Israeli/Palestinian Talks--Maybe Not Quite Derailed

Well, my faint sliver of hope has grown a teensy bit in size with Barak's recent comments.

He's claimed (though Netanyahu hasn't yet backed up) that Palestinian-dominated parts of Jerusalem would be part of the Palestinian state, and further, that the holy sites would be governed by a special body, rather than either country.

While there will be a great deal of opposition in both countries, the balanced perspective that Barak brings to the bargaining table suggests a genuine desire for a solution, rather than simple political posturing.

That said, the vast Israeli settlements in the West Bank will be even harder to withdraw than those in Gaza. Geopolitically, a 2-state solution is far-fetched. But, as they say, "Only Nixon could open China." Netanyahu might just be the man for the job.

But don't get too excited yet.

Incoming Israeli/Palestinian Talks--Derailed?

There was a sliver--however slight--of a good set of talks coming up in the Middle East.

An assailant attack that killed 4 Israelis near Hebron has probably undermined that entirely. The trick here is not that it will necessarily outrage the Israelis into quitting the talks, but that it will call into serious question Abbas' credibility in promising to handle his own security situation--this happened even with Israeli troops nearby.

Security, obviously, it Israel's biggest concern in the talks, and a number of more extreme-leaning groups (including Hamas) want to make that a tougher point during the talks. The emergence of a weak Palestinian state with Israel in a comparatively strong position would be a failure to the real revolutionaries.

In short: don't get your hopes up for these talks. Frankly, they were probably mostly a political maneuver anyway.

Impact of the Fatah Shakeup

Fatah had its first congress in 20 years over the week, in what was seen as an attempt to save the party from its quickly-deteriorating reputation (which has been, since 2004, increasingly along the veins of "corrupt," "divided," and "ineffective"). After the surprising 2006 loss to Hamas in parliamentary elections, and then its ouster from Gaza by a Hamas coup, Fatah appeared to be running out of time.

This sixth Congress was an exercise in enormous cat-herding, and the vote was severely delayed due to an apparently unexpected addition of delegates and a rather frantic worry about the outcomes. And, for the ruling powers of Fatah, worry was worth having. This "old-guard," as it's being called, lost big--of the 18 seats in Fatah's central committee, old-guarders won only 4 seats. Younger "reformists" won 14, setting the path for a new kind of party. Abbas, despite his links to the old-guard and the beginning of the movement, appears to come out of the congress strengthened, with young and energetic allies in the central committee, as well as a renewed mandate.

This "reform" sub-movement is much more a political party than a resistance movement. They support a two-state solution based on the 1967 treaty lines, and are willing to negotiate with Israel over the issue. They have not dropped the right to "resist by all means" for the independence of the Palestinian people, but doing so would have been political suicide anyway.

But this new Fatah is distinguishing itself from its violent-revolutionary cousins, Hamas, much to the relief of moderates in the US and in the Middle East, Israel included. But its leadership is younger, more popular, and probably less corrupt. The new leadership has a year to get its act together before 2010 elections, in which they hope to re-take control of the Palestinian territories, and can then negotiate with greater legitimacy on behalf of the Palestinian people for statehood.

Whether these negotiations can actually push forward in the face of continued Israeli settlement construction is daunting. Israel may require a change in regime itself before serious negotiations over the details of a two-state system re-emerge. But if the Palestinian Authority can present a moderate, reasonable alternative to the violent and inflexible Hamas, Israeli fears may be assuaged to such an extent that a more reconciliatory leadership will emerge in time. Fatah will need to remain consistently open to negotiations, and more importantly, it will have to impose credible control over all of the Palestinian Authority before the Israelis are likely to see the short-term risks of two-state solutions sink far enough below the potential long-term benefits to seriously consider that road.

