Hot off the presses, just for you, a paper I just finished for Barry Posen. It's called "Reasserting Control: Could China Conquer Taiwan?"
I decided to write it after reading a handful of academic campaign analyses on just the same thing that resoundingly concluded "no," but used a series of hogwash arguments that either lacked detail or chose assumptions and scenarios that arbitrarily favored the Taiwanese. My analysis decides that if China is able to pull off a coordinated missile, bomber, and fighter/ground-attack (FGA) attack on Taiwanese airbases and C4I centers, it can gain an advantage in the air war, and possibly establish air dominance. After that, it's a matter of using its submarines to pin Taiwanese ships in port to open up the way for an amphibious assault. Though amphibious assault landing ships are limited, China could combine its elite marines with an all-out airborne assault on a single point of attack near a port city in the north to establish a beachhead, and then reinforce the beachhead with a "Million-man swim:" an operation that would involve shipping as many as hundreds of thousands of Chinese troops on commercial fishing vessels and making them swim to shore in what amounts to a very wet airborne-style operation, which is only feasible under the protection of a secure beachhead, air superiority, and sea superiority.
After taking and reinforcing the beachhead, the Chinese would have a short march to Taipei, and with the assistance of tactical interdiction on the part of the Chinese PLA Air Force, Chinese troops could break through and race to the city, where they would fight Taiwanese troops in brutal urban warfare. The award-winning training of China's more elite small units, as well as renowned toughness and grit, would give China the advantage it needed in taking the city. With Taipei in hand, China could stop and defend its spoils, having dislodged the Republic of China government.
The full paper explains in detail each step of the hypothetical operation, and uses the conclusions of the analysis to guide future US, Taiwanese, or Chinese military policy. I encourage at least a skim-through.
http://web.mit.edu/efogg/Public/taiwan.pdf
Showing posts with label America. Show all posts
Showing posts with label America. Show all posts
Tuesday, May 8, 2007
Sunday, March 25, 2007
Iran Moves In for the Kill
Since the Islamic revolution of 1979, Iran has hated the United States. The end of the revolution wrought what was indeed a bad day for American flags in Tehran, as the American-backed government was fully overthrown. Iran's history from then is interesting, with their only significant war coming from the invasion of Hussein's Iraq in 1980. The war lasted 8 years, and Hussein's army inflicted 500,000+ casualties and USD 350 Billion in damage to the Iranians, in large part with mustard and nerve gas. The Iranians emerged from this war quite bitter, having felt teamed up against by just about everyone in the world. Iraq received weapons and support from many countries-- the highest number of weapons coming from France, China, and the Soviet Union. Even the United States provided political support and some helicopters (proving once and for all that the defeat of Iran seemed to be the only thing the Americans and Soviets could agree upon). Coming out of the war broken, but sovereign, the Iranians were rather pissed-- and bent on beefing up their military capabilities.
These days, the Iranians don't spend much on their own military, but still boast 550,000 troops, including the elite al-Quds. They have American F-14 Tomcats (provided before the revolution), as well as a large stock of Russian-provided weapons, and short-range ballistic missiles. But as the Iran-Iraq war showed us, Iran's home-field advantage would make it extremely difficult to invade. American forces' technological superiority would give them an advantage, but they're tied up with Iran's neighbors. And it's this tie-up that has given Iran the opportunity it needs to do something about being so angry at everyone all the time.
Not only is Iran angry about the United States' existence, but it is one of the few countries left in the world still trying to drive Israel into the sea (or, as it's written by President Ahmadinejad, "wipe Israel from the map." There's lots of good angry stuff at intelligence.org: http://www.intelligence.org.il/eng/sib/4_04/as_iran.htm). With the United States in Afghanistan and Iraq, (with alliances of sorts in Pakistan, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia) Iran has been feeling a bit surrounded. Not only that, but the fundamentalist theocratic government has had an opportunity to quell a lot of old unrest by uniting its people against the Zionists and the Great Satan. Iran's reaction to the United States and Israel cramping its style has not been to cow, but to flex its muscles. And Iran's government is starting to realize it can really do whatever it wants.
