A Brief Iraq Update

Maverick that I am, I've decided to bring you all an update on a war that nobody else is really updating for you: Iraq.

It'll be just a brief overview: I've got a lot to do for work. And I'll tell you more about work later (it is very awesome).

Anyway, there's not a whole lot to tell that isn't relatively obvious by the lack of news in the country. Deaths continue a relatively steady (but slow) decline. In December, Coalition deaths totaled 17, the third-lowest month yet (the lowest being 13 deaths). Deaths of Iraqis (related to the war) were 320, higher only than August and November of 2008 (311 and 317, respectively). This month is looking to be the most peaceful yet, with only 2 Coalition deaths do date, and 119 civilian deaths, though a number of events may attract terror attacks. A whopping four provinces are scheduled to be handed over in the next 2 weeks, as detailed in a map that I have modified below:

Iraqi Government Provincial Control, Updated for Jan 2009 (US DoD)

If these handovers go smoothly (which, to be honest, they do most of the time), then deaths should stay down. Provincial elections are on January 31st for all but four provinces, and these are likely to be the target of attacks (though solid security may make this an opportunity to capture militants). After the handover, the Iraqis are in charge everywhere but Baghdad, and US deaths will drop by even more. US costs should drop, too (particularly given incoming president Obama's political need to balance some sliver of spending discipline and bailing-out--he will not be spendthrift on this war).

Iraq's Kurd problem remains, but is resolvable--especially once the last four provinces hold their elections. The more the US can put its power into negotiating between Kurds and Arabs in Iraq, the more likely it is that an agreement can be forged.

Anyway, that's really it. In short, things are mopping up nicely in Iraq, for the moment, and they show no particular signs of falling apart.

Gen. Petraeus to Put US Forces in Back Seat

Before Mr. Obama takes office on the 21st of January, Iraq is going to go through a fair bit of wrapping up. As the DoD map below shows, all but Baghdad (18 of 19 provinces) will have been transitioned to full Iraqi control soon: according to the DoD September Report to Congress, the ceremonies will all happen in early and mid-Jaunary. Baghdad's ceremony will be in May--though it should be noted that its ceremony has been continually pushed back from October 2008.



With Iraqi Security Forces at the front in all of these provinces, Petraeus is likely trying to train them by fire--US forces will be in the back (notably, taking far fewer casualties than when in the front) provoding logistical support and giving advice. This "school for hard-knocks" is going to get Iraqi forces pretty chewed up over the next few months, but it will mean high-speed learning. So far, only a small percentage of Iraqi military forces are capable of full independent operations--logistics, supply, planning, and execution. Most need planning help from the US. Many need US logistics or even military backup. They must wean this dependence by 2011, or they will falter when the US withdraws.

Another reason for the speedy handover is the terms of the Status of Forces Agreement (SoFA). While US forces don't leave until 2011, they have to get off the streets of Iraqi cities and villages by the end of 2009--during 2010 and 2011, US forces can only act at the behest of the Iraqi government. They will continue to train, but will only get militarily involved when the Iraqis need the cavalry to come in.

The handover involves more than military control. It also signals full administrative control on the part of the Iraqis, with the State Department playing a purely supportive role. With Gates remaining head of the DoD and Petraeus keeping his post as head of CENTCOM, Bush appointees will be at the forefront of Iraq's endgame through 2011 (barring anything strange). Obama and Clinton will have surprisingly little influence over the Iraq situation, as policies being made now (namely the SoFA and handover timetables) have mostly sealed any questions on the remaining US role. This will free up the "team of rivals" to deal with more pressing crises--Afghanistan, Pakistan, and India are the main points of worry.

Intrigue and Betrayal at Damascus

The London Times has reported that the Syrian government had approved the US raid within its borders that it is now protesting--but it's a bit more complicated than that.

The Syrians allegedly gave the OK for US commandos to quietly pop in, kidnap a big al-Qaeda leader operating in Syria (that the Syrians sure as heck don't want there), leave, and interrogate him. Clearly, things didn't go to plan, and a number of Syrians died. Now there are pictures of crying family members all over Middle Eastern news.

What can the Damascus government do? They're already taking a fair amount of heat from the more conservative elements of their state for their Westernization efforts--but they've been smart. Their Westernization has been towards less-antagonizing powers like France, and their joining the MedU has allowed them to work with Israel and the European Union under the guise of economic construction. Syria's ties to the West are important mostly because the US is in Iraq--which Syria isn't terribly thrilled about, anyway.