Israeli Timing Holds True

While Mr. Obama was busy moving his family and belongings to Pennsylvania Avenue, Israel abruptly and unilaterally declared a ceasefire in Gaza. The Gazans (undeniably more than simply Hamas), a few hours later, declared one as well. The ceasefire is holding, somewhat surprisingly. Hamas has decided that they don't want to risk another invasion (yet), and no rockets are flying. Even a day without rockets is a huge symbolic victory for Israel.

Israel's unilateral ceasefire makes two points. The first is that the Israelis do not want a lingering war when Mr. Obama takes office. Such a decision is strategically calculated to prevent Mr. Obama from having to deal with an Israeli war (under the pressure of his allies to stop the Israelis) on day one; certainly, Israel wants to be as friendly with the new American president as possible. The second point is that the Israelis do not want to be bound by the terms of an internationally-brokered peace deal: they want to be able to move into Gaza unbound if the rocket fire continues.

But for now, signs point to Hamas being beaten up enough that it has no intentions of provoking the Israelis yet. It is likely waiting to see if it can rebuild and rearm itself over the next few years of quiet to be ready to weather another Israeli storm.

Calculated Madness

The New York Times has a fine article about the "calculated madness" of the Israeli attack, and its analogy in the Hamas circle. But I'm not going to re-hash that.

I intend to consider the validity of Israel's conclusions on its war. Israel took down a lot of Hamas infrastructure--and because Hamas is so ubiquitous in Gaza (it is pretty much everything), Israel took down many houses, schools, Mosques, etc. As far as I can tell, nothing hit wasn't either A) a legitimate Hamas target, or B) a complete mistake, but in war, intent is a very small part of the story.

Israel believes that it has taught them a lesson, as the Chinese are fond of saying in their wars. It strolled in, delivered a beating, and left. It wasn't going to destroy all of the rocket sites. It wasn't going to take down Hamas, and alas, it certainly didn't. This war was meant to show Hamas and its supporters that throwing rockets at Israel wasn't worth the risk of massive retaliation. Did that work? Indeed, can that work?

Israel's hope is that the sup;porters of Hamas, while angry at Israel, will question the wisdom of voting for Hamas. This is somewhat likely, but they may also be purple-blooded. After the Sept. 11 attacks in the US, Americans did not question their foreign policy, except perhaps in concluding that they were being too shy, too meek, too peaceful, and too generous (in conflict with pretty much the rest of the world). While the analogy between the 9/11 attacks and the Israeli war is pretty weak, it makes a strong point: can beating on people make them more calm and peaceful? The Blitz of London, the 9/11 attacks, the bombings of North Korea, the Rape of Nanking, they all say otherwise. But they were all primarily anti-civilian attacks. Can Israel make a clearer message by having almost exclusively attacked Hamas-related targets?

Perhaps. Israel has to make two messages clear: 1) Hamas got Gaza into this mess by refusing to stop launching rockets, and 2) that the Israelis were genuinely trying to avoid civilian casualties. The second will not make Gazans less angry at the Israelis for their friends and family dying from shell fire, but it will allow point #1 to have more salience. And that is the important part--if Gazans can say, "Hamas' irresponsibility is why the Israelis attacked" (whether or not it was deserved, etc), then they will back down.

A good example of this is Europe. Russia has recently been, for lack of a better term, insufferable and hyperaggressive. They have gone after Ukraine (with gas) and Georgia (with tanks) for minor provocations. But even though the Russian response was far out of line (and resembling that of a child's temper tantrum), the European Union has questioned the wisdom of continuing to agitate the Russians--particularly, it has questioned a continued policy of trying to subsume Georgia and Ukraine into NATO. Indeed, while Russia's actions have been largely unjust (particularly in Georgia), Europe has taken the posture that Russia is an entity whose disposition and behavior are both A) unlikely to change soon through any measures, and B) rational, even if unfair and disproportionate. And so the Europeans have acted just as the Russians have. So might the Gazans, if the Israelis can impart the same sense of causal linkage between the rockets and Israel's attack (as Russia did between Georgia's shelling of South Ossetia and its own assault). If that link can become salient and vivid for Gazans, then they will either pressure Hamas to change into a more reserved military entity, or they will vote them out. Either, to some extent, is a victory for Israel. But now that the 3-week assault is over, the propaganda war will only intensify.