On the list of Iran's diabolical plans for the Middle East:
1) Develop a nuclear weapons program. They're not fooling anyone. The wildly disparate UN Security Council continually agrees that Iran's "peaceful" nuclear power program covers a clandestine weapons program. It doesn't help that Iran's also developing "peaceful" medium range, nuclear-capable ballistic missiles. Having nuclear weapons would give Iran a leg up in its efforts in achieving objective number two...
2) Wipe Israel off the map. Nothing too new, but angrier than ever. President Ahmadinejad seems to have brought a whole new level to Iran's anti-Israeli hate. No real clashes yet... unless you count the unprovoked capture of soldiers and then rocket-bombing of civilians last summer by Iranian-trained, -funded, and -backed Hezbollah militants in southern Lebanon. But the consensus seems to be to blame Israel for that war anyway. Iran may not have driven Israel off the map with that effort, but Hezbollah emerged stronger than ever, and the Iranian government wouldn't be crazy to think that Israel lacks a great deal of political support these days, which might very well mean that Israel would think twice about a pre-emptive attack against a mobilizing Iranian army. Iran's strange alliance with Sunni-dominated Syria remains strong, perhaps only due to shared anti-Israeli sentiment. More strangely, this alliance hasn't been hampered by objective the third...
3) Win the war in Iraq and establish Shi'ite dominance in the region. Remember, Iran is a hard-line theocracy, and Sunni Muslims, while not as bad as Americans or Jews, still find a place on the hit list. Iran has clearly been funding the stronger Shi'ite militias in Iraq, hoping that they will triumph in the war and finally make Iraq a strong Iranian ally. The US invasion of Iraq has proved an opportunity for Iran to bring the only other large Shi'ite dominated country into its axis. If Iran can secure Iraq, it becomes a highly formidable force, and in time, could become an uncontested regional force. The US military and intelligence have found Iranian soldiers in Iraq, as well as evidence of their elite al-Quds infiltrating Baghdad and other hot spots.
And Iran hasn't stopped there. Until recently, they have kept to subversion and proxy fighting against the west. But now, they've taken another big step, and gotten aggressive. The capture and holding of 15 British troops has brought Iran into the war for real, as much as nobody really wants to admit it. This crisis puts Iran in a hugely advantageous position-- The Iranians understand that Britain values the lives of these 15 soldiers, and they now act as a powerful negotiating tool for the Iranians to get what they want. Britain, and the coalition in general, have been put in a very tough position.
Iran will continue its bold moves to take power in the region. It won't dismantle its nuclear program. It won't stop funding Hezbollah. It won't stop interfering in Iraq, and it won't give back British troops until it gets something very valuable in return. Iran feels emboldened, and invincible. This is mostly because no single group or alliance has both the will and the capability to invade. With the United States and Britain tied up in Afghanistan and Iraq, and their will for war depleting rapidly, Iran's two greatest enemies are all but out of the military picture. The next-largest militaries, France and Germany, surely won't consider invasion as a means for fixing Iran's behavior. Ever-confident that it can make move after move to shape the region as it wants, Iran knows that as long as none of its actions are too extreme, nobody will muster the will to do anything about it. This drip-by-drip escalation was mastered by Germany in the 1930's, and Iran may manage to stay far enough under the radar to see long-term success in its hopes for both an active nuclear weapons program and hegemonic dominance over the region.
But only if we decide to continue not to do anything about it.
These days, the Iranians don't spend much on their own military, but still boast 550,000 troops, including the elite al-Quds. They have American F-14 Tomcats (provided before the revolution), as well as a large stock of Russian-provided weapons, and short-range ballistic missiles. But as the Iran-Iraq war showed us, Iran's home-field advantage would make it extremely difficult to invade. American forces' technological superiority would give them an advantage, but they're tied up with Iran's neighbors. And it's this tie-up that has given Iran the opportunity it needs to do something about being so angry at everyone all the time.
Not only is Iran angry about the United States' existence, but it is one of the few countries left in the world still trying to drive Israel into the sea (or, as it's written by President Ahmadinejad, "wipe Israel from the map." There's lots of good angry stuff at intelligence.org: http://www.intelligence.org.il/eng/sib/4_04/as_iran.htm). With the United States in Afghanistan and Iraq, (with alliances of sorts in Pakistan, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia) Iran has been feeling a bit surrounded. Not only that, but the fundamentalist theocratic government has had an opportunity to quell a lot of old unrest by uniting its people against the Zionists and the Great Satan. Iran's reaction to the United States and Israel cramping its style has not been to cow, but to flex its muscles. And Iran's government is starting to realize it can really do whatever it wants.