So the operation got botched, and crying Syrian women are on the news--the Syrians, of course, are going to deny that they let such a terrible thing happen. And sure, they didn't really approve the US coming in and shooting people up, that wasn't part of the deal at all. So the Syrians have protested heavily. They've closed the US embassy--at least for now. Quietly, they are probably saying, "Sorry, there is nothing else we can do."

But they're also withdrawing troops from the Iraqi border--which is going to make the border more porous. Early in the war, Syria was quite happy to have a porous Iraqi border--their jihadists and extremists all left to fight and die in Iraq, which was quite fine with them (remember, they're a secular Ba'athist regime). But during the Surge and the Sunni Awakening, Western Iraq became less friendly to al-Qaeda and company--so they all started going back to Syria, so they would have a safe haven from which to conduct operations. Damascus had to finally get troops on the border to prevent arms and men from going out, so that the incentive for bad guys to hang out in Syria would be lower.

Now that the Syrian people are up in arms against the US, the Syrian jihadists are likely to be freshly motivated to go hit the US in Iraq as retribution--so under the guise of diplomatic outrage, the Syrians are quietly letting their jihadists in once more, and they're likely to re-seal the border in a week or two, to make sure that the bad guys don't try to come back after they find that Western Iraq is, once again, not a terribly friendly place to be for terrorists.

The US, obviously, feels somewhat betrayed. Sure, they botched the operation, but to be called out for being "aggressive" or violating Syrian sovereignty, is just untrue. A frustrated Washington is facing an Iraqi parliament using this incident as a new bargaining chip in sapping more concessions from the US in the extended US-Iraqi security pact. There will certainly be some sort of pact by December--moderate Iraqis and Americans know that neither side can tolerate the pact not happening, but many factions in Iraqi parliament are much more willing to play brinksmanship with the pact and get concessions for their particular party/sectarian group--all they need is just enough diplomatic legitimacy to do it, and the Syrian raid incident has given it to them; the US military will ultimately bear the brunt of this foul-up.

But the Syrians did make one mistake. If it's clear to US allies that Damascus gave the go-ahead for the raid, then US allies that Syria depends on are likely to make Assad's life difficult. For example: The UK quickly canceled a joint conference in London with the Syrian government after the raid--a confusing move at the time, but one likely meant to show Syria that London is not as quick to sell out Washington as Damascus may be. More importantly in the long-term, the ascent of Sarkozy in France has turned Paris into a strong Washington ally (and Bush ally, even). As head of the Mediterranean Union, and the key to Syria's entry into the Western fold, Sarkozy's voice has a lot of sway in Damascus.

Nothing terribly decisive is likely to happen until Bush is out of office, and puzzle pieces can't really fall into place until the Israeli election happens, either. But the decision in Damascus to sell out the US to keep itself from facing heat domestically is likely to have unforseen diplomatic consequences, for both the US and the Syrians, independently of each other. All in all, it was probably a bad decision. The Syrians could have claimed that there was a miscommunication, and that the US had mistakenly come over the border. Clearly, Damascus can't admit that it gave the US the go-ahead to enter Syrian territory, but to put the maximum possible blame on the US was not necessary to save face. If Damascus wants to Westernize, it needs to be able to take a stand with the friends it wants to make, and not sell them out at first convenience. Friends don't always get along, and the US in particular is a friend with liabilities in the region. But it comes with the territory--one has to take it or leave it.

The Iraq Endgame

The Iraq Endgame is on. General Petraeus has masterfully used the last 2 years to turn Iraq around from a seemingly-hopeless civil war to a functional--if highly flawed--Middle Eastern state that will soon be ready to control its own security. Mr. Petraeus has also managed to largely immunize his plan from the politics of the US Presidential Election and the US-Iraqi Security Pact, as we can see in the first figure, below.

Figure One: Iraqi Provincial Control

This picture has come a very long way from the mess that Petraeus inherited in February 07, and is right on track with his March 2008 predictions, except for Ninawah (pushed back 1 month) and Baghdad (pushed back a full 6 months). By the time the new president is in office, all provinces except for Baghdad will be under full Iraqi security control, with only minimal US support given. Petraeus is ready for even a hasty withdrawal, or some other form of unfavorable Iraq security pact.

In Iraqi polls, the number of people that feel safe in their neighborhood has shot up dramatically. This confidence is key to finally being able to report to authorities the locations and goings-on of local militias and gangs, which undermine the security of those outside one's neighborhood (which is why those poll number are so very low). If one feels very safe in his own neighborhood, he knows he'll receive protection if he is an informant, or if he stops funding the militias. Without funding or anonymity, the militias will be increasingly easy to track down and break up.

