoric remained strong. Despite this, American military and political officials praised his decision, and (sortof) implicitly pardoned the Mahdi Army (though there have since been arrests, much to Al-Sadr's chagrin). The current extension comes with little public reasoning, other than commitments to peaceful vanquishing of Allah's enemies (the US), as well as the intruders (US), invaders (US), infidels (yeah, you get the idea), and the like.

The US army is extremely appreciative of the move. With sharp positive trends in Iraqi security over the past six months, Al-Sadr's ceasefire has given the Multi-National Force and Iraqi Army time to build infrastructure, to consolidate security in other hot spots, and, most importantly, win the support and trust of Iraqi civilians. If Al-Sadr's army, presumably rebuilt, resumed operations, much of the "delicate" (as Gen. Petraeus consistently calls it) progress could start to fall apart.

Why did Al-Sadr extend the ceasefire, particularly if it helps the United States' goals? These are some of my speculations, but it is likely to be one or more of these:

1) The US is giving him immunity in return. With US and Iraqi troop levels still high, an end to peace could do more damage to the Mahdi army than to the US. American troop levels are likely to decline after the summer, and Al-Sadr may try to be patient and take better opportunities, later. In addition, the US is respecting the ceasefire, and may have even decided not to arrest or kill him if given the opportunity, which will largely allow him to power-grab in the Shiite regions of Iraq unmolested.

2) The Mahdi army is not yet rebuilt.
It's possible Al-Sadr is dissatisfied with the progress of the last six months, and thinks the next six months will bring about more. Alliances or deals with other groups may still be in the works. Either way, it's possible he is anticipating the Army's strength growing.

3) Al-Sadr's plan has backfired, and he has lost support. This is the most interesting possibility. The Mahdi army did very well in part due to the fact that it could provide security when American and Iraqi forces could not; Mahdi Army agents patrolled neighborhoods and protected civilians in return for monetary or other support. Because Al-Sadr declared a ceasefire during the surge, security improved very quickly as US troops became more present in urban neighborhoods. With the Mahdi army gone and US and Iraqi troops happy to provide security (and effectively) for free, support for the Mahdi army among many of their former patrons may have declined. Radical Shiites may not amongst themselves own enough resources to make the Mahdi army as strong as it once was. Given this, extended peace may be Al-Sadr's only good plan.

Lessons: What US policymakers should learn from this move is that militant groups can be dealt with in ways other than military. Al-Sadr may not be in much contact with Multi-National Forces, but there is some, and communication between both groups has passed through public hearings and press conferences; Al-Sadr may have to talk tough, but the careful listener can often hear where he is willing to make deals.

Sometimes, making deals with militant groups is key; fighting them all at once has proven impossible in Iraq, and similar efforts will yield similar results in future conflicts. We have learned that some Muslim extremists are more reasonable than others; some have real, tangible political goals, and those goals can be bargained with, like with any political group with an army. We must distinguish between Al-Qaeda-like groups (whose goals, like "Death to America," cannot be discussed or bargained), and groups like the Mahdi Army, whose political goals may cost us less to help than to hinder.

Hopefully, this cease-fire will help Petraeus and the Multi-National Forces shore up the security situation in Iraq over the next six months. Now, we just have to wait for the Iraqi parliament to start meeting more of those benchmarks.

Why and How Peace is in Iraq's Hands

This article will address two very important US national security concepts:
1) Why our assessment of the Iraqi ground situation is wrong.
2) How the Iraqis are trying to fix it (and why it might just work).

Part I: Misconceptions

First, our assessment of the ground situation. The fundamental judgments we have made (either as a government or a population) about the military and political situation in Iraq are largely wrong. Although the civilian population does not make policy, they will elect executive and legislative politicians that share their ideas, and pressure other politicians to follow their will. This is usually a good thing-- except in foreign policy, where civilians do not have access to some information, and do not pay attention to the rest.

The first fundamental assumption that many have is that we made a mistake in invading because Democracy cannot work in Islamic states. There are many examples to the contrary: Lebanon, Turkey, Egypt, Yemen, Syria, and Indonesia (the world's largest Muslim country) all have elected Republics of some sort. It can be done.

The second is that anti-Americanism is the primary problem in Iraq. It's true that two significant anti-American militia groups exist in Iraq (Cleric Al-Sadr leads one, the other is Al-Qaeda in Iraq). But the judgment that these are our biggest problem, or that our departure will cause them to stop being problems, is dangerous. The reason these militias exist is not simply due to an overwhelming hate of Americans. Because the Iraqi government is weak and unable to provide military security to its people, citizens depend on militias. The primary reason the Iraqi government is so weak is the nature of citizen's loyalties to their Sunni and Shiite sects, instead of the Iraqi state (this is covered in my previous article). Al-Sadr's militia, as well as the Al-Qaeda terrorists in the country, are likely to lose support if its citizens have a strong government that will provide them the security they need. The Iraqi people in general do not want Al-Qaeda in Iraq-- the organization attacks citizens, and is the focus of the American military. No working government, however anti-American, gives Al-Qaeda harbor or support, because the organization will bring them far too much grief from the west. The best way to get rid of these anti-American groups is to help the Iraqi government establish itself and strengthen security for the Iraqi people. The dangerous thinking that anti-Americanism is the source of Iraq's problems is that those that think it will drive the American military to leave Iraq prematurely, before helping the government establish security, and these anti-American organizations will remain.

If we do leave, and that does cause a decrease in security for the Iraqi people, the country's fighting may get worse. The Saudis have hinted that they will fund the Sunni minority militias in Iraq, and Iran is likely to support the militias of the only other major Shiite-majority country in the world. Pulling out early is likely a mistake.

Part II: Hope.

Yes, hope.

No matter how many political ideas the Untied States government or think tanks can produce, the Iraqi people and government must find a solution themselves-- Iraq is not an American puppet state. We can help, but we cannot fix this ourselves.

But it seems Iraq is about to take a subtle, but extremely important first step towards peace, independent of the Americans. One of the greatest disruptors in Iraq has been cleric Al-Sadr, his militia, and his political bloc. He is not only vehemently anti-American, but has also waged war against the Sunni militias for years. He has control of a powerful political bloc in the ruling Iraqi coalition. In fact, Maliki, the Prime Minister of Iraq, has depended on Al-Sadr's political support for his office. Maliki has refused to pressure al-Sadr's militia to halt its civilian attacks, and in doing so has shown that al-Sadr is free to do what he pleases, and free to manipulate the government.

But many Shiites, as well as Sunnis and Kurds, have grown tired of Maliki and al-Sadr, and are forming a new coalition. This coalition, unlike the current Shiite coalition, will have to cater to the needs of all three sectarian groups to stay in power, and will choose a Prime Minister that will have to enact cross-sectarian policies that may help reduced the need for a cross-sectarian power struggle. This new coalition would oust Maliki and wrest power from al-Sadr. In response, al-Sadr may lay down arms for a full month, according to anonymous close aides. If these two events happen near the same time, the government may have a brief opportunity to get itself upon its feet. It may be the beginning of a realization between many Sunnis and Shiites that cooperation in Iraq is necessary for survival.