Israel's Confidence is High

Israel is starting to hint that they have full intent to take down Hamas with this war in Gaza (though this has been pretty obvious for a few days now). Their confidence that they can do so is surprisingly high, as well--Israeli officials are calling Hamas "crippled" in a few ways: its physical governance infrastructure is ruined (parliament building, police buildings, etc), its leadership is dead or in hiding (having abandoned its population), and its popularity is going to drop.

Though the popularity of Hamas is currently rather high, the Israelis think it will go down significantly in the next few weeks as Palestinians wonder whether a militant anti-Israel stance is one that is going to serve them well in the future. In particular, if Hamas is unable to provide governance, order, medical supplies, etc after the war ends, then their support will erode. Pre-war, Fatah already had an edge in Gaza polls. When the Palestinians have elections, probably in April 2009, Fatah will probably have quite the edge, even in Gaza. And if it does, and if Kadima can hold on in Israel, then the whole situation in Palestine looks a lot different. Israel will probably do what it can to enforce Fatah's right to govern in Gaza Strip, and help clean the strip up before working on serious two-state talks.

Such confidence is strange, coming from an Israel that lost a 2006 war in Lebanon due to overconfidence and poorly-defined campaign goals. Israel had been showing serious conservatism in its war goals early on: the air campaign was aimed at reducing rocket attacks, not even eliminating them. While Israel is not saying that they have changed their goals to the toppling of Hamas, they are certainly saying that it's likely that they will, and that they're quite happy for it. This means one of two things:

1) Israel's government did not learn a lesson from its tough defeat, even though I was able to graft that lesson from my seat in Cambridge, or,

2) Israel is actually well and truly crushing Hamas' governance and combat capabilities.

Occam's Razor says it's probably the latter.

Despite confidence, Israel remains conservative. They have not given in to goading and luring on the part of Hamas to enter Gaza City or other urban areas for street fighting. They have kept their total military casualties to one, suffered on the first night of entry. Israel's targets have been picked with deliberate caution, as well: Palestinian medical authorities have reported only 16 children dead, despite a strong incentive to over-report. Hamas has claimed that half of the over-500 killed in Gaza are civilians, but there is a strong incentive to over-report here, as well: Hamas loses face by reporting its own fighters killed, and gains support by claiming that Israel has killed civilians. Given how informally one can join the Hamas paramilitary, it will be impossible for these figures to ever be confirmed beyond academic estimates.

So things seem to be going well for Israel so far. They have a lot of work to do, and in particular, Israel must keep up strong diplomacy with Jordan, Egypt, and Lebanon, in order to keep its free military reign in Gaza. But such support should have wavered days ago if it was going to. Israel appears to have a serious shot at crippling Hamas for good and, despite the cries of many protesters to the contrary, contribute to long-term peace in the Middle East.

Analysing Israel's Gaza Tactics

After a day of war, Israel stand at one dead and about 40 wounded. They say they have killed "dozens" of Hamas militants, but they are struggling with their opposition using civilians as human shields in the fighting.