A few very interesting observations should be noted about this poll. First, Anbar is one of the most responsive provinces to the question of confidence in the Government of Iraq (GoI). This kind of poll undermines serious concerns about Anbar citizens being able to accept government hegemony. Basrah has very little confidence, but this is largely due to the power of the Al-Sadr militia there--supporters of the militia are necessarily anti-government, and non-supporters feel largely unsafe, and lack confidence in the government's ability to keep Al-Sadr in check. The very red results in Ninawah and Salad al-Din are more difficult to interpret. I will have to look into it.


Average daily electrical power remains low. Here, I am not sure why the US is not able to use its many hundreds of billions of spending to build some oil-run power plants. It seems a rather simple solution. Any insight from my readers would be appreciated.Here we see the once-infamous security incident trends graph. Particularly low here are small arms attacks--mortar, gunfire, RPGs, etc. This indicates that the Iraqi insurgents have lost their ability to operate openly--they cannot simply patrol their blocks with arms, waiting for Coalition or ISF troops to jump. Anti-government attacks remain somewhat stubborn--this is strange largely due to the fact that Sunnis have largely stopped attacking the government (think Sons of Iraq) and the Shiite extremist groups have a lot of power in the government currently. Either these attacks are by Al-Qaeda and other fundamentalists (which is very possible given the high number of IED and other bomb attacks/removals remaining in this chart), or Shiite gangs in Basrah have stopped fighting each other and have tried to take control of the city instead.


This trend graph is one of the less dramatic--the green line is Iraqi Security Forces deaths, and it's not particularly heartening. 100 or so ISF troops are still killed per month, and that number has been stubborn for months. It's an indication that the dramatic decrease in US deaths is due in large part to the fact that US troops have taken a back seat in security operations. US troop deaths cannot be used as a direct proxy for peace in Iraq. On the other hand, it means that the ISF is growing increasingly competent--if they are taking a larger and larger role in Iraq and their death toll is not increasing, then they are definitionally becoming safer per capita or per operation. Expect to see this number drop a few months after the full handover is complete (probably May). This is probably the most heartening graph in the set. Ethnosectarian deaths are 2 orders of magnitude lower today than they were in December 2006, at their peak. The civil war is just plain over, and the ISF now needs to concentrate on fundamentalist militant groups and Shiite gangs. This is a sigh of relief for the ISF. During the civil war, protecting one group meant giving it a military advantage against the other--there were no clear "victims," and the government was the enemy of most of its citizens--and thus it undermined its own support. But as it eliminates al-Qaeda, confidence in its ability to protect and serve will grow. When that confidence is high enough, it will have the political capital to pressure Al-Sadr and the Shiite gangs to disarm, or finish them once and for all. The Iraqi government is not going to tolerate having its own Hezbollah-style groups running around its southern regions.

Perhaps the most important sign of security success is civilian deaths; reducing civilian deaths (and pain and displacement, etc) is the primary job of the ISF, and deaths are probably an excellent proxy for all the bad stuff. Current monthly civilian deaths are 1/7 their peak, and are not as stubborn as the ISF death numbers--that is, they have declined int he last 6 months. This means that the ISF is improving the security of its citizens as it takes over, while simultaneously not losing more men per month.

We should note that confidence lags security significantly--and why shouldn't it? When one has lived in civil war and terror for years, one is not going to jump on reports of a quiet month and decide that everything is okay. By the time the new president is in office, though, confidence in the government's ability to keep Iraqis safe is likely to be much higher. When that happens, Iraq will be ready to run itself--it is still a highly flawed country, but when people begin to feel safe, they can return to normalcy, and the government can more easily address the non-security needs of its nation. This is the endgame. We must now see how cheaply and quickly we can take our leave.

Iraqi Muslim Sectarian Groups Put Aside Infighting, Kill Other Religions Instead

A lot of progress has been made in the past few years in trying to get the Iraqi sectarian groups to get along. More and more, the Shiites and Sunnis are grumbling their way towards working for joint development and governance. The passing of the crucial election laws means there will be a flawed--but quite improved--representation in government for Sunnis.

But amid these improvements, a new sort of religious targeting has occurred. Christians, particularly in Mosul, have been attacked and killed, driven out, or have simply fled. Mosul, which was once known for heterogeneity and tolerance, is now swarming with anti-Christian gangs, prompting the government to send 1000 extra security personnel.