On the list of Iran's diabolical plans for the Middle East:
1) Develop a nuclear weapons program. They're not fooling anyone. The wildly disparate UN Security Council continually agrees that Iran's "peaceful" nuclear power program covers a clandestine weapons program. It doesn't help that Iran's also developing "peaceful" medium range, nuclear-capable ballistic missiles. Having nuclear weapons would give Iran a leg up in its efforts in achieving objective number two...
2) Wipe Israel off the map. Nothing too new, but angrier than ever. President Ahmadinejad seems to have brought a whole new level to Iran's anti-Israeli hate. No real clashes yet... unless you count the unprovoked capture of soldiers and then rocket-bombing of civilians last summer by Iranian-trained, -funded, and -backed Hezbollah militants in southern Lebanon. But the consensus seems to be to blame Israel for that war anyway. Iran may not have driven Israel off the map with that effort, but Hezbollah emerged stronger than ever, and the Iranian government wouldn't be crazy to think that Israel lacks a great deal of political support these days, which might very well mean that Israel would think twice about a pre-emptive attack against a mobilizing Iranian army. Iran's strange alliance with Sunni-dominated Syria remains strong, perhaps only due to shared anti-Israeli sentiment. More strangely, this alliance hasn't been hampered by objective the third...
3) Win the war in Iraq and establish Shi'ite dominance in the region. Remember, Iran is a hard-line theocracy, and Sunni Muslims, while not as bad as Americans or Jews, still find a place on the hit list. Iran has clearly been funding the stronger Shi'ite militias in Iraq, hoping that they will triumph in the war and finally make Iraq a strong Iranian ally. The US invasion of Iraq has proved an opportunity for Iran to bring the only other large Shi'ite dominated country into its axis. If Iran can secure Iraq, it becomes a highly formidable force, and in time, could become an uncontested regional force. The US military and intelligence have found Iranian soldiers in Iraq, as well as evidence of their elite al-Quds infiltrating Baghdad and other hot spots.
And Iran hasn't stopped there. Until recently, they have kept to subversion and proxy fighting against the west. But now, they've taken another big step, and gotten aggressive. The capture and holding of 15 British troops has brought Iran into the war for real, as much as nobody really wants to admit it. This crisis puts Iran in a hugely advantageous position-- The Iranians understand that Britain values the lives of these 15 soldiers, and they now act as a powerful negotiating tool for the Iranians to get what they want. Britain, and the coalition in general, have been put in a very tough position.
Iran will continue its bold moves to take power in the region. It won't dismantle its nuclear program. It won't stop funding Hezbollah. It won't stop interfering in Iraq, and it won't give back British troops until it gets something very valuable in return. Iran feels emboldened, and invincible. This is mostly because no single group or alliance has both the will and the capability to invade. With the United States and Britain tied up in Afghanistan and Iraq, and their will for war depleting rapidly, Iran's two greatest enemies are all but out of the military picture. The next-largest militaries, France and Germany, surely won't consider invasion as a means for fixing Iran's behavior. Ever-confident that it can make move after move to shape the region as it wants, Iran knows that as long as none of its actions are too extreme, nobody will muster the will to do anything about it. This drip-by-drip escalation was mastered by Germany in the 1930's, and Iran may manage to stay far enough under the radar to see long-term success in its hopes for both an active nuclear weapons program and hegemonic dominance over the region.
But only if we decide to continue not to do anything about it.
Friday, February 2, 2007
China's Taiwan Dilemma
The Republic of China is a problem that the People's Republic of China government has tried to resolve since its inception in 1949. On the other hand, the People's Republic of China is a problem the Republic of China government has tried to resolve since its inception in 1949. The relationship between the two entities has varied wildly in the past 57 years, edging occasionally towards conflict and the brink of war.