Let me first digress by expressing my own personal sympathies for Israel's difficult position. After returning full control of the Gaza strip to Palestine, Hamas used a civil war to wrest power, and has been using it as a safe haven to accumulate rockets from Iran and other sources to launch into Israel constantly, even during a six-month ceasefire in which Israel was relatively disciplined. Israel provided the majority of Gaza's fuel, food, electricity, and medical aid at no cost--despite access to the Mediterranean and Egypt, Gaza's Hamas leadership has held Gaza's economy back--gross mismanagement and excessive, corrupt government bureaucracy have made sure that Gaza's market has not spun up at all. Hamas hands out aid received by Israel, and takes credit--keeping its popularity high among its many poor and jobless. Hamas seems to take very little flak from its own people for storing weapons in Mosques and orphanages, or by using civilian human shields as they fight Israelis. The Arab world is starting to flare up in protest, and otherwise-moderate Arab governments have to condemn Israel's invasion to halt rocket fire--after relatively patient and persistent warnings to stop, offers to negotiate, and months of restraint--as a "war crime." Luckily for the Israelis, Egypt continues to stand by them (to what extent they can), and the Arab League is unable to spin up the momentum to actually meet over the crisis. The US will block any UN resolutions to officially condemn Israel in any way. Even US Senate Majority Leader, Harry Reid, has said that a ceasefire is impossible until Hamas offers to halt rocket fire. So even if this war lasts for a few weeks, the US will not be switching teams on a dime.

So Israel is now elbow-deep in this problem--what have they actually done? According to relatively scattered reports, Israel has already cut to the Mediterranean and has surrounded Gaza City and other urban centers, as far south as Netzarim, but the Israeli Army has been disciplined enough to avoid entering any major urban areas, where the Hamas militants likely have a great advantage (with huge numbers of civilians that the Israelis have to worry about, potential booby traps, and other "home turf" advantages like knowledge of the terrain, friendly homes, etc). A map I put together below should make it a bit more clear where the Israelis have gone.

Approximate Israeli Movement and Positions (Click for Larger)

Their staging ground was Sderot, on the northeast corner of Gaza. From there, Israel broke in during the night and cut power to most of the northern half of the strip, taking advantage of night fighting technology to strike their initial blow (and most of their advances in the last day). The Israelis are likely to continue using night to press their primary assaults in search of rockets, launch pads, and Hamas leadership. Note that with Gaza City surrounded (and certainly extremely strict policies for anyone escaping), Hamas leadership isn't going anywhere soon (for the Israelis control Gaza waters, as well). Special forces have an opportunity to use what intelligence that Mossad has gathered to take them down in the capital city if they weren't smart enough to get out early.

At this point, Israel looks like it is going to focus on a search-and-destroy mission in the north, and then perhaps move south to mop up militants that got out--it is unlikely to spread its 3 brigades so thin as to take the entire strip at once. Israel also has troops ready in Jerusalem and near Lebanon in case West Bank Palestinians or Lebanese Hezbollah militants try anything tricky to help out their brothers-in-arms.

So the easy part is over, with few casualties for the Israelis, but the hard part--search-and-destroy--is just beginning. The success of the rest of this mission will depend on Israeli tactical intelligence abilities more than brilliant ground war operational capabilities. Israeli unit tactical training will face a test, as well.

But this mission really has more substance than simply finding rockets, or even toppling Hamas leadership. After failing to meet its objectives in Summer 2006 in Lebanon--namely, preventing rockets from hitting Israel in the north--Israel is hoping to regain its deterrent capabilities with neighboring militant groups. Israel is unlikely to face a regular war with its neighbors in the near future--their willingness to negotiate has a lot to do with Israel's ability to bloody them up if they choose to fight. So far, Hezbollah has chosen to sit this one out (so far), and read (though I've lost the link) that there are rumors floating about Hamas heading to Egypt to talk potential ceasefire options. So maybe it's working.

Gaza Land War Begins

Israel is now holding nothing back against Gaza--its tanks and infantry have entered the strip with the public intent of capturing Hamas rocket launching sites (and likely very large weapons caches nearby) and dismantling them. The Israelis are also likely sending in large numbers of special operations forces to try and take down as much Hamas leadership-in-hiding as possible.