There is some speculation as to what has caused this sudden ethnic cleansing. It might be because of Christian protests--local election laws in Niniveh have taken away Christian quotas in parliament, and Christians have taken to the streets on Mosul and Baghdad over it. Such protests may be angering some Muslim minorities, who are looking to consolidate as many seats this coming October as possible (for example, Sunni Kurds). Until elections actually happen, there may be perverse power plays, intimidation, bribery, and all sorts of corruption to try to game the system into giving each group a political advantage.

And therefore! I believe that this is the very reason that provincial security handovers are on a long pause, despite the fact that security is good in a few of these regions (Wasit, Babil, Ta'mim): until the election, American forces want to be as present as is reasonable, and really make sure security is strong enough to prevent intimidation and other forms of disenfranchisement. When the election is over, the crisis will recede--violence against minorities will get Iraqis in more trouble than the payoff they can expect might balance. Therefore, the US is waiting until December to handover.

If Iraq can get this situation under control until the election, the Christians might be safe--but on the other hand, there may be angry reprisals by gangs or extremist sections of political groups that are angry at a raw deal--and looking for a scapegoat. It is easier for extremist Muslims to justify violence against Christians than other Muslims, and probably a bit easier to get away with, given the questionable reliability of some of the Iraqi Security Forces. But if the government can show that it's willing to pull out all the stops to protect its minorities, it will earn a lot of much-needed security credit.

Tracking Iraq's Progress

So a few things are going on (or, rather auspiciously, not going on) in Iraq that are worth mentioning.

Mention the first: Elections are coming! Parliament has given the thumbs-up to a key election law which will bring a re-shuffling of parliament and local leaders. If all goes to plan, the Kurds and Sunnis will have higher representation and slightly more autonomy, which should cool some serious worries by Sunnis and Kurds about Shiite domination. The one downside is that little is likely to get done if elections become proportional.

Mention the second: Anbar is being handed over slightly more quietly than expected. While there are some ethnic tensions and apparent abuse by Shiite police/military upon the Awakening Councils (likely in an effort to try to assert central government authority in the region), the Awakening Councils exist precisely to buy into the national system. They are likely to try to use the system itself to state their grievances, and compromise with the central government as the handover process becomes more complete.

Mention the third: Casualty rates continue to drop. Below, I've made some graphs from icasualties.org data of casualties since the start of the Surge:



In the first, we see that civilian monthly deaths are down by over an order of magnitude since the beginning of the surge, and are continuing to decline despite the fact that the Surge ended in July and most of the Surge troops went home. This is an early indication that the rate of decrease in violence is now relatively independent of numbers of American troops. This could be for a number of reasons: increased effectiveness of the Iraqi army/police (probably a big reason, in reality), political reconciliation and increased economic growth, increased civil services (like trash collection and water delivery), and a "positive spiral" of security (where now-secure people stop funding militant groups that are promising local security, thus weakening the very same militant groups that are decreasing security for others). But it's a very good sign, seeing as the Iraqis are kicking us out by 2011--we should well be able to go home and leave a very stable and prosperous Iraq; and with the election laws in place, it will even be a functional (if somewhat flawed) democracy. This would constitute a win (if an expensive one) by almost any standards.



This second graph only includes coalition casualties to make them easier to see. Deaths and wounds are both down dramatically, but wounds are decreasing much faster than deaths--in fact, in September (so far, I suppose) there have only been 40 wounds but 20 deaths, meaning that every other soldier wounded also died. In February 2007, it was only 85 out of 520, less than 1/5 of all wounded. This indicates a few things:

1) Violence is dropping faster than it appears from the most obvious metric, which is coalition deaths.
2) Attacks on Coalition troops are fewer, but more deadly, which is likely due to the fact that Coalition troops are fighting Al-Qaeda militants in higher and higher proportion--their attacks are likely more targeted and deadly than a quick squabble with sectarian militants.

I need to look more into the actual development of the Iraqi Army to be sure about the stability or this security progress, but I'll get to that later.

Anbar Handed Over

The US handed over Anbar province today, with great pomp and circumstance, in hopes of parading the success of the Sunni Awakening Councils, the Surge, and overall US efforts over the past three years. This is the 11th of 18 provinces, and was once the bloodiest.

While it is a triumphant sign of progress, worry remains in the next few months. The Sunni Councils may be used to their autonomy, and may be averse to being ruled by a Shiite-dominated central government. An influx of mostly-Shiite Iraqi troops may cause sectarian tensions in the region, that would derail the mopping up of Al-Qaeda in Iraq.