Taiwan has been an incredibly complex issue for the United States, as well. From 1949 to 1971, the United States backed the Republic of China (run by the exile KMT government on Taiwan) as the legitimate government of all of China. In the 1950's and 60's, The People's Republic (headed by the CCP on the mainland) made moves towards war, using backyard iron works to produce shells designed to fly over the strait. China lacked the military material and technology to mount an offensive, but was able to solidify its threats when it tested atomic and thermonuclear bombs.
In 1971, the United States and China turned fully around. Nixon and Kissinger's various envoys to China brought recognition from the United States of the CCP as the legitimate government of all of China, and new diplomacy and trade. (Contrary to the belief of many, the United States does not officially recognize the KMT government.)The United States insisted that China's resolution with Taiwan be "peaceful," and it would not allow war. China and the US grew closer, but strains over Taiwan remained.
In the 1990's, strains over Taiwan became crises. In 1994, the Republican-majority congress put pressure on the Clinton administration to take Taiwan-friendly steps, including allowing a visit from its prime minister. In 1996 and 1998, China put forth aggressive confrontational efforts to intimidate Taiwan, firing missiles into the oceans near Taiwan's largest port cities, causing panic and economic recession. The United States twice responded by sending aircraft carrier fleets to Taiwan to assert its dedication to maintaining peaceful relations across the strait.
The People's Republic of China's policy firmly remains that Taiwan is rightfully a region of China, and that the Republic of China government of Taiwan is in exile. All but a few of the world's countries explicitly recognize the People's Republic and not the Republic of China as the legitimate ruler of China, and do not hold official diplomatic ties with Taiwan. The People's Republic has touted "one country, two systems" as a peaceful method of reuniting the two states.
Understandably, many Taiwanese are not particularly enthusiastic about the idea. The pan-green coalition currently rules Taiwan, and strongly leads towards eventually making Taiwan an independent state. Although Washington does not publicly support the idea, and Beijing has threatened invasion on multiple accounts if Taiwan were to declare indepdendence, Taiwan may have a brief window where the PRC's power position is weak.
Beijing, in striving for modernity, has sought the acceptance of the international community into great power status. Its most recent great symbol of modernity shall be the 2008 Olympics, held in Beijing. To this end, the PRC has striven to impress the international community by pouring resources into cleaning up public streets, fixing bad English on signs, etc. Statues and heavy internal advertising, touting the coming Olympic games, are all over the country. The People's Republic sees the successful operation of the 2008 Olympics to be a great symbol of China's vaulting into modernity. Anything to either hinder these Olympics or undermine the good press to come from them would likely be avoided if at all possible. The Chinese, therefore, are going to be very wary about making military action against Taiwan as those Olympics approach.
Knowing this, the Taiwanese politicians may be mulling a possible independence bid. To make matters more interesting, Taiwanese elections will likely be held in early 2008 (the Taiwanese do not set the date until late), and President Chen is a lame-duck. As such, he has some freedom to make possibly controversial measures, and he already has in the past. In 2006, he disbanded the Reunification Committee in Taiwan, symbolizing his lack of dedication in reunification. China was infuriated, but could do little in reaction. A bold Chen may try to set up Taiwan for independence before his term is done.
At the same time, US President George Bush is a late lame-duck, as well. Should Taiwan declare independence, he has the US Pacific Fleet (complete with 2 active aircraft carrier groups) to move to Taiwan and enforce its sovereignty, should he need to. His politics largely hail from the 1990's Republicans that spent many years pressuring the Clinton administration towards diplomatically friendly measures with Taiwan (like allowing the Prime Minister of the ROC to visit), and his style of "Cowboy Diplomacy" makes him unlikely to be too hesitant about deploying the US Navy to accomplish his diplomatic goals. Knowing Bush is on the way out (and suspecting a more militarily restrained executive might follow), the ROC may very well want to take advantage of his diplomatic style.
The chance that Taiwan will declare independence remains low. But parallel events are making the chance that it might happen, and work, more likely. As much as the People's Republic of China may be furious at the idea of an independent Taiwan, US help would put China in a tough place. A direct conflict with the United States would halt critical exports, and would likely bring harsh criticism of the international community. It is this, along with the PRC's deep need for international approval, that is most likely to make them helpless.