There's little to say yet on the operation, except that it shows a real commitment for Israel to pay the necessary political costs to take down Hamas in a way that would allow Fatah to take control of Gaza if/when it wins elections that Abbas is calling. Strangely, it may be this very war that enables the Israelis and the Palestinians to make peace. A reminder is due that Hamas does not recognize Israel's right to exist--it is only interested in driving Israel out of the area, and that it took over Gaza strip in a civil war in 2006 after losing elections to Fatah--their continued presence has been a tough roadblock for the Israelis, and it seems the Israelis feel they finally have the political capital with their neighbors to finish Hamas off. And despite all the criticism coming Israel's way, it looks like they're right. But now the fate of this operation depends on the military's ability to achieve its objectives without "mission creep" or a quagmire.

Hamas' Neighbors Conspiring to Take it Down

Six days into the end of the ceasefire, rocket attacks from Gaza into Israel have gone up significantly--and not as a response in particular to any Israeli behavior. While the rockets are still not killing Israelis, they are making life for anyone nearby nearly unbearable.

These rocket attacks may have sealed Hamas' fate. Hope that Hamas can be groomed into a legitimate political party are falling apart, for even its neighbors. There is a lot of talk by relevant parties that seems to indicate that Hamas will soon be facing its doom. Even more significant, however, is who isn't talking.

Israel is sending strict warnings, and making it clear that they are preparing a massive offensive into Gaza. The operation would be aimed at toppling Hamas, and they might just have the support they need for it.

Egypt invited Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni to Cairo for talks over the issue. Egypt is urging restraint, but this is likely a mere diplomatic and political gesture. The place of the meeting has significance--Egypt usually only meets with Israelis in an out-of-town resort, but bringing Livni into Cairo is a gesture of respect and endorsement that Egypt rarely grants. It is an off-the-record way of saying, "we are on your side now."

But there's more. Al-Quds al-Arabi, a newspaper out of London, has reported that Egypt would not object to a strike by Israel to take down Hamas. This is big news. This is about as close to a full war endorsement as one can get from Arab neighbors--a light endorsement usually comes in the form of an Embassy-level protest, even if just to save face. But the Egyptians have said out loud that they're going to keep their noses out. And they'll probably keep enforcing the blockade.

The Egyptians have probably become tired of trying to be impartial mediators with Hamas after years of being snubbed and enabling bad behavior. In October, when Egypt tried to host reconciliation meetings between Hamas and Fatah, Hamas boycotted. Egypt kept suggesting to Hamas that they continue the Israeli truce and go to Cairo for peace talks, but Hamas refused. Hamas' rocket attack escalation has come against Egyptian warnings. Egypt realizes that anything short of an endorsement for war is a form of political capital for Hamas that it can use to pay for the flight of more rockets into Israel. Egypt doesn't want to be a part of it anymore.

Before now, domestic pressure kept the otherwise-moderate Egyptian government at least partially on Hamas' side. It is likely Hamas' loss of grace--rather than serious changes in the politics between Cairo and the Muslim Brotherhood--that has pushed Egypt to Israel's side. But it's there, and that's bad news for Hamas.

Abbas has taken the opportunity to declare his support of unity and democracy by vowing not to pursue a civil war to beat Hamas. Abbas gets to play good cop as more-established powers put the pressure on Hamas for him. But there's a lot to gain for him here. His popularity is on the rise, and world opinion turning against Hamas for irresponsibility and militarism, moderates in the Palestinian Authority are likely to shy away from Hamas as well. Abbas is preparing the battlefield for snap elections and a booming victory by Fatah that he will be able to hold onto for years. If Fatah can start to consolidate its political power, then an anti-Hamas operation will become much more viable an option for other world leaders.

But just as significant are those that are not talking. Iran and Syria have said little or nothing on the matter. They have not warned Israel, nor had words with Egypt over its pro-Israeli behavior. Whether this is a result of talks with Bush, Brown, and Sarkozy, or whether it's simply due to Hamas' PR gaffes of the last few years, is unclear. But by not talking, they too are giving as much of a green light to Israel as possible. The UN will complain if the Israelis invade, as will Russia; but if the regional actors here keep behaving like they are now, they will prepare the region for peace.