Elections are coming in October, and Sunnis are quite unlikely to make the same mistake as in 2004 when they boycotted the election. But the elections will bring a dramatic change to the Iraqi parliament--total Shiite domination will end if the election goes as planned. If Shiites get too worried about this, violence may flare beforehand, and Al-Qaeda is sure to be planning attacks for the weeks before and day of the election. The next six weeks will be pivotal.

Well, Maybe the Surge is Working

On today, the last day of July in Iraq, the US troop death toll has rung to 12, after
Staff Sgt. Faoa L. Apineru died of a wound suffered on July 2. If this holds (barring some terrible event today or wounded soldiers dying later), it would be a death toll less than 2/3 of the previously lowest month in Iraq (May: 19 deaths). So the by-far two lowest death tolls since the beginning of the war have been in the past 3 months, and this most recent one has come after the end of the surge.

Recorded Iraqi deaths are also at an all-time low: 393 (lower only than June, at 450, which was lower only than May, at 506). A pattern is emerging, and it's one of steadily, reliably increasing security and safety.

It is thus time to face a simple fact down a dark alley that most of us have been trying to avoid: The Surge worked, General Petraeus is not an unpatriotic, treasonous Bush lackey, and the Iraq war is winnable.

Now, Mr. Obama's campaign boat has a lot of wind behind its sails right now, because even Mr. McCain is agreeing to the sixteen-month timetable for withdrawal. This vindicates Mr. Obama, right? He was right all along?

No, not at all. Mr. Obama has spent the entire surge saying that it was not working. In July, his website was smart enough to remove his consistent, zealous opposition to the Surge from their Iraq page, but he has not come out to say that it has worked. Does he still think that it hasn't? Or is he simply as stick-to-your-guns consistent in his ideological stances as Mr. Bush?

Mr. Obama has not only opposed the surge since the beginning, but his 16-month withdrawal plan came around not because of successes in Iraq. His withdrawal plan has been the same, from the absolute worst conditions in Iraq (in 2006 when the violence was over 10 times what it is now) to today. The 16-month timetable was a strategy for easy defeat, not one for actually winning. But, quite luckily for Mr. Obama, he was wrong about the surge. His being wrong about the surge makes his 16-month timetable look entirely reasonable, as long as you are not willing to think about it too hard.

Unfortunately for the future of US foreign policy, Obama's political stars-and-moons lining up is nothing but luck, and has absolutely nothing to do with his ability to make judgments and decisions as Commander in Chief. He was wrong--and still is wrong--about the Surge, and his being wrong about the Surge is the only reason his years-old 16-month withdrawal timetable looks like anything more than a bloody white flag strategy. His policies and stances have not changed at all, regardless of wildly varying conditions in Iraq. This would mean an even more inflexible and ideological foreign policy than that of Mr. Bush, who was at least smart enough to consider Mr. Petraeus' plan for changing strategies.

But, even more unfortunately for the future of US foreign policy is that the McCain campaign camp is completely incompetent, and will not be able to capitalize on this glaring flaw in Mr. Obama's shining moment. If they can't, then Mr. Obama will win this election, and the American people will spend at least four years knowing that they truly had no idea what they meant when they spent the last 8 years complaining about idealistic and inflexible foreign policy. I have yet to see an Obama foreign policy point that shows any shred of good judgment or consideration for earthly realities, particularly in regards to military matters.

Syria is Preparing for a Major Shift

Syria accepted a visit by French President Sarkozy this weekend, and started making noise about major policy shifts that are likely to set the balance of the Middle East well in favor of the West.

First, they accepted a visit by Sarkozy at all. Sarkozy, of course, has been on a foreign policy blitz since he took over for Chirac. Counter to all his economic impotence, he has deeply improved ties with the US, UK, and Germany, re-entered NATO as a full member, taken his own tough stance against Russia and Iran in a way that Europeans have been highly averse to for a very long time. He has proposed a Mediterranean Union, one in which France would likely lead states like Morocco, Algeria, Italy, Turkey, Greece, and other middle-sized states. Syria is a small-but-critical piece of making a great deal of French geopolitical re-positioning possible. For the Syrians to accept them shows an opening-up to their former colonial overlords, despite years of almost-jihadist rhetoric coming from the government.

Second, they are upgrading to full diplomatic relations with Lebanon, for the first time since they declared independence. Such a move, even if it does include Hezbollah as a political party, likely shows an intent to work together with the anti-Syrian majority that ousted the Syrians in multiple bloody steps, ending in 2005. Such cooperation would make it difficult for Hezbollah to make gains from its minority position, and also much harder to acquire weapons. The Syrians are investing in the success and stability of the Lebanese government, and are thus helping to assure it. A willingness to deal with the ruling party in Syria means that Hezbollah will no longer be their only option, and so they are likely to put their limited eggs in multiple baskets.