Taiwan has been an incredibly complex issue for the United States, as well. From 1949 to 1971, the United States backed the Republic of China (run by the exile KMT government on Taiwan) as the legitimate government of all of China. In the 1950's and 60's, The People's Republic (headed by the CCP on the mainland) made moves towards war, using backyard iron works to produce shells designed to fly over the strait. China lacked the military material and technology to mount an offensive, but was able to solidify its threats when it tested atomic and thermonuclear bombs.
In 1971, the United States and China turned fully around. Nixon and Kissinger's various envoys to China brought recognition from the United States of the CCP as the legitimate government of all of China, and new diplomacy and trade. (Contrary to the belief of many, the United States does not officially recognize the KMT government.)The United States insisted that China's resolution with Taiwan be "peaceful," and it would not allow war. China and the US grew closer, but strains over Taiwan remained.
In the 1990's, strains over Taiwan became crises. In 1994, the Republican-majority congress put pressure on the Clinton administration to take Taiwan-friendly steps, including allowing a visit from its prime minister. In 1996 and 1998, China put forth aggressive confrontational efforts to intimidate Taiwan, firing missiles into the oceans near Taiwan's largest port cities, causing panic and economic recession. The United States twice responded by sending aircraft carrier fleets to Taiwan to assert its dedication to maintaining peaceful relations across the strait.
The People's Republic of China's policy firmly remains that Taiwan is rightfully a region of China, and that the Republic of China government of Taiwan is in exile. All but a few of the world's countries explicitly recognize the People's Republic and not the Republic of China as the legitimate ruler of China, and do not hold official diplomatic ties with Taiwan. The People's Republic has touted "one country, two systems" as a peaceful method of reuniting the two states.
Understandably, many Taiwanese are not particularly enthusiastic about the idea. The pan-green coalition currently rules Taiwan, and strongly leads towards eventually making Taiwan an independent state. Although Washington does not publicly support the idea, and Beijing has threatened invasion on multiple accounts if Taiwan were to declare indepdendence, Taiwan may have a brief window where the PRC's power position is weak.
Beijing, in striving for modernity, has sought the acceptance of the international community into great power status. Its most recent great symbol of modernity shall be the 2008 Olympics, held in Beijing. To this end, the PRC has striven to impress the international community by pouring resources into cleaning up public streets, fixing bad English on signs, etc. Statues and heavy internal advertising, touting the coming Olympic games, are all over the country. The People's Republic sees the successful operation of the 2008 Olympics to be a great symbol of China's vaulting into modernity. Anything to either hinder these Olympics or undermine the good press to come from them would likely be avoided if at all possible. The Chinese, therefore, are going to be very wary about making military action against Taiwan as those Olympics approach.
Knowing this, the Taiwanese politicians may be mulling a possible independence bid. To make matters more interesting, Taiwanese elections will likely be held in early 2008 (the Taiwanese do not set the date until late), and President Chen is a lame-duck. As such, he has some freedom to make possibly controversial measures, and he already has in the past. In 2006, he disbanded the Reunification Committee in Taiwan, symbolizing his lack of dedication in reunification. China was infuriated, but could do little in reaction. A bold Chen may try to set up Taiwan for independence before his term is done.
At the same time, US President George Bush is a late lame-duck, as well. Should Taiwan declare independence, he has the US Pacific Fleet (complete with 2 active aircraft carrier groups) to move to Taiwan and enforce its sovereignty, should he need to. His politics largely hail from the 1990's Republicans that spent many years pressuring the Clinton administration towards diplomatically friendly measures with Taiwan (like allowing the Prime Minister of the ROC to visit), and his style of "Cowboy Diplomacy" makes him unlikely to be too hesitant about deploying the US Navy to accomplish his diplomatic goals. Knowing Bush is on the way out (and suspecting a more militarily restrained executive might follow), the ROC may very well want to take advantage of his diplomatic style.
The chance that Taiwan will declare independence remains low. But parallel events are making the chance that it might happen, and work, more likely. As much as the People's Republic of China may be furious at the idea of an independent Taiwan, US help would put China in a tough place. A direct conflict with the United States would halt critical exports, and would likely bring harsh criticism of the international community. It is this, along with the PRC's deep need for international approval, that is most likely to make them helpless.
Wednesday, December 6, 2006
Federalism in Iraq
Iraq's in civil war, and the US is bogged down in a mess. "Stay the course" has gone out the window, but few ideas have entered the political landscape to replace it. Most of these ideas are military, and include restructuring the police force, adding more US troops, removing US troops, training the Iraqi military, directly striking militia groups, etc.