If Hamas' domestic popularity tumbles, then their ability to wage a messy and bloody insurgency against Israel will be limited--people will give them less funding, fewer troops, fewer places to stay. Palestinians will betray their positions to the Israelis. The war will go well, and the militant machine that keeps Hamas in place will start to weaken. Until this happens, elections will be meaningless--Hamas has already shown that its respect for democracy and peace are long trumped by its ideology and thirst for power (see: the PA civil war). But if they can be crippled, then Fatah's elections can bring a new mandate for the region to work together to clear any Hamas resistance to the new PA order. Some control over Gaza may become possible, in time. It will require patience.

As importantly, Egypt's blessing of Israel will make it an excellent supporter of the Israeli-Fatah peace talks, especially if the Syrians choose to continue to participate after election cycles are over. Israel, should it choose to pursue the two-state option, will have regional support and mediation that should make life a lot easier.

Finally, Livni seems to be showing she's got the right stuff to be Prime Minister--and she's using the opportunity to steal the spotlight from Netanyahu. This will be critical in Israel's upcoming elections--if she can use her power as Foreign Minister to keep the region on Israel's side even during an attack on Gaza Strip, then she will at lest carry an image of a great diplomat and representative of Israel. More importantly, this fight is a big test as to whether or not her two-state system can work, or whether it should be abandoned for Netanyahu's one-state system. But with Fatah and Egypt giving tacit support to Israeli operations in Hamas, Syria and Iran's non-involvement, and the continually increasing likelihood that Hamas' days as a major player in the region are coming to a close, moderate Israelis are likely to favor the two-state system, Livni's ascendancy to PM, and continued peace talks.

Livni Starts Talking Tough as Elections Loom

With elections in January, Tzipi Livni, leader of Israel's Kadima party has been thinking very hard about what to say and do, balancing her principles and her obligation to lead her party to victory. It seems she has come up with just the solution.

Many Israelis worry that an unchecked Palestinian state would be a broiling terror base. There is some evidence for this--in occupied West Bank, few terror incidents have occurred in the past few years. Despite Israeli domination, those in West Bank favor the Fatah party, and are pro-reconciliation. In Gaza, where Israel withdrew earlier in the decade, Hamas reigns supreme, and launches rocket attacks at Israeli towns almost every day. Hamas is still officially at war with Israel, holding rather ineffectually to a six-month truce that will expire on the 19th of this month. Hamas has not made it clear whether the truce will be extended. Hamas politicians are also sending mixed messages on whether they want a two-state solution--one of Hamas' underlying principles is the elimination of Israel and the creation of a Palestinian state in the territory. Hamas propaganda and speeches drip with anti-Israeli rhetoric. Naturally, leaving the Palestinians to their own devices seems like an unattractive option for Israelis.

Livni may have appeared soft earlier, willing to push for a 2-state solution despite Hamas' continued anti-Israeli stance and behavior. But Livni has taken advantage of international recognition of Hamas as a terror group--while she is willing to deal with the moderate Fatah party as a representative of the PA, Hamas has no authority in the eyes of Israel. They would not be invited to the negotiating table. But further, she's taken a stance of zero tolerance for Hamas, and declared her willingness to use military means to eject them from the Gaza Strip. Such a maneuver will be difficult, given that Hamas is a decentralized party and militia, but it's an important signal coming from Livni. She's saying to the Israeli people that she will not allow her pro-negotiation stance to grant Hamas any legitimacy, and further, that she is willing to be the candidate that gets rid of them for good.

There would even be some shred of international legitimacy in such action--Fatah is currently the ruling party of the PA, but has no control over Gaza because Hamas drove them out militarily--thus, Hamas' control of Gaza can be considered illegitimate and tyrannical. Israel is probably the most effective (if not the most politically attractive) force that could restore Fatah power over Gaza.

This new, tougher stance may win back some of the Israeli moderates that jumped the Kadima ship to Likud. But we'll have to wait a few weeks for the pundits to talk and the polls to come in before we can know.