Finally, the Syrians are seriously looking to continue peace talks with Israel--as soon as the US election is done. This not only shows us how important the US is in such things, but also that it is weighing the timing of the decision seriously, even if it is not clear exactly how. Would McCain scare them into siding with the West? Or would Obama convince them that a friendlier, more regionally hands-off US presidency makes the next 8 years a better time to experiment with pro-Western stances? Or is it as simple as they state--they want either candidate that is not George Bush to work with? I simply don't know. But the sign that they are waiting for the US election shows serious policy consideration on the issue--it is not a matter of whim, but of real conditions. The Syrians want this peace deal. They just need the conditions to be right.

And so they are planning something big. Peace with Israel would mean an Israel secure from any land invasion except by Hezbollah insurgents from Lebanon--and combined with good relations with Lebanon, peace with Israel would lead to a Syria much less excited about supporting unpredictable Shiite insurgent groups that are likely to both destabilize Lebanon and anger Israel. This would also necessitate a moving-away from an Iran that would feel abandoned by its ally. No doubt, the Iranians are likely screaming at Syrian policymakers to reconsider, which may be why they are waiting until the US election. The move would leave Iran relatively isolated by--if not an enemy of--the Middle East, much in the same way that Japan is the black sheep of East Asia. The Syrian abandonment is likely going to give the next US president bargaining power with Iran to come to a deal in Iraq favorable to the US. Iran knows that Iraq will be a Shiite-dominated country, the only question is how much. They may be willing ot hedge their bets on Iraq and ensure a friendly neighbor rather than use brinksmanship to create an idealistic ally, at risk of alienating their last chance in the region.

Petraeus to the Rescue Again

The Senate confirmed General Petraeus to lead Central Command (covering the entire Middle East), 95-2. His deputy General, Lt. Gen. Ray Ordierno, has been promoted to General of Iraq operations, ensuring that Petraeus will have a strong say and a competent, experienced sidekick for the US' biggest war since Vietnam.
Going to Save All Our Other Messes, Too
I'll bet that the Senate is hoping, like I am, that Petraeus has enough magic in his bag of tricks that he can pull Afghanistan out of the terrible mire it's run into, just as he did Iraq. It will be harder, much harder. For all that Bush complains of Iran's intervention in Iraq, they are a stable state with control that can rein in their own hounds--and they largely have. Pakistan has no power over the Northwest, and won't let the US operate there. The Taliban literally have an impervious fortress from which to operate in Pakistan's northwest. I don't know how Petraeus plans to deal with this.

The Superhero Cred

But Petreaus now also gets to watch over Iran. His recent successes do not prove that he knows how to manage Iran's entire repritoire of threats and irritations, but he has certainly beefed up the US Army's credibility against insurgent warfare that Iran can't depend on Hezbollah or its other Shiite puppets for free pecking of US interests any longer.

The Senate's confidence in him is well-founded, surely. And it shows a surprising ability to change opinions based on reality. I'm sure many of us remember the left-wing response to Petraeus' initial appointment:
Destroying America with Victory!

But those days might be over. Not only is this man finally getting a shred of the respect he deserves, but the US Senate is not so ideological as to shoot its own military policy in the foot to make a point. And who knows: maybe he'll come to the rescue for us once more.

Iraqi Timetable May Be More Than it Seems

The Surge is ending: The final brigade is on its way out of Iraq right now, after tremendous security success. For the next few months, we will have to hold our breaths and see if the situation keeps improving with fewer forces.

The Bush adminsitration has wanted a "long-term" US presence in Iraq, including permanent bases (like in Korea, Japan, Germany). Al-Maliki, the Prime Minister, has suggested a counter-proposal: A withdrawal timeline. At first glance, this would be a crippling defeat for George Bush, vindicating all of his political opponents that have been demanding such a thing for years.

But more likely, it is a compromise proposed by the administration itself, after realizing that permanent bases were not feasible. If Al-Maliki told Bush "we don't want permanent bases, and even if I did, I couldn't make them happen," then a withdrawal timeline is the immediate second choice.

Al-Maliki mentioned that the timeline would stretch until 2011 or 2012--2 or 3 years into the new presidency. At this point, I think most people in the administration are betting that Obama is going to win the election, and are hedging against him. That, or they could be trying to defeat him.