The only political idea that's popularized by policy-makers is that of asking Iran and Syria for help. Let's be clear that the guys in charge of these countries are not nice guys, and are not our friends. Embracing their help will, at best, give them huge influence in Iraq, or, at worst, backfire completely. But if the situation in Iraq becomes desperate enough, an unholy alliance may look more tempting.
But for now, we explore other political options. To preface my thesis, I am going to make a few assumptions:
1) The fighting between Sunnis and Shiites is a power struggle. That is, they're not just killing each other simply because they're racists, but because each ethnic group has specific needs and political agendas, and they do not want the other ethnic group to impose conflicting political agendas upon them.
2) The key to power in Iraq is currently Baghdad, due to the central nature of the government.
The Shiites and Sunnis may very well be trapped in a cycle in which neither is secure while the other still fights, and neither will stop fighting until it is secure. It will take a drastic military or political intervention to change this. But can we do it without shedding the blood of thousands?
If the fighting really is a power struggle, then we should take away the reason for fighting: take away power from Baghdad. The American Federalist system works by giving the Federal government in Washington limited power over the states, mostly to ensure interstate commerce is smooth, that national defense is strong, and that fundamental freedoms are not infringed. If Iraqi "States," like American states, are set up, each with a large deal of autonomy, it's very possible the desperate power struggle between the Sunnis and the Shiites will decrease. It will be important to be clear that Baghdad is a city not affiliated with any state, like Washington DC.
Above is an image of a three-state Federalist system as proposed by goalsforamericans.org. They ask for a very high degree of decentralization, almost to the extent of separate countries. but I believe that maintaining a strong army run by Baghdad will decrease the incentive for the three regions to go to war.
The states would be divided up largely along ethnic lines, as it's Sunni and Shiite ethnic loyalty that seems to drive the actions of political and militia groups. By giving ethnic states a level of autonomy, they will have secure power, and will be less likely to fight to make sure that their own interests are protected.
We've seen this work in the Kurdish state already. The Kurds have had semi-autonomy for 15 years (since the first Gulf War), and have dealt with it very well. It is the Kurdish semi-autonomous state that is the most peaceful, despite being the least represented in the central government parliament, because its regional power means it does not need command of the central government to feel secure.
There are criticisms of the Federalism idea. The first criticisms are that it addresses the wrong problem; that the ethnic clashes are not politically motivated. This is just untrue. The militia sympathizers boycott elections, walk out of parliament, and make careful political assassinations to try and either protest or gain political advantage. This is not simply racial genocide and carnage.
The second criticism is that Turkey, our allies, would be very upset at the move, as it would invigorate the Kurds in eastern Turkey, and open up the possibility of the formation of a Kurdish state. I find this problem to be largely overplayed. The Kurds simply don't need more autonomy (as their region is so peaceful), and they would be unlikely to get more. In fact, the Kurdish semi-autonomous state should be used as a model for the other two.
Finally, there are fears that an Iraqi three-state program would turn into a mass migration and refugee nightmare like India and Pakistan/Bangladesh when they formed. While many people would likely move between states, this problem is also overplayed. First, American and Iraqi forces would clearly oversee state migrations in the first few months to make sure that the situation remained as peaceful as possible, and so fewer fights are likely to break out. Also, many fewer people would be moving across a border with better infrastructure, so the migration would be faster and easier. It's entirely possible that blood could be shed during this process, but we are clearly not saving lives by doing nothing at all, and the long-term benefits could be the saving grace of Iraq.
Clearly, Turkey's worries and the problems of migration and refugees should not be ignored, but they are relatively small problems compared to the civil war that rages in Iraq today, and could be managed to some degree by coalition and Iraqi forces. Once the migration has occured, the two new states could set up their own constitutions and parliaments, like American states, and begin a sense of self-rule that would bring great political security to all three regions.
Ultimately, the average Iraqi person wants peace. And if the average Iraqi person feels political and military security, he is not going to support dangerous militias that will propogate a civil war that is primarily targeting civilians. But until the Iraqi people have this security, they will fight desperately and bitterly to make sure they get it, and this civil war will rage on, no matter how many troops we have (or don't have) in Iraq.