Stealing the initiative: If the Administration agrees to a 2012 withdrawal timeline and Obama wins the election, he will be hard-pressed to implement his 16-month withdrawal plan, given a previous treaty arrangement with the Iraqis (which he is bound by the Constitution to obey). If the Bush administration's war thinkers are worried about a speedy withdrawal, setting their own timeline with the Iraqis is the best way to prevent it.

Influencing the Election: This move has clear implications in the election that Obama will have to deal with very carefully. He could be caught in a double-bind. If this timeline agreement goes through, Obama will have to choose whether or not to dramatically change his policy. Should he obey the timeline, and try to delicately drop his 16-month withdrawal plan? He might draw serious criticism for flip-flopping, discourage his base, or lose his anti-war cred with moderates. Or should he defy the treaty, and stick to the plan? The Republicans may try to snatch moderates back by calling him out-of-touch, idealistic, unwilling to deal with reality, ignoring international treaties, etc. This timeline may make his Iraq stance an automatic liability, which is definitely a win for an administration that wants someone who is going to stick closer to its foreign policy aims into the future.

Whatever is happening, it is likely very thoroughly-thought long-term planning by the Bush administration. Al-Maliki is a close enough Bush ally that he almost certainly would not publicly request a request for a withdrawal timetable unless it had been already agreed-upon (or unless the administrations were at a deadlock, but it does not appear so at all). And, having been already agreed-upon, the intuitive thing for Bush to do is announce it himself, to show the public he is dedicated to changing his policy with changing times. But he gave the initiative to Al-Maliki, allowing the US press to call it a defeat for him. When he agrees to the timetable, it will appear as if he "caved to pressure." This is exactly what he wants. If it looks like he fought this timetable tooth-and-nail, then the Democrats will be politically forced to rejoice when he signs it, and won't be able to criticize it. Bush, once again, is going to get (almost) what he wants, despite a Democrat congressional majority. Sometimes, Bush is more clever than most give him credit for, and it is this very reputation for lacking subtlety that will allow him to outsmart the Democrats in congress once again.

Obama "Preparing the Battlefield" for a Good Iraq Policy

Obama's earlier remarks on Iraq have been highly political and devoid of much consideration of actual military/political force in the country. His high-speed withdrawal plans came without a single conversation with a US military commander involved in the theatre, and has had no good answer (that I can find) for media that have proposed the question that a quick withdrawal may lead to a surge in violence.

But Obama his changing his tune. He actually plans to sit down with military commanders, and might "refine" his Iraq stance in light of evidence. What a novel idea!

But an idealistic young senator running for president is not going to change his long-defended Iraq stance before the election--even if it is a good idea--unless there is a public opinion reason involved. Obama's remarks are preparing the base of the Democratic party--many of them ardently opposed to any coninued US presence in Iraq--for a shift away from telling them what they want to hear, and a shift towards some deeper thought on the subject.

Is Obama trying to make sure he does not end up on the wrong side of the Iraq debate? Maybe, but polling is currently in favor of his old stance--70% of Americans either want troops removed right away or within a year.

Interestingly, Americans are starting to change their idea of just how effective the surge has been:



Does this change in assessment mean a change in opinion is also coming? Why does Obama now want to soften a hard stance that has seemed to work for him so well? Is he simply looking to try to catch moderate Republicans without losing his left-wing base?

Or is he simply so confident in his victory (he shouldn't be--old "comeback McCain" still has a few tricks up his sleeve) that he can actually afford to ignore politics and pursue a more rational strategy in Iraq?

Iraq is Very Quiet

You know what hasn't been in the news in the past many weeks? Iraq. I'm sure you can guess exactly why:

That's right, because there's nothing bad to report. Finally, today, BBC published an article (which hasn't made the front page), noting that coalition troop deaths in May were their lowest since the war began in 2003. Civilian deaths have dropped by half from the months of March and April--much of this is due to a truce signed with Al-Sadr and other Shiite Militias. I'm not sure it will hold, but every day of calm gives the Iraqi government more time to solidify its daily civil functions--power, water, trash collection, etc.

Elections in the fall will be critical--whether they lead to better power-sharing in the government (the Sunnis have been underrepresented due to their own boycott) or to voilence as Shiites try to resist losing power is unsure.

I don't have too much analysis about these figures that I haven't already given you before. But in this particular post, I just wanted to report the news as I've seen it, because CNN sure as hell won't.

As a post-script, icasualities is a pretty reliable source for death trends in Iraq, should you want it: http://icasualties.org/oif/

Petraeus' Great Iraq Update

On April 8th and 9th (with lots of pomp and circumstance thanks to the presence of all three presidential candidates, trying to show off for the press), General David Petraeus gave his Great Iraq Update to Senate, discussing progress and future strategy. Released to the public was a handout that each Senator received, and I humbly present my analysis of some of the better graphics from it.



Because I am a geopolitical wonk, I keep coming back to the Iraq Provincial Security Transition Assessment Map (or Provincial Iraqi Control Map). As we can see, some interesting progress has been made. Half of all Iraqi provinces (9/18) have been handed over, though the handover process stalled after 2007. In July, the third-last Polish-led province of Qasidiyah, as well as the once-restive province of Anbar will be handed over. Anbar's "renaissance" will be completed in July, and the Bush Administration is likely to hold it high as a sign of success in Iraq.

Interestingly, there seems to be no politically-motivated rush on the part of Petraeus to hand over other provinces; six provinces are going to be handed over immediately after the US 2008 election, if they are handed over on time. Petraeus may have been able to stack some of these provinces in a lump October 2008 handover to try and influence US voters to elect a more pro-occupation candidate like John Mccain, but has opted not to, presumably in favor of a more militarily sensible strategy.

Interestingly, all provinces but Tam'im are scheduled to be fully handed over to Iraqi Provincial Control by the time a new president is sworn into office. In doing so, Petraeus is able to (intentionally or not) preempt any new president's Iraq strategy by sealing the United States Military's fate as a secondary force in Iraq by 2009. The post-handover provinces in Iraq have not all been perfectly peaceful--the recent violence in Basrah has been an embarrassment to the possibly-hasty full UK pullout--but ethno-sectarian violence remains low (despite a small spike), and Al-Qaeda seems to be losing ground. Continued handover, despite March's spike in violence, looks like it will progress smoothly.



The next gorgeous chart here is ethno-sectarian violence in Iraq (this measures only deaths by inter-sect rivalries, rather than Al Qaeda bombings or Al-Sadrite militia spats with the Iraqi Army). As we can see, Iraq has passed its "civil war" stage of 2005-2007, and remains in a state of tough pacification and unification. Whether ethno-sectarian violence remains quite this low after a US drawdown over the summer remains to be seen, but political progress is slowly and painfully being made. More importantly than parliamentary benchmarks, perhaps, is Petraeus-led integration of Iraqi Army and National Police units into communities, mirroring the integration the Petraeus implemented with US troops. Such an integration provides a stable security base (lowering the incentive to support militias for one's street-side security) and also a friendly and helpful grassroots face for the government (increasing civilian support of its continued success). So while critics point to a strikingly slow development of nationwide laws that are meant to bring long-term stability, the ubiquitous-police society developed, especially in Baghdad, is likely to maintain stability in urban centers as the government continues to try and reconcile political differences.

McCain called Baghdad life "more or less normal" in a recent speech, and these graphs are the best evidence we can get to support such a claim. Assuming these graphs are not designed to intentionally mislead, Baghdad now looks more or less like a large American urban center in its ethnic violence density. Nationwide ethno-sectarian deaths remain at about 200 per month, or 2400 per year, which is about 8.2 ethno-sectarian deaths per 100,000 people (the US homicide rate is 5.6 per 100,000 even though this is a pretty poor comparison). Again, this doesn't include suicide bombings or the recent Mahdi-Iraqi Army fighting. On that note:



The MNF Coalition estimates about 300 total civilian deaths last month (12.3 per 100,000 per year), and Iraqi data estimates about 750 total civilian deaths last month (projecting to about 21 per 100,000 pear year); both estimates are higher than political scientists would see as sustainable and acceptable for a stable domestic society.



Finally, the last image is the most promising, if it's accurate. Even if Iraq does not become a fully stable and and pro-American society any time soon, Al-Qaeda remains the United States' enemy number one. To leave Iraq as a safe haven for Al-Qaeda would be a total military failure of the operation, regardless of any other political or military progress in the country. It remains the United States' moral obligation to clean up the mess created in Iraq by its overthrow of the Hussein regime, but it remains the United States' primary security obligation to eliminate Al-Qaeda at all corners, and deny them all possible havens. Progress in eliminating Al-Qaeda in Iraq since the Surge strategy has been stark.

Completing a rooting-out of of Al-Qaeda looks within reach. Continued progress on bringing political reconciliation, military stability, and delivery of daily necessities to the Iraqi people will create a sustainable country in which Al-Qaeda's destabilizing presence will not be tolerated.