The only political idea that's popularized by policy-makers is that of asking Iran and Syria for help. Let's be clear that the guys in charge of these countries are not nice guys, and are not our friends. Embracing their help will, at best, give them huge influence in Iraq, or, at worst, backfire completely. But if the situation in Iraq becomes desperate enough, an unholy alliance may look more tempting.
But for now, we explore other political options. To preface my thesis, I am going to make a few assumptions:
1) The fighting between Sunnis and Shiites is a power struggle. That is, they're not just killing each other simply because they're racists, but because each ethnic group has specific needs and political agendas, and they do not want the other ethnic group to impose conflicting political agendas upon them.
2) The key to power in Iraq is currently Baghdad, due to the central nature of the government.
The Shiites and Sunnis may very well be trapped in a cycle in which neither is secure while the other still fights, and neither will stop fighting until it is secure. It will take a drastic military or political intervention to change this. But can we do it without shedding the blood of thousands?
If the fighting really is a power struggle, then we should take away the reason for fighting: take away power from Baghdad. The American Federalist system works by giving the Federal government in Washington limited power over the states, mostly to ensure interstate commerce is smooth, that national defense is strong, and that fundamental freedoms are not infringed. If Iraqi "States," like American states, are set up, each with a large deal of autonomy, it's very possible the desperate power struggle between the Sunnis and the Shiites will decrease. It will be important to be clear that Baghdad is a city not affiliated with any state, like Washington DC.
Above is an image of a three-state Federalist system as proposed by goalsforamericans.org. They ask for a very high degree of decentralization, almost to the extent of separate countries. but I believe that maintaining a strong army run by Baghdad will decrease the incentive for the three regions to go to war.The states would be divided up largely along ethnic lines, as it's Sunni and Shiite ethnic loyalty that seems to drive the actions of political and militia groups. By giving ethnic states a level of autonomy, they will have secure power, and will be less likely to fight to make sure that their own interests are protected.
We've seen this work in the Kurdish state already. The Kurds have had semi-autonomy for 15 years (since the first Gulf War), and have dealt with it very well. It is the Kurdish semi-autonomous state that is the most peaceful, despite being the least represented in the central government parliament, because its regional power means it does not need command of the central government to feel secure.
There are criticisms of the Federalism idea. The first criticisms are that it addresses the wrong problem; that the ethnic clashes are not politically motivated. This is just untrue. The militia sympathizers boycott elections, walk out of parliament, and make careful political assassinations to try and either protest or gain political advantage. This is not simply racial genocide and carnage.
The second criticism is that Turkey, our allies, would be very upset at the move, as it would invigorate the Kurds in eastern Turkey, and open up the possibility of the formation of a Kurdish state. I find this problem to be largely overplayed. The Kurds simply don't need more autonomy (as their region is so peaceful), and they would be unlikely to get more. In fact, the Kurdish semi-autonomous state should be used as a model for the other two.
Finally, there are fears that an Iraqi three-state program would turn into a mass migration and refugee nightmare like India and Pakistan/Bangladesh when they formed. While many people would likely move between states, this problem is also overplayed. First, American and Iraqi forces would clearly oversee state migrations in the first few months to make sure that the situation remained as peaceful as possible, and so fewer fights are likely to break out. Also, many fewer people would be moving across a border with better infrastructure, so the migration would be faster and easier. It's entirely possible that blood could be shed during this process, but we are clearly not saving lives by doing nothing at all, and the long-term benefits could be the saving grace of Iraq.
Clearly, Turkey's worries and the problems of migration and refugees should not be ignored, but they are relatively small problems compared to the civil war that rages in Iraq today, and could be managed to some degree by coalition and Iraqi forces. Once the migration has occured, the two new states could set up their own constitutions and parliaments, like American states, and begin a sense of self-rule that would bring great political security to all three regions.
Ultimately, the average Iraqi person wants peace. And if the average Iraqi person feels political and military security, he is not going to support dangerous militias that will propogate a civil war that is primarily targeting civilians. But until the Iraqi people have this security, they will fight desperately and bitterly to make sure they get it, and this civil war will rage on, no matter how many troops we have (or don't have) in Iraq.
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